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Special Issue on Performance Modeling and Evaluation of Computer and 
Telecommunication Systems 
 
Guest Editorial 
 
This special issue of the Journal of Networks on “Performance Modeling and Evaluation of Computer and 
Telecommunication Systems” includes extended versions of selected best papers accepted and presented at the 2010 
International Symposium on Performance Evaluation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems (SPECTS 2009). 
Six papers were selected based on their excellent review scores. Their authors were invited to submit extended versions 
which have undergone a second review process. This selection addresses a variety of topics related to the Performance 
Modeling and Evaluation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems. 
The first paper “Software Performance Modeling using the UML: a Case Study”, by Issa Traore, Isaac Woungang, 
Ahmed Awad El Sayed Ahmed and Mohammad S. Obaidat, describes the design of annotated UML (Unified Modeling 
Language) performance models for the performance analysis of distributed software systems, based on the UML profile 
for Schedulability, Performance and Time. An approach previously proposed by the same authors, named Model-
Driven SPE (MDSPE), is used. An outline of system performance models and metrics is provided and a case study of a 
business system is used to validate the stated goal. 
The second paper is “User-centric Mobility for Multimedia Communications: Experience and Evaluation from a Live 
Demo”, authored by Raffaele Bolla, Riccardo Rapuzzi and Matteo Repetto. Session migration, a key issue in pervasive 
communications, is evaluated with a user-centric vision. Users’ feelings are evaluated with a user-centric networking 
mobility framework based on the concept of Personal Address. The user evaluation is carried out by a live demo open to 
a large heterogeneity of potential users at a national science exhibition, through written questionnaires and direct 
interviews, with the support of a psychologist skilled in this field. General indications for the whole research 
community about user’s expectations and requirements for session migration are presented. 
In the third paper, “Tracking Per-Flow State – Binned Duration Flow Tracking”, authored by Brad Whitehead, 
Chung-Horng Lung and Peter Rabinovitch, the issue of network monitoring is addressed. A time efficient novel method 
– Binned Duration Flow Tracking (BDFT) – of tracking per-flow state by grouping valid flows into “bins” is presented. 
BDFT is intended for high-speed routers where CPU time is crucial. BDFT is time and space efficient thanks to the use 
of counting Bloom filters as the data structure that represents the bins. Simulation results show that BDFT can achieve 
over 99% accuracy on traces of real network traffic. 
The fourth paper, “Impact of Retransmission Mechanism on SIP Overload: Stability Condition and Overload 
Control”, is authored by Yang Hong, Changcheng Huang and James Yan. A discrete time fluid model is created to 
study the impact of retransmission mechanism on SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) overload. The authors also derive a 
sufficient stability condition that a SIP server can handle the overload effectively under the retransmission mechanism. 
Simulation results are presented using both a fluid-based Matlab simulation and an event-driven OPNET simulation. A 
simple overload control solution is also proposed to mitigate the overload by reducing the retransmission rate only, 
while keeping the original message rate unchanged. 
Finally, the fifth paper is entitled “Improving the Resilience of Transport Networks to Large-scale Failures”, by Juan 
Segovia, Pere Vilà, Eusebi Calle and Jose L. Marzo. Two heuristic-based link prioritization strategies for improving 
network resilience are proposed, which are evaluated through simulation on a large synthetic topology that represents a 
GMPLS-based transport network. In the studied scenario, several links of the GMPLS-based network fail concurrently 
in random locations, provoking the loss of all the end-to-end connections. The aim is to identify elements (e.g., links) to 
which extra network protection can be applied so that the impact of such failure events, in terms of the number of 
connections affected, is minimized. Results show that the two proposed strategies succeed in decreasing the number of 
affected connections. 
The guest editors would like to thank all the authors and reviewers for their valuable contributions to this special 
issue. We hope that the papers selected in this special issue will become useful resources for researchers and 
practitioners in the area of Performance Modeling and Evaluation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems. 
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Abstract1 —The performance analysis of distributed 
software systems is a challenging task in which the 
assessment of performance measures is a vital step. Due to 
its versatility, the concept of software performance 
engineering (SPE) has been advocated as a promising 
solution towards realizing that step. This paper illustrates 
how by using our recently proposed Model-Driven SPE 
(MDSPE) approach, one can design annotated UML 
performance models for the performance analysis of 
distributed software systems, based on the UML profile for 
Schedulability, Performance and Time. An outline of system 
performance models and metrics is provided and a case 
study of a business system is used to validate the stated goal.  
 
Index Terms —Software performance engineering process; 
UML profile for schedulability, performance and time; 
distributed software systems.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
    In the design of complex distributed software systems, 
analyzing the software performance requirements is a 
mandatory step towards evaluating alternative designs 
that would produce the best effort architecture – i.e. an 
architecture that meets the quality of service (QoS) 
requirements and cost constraints. This step can be 
achieved by designing suitable performance models that 
can be used to identify the performance critical scenarios 
                                                 
1 An abridged version of this paper (referenced here as [1]) has been 
published as follows: I. Traore, I. Woungang, A. A. E. Ahmed, and M. 
S. Obaidat, " UML-Based Performance Modeling of Distributed 
Software Systems”, Proc. of  IEEE International Symposium on 
Performance Evaluation of Computer Telecommunication Systems 
(SPECTS 2010), July 11-13, Ottawa, Canada, pp. 119-126, 2010. 
and associated requirements, thereby, allowing for the 
prioritization and achievability of different performance 
goals, and their impact on the design.  
   Several performance modeling approaches have been 
proposed in the literature, including simulation-based 
approaches [1, 2], model-based approaches, particularly 
UML-based approaches [4, 5, 6, 7], to name a few. 
Ideally, prior to computing and evaluating performance 
measures, performance requirements should be captured 
and expressed in the software architecture design. That 
way, performance concerns can be assessed along with 
other important software quality attributes such as 
security, reliability, and maintainability. 
   This paper argues that the UML Profile for 
Schedulability, Performance, and Time [8] introduced a 
few years ago provides an important ground toward 
achieving this goal.  We describe the application of our 
recently proposed Model-Driven SPE (MDSPE) 
methodology [1] based on UML diagrams with 
annotations taken from the above-mentioned profile. We 
provide background information on basic performance 
modeling concepts and metrics and then present a case 
study illustrating the application of the above-mentioned 
profile in expressing performance concerns during the 
software architecture design phase.  
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, few representative works on software 
performance modeling using UML concepts are 
discussed and contrasted. In Section 3, we introduce our 
novel MDSPE process. In Section 4, we provide an 
outline of the performance modeling concepts and 
metrics. In Section 5, we describe the main components 
of the above-mentioned UML profile that deal 
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specifically with performance modeling, along with the 
semantics of the performance values - i.e. a description of 
how these values can be interpreted as UML tagged 
values. In Section 6, a case study of a distributed software 
system is presented. In Section 7, performance testing 
concepts are presented and experimented using the 
above-mentioned case study. Finally, in Section 8, we 
present some concluding remarks.  
 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
In the recent years, software performance 
engineering (SPE) has been advocated as both a method 
and tool that can be used for the evaluation of 
performance estimates of software systems in the early 
stage of the software life cycle. In this regards, the 
election of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [10] 
as the standard reference notation to describe the 
operations of software systems and their performance 
requirements, has allowed the emergence of several 
approaches where UML is considered as design language 
for the SPE process. Few of these works that inspired the 
topic presented in this paper are summarized in the 
following.  
In [11] Street et al. focused on the use of UML 
profile for Schedulability Performance, and Time (SPT) 
in conjunction with coloured Petri nets and statistical 
simulations for analyzing the performance modeling of 
object-oriented software systems, by highlighting few 
lessons learned from this experience. The main 
highlighted advantage is that UML SPT profile 
significantly outperforms other known techniques due to 
its small learning curve since it can be applied directly to 
existing UML 1.4 models; however, the practical 
application of SPT is limited because there are less tools 
and techniques available for modeling using the SPT 
profile.  
As a follow up, a recent paper by Garousi [12] 
introduced a UML-based method where control flows in 
sequence diagrams and interaction overview diagrams are 
analyzed to produce performance bottlenecks in 
concurrent real-time software.  
Similarly, in [13], Cortellessa et al. investigated the 
open problem of formalizing anti-patterns and detecting 
them automatically in design models. A UML-driven 
approach using Object Constraint Language (OCL) 
engine [14] is proposed as a solution and validated using 
a case study in UML annotated with the MARTE profile.  
In [15], Abdullatif et al. proposed a UML-JML based 
tool that can be used for studying the expected 
performance characteristics of an architectural design. 
Following the same trend, Distefano et al. [16] introduced 
a technique to identify and define rules and guidelines for 
specifying UML-ArgoPerformance compliant models, 
which can be used for implementing the SPE 
development process.  
In [17], a declarative method for modeling the 
performance impact of container middleware to 
component-based systems is proposed, which is based on 
UML activity diagram with UML SPT annotations. Using 
this approach, the performance impacting factors can 
automatically be mapped into application UML model. 
With regards to component-based software systems, a 
state-of-art review of approaches that target performance 
predictions during design time for these systems modeled 
with UML is given in [18].  
Similarly, Bernardi et al. [19] investigated SPE 
approaches that deal with using UML diagrams for 
specifying the functional and performance requirements 
of a system. They proposed a method that combines 
UML and Petri Nets to achieve this same goal.  
In [20], an initial UML-based approach to SPE using 
stress testing is proposed, which can help developers 
cope with performance related real-time faults in UML-
driven developments. To achieve this same goal, but 
using simulation, Marzolla [21] proposed a technique for 
translating the UML software specifications into 
simulation models, thereby defining a set of annotation of 
UML specifications that can be used to add quantitative 
performance-oriented information using a UML SPT 
profile.  
In [22], the above same goal was achieved by 
designing UML-driven performance models based on 
multi-chain and multiclass queuing networks. In this 
case, the UML model was annotated according to the 
UML SPT profile, and the technique consisted in 
translating the annotated UML specification into QN 
performance models; then analyzed these models using 
standard solution methods.  
Similar to few of the above-mentioned related works, 
the UML-based performance model described in this 
paper targets primarily an effective integration between 
functional analysis and performance analysis activities. 
Its design follows the architecture proposed by OMG [8] 
in the UML Profile for Schedulability, Performance and 
Time Specification. This model is also relatively easy to 
construct and evaluate with the performance modeling 
tools available today. 
 
III. PROPOSED MSDPE PROCESS 
 
Software Performance Engineering (SPE) is a process 
through which performance concerns are taken into 
account when applying the traditional software 
engineering activities [2, 3]. In [1], we have proposed a 
model-driven SPE process referred to as MDSPE 
process), which consists of deriving the performance 
models from the UML specifications, annotated 
according to the Object Management Group (OMG) 
profile for schedulability and performance [8]. The 
operational aspects of this MDSPE process integrate 
functional analysis activities and performance analysis 
ones as shown in Fig. 1. A detailed description of these 
aspects can be found in [1]. The part of this process that 
deals with performance modeling and analysis is 
represented by the Prediction step, right after the design 
step (as shown in Figure 1). It consists of Performance 
Annotation and Performance Analysis steps.  
Assuming that the performance measures are known, 
the Performance Annotation step (also referred to as 
performance modeling step) consists of using the above-
mentioned UML profile to encapsulate the performance 
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characteristics of the hardware and networking 
infrastructure, as well as the QoS requirements of specific 
functions, into the software architecture derived from the 
design step. The result is an annotated model for 
performance.  
The Performance Analysis step consists of submitting 
the obtained annotated model to a performance analyzer 
in order to compute the performance metrics, thereby 
predict the software performance. Using these 
predictions, alternative designs can be evaluated in order 
to decide the one that is best suited for the 
implementation step. The rest of this paper will focus on 
the Performance Annotation step.  
 
 
Figure 1: MDSPE process. 
IV. BACKGROUND ON PERFORMANCE MODELING 
 
In this section, we provide an outline of basic 
performance concepts, models, and metrics, which are 
essential elements of any performance modeling and 
analysis undertaking. 
 
A. Performance Parameters 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Workload arrival and completion. 
 
Figure 2 depicts a simplified view of a computing 
system or device. The system is submitted to some 
workloads arriving at a given rate. The workloads are 
processed and then leave the system at certain rate. In 
order to study performance and scalability of a computing 
system, we are interested in measuring directly or 
indirectly the workload arrival and completion rates, as 
well as the delay between the arrival and completion for a 
given workload. The completion rate corresponds to the 
throughput and the delay corresponds to the response 
time. We also need to understand the internal of the 
system. This is characterized by resource utilizations and 
service demands. Basic performance characteristics that 
need to be captured and expressed during performance 
analysis include the notions of workload, throughput, 
utilization, service demand, and response time. We 
provide a brief definition for each these notions as 
follows. 
 
• Workload: Represents an amount or type of job 
submitted to a system for processing. Examples of 
workloads include interactive user request, batch 
jobs, SQL requests, request from client workstation 
to server machines etc. Workloads received by a web 
site may include for instance “select”, “order”, 
“search” for respectively item selection, placing an 
order or searching an item. A workload is 
characterized by its type, size, and frequency. 
Workload frequency also called workload intensity 
or workload arrival rate is measured in terms of 
number of requests received per time unit (e.g. 
req/sec, req/hour, req/day etc.). Workload size can be 
measured in terms of bits, bytes etc. Workloads of 
the same size or of the same statistical characteristics 
can be grouped into the same class, and treated for 
performance analysis purpose as a single workload. 
System or 
device 
Transaction 
Arrival 
Transaction 
Completed 
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There are two categories of workloads: open or 
closed. An open workload is a sequence of requests 
arriving with a known pattern or distribution such as 
Poisson for instance. A closed workload is 
characterized by a fixed number of requests or jobs 
or potential users. Another parameter of a closed 
workload is the think time, which is the elapsed time 
between the end of one response and the next 
request. 
 
• Throughput: Gives a measure of the amount of work 
processed or completed per time unit. For instance, 
the throughput of a database server corresponds to 
the number of database requests processed by the 
server per time unit. Common throughput 
measurement units include transaction per second 
(tps), hits per second (hits/sec) etc. 
 
• Utilization: The utilization of a given resource (e.g. 
CPU, Disk, memory, network) gives a measure of 
the level of use of this resource in percentage. A 
resource is either busy (0%<U≤100%) or idle 
(U=0%). The maximum possible utilization for a 
resource is 100%. 
 
• Service Demand: The service demand of a resource 
for a given request type corresponds to the time used 
by the resource to process an instance of this request. 
It can be measured in seconds, milliseconds etc. The 
service demand is function of the resource service 
time and of the number of visits to the resource 
needed to process the request. The service time is 
specific to the resource and measure the time used to 
execute an elementary job unit. For instance, for a 
processor the elementary job unit corresponds to one 
instruction. So the service time corresponds in this 
case to the time used by the processor to execute one 
instruction. The number of visits required to process 
a given request will correspond to the number of 
instructions involved in this request. For a disk, the 
elementary job unit corresponds to a single 
input/output. Hence the service demand of a request 
can be calculated using the following formula: D = 
V×S, where V and S are respectively the number of 
visits corresponding to the request and the service 
time of the resource. 
 
• Response Time: Correspond to the time or delay 
between the submission of a request and its 
completion. The response time can be measured in 
milliseconds, seconds, hours etc.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Client-Server Interaction 
The notion of response time can be viewed from two 
different perspectives in client-server applications: end 
user response time and server response time. The server 
response time captures the duration between the instant 
when a request arrives at the server until the request 
processing is completed and the response is ready to be 
sent back. In that case only the server is taken into 
account in the measurement effort. End user response 
time captures the duration between the instant from 
which the request is issued at the client workstation until 
the result appears on the user’s screen. The system’s 
components involved in this scheme include the user’s 
workstation, and the servers accessed from that 
workstation and the network segments linking them. The 
end user response time, in client-server application, can 
be broken down into the network (service) time and the 
server time as shown by Figure 3. The network time 
corresponds to the time needed by the network to transmit 
the request to the server and send back the reply to the 
client. The delay between the time a request is submitted 
and the start of the response is the reaction time. The 
think time is the average time between two consecutive 
requests submitted by a client. 
 
B. Performance Models and Metrics 
 
Performance models come in two flavors: system-level 
models and component-level models. System-level 
models view the system as a black box while component-
level models consider explicitly the resources involved 
[2], [5]. Choosing either models depend mostly on the 
availability of detailed information about the system 
parameters. Component level models are based on 
queuing theory. Each resource is represented as a queue. 
The interconnection of the different queues involved in 
the system gives a queuing network model (QNM). 
Several assumptions are made in the definition of 
performance models. Some of these assumptions include 
the following: 
 
• Infinite versus finite population assumption: an 
infinite population model assumes that the user 
population size is unknown, and as such it may 
be considered infinite. In contrast, a finite 
population model assumes that the user 
population is known in advance. 
• Infinite versus finite queue assumption: an 
infinite queue model assumes that all arriving 
requests at the queue will eventually be 
processed, i.e., no request is refused. In contrast, 
a finite queue model assumes that there is a 
maximum limit on the queue size, i.e., any 
request that arrives on top of this limit is rejected. 
• Operational equilibrium assumption: the number 
of requests present in the system at the start of an 
appropriate observation period should be the 
same as that at the end of the period, even though 
the number may vary in between. 
• Single-class (also called homogeneous) 
assumption: workload units with the same 
Response time: request + reply 
Network time Server time
Think time 
Client Server 
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statistical characteristics can be combined into a 
single class and analyzed as a single workload.  
 
 
Real-life systems typically involve several classes of 
requests, so they can be studied using multi-class models. 
Moreover, single-class models are particular cases of 
multi-class models.  
Multi-class models allow the prediction of 
performance for systems involving different workloads or 
different classes of workloads. A separate class represents 
each unit of work. Assume that we have m queues and n 
classes. Given a workload i (1≤ i ≤ n) and a queue j (1≤ j 
≤ m), the utilization of resource j created by workload i is 
given by: 
 
Uij = λi Dij 

where λi and Dij stand for the workload intensity for class 
i and the service demand of workload i at resource j, 
respectively. 
 
The total utilization Uj of resource j is computed as the 
sum of all the utilizations created by the different 
workloads as follows: 
 
∑
=
=
n
i
ijj UU
1
 
 
 The residence time Rij for workload i at resource j is 
defined as follows: 
 
j
ij
ij U
D
R −= 1  
 
The response time Ri of workload i is computed as the 
sum of the residence times over all the resources: 
 
∑
=
=
m
i
iji RR
1
 
 
In the above formulas, n and m denote the total number 
of workload classes and the total number of resources 
respectively. 
 
V. UML-BASED PERFORMANCE MODELING 
 
The UML Profile for Schedulability, Performance, and 
Time [8] is a section of the UML standard, which 
supports the specification of performance and real-time 
requirements, via the following activities: 
 
• Performance requirements capture. 
• Integration of the performance requirements in 
(functional) UML models. 
• Specification of execution parameters used by 
performance analysis tools to evaluate and 
predict performance measures. 
• Communicate performance measures generated 
by the performance tools. 
 
The produced specification can be submitted to 
existing performance analysis tool for performance 
evaluation activities. The main interest in defining 
performance parameters in baseline UML models is to 
establish a direct link between performance analysis and 
baseline model improvement. Performance issues 
identified during the performance analysis step, such as 
bottlenecks, can be traced back directly to the baseline 
model, which can be revised and improved accordingly. 
This process can continue iteratively until a satisfactory 
baseline model fulfilling all the QoS requirements is 
obtained. In the sequel, we describe the components of 
the above-mentioned UML profile that deal specifically 
with performance modeling. 
 
A. Modeling Concepts  
System analysis and design may proceed typically by 
identifying and implementing the different scenarios that 
characterize the operation of the system. Performance 
analysis activities can also be built around the same 
concept. Performance modeling in UML is carried around 
the concept of scenario. Performance relevant scenarios 
identified during the functional analysis step (see Figures 
1) serve as building blocks for the UML performance 
modeling. During functional analysis, scenarios are 
represented using UML collaboration or activity 
diagrams. The performance modeling task simply 
consists of annotating these diagrams by specifying the 
values of relevant basic performance parameters. Key 
performance concepts in UML include the notions of 
performance context, scenarios, and scenarios steps. We 
define these concepts as follows. 
 
Performance Context: The highest-level performance 
concept in UML is the notion of performance context. A 
performance context can be defined as a collection of 
scenarios, which are used to describe specific dynamic 
situations involving specified resources. For instance, a 
performance context can be defined for system usage 
under particular loads such as peak loads. Performance 
modeling starts by identifying performance contexts, and 
by associating scenarios with each context. A 
performance context is characterized by a set of 
resources, a set of scenarios, a set of workloads applied to 
the scenarios in this context, and some quality of service 
(QoS) requirements.  
 
Scenarios: Scenarios represent externally visible 
response paths characterized by response times and 
throughputs. In UML, a scenario is defined within a 
performance context. QoS requirements are associated to 
scenarios. Each scenario is characterized by a workload, 
also called job class or user class, which is applied with 
some workload intensity. A workload can be either open 
(open workload) or closed (closed workload).  
 
Scenario Steps: Scenarios are basic execution 
sequences during the lifetime of the system. Those 
execution steps are called scenario steps. A step 
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represents an increment in the execution of a scenario. A 
scenario step may correspond to an activity, an 
elementary operation, or a sub-scenario. The first step of 
a scenario is called the root step.  
 
Scenario steps are executed on host resources. A host 
resource is defined for a scenario only if all its sub-steps 
execute on the same host. A step is characterized by its 
host execution (service) demand. A scenario step is 
characterized by a mean execution count (i.e., mean 
number of times it is repeated during execution) and the 
host execution demand (i.e. the service demand created 
by the step on its host device). Resource demands may 
also be specified for sub-steps of the scenario step, and 
for external resource operations (e.g., disk I/O, CPU, etc). 
 
B. Notations and Definitions 
Scenarios are modeled in UML using collaboration or 
activity diagrams. Performance concepts can be captured 
using the same modeling paradigms. However, activity 
graphs are more appropriate for modeling complex 
hierarchical scenarios, which can be described by 
decomposing sub-activities into lower-level activity 
graphs. The UML performance profile defines a set of 
standard stereotypes that can be used to express 
performance concepts and annotate UML models 
accordingly. The stereotypes are the same regardless of 
whether we are using activity or collaboration diagrams. 
However, there are some modeling exceptions that are 
specific to activity diagrams.  
 
Now, we present an overview of common stereotypes and 
briefly discuss the specifics for activity modeling. The 
annotation of a collaboration or activity diagram involves 
the specification of the performance context, the scenario, 
and scenario steps.  
 
Performance Context and Scenario: A performance 
context is modeled as a stereotype <<PAcontext>> of a 
UML collaboration or activity diagram. The stereotype is 
placed on top of the diagram.  
 
A scenario maps to an interaction. It is explicitly 
represented by its first step also called root step, to which 
corresponding performance characteristics are associated 
as a UML note. The note may include performance 
characteristics such as workload type (open or closed), 
workload intensity, population size, and think time (in 
case of closed workload). 
 
Steps and Performance Steps: A step corresponds to an 
execution of some action. A step is defined by associating 
a step stereotype <<PAstep>> with an action execution 
model element or with a message causing the action 
execution. The root step may optionally be associated 
with a stereotype describing the workload class: 
<<PAopenLoad>> for an open workload or 
<<PAclosedLoad>> for a closed workload. 
  
Performance steps can be defined for all execution 
steps in the scenario. However, in order to avoid clutters, 
it is recommended to define them explicitly only for a 
limited number of steps, which carry useful or significant 
performance information that can be specified along with 
the step. Performance information includes performance 
characteristics such as response time, throughput 
requirements, service demands, etc.  
 
Processing and Passive Resources: Processing 
resources can be specified separately in a deployment 
diagram by using the <<deploys>> relationships, and by 
showing which processor resource runs specific classifier 
role or instance. Processing resources can be shown in a 
collaboration diagram in the rare case where each 
classifier role or instance executes on its own host. In that 
case, the classifier role or instance is associated with a 
stereotype <<PAhost>>. 
 
Passive resources can be defined by associating a 
stereotype <<PAresource>> to classifier roles or 
instances representing them. Associating one or several 
PAextOp tagged values with the steps using those 
resources may also represent them. 
 
C. Example 
 
To illustrate the above notions, let us consider the 
example of “a deposit scenario at an ATM cash 
machine”. 
Figure 4 shows an example of performance annotated 
sequence diagram specifying a deposit scenario at an 
ATM cash machine. The performance context is shown 
with the stereotype <<PAcontext>>. Scenarios and 
scenario steps are represented using UML tagged 
expressions. The meanings of these expressions will be 
provided later in this Section. The root step shows that a 
closed workload model is used for this scenario. 
Figure 5 shows an example of performance annotated 
deployment diagram for the cash machine example. The 
diagram shows the allocation of the objects involved in 
the scenario to the different nodes of the hardware 
infrastructure. The relationship between an object and 
associated node is stereotyped using keyword 
<<GRMdeploys>>. 
Figure 6 shows an activity diagram representation for a 
deposit scenario in the cash machine example. The swim 
lanes of the activity graph correspond to the resources or 
the object instances involved in the scenario. An activity 
graph can be used to model only one scenario per context. 
Sub-scenarios are represented by using sub-activities 
linked to an activity. Only the top most performance 
context can define a workload (e.g., <<PAopenLoad>> 
or <<PAclosedLoad>>).  
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Figure 4. Performance annotation for a deposit scenario at a cash machine - Sequence diagram. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Performance annotation for a deposit scenario at a cash machine - Deployment diagram. 
 
 
D. Performance Values 
 
For numerical results obtained from the performance 
analysis step to be meaningful, the meaning or 
interpretation of those results should also be provided. 
Numerical values are expressed as UML tagged values 
using the above mentioned performance stereotypes. 
These numerical results may correspond to some 
measures or some predictions, or some mean, average, 
maximum values, etc.  
Performance values can be expressed in UML in a 
meaningful way by using the following template: 
<performance-value> ::= <source-modifier><type-
modifier><time-value>    
    A performance value can also be expressed in a UML 
note as an array in the following format: 
 
     “(“<source-modifier>”,” <type-modifier>”,” <time-value>”)” 
 
where:  
- <source-modifier> specifies whether the value 
is required, assumed, predicted, or measured. 
<source-modifier> ::= ‘req’|’assm’|’pred’|’msr’ 
- <type-modifier> specifies whether the value is 
average, variance, kth moment, maximum, kth 
percentile, or probability distribution.  
<type-modifier>::= ‘mean’|’sigma’|’kth-
mom,<Integer>’|’max’|’percentile,” <real>|’dist” 
- <time-value> corresponds to the actual 
performance value. 
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                                   Figure 6. Performance annotation for a deposit scenario at a cash machine - Activity diagram. 
Table 1: Examples of performance modeling stereotypes and 
tagged expressions [1]. 
 
Stereotypes Tags Notes 
<<PAcontext>>   
<<PAclosedLoad>> PArespTime 
PApopulation 
PAextDelay 
PApopulation 
corresponds to  
the user population; 
PAextDelay  
corresponds to the 
think time  
<<PAopenLoad>> PArespTime 
PAoccurence 
PAoccurence 
corresponds to the 
workload intensity. 
<<PAhost>> PAutilization 
Pathroughput 
Expresses the 
utilization and 
throughput 
<<PAresource>> PAutilization 
PAcapacity 
PArespTime 
PAthroughput 
PAcapacity expresses 
the resource capacity 
<<PAstep>> PAdemand 
PArespTime 
PAprob 
PArep 
PAdelay 
PAextOp 
Painterval 
PAdemand expresses 
the service demand; 
PAprob expresses the 
probability of 
execution 
for the step; PArep 
expresses the 
repetition of the  
Step; PAextOp 
identifies an external 
operation. 
 
For instance, the tagged value expression 
{PArespTime=(‘req’,’max’,(5,’s’))} represents a 
maximum response time requirement of 5 seconds in a 
scenario or scenario step. The tagged value expression 
{PAdemand=(‘msr’,’mean’,(23,’ms’))} represents a 
measured mean service demand of 23 milliseconds for a 
given scenario step. It should be noticed that the 
parenthesis around the time value can be removed 
without changing the semantic of the expression. Hence, 
{PAdemand=(‘msr’,’mean’,(23,’ms’))} is equivalent to 
{PAdemand=(‘msr’,’mean’,23,’ms’)}. 
 
The above expressions can be used to describe 
multiple or complex values for a single performance 
characteristic. For instance, the tagged value expression 
{PApopulation=1000, 
PAextDelay=(‘est’,’assm’,10,’min’)} represents a 
scenario in which the maximum number of concurrent 
users in the system is limited to 1000, and the average 
think time is assumed to be 10 minutes.  
 
Table 1 gives a list of commonly used stereotypes and 
tagged expressions. The reader is referred to paper [8] for 
a more complete list of available tags. 
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VI. CASE STUDY 
To illustrate the concepts introduced above, we present 
in this section a case study based on the performance 
requirements of a reservation system for a hotel chain. 
 
A. Performance Requirements 
 
A major hotel chain is replacing its old reservation 
system by a new Web-based system. Customers can 
search for rooms that match their preferences by filling a 
form, in which they specify the following information: 
bed size, smoking or non-smoking preference, start and 
end dates of stay, and city where the hotel is located. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: System architecture for the Hotel Reservation System. 
 
After submitting the search request, the system checks 
the room availability and returns either a match and daily 
price or a non-match. In the case where a room is 
available, the customer can confirm the booking by 
providing his personal information (i.e., name, address, 
phone number, and email) and his credit card information 
(i.e., type, number, and expiration date) for billing 
purposes. After booking the room and storing the 
customer’s information, the system returns a confirmation 
number to the customer that the customer will use for 
check-in. A customer can cancel a reservation by simply 
specifying the reservation number. In this case, he/she 
must receive a cancellation notice. In order to ensure 
customer satisfaction, the company requires that the 
average response times for checking room availability 
and confirming a reservation should always be less than 7 
seconds. No particular restriction is put on the reservation 
cancellation. 
 
After monitoring the system during a peak period of 4 
hours, the following measurements were taken: (i) 
120,000 search requests were processed by the system, 
(ii) 30% of these requests resulted in actual reservations, 
(iii) 5,000 reservation cancellation requests were 
processed. 
 
Figure 7 represents the information technology 
infrastructure on which the system is deployed. It consists 
of two identical Web servers, one application server, and 
a powerful database server. The network architecture 
involves two 100 Mbps Ethernet LANs named LAN1 and 
LAN2. LAN1 is connected to the Internet via a firewall, 
and contains two Web servers. LAN2 is connected to 
LAN1 via a firewall and contains the database and 
application servers. All servers use Microsoft NT as 
operating systems. The web server runs IBM WebSphere 
as HTTP server. The application server runs IBM 
Application Server, and the database server runs IBM 
DB2 for database management. Using appropriate 
measurements tools (e.g., LAN analyzer, NT 
performance monitor, Web Server Logs, etc.) the service 
demands at network segments, the processors and disks 
of the Web servers, the applications servers, and the 
database servers are computed. Tables 2 and 3 provide 
these values. 
 
 
Table 2: Service demands (in msec) for the Hotel Reservation System.  
 
 Search Room Confirm 
Reservation 
Cancel Reservation 
CPU I/O CPU I/O CPU I/O 
Web servers 
 
Application server 
 
Database server  
8.5 
 
18.0 
 
19.7 
12.5 
 
15.1 
 
88.8 
8.1 
 
13.4 
 
17.5 
12.5 
 
12.5 
 
85.2 
3.1 
 
8.9 
 
35.5 
8.5 
 
17 
 
98.9 
 
Table 3. Network service demands (in msec) for the Hotel Reservation System.               
 Search Room Confirm Reservation Cancel Reservation 
LAN1 
 
LAN2 
0.81 
 
0.42 
0.22 
 
0.80 
0.11 
 
0.17 
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B. Functional Analysis  
 
Architecture analysis for the above software system 
involves conducting a functional analysis for the system 
and identifying major use cases and scenarios. 
Quantitative performance characteristics such as 
workload intensity for corresponding scenarios can then 
be computed. Using the computed performance measures, 
an annotated software architecture model can be derived 
based on the UML profile for performance and 
schedulability. 
A complete use case analysis of the system reveals the 
main functionalities carried by the system. The brief 
requirements provided in the previous section 
characterize mainly a room reservation use case, which 
involves three scenarios, namely room search, 
reservation confirmation and reservation cancellation. In 
order to illustrate the introduced concepts, we will 
analyze the two first scenarios. In the UML notation, 
scenarios are modeled using either interaction or activity 
diagrams. In order to illustrate both approaches, we 
describe the room search scenario using a sequence 
diagram and the reservation confirmation using an 
activity diagram. This allows us to illustrate how 
performance annotations can be carried in each of these 
notations. 
      The sequence diagram characterizing the room search 
scenario is shown in Figure 8. Using a Web browser, the 
customer first fills a form by specifying his/her 
preferences and then submits a search request. The Web 
server receives and forwards the search request to the 
application server, which delegates the search to a 
Reservation Manager object. The Reservation Manager 
then checks for a room availability at an appropriate hotel 
by searching the database. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Sequence diagram of the Reservation System - Room search scenario. 
    Figure 9 depicts a hierarchical activity diagram 
representation of the Reservation Confirmation scenario 
(here, only one representation is needed, either the 
sequence diagram or the activity diagram). 
A request to book one of the rooms returned after the 
room search is submitted by the customer through the 
Web browser. A customer information form is then 
created. After filling and submitting the customer form, 
the Web server transmits the booking request to the 
Reservation Manager, which processes and returns the 
result to the customer. The result can be either a 
successful booking with a confirmation number or an 
unsuccessful booking.  
The sub-activity diagram shown in Figure 10 further 
details the processing performed by the Reservation 
Manager. This diagram is a refinement of the sub-activity 
entitled “handle booking” in Figure 9. 
In the sub-activity diagram shown in Figure 10, the 
reservation manager initiates the booking process by 
creating or updating the customer’s personal information 
collected from the information form initially submitted 
with the request. Then, the effective booking takes place 
by finding the requested hotel with an available matching 
room. The room is booked and a reservation record with a 
number is issued and a confirmation is sent back to the 
customer. In the case where no room is available, a 
message is sent back to the customer. 
Figure 11 shows the deployment of the objects 
involved in the reservation system across the underlying 
hardware and networking infrastructure. The Web 
browser is deployed on the client’s workstation. The Web 
server machine deploys the Web server program, and the 
customer and room forms (objects), which may be 
implemented, for instance, using JSP or ASP 
technologies. The application server program and the 
Reservation Manager object are deployed on the 
application server node. The Database Manager is 
deployed on the database server node. The database 
server node deploys also the data tables, which are not 
represented in Figure 11 to avoid clutter. Instead, data 
tables are represented in Figure 12. 
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Figure 9: Activity diagram for the Reservation System - Reservation confirmation scenario. 
 
 
Figure 10: Activity diagram for the Reservation System -“Handle Booking” sub-activity. 
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Figure 11. Deployment of the logical elements on the hardware infrastructure for the Reservation System. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Data Model for the Reservation System. 
Figure 12 describes the data model, which is quite 
simple. A hotel is supposed to contain at least one room. 
A reservation is linked to exactly one room and is issued 
in the name of a single customer, even though the room 
may host several persons. A customer is required to 
provide at least one credit card. A hotel is described by 
specifying a unique identifier, the city where it is located 
(we assume that the hotel is named after the city), its 
address, and the set of available rooms. A room is 
described by specifying a unique number, the bed size 
(double, single, etc), whether the room is for smoking or 
non-smoking customer, the room’s price and status 
(available or non-available). A reservation is described by 
providing a unique confirmation number, the start date, 
the end date and the corresponding room number. The 
customer data include its name, address, phone number, 
email and credit card information. The credit card 
information includes the type (e.g., visa, master card, 
etc), the number, and the expiration date. 
C. Performance Measures  
Measurements taken during a peak period of 4 hours 
showed that 120,000 search requests were processed by 
the system, and 30% of these requests resulted in actual 
reservations. Also, 5000 reservation cancellation requests 
were processed. Thus, the workload arrival rates for these 
transactions can be calculated as follows: 
 
req/sec
timemonitoring
requestsincomingofnumber
8.33
36004
120000
searchλ
λ
=×=
=
  req/seccancel
req/secconfirm
347.0
36004
5000
5.2
36004
3.0120000
=×=
=×
×=
λ
λ
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D. Annotated UML Model  
Performance requirements and measures for the hotel 
reservation software system are shown in annotated 
models using standard UML stereotypes and tagged 
expressions. We assume open workload in this case.  
 
 
Figure 13. Sequence diagram of the Reservation System – Room search scenario. 
 
Figure 14. Annotated activity diagram for the Reservation System- Reservation confirmation scenario. 
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Figure 15. Annotated activity diagram for the Reservation System-“Handle Booking” sub-activity 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Annotated deployment diagram for the Reservation System. 
 
The annotated diagram for the sequence diagram is 
shown in Figure 13. Similar diagrams for the activity 
graphs are shown in Figures 14 and 15.  
For instance, in Figure 13, the first note (see upper 
corner left side of Figure 13) indicates that the scenario is 
represented as an open workload model, in which the 
mean workload arrival rate is measured as 8.33 req/sec. 
The symbol “msr” indicates that the corresponding values 
are also measured.  
The second note specifies that response time for search 
transactions should be no more than 7 seconds. Service 
demands are specified in appropriate steps as well. For 
instance, the second note specifies mean service demands 
of 8.5 msec at the CPU and 12.5 msec at the disk in the 
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Web Server node. An annotated diagram is also given in 
Figure 16 for the deployment diagram. The annotation 
includes the nodes’ relevant performance characteristics 
such as utilization, scheduling policy, etc. For instance, 
utilizations are computed using some performance 
models and tools. 
 
VII. PERFORMANCE TESTING 
 
Performance testing can be conducted by evaluating 
the system against some published benchmarks or by 
using testing environments. Benchmarks provide a 
synthetic environment that mimics the real environment 
in which the system may be deployed [23, 24]. On the 
other hand, testing tools are used to simulate realistic 
workloads using load generators and usage scenarios, by 
generating scripts. Executing the scripts allows one to test 
the system response under specific workloads. 
   Performance testing consists of evaluating the system 
performance using realistic workloads and under 
particular usage scenarios. Possible workloads include 
steady-state workloads and peak-usage workload. 
According to the load used, three kinds of performance 
testing may be conducted: 
1. Load testing: to evaluate the system under 
specific workload. The system is submitted to 
various workloads representative of real or 
projected usage scenarios. 
2. Stress testing: which consists of testing the 
system under extreme workloads, heavier than 
what would be expected (i.e. worst-case 
scenarios). 
3. Spike testing: which consists of testing the 
system by simulating the potential load spikes 
(e.g.: heavy load for a short time length). 
Since most realistic systems are complex, it is more 
convenient and practical to automate the testing process. 
There is a variety of performance testing tools available 
on the market. Examples of tools include Rational 
Performance Tester [24] and Mercury Load Runner [25]. 
A typical performance tester consists of two basic 
elements: controller and virtual users (VU). VUs 
simulate the workload to which the system under test 
(SUT) is submitted to. As such, they play the role of real 
users. The controller, as the name indicates, controls the 
load generation process. A performance testing process 
involves several activities as illustrated in Figure 17.  
• Defining the test objectives: At the beginning of the 
test process, the goals of the testing must be clearly 
established. For instance, testing may be conducted 
to identify the maximum throughput that the system 
can achieve or to determine the number of concurrent 
users that the system can support under peak load 
with acceptable response time.  
• Analyzing the application workload and 
environment: This step consists of establishing a 
clear understanding of the workload under which the 
system is submitted to, as well as the services it 
provides, and the hardware and software 
environment in which it is running.  
 
 
 
Figure 17: Major Phases of the Performance Testing 
Process. 
 
• Defining the test plan: In this step, the test plan 
typically outlines the functions and services that are 
targeted by the testing process, the workload and 
usage scenarios, and the quality of service (QoS) 
requirements that should be met. The test plan must 
also include a schedule specifying in which order the 
services and functions will be tested, as well as the 
list of deliverables. 
 
• Setting up the test environment: This step involves 
initializing the persistent data, for instance, by 
populating the database and generating test scripts 
based on the different scenarios.  
 
• Running the test: This step consists of executing the 
developed test scripts. The same test must be 
executed several times in order to obtain statistically 
significant results.  
 
• Analyzing the results: At this step, the test results 
are collected and analyzed. For instance, by 
identifying bottlenecks and by taking proper actions 
to improve the performance of the system when 
necessary. This may lead to several iterations of 
some major phases of the testing process. 
 
A. Example  
 
      We consider the same Case Study introduced in 
Section 5. Assuming that the hotel reservation system can 
support up to a maximum of N =1500 concurrent users, 
we can determine, as explained in the following, the 
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number Nvu of concurrent virtual users (VUs) needed to 
stress test search transactions. 
      The maximum response time requirements set for 
search transactions is Rmax= 7 sec. During stress testing, a 
virtual user (VU) responds directly when it receives a 
request; thus the think time is Zvu = 0 sec. The goal of 
using virtual testers is to simulate the real environment so 
that the throughput and response time remain the same in 
both the real system and test environments. Thus, by 
applying the response time law in both cases, we obtain 
the following: 
 
    Therefore, the required number of VUs to stress test 
search transactions is Nvu = 191. The project manager or 
the test engineer should ensure that the licenses for the 
targeted performance testing tool can accommodate at 
least 191 concurrent VUs. 
Based on the maximum number of VUs, several runs 
of the test are conducted by increasing the number of 
VUs. During each run, performance measures such as 
response times and utilizations are collected. Repeating 
the test over several iterations allows one to obtain 
statistically significant measures. Statistically stable 
performance measures can be computed by averaging the 
measurement outputs over the different runs and by 
computing the corresponding confidence intervals. At the 
end of the test, the collected data can be analyzed in order 
to identify potential bottlenecks. The analysis consists of 
studying trends versus performance requirements, 
correlating and interpreting performance results. In the 
considered example, a typical trend is that increasing the 
number of VUs leads to an increase in response time. In 
principle, the utilization should increase as well. If the 
resource utilization levels off while the number of VUs is 
increasing, this means that the system has reached a 
bottleneck. Further analysis would then be required in 
order to identify this bottleneck. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Identifying and addressing quality concerns as early as 
possible in the software development cycle is a well-
established and accepted wisdom in the software 
community. Software performance is one most of the 
essential quality criteria for most of today business 
applications. In this paper, we have introduced a SPE 
process that assists in addressing performance concerns 
throughout the software development lifecycle. We have 
shown that by using the recently proposed UML Profile 
for Schedulability, Performance, and Time, our proposed 
model-driven SPE process can effectively deal with 
building annotated UML models for performance, which 
can thereby be used for the performance predictions of 
software systems. A case study illustrating our approach 
has been presented, along with the performance 
annotation steps. As future work, we intend to explore the 
implementation of the MDSPE process and its 
applications to case studies from the industry from a 
performance study viewpoint.  
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Abstract— Nowadays people claim and expect pervasive
communications, with continuous and seamless media ac-
cess; that requires new communication paradigms beyond
the legacy network- and device-centric approaches, and
leads to the user-centric concept.
Mobility is a key issue in pervasive communications, and
session migration is the most related aspect with the user-
centric vision; however, despite of the fact that the user
should be at the center of the system, no evidence of user
involvement in the design and evaluation phase can be found
in the literature for this topic.
In this paper we describe the user evaluation we carried
out by a live demo open to a large heterogeneity of potential
users at a national science exhibition. Our purpose was
twofold: on the one hand, to evaluate users’ feeling with
our user-centric networking mobility framework based on
the concept of Personal Address and, on the other hand,
to figure out general indications for the whole research
community about user’s expectations and requirements for
session migration.
Index Terms— Session migration, integrated mobility, user-
centric communication, personal address, user evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern communication paradigms have gone well
beyond the raw packet transport service for which the
Internet was originally designed. The latter has radically
evolved since its beginning; this change concerns the
nature and composition of the traffic but also – and mainly
– the way the Internet is perceived by users: today most
of the people expect to “interact” with the Internet, not
only to retrieve HTML pages or to transfer files.
This evolution has had a deep impact on the
masses, with significant social implications, yielding new
paradigms of communication in which users are at the
This paper is based on “User-Centric Mobility for Multimedia Com-
munication: Experience and Evaluation from a live demo” by R. Bolla,
R. Rapuzzi and M. Repetto, which appeared in the Proceedings of the
2010 International Symposium on Performance Evaluation of Computer
and Telecommunication Systems (SPECTS 2010), Ottawa, Canada, July
11-14.
center of the network. Nowadays people expect com-
munications to happen in a way that is more tailored
to humans instead of machines; the trend is to move
from legacy device- and network-centric approaches to
the user-centric paradigm. Roughly speaking, technology
should go towards users and adapt itself to them, unlikely
what has been happening until recently.
One of the key aspect in this evolution is transparent
and seamless access to network content and services
by users, regardless of their location and the terminal
device(s) they are using. That rises new expectations
about an effective and flexible mobility support in the
current Internet.
There has been an ever increasing interest in bringing
mobility into the Internet architecture during the last 20
years, which somehow resembles the evolution discussed
so far: initially, the effort was mainly devoted to make
devices mobile (terminal handover), whilst in the past
decade the focus was on session and service mobility
(session migration and service portability). The latter are
essential in order to build user-centric pervasive commu-
nication environments; however, despite of the large num-
bers of algorithms and protocols for terminal handover,
few proposals are available for session migration.
The main performance issue of mobility frameworks
concerns the “seamless” property, which demands for fast
and timely execution of the migration procedure. Usually,
an upper bound on the communication gap during the
handover procedure can be easily derived depending on
the application; for example, it is well known that a few
hundreds milliseconds of voice conversation can be lost
without significantly affecting the understanding of the
whole dialog, while for data traffic few seconds of delay
may be tolerated before muddling the TCP congestion
control up.
The above consideration is certainly true for terminal
handover, but things are more complicated in case of
session migration: the quality of service perceived by the
user depends not only on the media disruption but also
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on the current user behavior and context. Indeed, when
an active session is migrated from one terminal to another
one, depending on the relative position of the user and the
two devices the user may have to turn his head, to pick
up the new device or to move towards the new terminal
(if the two devices are not close each other); in all cases,
his behavior may hide in part or completely the transition
delay.
The main outcome from this reasoning is that session
migration should be evaluated both quantitatively (in
terms of migration delay) and qualitatively (in terms
of user satisfaction). Unfortunately, the latter aspect is
very often (if not always) neglected. Nevertheless, user
evaluation is crucial while developing user-centric sys-
tems, where the interaction between the user and the
device is as important as technological issues. Further,
quantitative measurements are almost impossible with
automatic session migration: it is not possible to say when
session migration should start and the time by which it
should be completed, as that would require to know where
the user is looking at and whether the devices could be
seen at the same time.
In this paper we discuss our experience with the eval-
uation of a user-centric mobility framework. Such frame-
work is built around the concept of Personal Address (PA)
[1], i.e., a network address logically associated to the user
rather than to a physical device; it accounts for personal
mobility, terminal handover and session migration.
We carried out user evaluation in a live demo at a
national science exhibition, by asking visitors to com-
pile a short questionnaire after they had tried the demo
themselves. We did not limit to gather feedback about our
framework, but we also asked more generic questions that
was used to figure out what users expect from a pervasive
system and how they are willing to interact with it. We
think our work may be a reference for whoever would
deal with mobility issues in user-centric systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
a brief overview about mobility, in particular for what
concerns session migration. Section III explains the PA
concept and the user-centric framework for mobility,
while Section IV discusses the current architectural so-
lution. Section V describes how the mobility framework
was used to build a Video and Voice over IP application
(VVoIP) for user evaluation and Section VI describes the
set up of the live demo. User evaluation is discussed
thoughtfully in Section VII and final remarks are given
in Section VIII. Finally, our conclusions are derived in
Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Applications establish communication sessions over the
network and maintain a status and a context for each of
them. The migration of an on-going session requires the
transfer of its status/context to another instance running on
a different host, therefore this kind of mobility always re-
quires support at the application layer. Some applications
have very complex status information and so migration is
not a trivial task; thus, this topic has not been considered
in the literature as much as terminal mobility [2], [3].
Session migration may be implemented by means of
specific middleware, working for all applications. The
Adaptive terminal Middleware (AMID) [4] provides an
architecture for network monitoring, device discovery and
session migration. The middleware scans for devices on
each network and makes decisions on the basis of resource
availability. The migration architecture requires the user
to have a mobile device with him: this device is supposed
to follow the user during his movements, it maintains the
current context and controls the session for the whole
duration; it can either redirect media from the source to
the new local device or act as a proxy to deliver media to
the current local device, without any update to the source.
This last scheme is useful when the new local device is
not addressable from the source, e.g., it lies on a local
network without a direct Internet connection.
The most recent paradigms for session migration aim
at maintaining the same IP address for the whole session
duration, VNAT [5] and DIP [6] first introduced this
concept. Both of them envision a sort of “loan” of the
original IP address coupled with a MIPv6 architecture;
the application and transport protocols at the new terminal
use the borrowed address, which is translated into a usable
real address through specific mechanisms.
Virtual Network Address Translation (VNAT) with
MIPv6 [5] relies on the network address translation (NAT)
function to map a virtual address (the first used for the
session) into a real one (that used at the current host) at
both the local and the remote peer.
Delegated IP (DIP) [6] exploits the Return Routability
of MIPv6 to redirect packets towards a target node. The
original host “delegates” the use of its Home Address to
the target node; DIP provides a DIP IP Adaptation Layer
(DIAL) and a DIP Transport Adaptation Layer (DTAL)
at the target node to receive packets addressed to a third-
party from the MIPv6 infrastructure and to deliver them
to a local socket.
VNAT and DIP share the risks of using the same
address at the transport layer of two different hosts. For
example, in VNAT the local host does not keep track
of session migrated elsewhere; port number conflicts are
possible at the corresponding host whether this latter tried
to set up another session before the previous were closed
[7] (this is quite likely, as each application usually uses
the same port numbers). On the other hand, in DIP the
corresponding host cannot reach the local host for the
whole duration of the migration because of a route update
towards the target node (see [6] for protocol details).
Other issues about VNAT and DIP concern their ap-
plicability limited to IPv6 networks. Moreover, VNAT
requires its framework to be present in the corresponding
node as well and does not manage the simultaneous
movement of the two endpoints. On the other hand, DIP
only permits one single migration per session; moreover
DIP violates the usual division in layers, as it requires
the network entities to inspect packets for higher-layer
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TABLE I.
CLASSIFICATION OF PROTOCOLS FOR SESSION MIGRATION
Protocol Layer Type Applicability Notes
AMID Application Middleware
Generic
Deals with network monitoring, device discovery and session
migration. The user must keep a device with him.
VNAT/MIPv6
Network/Application Address preserving
Two (or more) devices use the same address; port conflicts
are possible.
DIP Two (or more) devices use the same address; port conflicts
are possible. Only one migration is possible.
PA Cross-layer approach. The address is not shared among de-
vices. Requires at least one address per user.
3PCC
Application SIP extension SIP
The original device keeps the control of the session. Session
may be adapted to the capability of the new terminal.
SH Session may be adapted to the capability of the new terminal.
information (i.e., source and destination ports), and this
results in increasing the complexity of the solution.
The Personal Address (PA) [8] enriches the above
protocols by bringing the user-centric principles and
paradigms into the network as well, pursuing an approach
where users have the leading role. Users are the session
endpoints whilst devices only act as the physical termi-
nals. To this aim, users are assigned network addresses,
which are used by hosts and applications on behalf of the
user.
Another approach to session migration is building spe-
cific (optimized) frameworks for each application. The
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [9], chosen for control-
ling interactive multimedia sessions, supports all aspects
of mobility [10].
SIP provides two migration schemes for mid-call mo-
bility (session migration), namely Third Party Call Con-
trol and Session Handoff modes [10]. In Third Party Call
Control (3PCC), the current terminal transfers the media
to a new device, but retains the control of the session until
its termination. On the contrary, Session Handoff (SH)
transfers the whole session to a new device by notifying
the remote peer. SIP also enables advanced features
related to session migration, as connection splitting on
different terminals [11].
SIP has a very good and complete mobility framework,
but this has three main drawbacks: i) it works only for
the specific application, ii) it is not integrated with link-
and network-layer mechanisms to detect link failures and
iii) it requires both peers to implement the framework.
Table I provides a brief comparison of the mechanisms
available for session migration.
Rather surprisingly, many papers dealing with session
migration only describe mobility protocols and pervasive
environments, without any evidence of performance mea-
surements from working testbed [12], [13], [14], [15],
[16], [17], [18], [19] or even any proof of implementation
[5], [6]; when some numerical results are available, they
only concern quantitative measurements in few and very
simple scenarios [4], [11], [20], [21]. A more accurate
performance analysis is only available for the PA, in dif-
ferent networking scenarios and for different multimedia
applications [8].
User evaluation is not taken into account in papers
dealing with session migration; however, user preferences
should be a leading factor in designing multimedia per-
vasive systems.
III. A USER-CENTRIC MOBILITY FRAMEWORK
A lot of mechanisms and protocols for mobility are
available, but most of them only cope with one specific
aspect, mainly handover and terminal mobility. We cannot
find a generic and flexible framework suitable for any kind
of application.
Apart for the SIP protocol, no example of user-centric
approach is known. However, a slight evolution has taken
place during the years from a prominent network-centric
paradigm to a more recent device-centric approach. In-
deed, most of the oldest mechanisms are mainly focused
on solving the problem from a network perspective.
One solution was to keep invariant the IP address of
devices and to deploy mobility infrastructures to trace
their position within the network; this avoids maintaining
host-specific information in the routing tables for each
mobile host, which would not scale for the whole Internet.
Anchors, proxies, multicast and end-to-end signaling have
been used to this aim [2], [22], [23], [24], [25].
Recently, new approaches have been proposed that
hide the changes in network/terminal to the applications
without requiring any network infrastructure. We denote
them as device-centric just because of this. We briefly
discussed two interesting examples of this approach in
Section II based on an invariant IP address, namely VNAT
and DIP.
However, to fully implement the user-centric vision,
the main principles of this paradigm must be brought
into the network as well, in order to build communi-
cations around the users. That means users should be
the session endpoints (sources and/or destinations), at
least in principle, whilst devices act as the physical
terminals. Such idea was the starting point to derive a
general mobility framework at the network layer. Briefly,
we assign network identifiers (addresses) to users; these
identifiers will then be used by hosts and applications on
behalf of the user for networking issues. The basic idea is
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simple and straightforward, yet very powerful: however, at
the best of our knowledge, it has never been used before.
This approach is not far from the principles behind
VNAT and DIP; however, users have their own identifiers
and we do not need using any device’s address. That
enables to overcome the main limitations of these two
approaches.
Starting from the considerations above, we derived a
mobility framework to address all aspects of mobility.
It inherits the user-centric characteristic from the basic
definition of the approach; moreover, we aimed at making
it transparent to third parties and at keeping it independent
of any specific network protocol.
The core of this framework works at the network layer
and it deals with both terminal handover and session
migration in a uniform way. The main idea is to maintain
the same network address for the whole session duration,
while the network and/or the device change. Obviously,
we need some interaction with the application for han-
dling its context during session migration and thus our
framework spans across multiple layers.
A. The concept of Personal Address
We think users may be assigned static and invariant
identifiers, likely in the form of Universal Resource
Identifiers1 (personal mobility). User identifiers are then
translated in temporary Personal Addresses depending on
the underlying network technology.
We define the Personal Address (PA) as “a network
identifier dynamically assigned to a user for a spe-
cific communication session.” Personal Addresses are
exploited to identify users instead of their terminals.
Actually, we may use any kind of network identifier (for
example, those provided by HIP [27]); until now, we have
been focusing on IP addresses in order to deploy our
framework in the current Internet.
The PA is specific for each communication session2;
that prevents the risk of having address/port conflicts
whether multiple sessions were initiated by the same user
at some corresponding node.
The corresponding nodes involved in the session see
at any time the same address, independently of the
user movements and the devices used. Any migration
(handover or session transfer) is transparent to remote
applications and these latter are not required any specific
functionality. This is one of the main assets of the PA
scheme.
Figure 1 depicts the basic idea behind the PA concept.
The user is assigned a network identifier (the IP address
1.1.1.1 in this example), this address is used to manage
multimedia content (like a VVoIP session) on a small
portable device (for example, a handheld), independently
1Actually, the user identifier may be a structure including information
for different networks (see, for example, Chapter 15 in [26]).
2The idea of using a fixed IP for each user is not feasible in
IPv4, which currently lacks addresses for devices, although it would
be possible in IPv6. However, to maintain the approach as general as
possible, we keep in mind the limitations of IPv4 and think at the PA
as a dynamic address.
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1
Internet
Corresponding
Figure 1. The Personal Address concept.
Handover Handover Handover Delivery
Terminal 2Terminal 1 Network
PA Management
Migration
PA PA
Adaptation
TCP−Migration
Transport
Network
Application
Figure 2. The architecture of the user-centric mobility framework based
on the Personal Address.
of user movements across different networks (dash and
dot arrows). The same network identifier continues to
be used when the session is transferred to a different
device, for example a television with a bigger monitor
(dash arrow).
B. The mobility framework
The mobility framework based on the Personal Address
accounts for both terminal handover and session migra-
tion. A cross-layer approach is the most suitable solution
to handle all of these issues efficiently. Our mobility
framework mainly works at the network layer, although
some operations are still necessary at the application
layer to migrate the session context. Figure 2 depicts the
architecture of the mobility framework.
The PA Management function retrieves a PA for the
current user and makes it available for the application.
In practice, this is accomplished by adding the Personal
Address to the network interface of the current device
(say Terminal 1 in Fig. 2); only one application at a time
can bind to it.
The PA must be a topologically independent address,
as it does not reflect the current point of attachment to
the network. Thus, the network must provide a Delivery
function to locate the user and to deliver packets to the
current terminal. When the network or the device change,
the PA remains the same, but the Delivery function must
be updated with the new location.
The Handover task deals with two main issues: move-
ment detection and handover management. It works at
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the network layer because the PA is physically configured
as a network address of the host; moreover, handover is
usually implemented in a more effective way at this layer.
The Migration function moves the user PA and the
application context from one terminal to another and
updates the Delivery function about the new location; this
last task is essentially the same as in terminal handover,
thus it can be accomplished by the same mechanism.
Usually, UDP is used to transmit multimedia traffic;
however, for the sake of generality, we should also envi-
sion a TCP-Migration function whether TCP connections
were used (this mainly happens for signaling).
The migration may involve heterogeneous devices or
even different implementations of the same application.
In order to preserve transparency for the corresponding
peer, the network should provide an Adaptation function,
which adapts the session to the new device. This function
may deal with bandwidth requirements and different de-
vice capabilities; for example, for multimedia streams it
involves transcoding of codecs, frame rates, aspect ratio,
etc.).
The concept of PA and the structure of the mobility
framework lead to three great advantages with respect
to previous works (i.e., VNAT, DIP). First, the device-
independent nature of the address enables an arbitrary
number of migrations. Second, the presence of a Delivery
function in the network also makes it possible to account
for simultaneous mobility of both peers. Third, corre-
sponding nodes are completely unaware of any mobility
issue.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE MOBILITY FRAMEWORK
The cross-layer architecture depicted in Fig. 2 allows
to split the implementation into two main components,
namely core functions common to all applications and
application-specific functions.
A. Core functions
The core of our mobility framework is the part which is
common for every application. It includes all the functions
working at the network and transport layers.
Summing up the main design guidelines discussed in
Section III, we need suitable mechanisms to address the
following issues:
• finding the user’s current device(s);
• forwarding packets towards the user’s current de-
vice(s);
• managing the change in network and/or device at the
user side;
• updating the forwarding at the network side when
the migration occurs.
Instead of thinking at entirely new mechanisms for
the Handover and Delivery functions, we searched the
scientific literature for architectural schemes that man-
age topological-independent network addresses. We found
three alternatives: multicast, anycast and Mobile IP.
Multicast [28] provides an architecture to deliver pack-
ets to IP addresses (class D) that do not lie on the same
network; unfortunately, at present multicast infrastructures
are available only within few administrative domains.
Anycast [29] uses the same unicast IP address for
multiple hosts, delivering packets only to one of them
through standard routing mechanisms. However, routing
is known to be slow to converge and the user client
would unlikely be allowed to propagate its own routing
information.
Mobile IP (MIP) [30] enables mobile nodes to use a
fixed network address (the Home Address, HoA) inde-
pendently of their location. It only requires a minimal
infrastructure: one Home Agent (HA), owned by the user
himself or some service provider, and optional Foreign
Agents (FAs) in local networks for the sake of improving
performance (only for IPv4 networks). This protocol
registers a dynamic IP address (Care-of Address, CoA)
for the Mobile Node (MN) with the Home Agent, so
the latter can forward packets addressed to the HoA
to the current host location. Moreover, it is transparent
for Corresponding Nodes (CNs). MIP includes security
mechanisms to prevent most attacks concerning flow
redirection and spoofing.
MIP is a suitable solution for our framework, at least at
the current implementation stage. In the MIP architecture,
packets addressed to a Mobile Node (MN) are routed
towards its Home Network, which is the network that
the HoA topologically belongs to. As shown in Figure
3, if the MN does not lie in this network, packets are
captured by the Home Agent, which answers to ARP
Request packets on behalf of the MN with its own MAC
address. The HA records the current position of the MN
in terms of Care-of Address (CoA), which is the address
packets must be sent to. This forwarding is made through
tunneling mechanisms. The CoA is either the address of
a local Foreign Agent (FA-CoA) or a temporary address
assigned to the MN (Co-locate CoA, CoCoA); in both
cases, packets finally reach the MN (see [30], [31] for
details about MIPv4/6).
The same structure can be used in our mobility frame-
work for the Handover and Delivery functions: MIP
clients accomplish the tasks of the former, while the HA
acts as the latter. However, we formally consider the HoA
assigned to the user, rather than to one device of his; the
device is simply a physical mean to use the address and
so the HoA can be considered in every respect a Personal
Address.
As a matter of fact, MIP was developed for terminal
mobility, but its framework does not require the reg-
istration to be updated by the same host. We exploit
this consideration to update the Delivery function from a
different host in case of session migration3. From the HA
perspective, this appears as a standard terminal migration,
thus packets are redirected to the new terminal. Figure
4 sketches this mechanism; note that the FAs are not
mandatory, although they are useful in the IPv4 version to
speed up the process of detecting a migration whenever
3Obviously, the hosts migrating the session must share the same secret
material requested by MIP security mechanisms.
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Figure 3. The basic operations of Mobile IP.
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Figure 4. The implementation of the core functions of the mobility framework.
it occurs.
The last core function in our framework is TCP-
Migration. It is only needed for applications relying on
connection-oriented services from the transport layer. We
have not still taken into account this issue in our imple-
mentation; however, we are currently thinking at splitting
the connection at an intermediate agent, like MSOCKS
[32]. This approach maintains transparency with respect
to third parties (the Corresponding Nodes); moreover, the
intermediate agent may be co-located with the HA.
B. Application-specific functions
Four tasks are needed to handle application-specific
issues of the PA Management and Migration functions:
• retrieving the Personal Address;
• setting up the Personal Address;
• saving, transferring and restoring the application
context;
• removing the Personal Address.
A generic and common protocol may be considered to
accomplish the first and third tasks; however, in the cur-
rent implementation we delegated the application to take
care of that. This way, we avoid adding new architectural
elements; anyway, the two approaches are substantially
equivalent. This issue will be covered in details in Section
V.
Adding or removing an IP address to a network inter-
face (the second and fourth tasks) is a trivial task and can
be done by the network APIs of the operating system. It
is worth noting the four tasks must be triggered by the
application in any case.
Finally, we envisioned the presence of an adaptation
server (e.g., transcoding). It may be located at the Home
Agent, because all traffic is forced to cross this point. Our
focus was mainly on the mobility infrastructure, so we did
not consider either any solution nor implementation for
the Adaptation function.
V. AUTOMATIC SESSION MIGRATION FOR
INTERACTIVE MULTIMEDIA SESSIONS
For the purpose of evaluation, we need to select a
specific application which exploits the PA mobility frame-
work. Among several alternatives concerning multimedia
transmission, we found interactive communications the
most challenging and suitable example, as of their hard
requirements for real-time operations. Further, to make
the whole framework more appealing for user evaluation,
we also decided to account for automatic migration by
exploiting information about the user position [33].
We selected SIP as the signaling protocol for the
interactive multimedia communication framework; thanks
to its flexibility, this protocol can easily integrate session
control (initialization and migration) and user localization.
This Section describes the localization system and the
SIP messages used to implement the application-specific
part of the PA mobility framework.
A. User localization
User localization is made by two components: the
Localization Server and a localization system.
The Localization Server gathers information by het-
erogeneous localization sources and computes the user
position. In order to abstract from a particular localization
system, the Localization Server was designed on top of
the SAIL architecture [34], to enable the abstraction and
integration of heterogeneous sensors within a common
context-aware framework. In SAIL a localization system
monitoring a set of mobile devices is abstracted as a set
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of logical devices (one for each mobile device) provid-
ing their localization information. SAIL also provides a
simple way for allowing multi-protocol network access
to the data, which becomes useful for integrating the
Localization Server with the Personal Address Mobility
Framework.
Behind the Localization Server there is the actual
localization work. This is done by sensor networks, a
low-cost wireless technology that is expected to be largely
deployed in the near future. Sensors are tiny devices with
limited computing capabilities, integrating hardware for
environmental monitoring (typically temperature, bright-
ness, humidity, position, speed, acceleration) and short-
range radios; these devices have networking capabilities
as well.
Localization establishes which terminal the user is close
to; this happens by evaluating whether he is inside the
“usage range” (Area of Interest, AoI) of a terminal. Such
an estimation of position is quite raw, but it is enough for
session migration. To this purpose, fixed sensors (called
anchors) are placed around each terminal, whose position
is known “a priori”; the user carries with him a mobile
sensor.
The mobile sensor, which needs to be localized by
the system, periodically emits a beacon packet containing
its identifier. As the anchor sensors receive the beacons,
they compute the corresponding RSSI and send to the
Localization Server all the pairs <RSSI, anchor id>. The
Localization Server accumulates all the pairs and, using
a couple of thresholds evaluated during a training phase4,
estimates the mobile position.
In our testbed the mobile position are obtained by
means of a network of MicaZ sensors5, which operate
at the 2.4 GHz ISM frequency band and adopt the IEEE
802.15.4 communication protocol.
B. Automatic migration
Proxy and Registrar servers are used in SIP to locate
the user’s current device. We co-locate the HA and these
functions in a single element and extend its interface.
Personal Addresses are taken from the Home Network
address space and dynamically assigned by the Proxy as
detailed in the following.
Figure 5 shows the signaling flow for setting up the
session and for migrating it from one local terminal (LT1)
to another (LT2); we extended the basic SIP signaling
(see [9]) to account for migration-specific issues, i.e.,
retrieving the PA and transferring the session context.
The PA is assigned during SIP registration, but it will
only be used when the session starts. There could be
objections about the fact the address is assigned and
perhaps never used; we argue this is our implementation
4The deployment of the localization system requires a training phase,
which consists in configuring and calibrating the sensors providing
localization information for the AoI. The calibration enables the sensors
to recognize when a person equipped with a localization sensor (the
mobile sensor) enters or exits the AoI.
5Crossbow, MicaZ Specification, http://www.xbow.com.
choice for the sake of simplicity, but other solutions
can be easily integrated, as providing extensions to the
registration message to get the address when really needed
(see, for example, the procedure outlined in [8]).
The registration makes the Proxy aware that the user is
“on-line” and his location needs to be tracked in order
to know his current device (the Local Terminal, LT).
Thus, the user’s Proxy subscribes the location service at
the Location Server of the domain where the registration
came from (SIP provides SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFICATION
messages). We did not explicitly address the mechanism
used to find the Location Server for a domain; however,
that might happen through standard TXT or SRV resource
records; moreover, the domain name could be retrieved
by a reverse query for the source IP address of the
registration message. After the subscription is completed,
the Location Server starts immediately updating the user
position and the closest available terminal (LT1 in the
example).
Requests of setting up a session coming from Corre-
sponding Nodes (CNs) are forwarded by the Proxy to
the current device LT1. Before answering the INVITE
message, this terminal adds the PA to its network interface
and runs the MIP client registering the PA as the HoA;
from now on, the SIP user agent begins using the PA just
set up and all signaling and media are routed within the
MIP architecture through the HA6. The same mechanism
also applies if the mobile user’s terminal initiates the
session; the only difference is that the PA is set up before
sending the INVITE message.
When the user moves closer to a new terminal (LT2
in Fig. 5), the Localization Server notifies the Proxy of
the change. The latter updates the registration with the
Registrar server. The Proxy is stateless, thus it does not
know whether there is any active session; nevertheless
it sends a REFER message to the previous device LT1.
If a session is active on LT1 for the migrating user,
this terminal initiates an INVITE/OK/ACK exchange to
transfer the current session context to LT2. The INVITE
message contains the session description, including the
PA to use. During this phase, the MIP client is stopped
on LT1 (after the OK is received) and the PA is removed
from its network interface; then it is added on LT2 and
another MIP instance is started with the same PA (after
the ACK message). That updates the location of the PA
inside the network; this sequence of operations avoids the
duplication of the IP address on the two terminals. Note
that the remote peer CN is completely unaware of the
migration procedure as the IP address used in the session
does not change7.
VI. THE LIVE DEMO
The live demo was organized at an Italian national
science exhibition, named “Science Festival”, held in
6SIP provides the current IP address of the remote terminal in the
“Contact” field of the headers, thus the CN knows the PA to use after
receiving the OK message.
7The presence of an adaptation server on the Home Agent would take
care of transcoding, if needed. We did not deploy it in our testbed.
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Figure 5. SIP signaling for session set-up and migration in the mobility
framework.
Genoa on October 23rd – November 1st 2009. The Science
Festival8 is an important Italian dissemination initiative
where researchers in different science and technology
fields meet a large audience, ranging from business men,
to students and families. The Festival saw 200.000 visitors
that year: 160.000 people visited exhibitions and laborato-
ries whilst 40.000 people attended conferences, shows and
free-access events. Indeed, we only stayed at the Festival
two days and got feedback from 101 users.
Visitors of the Science Festival are very heterogeneous
and usually do not have in-depth technical knowledge;
therefore they are more inclined to give plain and uncon-
ditioned reviews of demos and applications. Following
these considerations, we decided to organize a live demo
showing dynamic networking in action and to get user
feedback about the PA framework.
Unskilled people have little or no knowledge at all
about networking and related issues. It is also very
difficult to let them try networking, as this latter is
usually hidden behind applications and services of dif-
ferent nature. To this aim, we built a simple Video and
Voice-over-IP (VVoIP) application based on the mobility
framework with automatic session migration we have
described in Section V. The same software also allows
8Festival della Scienza, web site: http://www.festivalscienza.eu.
a manual control of the migration; it was already used
for quantitative performance measurement in both local
and Internet scenarios (see [8]).
The testbed was composed by three parts: the SIP
agents (one Proxy server and the clients on each terminal),
the localization infrastructure (wireless sensors and one
Localization Server) and the mobility infrastructure (one
MIP Home Agent, one MIP Foreign Agent and the clients
on the mobile user’s terminals). The demo followed the
architectural scheme depicted in Figure 6: three terminals
were used, one for the corresponding (fixed) user and
two for the mobile user. All network elements (terminals
and agents) were deployed in the same room, with direct
connection among them (i.e., no Internet links); this
corresponds to the scenario called “local” in our previous
quantitative analysis shown in [8]. Two sensors were put
near each terminal and an anchor sensor was tied to the
wrist of the mobile user by a strip of velcro.
The users began a VVoIP conference; each user could
see himself and the other person in the graphical user
interface. This is only a minimal VVoIP application:
the main window contains stored profiles and provides
options to manage profiles, to set connection parameters
and codecs, to start calls; the call window also enables
to manage profiles and settings. Two rendering boxes are
available in the call window: the big box displays the
video of the remote user, the little box plays the video of
the local user. Screenshots of the application are given in
Figure 7.
The mobile user was then asked to move to and fro
between his terminals, so he could evaluate the respon-
siveness of the automatic session migration (there was
no way to separate localization and session migration);
the corresponding users saw a freezing image during the
migration and could assess the nuisance value of this
interruption.
VII. USER EVALUATION
User evaluation was conducted in three steps:
• Presentation: Users were presented a brief intro-
duction about the user-centric vision and the VVoIP
application they were going to try.
Figure 7. Screenshots of the VVoIP application. Upside the main and
the call windows are shown; items under menu entries are shown below
each window (the Tools entry is currently empty).
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Figure 6. Set up for the live demo. All terminals (LT1, LT2, CN), the Foreign Agent and the Localization Server lie on the same local network;
the Home Agent is co-located with the Proxy and is one hop away the Foreign Agent.
• Live demo: Users were invited to try the automatic
migration during a video call. We prepared three
different locations with a laptop each. Each demo
session was attended by two users, the first user made
a video call from one location, and the second one
moved between the other two locations to test the
migration. Then the roles were inverted.
• Assessment: After they had tried the demo, users
were asked to compile a questionnaire. The assess-
ment phase was not limited to that issue; indeed,
it was also extended to the previous two phases
by observing commonly asked questions from users,
their difficulties while using the migration service,
their comments and suggestions for improvement.
The questionnaire was proposed to potential end-users
to assess their interest in automatic session migration
and to gather their feeling about the usefulness and
applicability of such feature; questions were prepared
with the support of a psychologist and took into account
background skills, familiarity with technology, personal
assessment of the system, social impact of this kind of
technology.
The questionnaire was organized in three parts:
• First part concerned the user’s profile. We were
interested in knowing age, gender, education, work,
familiarity with and use of technologies in daily life.
• Second part focused on the assessment of the live
demo. After they had tried the automatic migration
of a video call, we asked users to assess their
experience in terms of usability and responsiveness
of the migration service.
• Last part concerned the investigation of user prefer-
ences about physical and ergonomic characteristics
of sensors, the possible contexts where the migration
may be used and potential issues such as security and
privacy.
A. User’s profile
The questionnaire was filled in by 101 people (48
females, 53 males), aged between 10–69. In the analysis
of results we divided the subjects based on their age, as
shown in Table II. Most results later on are expressed
as percentages and are relative to each of these classes;
many questions allowed multiple answers.
The Science Festival especially draws the attention of
people with a natural gift and practice for technology,
TABLE II.
NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES FOR DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS
Age Males Females Total
<14 14 11 25
15–19 20 16 36
20–29 9 6 15
30–50 7 9 16
>50 3 6 9
Total 53 48 101
TABLE III.
YEARS SPENT IN EDUCATION
Age Average Standard Deviation Min Max
<14 6.04 0.45 5 7
15–19 9.94 1.01 9 12
20–29 14.73 3.99 8 18
30–50 14.92 2.53 13 18
>50 16.75 2.26 13 18
usually the younger generation; moreover, many teachers
bring their students to this event to get them in touch
with applied sciences and future technologies. For this
reason, most people who completed the questionnaire
were schools, high schools and university students (69
people); Table III shows the average of years they had
spent in education, together with other statistical param-
eters as standard deviation and minimum and maximum
values. The remaining part of the sample was rather het-
erogeneous in terms of education and employment; they
were teachers, employees, professional men, housewives,
unemployed people and pensioners.
Regarding the use and familiarity with technology, most
of the sample feels skilled with technology and uses
several devices every day, without distinction between
genders. Evaluation of familiarity with technology is
placed on a Likert scale from 1 up to 5, where 5 indicates
a great familiarity and 1 no familiarity; moreover, visitors
were asked to tick off equipment they usually use on a
list of 12 technological devices quite common in everyday
life. Table IV analyses the number of devices used and
the familiarity with technology in terms of mean value,
standard deviation, minimum and maximum value.
Detailed statistics about usage of each of the 12 devices
in the list are given in Figure 8, classified according to
the age classes identified in Table II. The most commonly
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TABLE IV.
NUMBER OF USED DEVICES PROPOSED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND
FAMILIARITY WITH TECHNOLOGY
Avrg Std Dev Min Max
Number of devices (¡ 12) 7.35 2.07 1 11
Familiarity with technology 3.92 0.74 2 5
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Figure 8. Statistics about device usage for different age groups.
used devices are televisions (98%), mobile phones (97%)
and PCs (86%), which are used by almost all people
regardless of their age and gender. Other kinds of devices
are most suitable to different age ranges: video consoles
and MP3 players are used by younger subjects, whilst
car stereos and laptops are used by adults. Expensive and
niche devices are currently less used, examples are PDAs
(10%) and smart phones (12%).
B. Assessment of the demo
After they had tried the automatic migration of the
video call, we asked users their feeling about the applica-
tion. The main purpose was to check the intuitiveness
of the framework, the performance of the underlying
network mechanism and the usefulness of the migration
feature. The first question was the effort in understanding
the migration feature (immediateness of use, i.e. Rapid-
ity), which only means the level of difficulty in learning
how to use the migration service (in practice, tying a
sensor-wristband) and not technical details. The second
question concerned performance, and thus how quick
the migration happened (Speed). The following questions
were about the usefulness of session migration among
multimedia devices: how much the user had liked this
feature (Pleasant), their assessment about its usefulness
in everyday life (Utility) and how much they would have
spent to use it (Value). Users answered these questions on
a Likert scale from 1 to 5, where 5 is the more positive and
1 is the more negative opinion. Each score corresponds
to a meaning adjective, specific for each question; for
example, the judgment about migration usefulness was
proposed as follows: “very useful” (5), “useful” (4),
TABLE V.
USER ASSESSMENT OF THE MIGRATION FEATURE FOR EACH AGE
RANGE
Age Rapidity Speed Pleasant Utility Value
<14 4.16 4.24 4.76 4.48 4.12
15–19 3.94 4.14 4.22 3.89 3.97
20–29 4.13 4.21 4.50 4.00 3.31
30–50 3.92 4.08 4.46 4.00 3.42
> 50 3.92 4.08 4.75 4.08 4.08
“not so useful” (3), “not useful” (2), “harmful” (1). The
assessment of the economic value of the feature was
proposed in Euros according to the following arbitrary
scale: “above 20” (5), “5 up to 20” (4), “less than 5” (3),
“nothing, I would only use it whether it were free” (2),
“nothing, I would not use it” (1). Mean values for each
age group are shown in Table V.
As the results show, the effort to understand the user
interface and the migration feature was acceptable, even
for older and unskilled people; further, we may note
younger generations required less effort, as probably they
are friendlier and more used to modern technologies than
eldest people, which often are less prone to learn new
technologies. The rapidity of migration mainly depends
on the Personal Address framework as the delay intro-
duced by media codec in video acquisition and rendering
is almost negligible; we got a good score here, thus we can
take the quantitative analysis for the local testbed given in
[8] as a good benchmark for assessing the effectiveness
of session migration.
The second part of the evaluation shows a substantial
interest by users towards the demo scenario and their
willingness to accept the migration feature in the next
future; this feedback motivates our work and future re-
search in this field. Users liked the feature of migrating an
interactive video session among devices, they considered
the service useful and they would have spent some money
for it. A MANOVA [35] analysis was conducted to check
if there were differences in the answers by different age
groups; no relevant variation has arisen among those
groups in assessing usability and suitability of the migra-
tion service to the needs and interests of potential users.
Finally, innovation was evaluated by asking users
whether they had ever found session migration in any
application. Most people (86% of interviewed) consid-
ered the migration service innovative, as they had never
seen before this functionality. A small percentage (9%)
said they had already seen similar application, but oral
interviews following the compilation of the questionnaires
pointed out that most of them referred to side aspects of
the demo, which are not related with session migration,
as the use of webcams and VVoIP calls. Finally, few
users (about 3%) found the migration service similar
to other kinds of functionality: the GPS localization
available in the iPhone, the automatic re-tuning to a
different frequency providing the same station when the
first signal becomes too weak (e.g., when moving out of
range) usually found in car stereo systems (AF function
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of the RDS9 system), the handover mechanism of cellular
networks.
C. User preferences
Although the migration framework mostly works at
the network layer, it implements a service that directly
interacts with the user, thus it is important to keep into
account the user’s needs and to involve people in the
development phase. Hence the last part of the question-
naire investigates how users perceive our technology and
their feeling with related ethical issues; in particular, we
were interested in understanding whether they found the
migration framework intrusive, whether they were afraid
about their privacy to be violated and which kind of
sensors they would have been willing to interact with.
Session migration is always related to applications, as
each of them has its own context to be transferred; how-
ever, the migration is not meaningful for every possible
application (a file transfer is a typical example where the
migration is not useful), thus it is important to find out for
what applications users expect the feature to be available.
We selected a list of session-based networked applica-
tions, considering interactive sessions (multimedia, chat),
content access (broadcast and on demand media, Internet
browsing), entertainment (videogames) and generic work
applications. Users checked off those they would find our
service most useful (multiple selections were allowed);
indeed, our demo falls within the most rated topic. The
full classification, in decreasing order of preferences is:
“phone calls” (74%), “watching TV” (53%), “listen to
music” (49%), “Internet browsing” (40%), “videogames”
(38%), “chat” (34%), “office applications” (23%), and
“other” (2%).
Figure 9 shows the preferred user applications for each
age group; in this case there are significant differences.
For example, 80% of users aged under 14 would like
to use the migration service to play videogames, whilst
the corresponding percentage for the other groups is sig-
nificantly lower (range 15–19=31%, range 20–29=33%,
range 30–50=0%, >50=17%). Note that the youngest peo-
ple always have higher percentages than other groups; this
means they checked off a larger number of items for this
question; the only exception is the “office applications”
item, as users under 14 are students and are not involved
with such activity.
From a technological point of view, many features can
be implemented in a easier way on certain devices: writing
software for general purpose PCs is much simpler than
developing Symbian10 applications for smartphones or
firmware for televisions. Unfortunately, users expect the
migration feature on most of their daily equipment: “TVs”
(83%), “mobile phones” (71%), “desktop PCs” (67%),
“laptop PCs” (51%), “MP3 players” (33%), “stereos”
(26%), “fixed phone” (24%), “DVD players” (23%),
“PDAs” (20%), “smart phones” (19%), “car stereos”
9Radio Data System, http://www.rds.org.uk/.
10The Symbian Fundation, http://www.symbian.org/.
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Figure 9. Statistics about which applications users would like session
migration to be available for.
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Figure 10. Statistics about which devices users would like session
migration to be available on.
(17%) and “others” (1%). This implies the algorithm must
be kept simple enough to be ported on a wide range
of different devices. Again, users were allowed multiple
selections.
The preferred devices vary with age (see Figure 10):
100% of the oldest users (above 50) checked off televi-
sion, while 92% of youngest people (under 14) selected
the cell phone. Other devices voted by a large number of
people are desktops and laptops.
Session migration is a component of pervasive com-
munication. The latter relies on complex frameworks
which may be difficult to deploy in certain scenarios [20];
however, users may not need pervasive communication
everywhere. Indeed, user feedback was quite surprising
for us: they mainly expected session migration at home
(which is the preferred answer of eldest people), and only
in lower percentage everywhere (which is the preferred
answer of youngest users). The full classification is: 50%
“at home”, 32% “everywhere”, 26% “at school/work”,
15% “in street”, 4% “nowhere” and 2% “other”. Figure
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Figure 11. Statistics about where users would like session migration to
be available.
11 shows the detailed answers for each age group.
As a side effect of automatic session migration, users’
movements have to be tracked and this may concern
privacy issues for many people, hence the natural question
for users was where they would be willing to be located
by sensors. Most users checked off their own home,
whilst other options got far less preferences: 60% “at
home”, 27% “in street”, 24% “at school/work” and 20%
“nowhere”. The large gap among “home” and other op-
tions sounds quite strange; perhaps people take privacy for
granted in personal environments, i.e., a tracking system
working at home keeps all data on private equipment and
does not allow anybody to access such information.
Taking into account the behavior according to age,
all groups agreed that home is a perfect place to locate
sensors, while disagree in the other responses (see Figure
12). People aged 20–29 and 30–50 are less inclined to
be located with respect to other groups, people under 14
and above 50 are more willing than others to be also
located “in street” and people aged 15–19 have a higher
percentage “at school/work” than other groups. This last
fact is quite curious as well, as teenagers often care about
letting their parents know they are (or are not) at school!
Another consideration regards the fact many people above
50 have already left work.
Just to be sure our users were aware of the relationship
with current technologies, people who did not like to
be located anywhere were asked if they knew cellular
systems indeed maintain information about the cell of
their phone (and implicitly of their position); everyone
said yes to this question and thus we argue people are
willing to postpone their qualms about privacy whether
they are really interested in the service.
Another issue in pervasive communication is the pres-
ence of public, shared and private devices in the envi-
ronment. That poses security concerns around who is
allowed to use what. From the user’s perspective, the
problem is twofold: which devices the user would use
among those available and whether the user would share
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Figure 12. Statistics about where users would be willing to be tracked.
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Figure 13. Statistics about which devices people would migrate their
sessions to.
his own devices with other people.
The first side of the problem concerns the use of
equipment by the user. To this aim, we identified three
classes: own devices, devices belonging to people the
user knows and public/third parties’ devices. Most people
would use their own devices and those of their friends, but
few users are interested in other devices; the classification
we got from the questionnaire is: own devices (44%),
own devices and devices of my friends (43%), all devices
(10%), public devices (5%). Note this time only a single
answer was allowed.
Figure 13 shows the results for the different groups
of users. Only people aged between 20–29 are interested
in using public devices; indeed, this group includes uni-
versity students and young workers which are usually
more used to share computers and other devices with their
colleagues (at the university, at office); on the other hand,
teenagers and elder people are more bound to the concept
of personal computers and often do not know features as
centralized profiles and authentication management.
The other side of the problem concerns sharing of
user’s devices: if the owner is not currently using them,
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Figure 14. Statistics about willingness of users to share their personal
devices with other people.
they may be used by other people to enrich the envi-
ronment pervasiveness. The result is congruent with the
previous question: people are not inclined to share devices
with third parties. Indeed, most of them would only let
their friends to use their own devices (75%), some people
would not lend devices to anyone (10%) and very few
users would make them available to everybody (5%).
Figure 14 shows a slight trend for older users to share
their devices with friends.
Coming back to more technical issue, some questions
were devoted to sketch enhancements and guidelines for
the future development of personal mobility infrastruc-
tures. These questions concerned the interaction of users
with session migration, mainly integration of sensors in
daily life and alternative forms of control of the migration
process.
Sensors represent the most intrusive part of the system,
as one of them needs to be carried by the user. Other
techniques might be used for localization, but sensor
networks are currently low-cost and tiny devices, which
are expected to be easily spread in most environments in
the near future. As of these characteristics, sensors may
be integrated in several objects users usually bring with
them, and the main question here is what kind of object
the users would like.
We proposed a list of items in the questionnaire; 40%
of users would prefer sensors as an object to wear, 37%
would like it were integrated in their mobile phone, 18%
would bring it as an object apart, 8% would integrate it
in an article of clothing, 7% would not like any object,
3% would choose other options. Many differences arose
among answers from the different groups (see Figure 15).
Users who chose an “object to wear” or “other” specified
that it could be a clock.
An automatic migration system must take care of
selecting the right device to use among those available;
obviously, it needs to account for user preferences and
impairments, security requirements, and so on.
Despite of the good logic it can implement, an auto-
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sensor they have to bring with them.
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Figure 16. Statistics about user’s preference on the control of session
migration.
matic decision maker may not reflect the current user’s
need. Thus, some form of direct user control is needed in
addition to the fully autonomic feature. Given the nature
of the system (pervasive communication, multiple hetero-
geneous devices, distributed computation), it is necessary
to find the most appropriate way for users to interact with
the mobility framework.
Several alternatives were envisioned and users gave
their preferences as follows: 38% of users would control
migration through a voice command, 26% through a
gesture command, 19% would prefer automatic migration,
17% would use the mobile phone to control the session,
7% would like a button on the devices (TV or PC
monitor). There are many differences among the different
age groups (see Figure 16).
VIII. REMARKS ON THE OUTPUT FROM THE
EVALUATION
The results coming from questionnaires, the obser-
vation of the user interaction with the service and the
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analysis of type and number of errors allowed us to give a
positive judgment about usability of the migration service
(conclusions are drawn using the ISO 9241 standard [36]).
This evaluation takes into account three parameters:
• Effectiveness: The level of achievement of the objec-
tives. The first and simplest effectiveness index is the
achievement of the objective: a product is effective
if it carries out its task. Otherwise, if the objective
is not achieved, the effectiveness can be measured in
terms of number of operations towards its completion
state. The migration service has been evaluated as
“effective” because all users achieved the goal in the
live demo, i.e. they migrated a video call from one
computer to another one, without they were required
to take any control action.
• Efficiency: The effort required by the user to achieve
the goal. The migration service has been evaluated
“efficient” because users easily learned how it works
and they quickly began to use it.
• User Satisfaction: The perceived usefulness of the
service by users. The service has been evaluated
“useful” by users and they talked positively about
the migration concept.
More feedback was collected by analyzing answers,
comments and critics from the users during the demo.
This information provided us useful indication about
aspects that should be taken into account in developing
user-centric systems. For example:
• Security: Users are interested in security and privacy
issues involved in using devices owned by other
people.
• Human-Machine Interface (HMI): Many users, es-
pecially the youngest, underlined the importance of
improving the service interface and physical aspect
of sensors; obviously these are minor remarks for
our purposes, as our framework works at the network
layer and the VVoIP application was only developed
to set up a live demo, while at the current stage
sensors are only prototypes and are far from being
a real product. About control of migration, a clear
and unique trend does not appear from users; indeed,
answers from users suggest that different solutions
could be integrated, according to different user pro-
files and preferences.
Finally, the last remarkable aspect to be considered
is the tendency of adult users to perceive the migration
service as a futuristic technology, while younger users
seem more inclined to use this technology in daily life
straightaway.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have applied the user-centric paradigm
to dynamic networking. We have discussed the concept
of Personal Address and we have described a cross-layer
framework which accounts for different aspects of mo-
bility. This framework exploits a cross-layer architecture,
which brings together efficiency at the network layer with
flexibility at the application layer. The other important
benefit is transparency for unaware corresponding appli-
cations.
This paper extends our previous work about this topic
by presenting the user evaluation we carried out at a
national science exhibition. A live demo was built by
using the Personal Address framework for a VVoIP appli-
cation with automatic session migration. SIP was used as
the session control protocol at the application layer, MIP
implements the mobility framework at the network layer,
sensor networks were used for tracking the user position
and the SAIL framework was used for the Localization
Server; only few extensions to SIP were necessary to
account for migration-specific issues at the application
layer.
Visitors of the exhibition were invited to try the live
demo; evaluation was done by written questionnaires and
by direct interview, with the support of a psychologist
skilled in this field. Outcomes from the evaluation has
given positive feedback about the effectiveness of our
framework and outlined general indications for designing
pervasive communication systems. To the best of our
knowledge, no trials of this kind have been ever carried
out before.
Users liked the automatic migration feature and they
positively assessed its effectiveness in terms of timeliness
and speed. Moreover, they found the application easy to
use, that especially thanks to the user-centric approach
followed by the architecture design.
As general concerns, users would have expected to
keep more control over their sessions, mostly by advanced
interaction interfaces as voice and gesture recognition;
fully automatic migration was seen as something that may
elude what they really mean to do. Automatic migration
requires locating and tracking the users, and thus privacy
issues must be taken carefully into account before consid-
ering applicability of such kind of system in environments
other than private (especially home). Finally, there is not
a large willingness in sharing devices, although there are
significant differences among different age groups.
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Abstract—Recent advances in network monitoring have 
increasingly focused on obtaining per-flow information, such 
as flow state. Tracking the state of network flows opens up a 
new dimension of information gathering for network 
operators, allowing previously unattainable data to be 
captured. This paper presents a time efficient novel method – 
Binned Duration Flow Tracking (BDFT) – of tracking per-
flow state by grouping valid flows into “bins”. BDFT is 
intended for high-speed routers where CPU time is crucial. 
BDFT is time efficient by adopting Bloom filters as the 
primary data structures. Simulation results show that BDFT 
can achieve over 99% accuracy on traces of real network 
traffic.
Index Terms—network monitoring; flow tracking, Bloom 
filter, high-speed networks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The continual evolution of the Internet creates a dynamic 
environment for ISPs to operate their network within. 
Traffic patterns have changed dramatically in recent years, 
from a history of a few heavily used protocols, the Internet 
today contains hundreds. Identifying and managing the 
transmission of these protocols is critical for ISPs, as better 
network control leads to better utilization which leads to 
lower costs. 
The operation of many network measurement 
applications can be abstracted to a requirement to store 
some amount of state about individual flows. Tracking per-
flow state on high-speed routers requires an approach that is 
customized to the demands of an embedded environment, 
typically limited memory and processing capability. In this 
environment, monitoring applications such as NetFlow are 
not able to scale to the ultra-low per-flow resources 
available; typically NetFlow requires a minimum of 21 
bytes per flow. Packet sampling (e.g., 1 in 20 sampling), on 
the other hand, normally returns low accuracy. For long 
duration flows that are also high bandwidth flows, due to the 
fact that high bandwidth means the probability of them 
being sampled is high, naive implementation does manage 
to track some long duration flows. However, the memory 
usage could be very high [17]. 
This paper proposes a time and space efficient method of 
tracking per-flow state by grouping flows into bins called 
Binned Duration Flow Tracking (BDFT). The “binning” 
concept was motivated by design tradeoffs that ensure that 
efficient operation in terms of accuracy, computational 
resources, and memory resources, can be attained. 
Flow state is an abstract concept that is best discussed in 
terms of an example, in this paper we focus on tracking the 
duration of flows with the BDFT concept. In brief, BDFT 
operates by placing individual flows into “bins” which 
represent the current state of the flow. BDFT assigns time 
ranges to each state (bin) (e.g., 0-15 sec, 15-45 sec, 45-75 
sec, 75-105 sec), and moves flows to the next time range 
(state) on a periodic basis. BDFT inherits much of its time 
and space efficiency from the use of counting Bloom filters 
[3] as the data structure which represents the bins. 
Symmetric Connection Detection (SCD) [18] (described in 
Section III) is used for BDFT to pre-filter incomplete 
connection attempts and reduce the total loading on the 
methods.   
Flow duration is a useful metric in real-world situations. 
For example, determining the application-level content of a 
network flow normally requires Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI) of critical packets in the flow. Unfortunately, DPI is 
not available on high-speed routers due to intrinsically high 
requirements for processing cycles and memory accesses 
per packet. An alternative to DPI is to classify traffic based 
on transport level network flow information, such as flow 
duration, average packet size, and fan in/fan out [10][14].  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
describes the background. Section III highlights SCD. 
Section IV explains tracking the state with bins. Section V 
presents basic BDFT. Section VI discusses BDFT 
extensions. Section VII describes false positive removals. 
Section VIII demonstrates the experiments and results for 
memory usage and accuracy. Section IX presents detailed 
computational analysis of BDFT. Finally, Section X 
concludes our study. 
II. BACKGROUND
Tracking per-flow state is a relatively new area with little 
work that is directly related to BDFT. However, the use of 
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Bloom filters and Bloom filter variants such as counting 
Bloom filters [2] has become wide-spread in network 
monitoring. The main reason for the popularity of Bloom 
filters is their ability to provide a time and space efficient 
data structure to represent a set of items when some errors 
are acceptable [2]. A good survey of Bloom filters in 
network applications is [4]. Some other Bloom filter 
variants are Space-Code Bloom filters [13], and Time-
Decaying Bloom filters (TDBF) [7] which can track flow 
duration with medium accuracy as shown in [17]. Attig and 
Lockwood have shown that a Bloom filter can be 
implemented in hardware and can scale to OC-192 
(10Gbps) speeds [1]. 
Bonomi et al. [3] presented methods of tracking the state 
of network flows. They described the use of Bloom filters 
and d-left hashing to enable per-flow tracking of state in a 
network. They presented two variations of a state tracking 
system using Bloom filters. Their first method uses a single 
counting Bloom filter to store a set of <flow, state> pairs. 
Their second approach uses counting Bloom filters to store 
both a count and a state in each cell corresponding to a 
flow's hashes. Although both of these approaches rely on 
Bloom filters, they are significantly different from our 
approach to per-flow state tracking using “bins”. This paper 
introduces the concept of using multiple bins (and therefore 
multiple Bloom filters) to achieve high accuracy with low 
computational requirements.  
Bonomi et al. [3] found that the accuracy of both 
approaches was low enough to motivate a third method 
which is based on d-left hashing [5] and fingerprints called 
Fingerprint-Compressed Filter Approximate Concurrent 
State Machine (FCF ACSM). Each cell in the d-left hash 
stores the fingerprint and the state of the flow. FCF ACSM 
was found to be very accurate and to have good memory 
efficiency when compared to the Bloom filter based 
approaches. Its accuracy remains good up to ~80% memory 
efficiency (depending on table/bucket/cell configuration), 
after which bucket overloading can become a problem. 
FCF ACSM is memory-efficient but has higher 
computational cost than BDFT. Computational performance 
is a metric that is rarely analyzed in determining a method's 
performance in this area. Computational analysis is an 
important part of the overall performance picture of each 
method, because CPU time is critical for high-speed routers.  
Cuckoo hashing is a combination of multiple-choice 
hashing with the ability to move elements. Cuckoo hashing 
requires only a constant number of items to be moved for 
each insertion, depending on the load of the hash table. 
However, standard cuckoo hashing suits software 
applications, not high-speed routers [11]. Cuckoo hashing 
combined with insertion queue was proposed in [11]. In 
[12], the authors designed a scheme that allows at most one 
item to move during insertion, which results in higher space 
utilization. Comparison with other schemes was conducted 
and reported in [12]. Both [11] and [12] consider the 
availability of content addressable memory that allows 
parallel lookups. 
III. SYMMETRIC CONNECTION DETECTION
SCD [18] is method of filtering network traffic such that 
only fully established TCP (the protocol of concern) flows 
will pass through the filter. To establish a TCP connection a 
three-way handshake process takes place; each computer 
sends a SYN, and the initiating computer sends an ACK to 
complete the connection. Once the ACK is received, the 
connection process is completed and the TCP session is 
fully established. Tracking the establishment of a TCP 
connection therefore requires keeping track of all three 
states. However, this can be simplified to two states with the 
following observation. From a point in the middle of the 
route between the computers the receipt of SYN packets 
from both sides of a connection implies that both computers 
can reach each other and want to establish a connection, 
strongly indicating that the connection will be established 
with a completing ACK. SCD makes use of this observation 
and defines an established connection as one where both 
sides have received a SYN from the other side but not 
necessarily an ACK. Therefore, SCD processes only TCP 
SYN packets, or an average of about 1 in 20 packets. In 
typical Internet traffic, TCP accounts for the most of traffic 
(could be as high as 95%), of which 5-10% is SYN packets 
[15]. 
SCD is used for BDFT to pre-filter incomplete 
connection attempts and reduce the total loading on the 
methods. SCD stores the state of all connection attempts and 
performs a comparison on the connection state to determine 
when a connection has been established. SCD can report the 
current connection status in real-time, every time the state of 
a flow changes. The connection status is reported as a 
Boolean value; true if the flow is now established, and false 
if it is not yet established. Connection information can then 
be used to filter or pass packets for that flow to a higher 
level monitoring system. 
The operation of SCD can be summarized as follows: 
TCP SYN packets are associated to flow identifiers using 
two Bloom filters for both space and time efficiency. We 
employ two Bloom filters, one filter for each SYN direction. 
Once a TCP SYN has been detected from both sides of a 
connection, SCD will report that the connection was 
successfully established. The problem of tracking 
connection establishment can now be defined as the 
following question: when a TCP SYN is received from one 
side of a connection has the other side already sent a SYN? 
If so, then the connection is established; if not, then store the 
fact that this side of the connection has sent a SYN. To 
answer this question, SCD keeps state on all SYN packets 
that have been sent and the direction that they were sent in. 
Direction is determined by comparing the source and 
destination IP addresses, e.g., if source IP is greater than 
destination IP then the packet is assigned direction 1, and if 
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source IP is less than destination IP the packet is assigned 
direction 2. 
Network monitoring applications such as tracking the 
duration of TCP flows can be significantly improved using 
the pre-filtering provided by SCD to filter out flows which 
are never fully established. In [18], it was shown that 
filtering those unsuccessful flows can reduce the processing 
requirements by 95%. In this paper, SCD is adopted to pre-
filter incomplete TCP flows for BDFT. Section IX.A 
highlights the effect of SCD parameters on accuracy and 
memory usage. 
IV. TRACKING STATE WITH BINS
Network operators desire to track the state of network 
flows to extract additional information about the traffic on 
their network. This information can be varied, and the 
required state transitions for a flow can be equally varied. 
Providing a truly flexible and open definition of the state 
transitions for a flow requires that the state tracking method 
be able to update the state of a flow based on arbitrary 
packets and times. Such a state tracking method can meet 
any demands placed on it. Flexibility comes with a price, 
however, and a state tracking implementation which 
processes every packet and can allow arbitrary state 
transitions may not be practical on today's router.   
Finding an implementable solution for tracking per-flow 
state is possible if the scope of the problem is narrowed.  
For some classes of information, such as flow duration, a 
limited state tracking method may meet both the 
information needs of a network operator, and be practical 
for current router hardware. Narrowing the scope of the 
problem, accepting a less precise state, and trading off 
accuracy for some errors, are several general ways to gain 
efficiency in a system. Following these principles leads us 
to define a class of flow states with the following 
characteristics:
? Many flows share a common state 
? State transitions happen for many flows at the same 
time 
? State transitions are singly-linked 
These state characteristics can be intuitively thought of as 
grouping flows into “bins”. A bin represents a group of 
flows that are all in the same state. And since all state 
transitions are unitary and happen at the same time for all 
flows in a bin, state updates can be performed by simply 
moving all of the flows in one bin to another. Such a simple 
model of state transitions creates some advantages for a 
method which tracks flow state.   
The bin grouping allows a potentially large set of flows to 
be treated as a single entity for operations such as state 
transitions, flow removal, and information queries. Memory 
efficiency can also be increased, since all flows in a bin are 
known to have a specific state there is no need to have a per-
flow state indicator. In addition, each bin can be represented 
using an arbitrary data structure, which allows a designer to 
choose the best data structure that meets the performance 
requirements specific to each bin.    
Using bins can increase state-tracking efficiency 
dramatically, but only for some applications. This is the 
main disadvantage of grouping flows into bins. There is a 
potentially large array of state machines which cannot be 
translated into a grouping of bins. For instance, state 
machines which require processing of every packet in the 
network and allow per-flow state transitions at any time are 
not easily translated into a binning approach.   
Tracking the duration of flows is one example of state 
tracking which translates well into a binning approach.  
V. BINNED DURATION FLOW TRACKING
BDFT is a method of tracking the duration of network 
flows on a per-flow basis, for every flow that passes through 
a network device. This section presents a high-level 
overview of BDFT, followed by a detailed description of 
permissible BDFT operations. Section VI discusses the 
extensions to BDFT which can improve the accuracy of 
expected BDFT performance.   
BDFT is a data structure and algorithm designed to track 
the approximate duration of all TCP flows seen on a high-
speed router. The BDFT-style binning method can also be 
extended to any network measurement application where 
minimal state is required, and where the operations required 
are adding flows, removing flows, and querying for a flow's 
state. Using BDFT as a classier allows the long duration 
flows to be aged for further processing by a DPI device to 
determine if they are P2P traffic or other traffic types. 
 Compared to NetFlow, BDFT reduces memory 
requirements in two novel ways. First, the flow 
identification information is simply not stored in memory. 
This technique of network monitoring, not storing the flow 
identification information, is one of the primary 
contributions of BDFT, and is explained further below. 
Second, the per-flow state information is stored by splitting 
the flows into a number of bins, each bin is associated with 
some state, so all flows in a bin share some common 
characteristic. Bins are the only data storage component of 
BDFT. In BDFT, each bin represents an independent and 
arbitrary length of time, therefore the bin that a flow is in 
corresponds to its current duration. A bin can be represented 
and stored using an arbitrary data structure; however 
selection of an appropriate data structure is a critical design 
decision. The selected data structure must allow the flow's 
state to be saved, queried, and removed, without any 
requirement to store flow identification information.   
In BDFT, counting Bloom filters were selected as the 
default bin data structure. This selection allows the intrinsic 
operation of Bloom filters to be used to our advantage, by 
replacing the flow identification information with hashes. 
This replacement takes advantage of the fact that counting 
Bloom filters use a number of independent hash functions 
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which are used to index counters in an array, incrementing 
them on insert, and decrementing them on delete. When a 
packet is received the hashes are calculated based on various 
flow identification information contained in the header. As a 
result, the hashes are the only information required to index 
the flow’s location in the filter, and all flow identification 
information is calculated on-the-fly from the current packet 
and the hash values, not stored in memory.    
BDFT’s bins are its only data storage component, so the 
execution of BDFT involves operations that modify, or 
lookup, the data stored within the bins in response to 
external inputs.  These operations are triggered by TCP 
packets received in the data path of a router (or other 
networking device) with the SYN, FIN, or RST flags set. 
When a TCP SYN packet is received, the corresponding 
flow is entered into the first bin, and is then automatically 
aged to successively older bins until the flow is removed 
when a FIN or RST packet is received. To determine the 
current or end-point duration of a flow, BDFT determines 
the bin number that the flow is in, which is then translated 
into a range of time (or the midpoint of the bin) and returned 
to the requester. The next sub-sections describe the 
operations of BDFT in detail.  
A. BDFT Components 
Figure 1 shows the basic operations that define how 
BDFT maintains duration information for all flows. For 
applications requiring higher performance in terms of 
accuracy, there are ways to increase the accuracy of BDFT, 
which is described in Section VI. Many of these 
enhancements come at very little cost in terms of 
implementation complexity or computing requirements, and 
therefore should be employed in most BDFT 
implementations. The basic operations are depicted as 
follows. 
Figure 1. Diagram of BDFT operations 
1) Add a Flow 
Flows are added to Bin #1 when they enter a “partially 
established” state, which we define as receipt of a SYN 
packet from either side of a connection (1st or 2nd step of 
the TCP 3-way handshake). Flows are added by creating k
hashes from the flow identification information, searching 
all bins to see if the flow already exists; and if not, 
incrementing the counters in Bin #1 corresponding to those 
hashes. Searching all bins can be avoided by using SCD pre-
filtering as described in Section III, so flows are only added 
on the 2nd step of the handshake. 
When adding a flow to a counting Bloom filter, it is 
possible that one or more counters are already at their 
maximum value. In this case, counters which are at the 
maximum value should be left at the maximum and all other 
counters incremented. Ideally each flow should only be 
added once and flows which are never established (e.g. port 
scans) should not be added. Flows which never complete the 
establishment phase must be removed from the filter. 
2) Remove a Flow 
TCP packets containing a FIN or RST flag signal the end 
of a flow, at which point the flow is removed from its bin. 
Flows are removed by searching from the shortest-duration 
bin to the longest. When the flow is found the counters 
corresponding the flow’s hashes are decremented. The 
counters corresponding to the flow must be decremented 
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every time a FIN or RST is received, until one of the 
counters reaches zero. This operation results in an 
aggressive removal of flows, e.g., some flows may be 
removed prematurely, due to multiple FIN packets being 
sent.  A solution for multi-removal of flows is presented in 
Section VI. Bins are searched starting with the youngest 
based on the observation that 40% to 70% of flows last less 
than 2 seconds [6], so the flow will most likely to be found 
in the youngest bin. 
3) Aging 
BDFT maintains its per-bin state by “aging”–the process 
of moving all flows in a shorter-duration bin to the next 
longer duration bin. When a bin is in a state where it needs 
to be aged we say that it is “expired”. Each bin represents a 
time range (duration) for flows. The time range for each bin 
must be selected based on the accuracy required vs. memory 
requirements. TABLE I shows an example of BDFT array 
configuration that uses 180,224 bytes (or 1,441,792 bits) of 
memory. (There are 720,896 entries in total for this 
example; each entry has a 2-bit counter, so the total memory 
size is 720,896×2 = 1,441,792 bits). The expected number 
of flows in each bin is based on the C_04 [16] trace flow 
duration which will be presented in detail in Section VIII.  
TABLE I. EXAMPLE BDFT ARRAY CONFIGURATION
Start 
Time
End
Time
Max
Entries
Expected 
# of 
Flows 
# of  
Hash
Counter
Bits
0  15   131072  2125  3 2 
15  45    131072  1692  3 2 
45  75      65536  929  3 2 
75  105      65536  565  3 2 
105  165      65536  620  3 2 
165  225      32768  301  3 2 
225  285      32768  228  3 2 
285  405      32768  323  3 2 
405  525      32768  189  3 2 
525  765      32768  208  3 2 
765  1245      32768  213  3 2 
1245  2205      32768  183  3 2 
2205  3165      16384  51  3 2 
3165  3600      16384  26  3 2 
Note that the number of entries for each bin should be 
configured significantly higher than the expected number of 
flows. In addition, the array should be designed so that 
when the flows are moved to the next longer bin, the next 
longer bin should have enough entries for those flows. Bin 
sizes should also be a multiple of a base unit to increase the 
efficiency of the aging algorithm. For instance, bin 1 (0-
15sec) and bin 2 (15-45sec), as illustrated in TABLE I, have 
the same number of entries (131072), as the expected 
number of active flows in bin 2 (1692) is more than half of 
that in bin 1 (2125). The size of bin 3 (65536), however, is 
only half of that of bin 2, since the expected number of 
active flows in bin 3 (929) is close to half of that in bin 2 
and many flows in bin 2 will terminate due to the fact that 
most flows only last for a short duration. The next 
subsection discusses bin time ranges and sizes in details. 
As time advances during the operation of BDFT, the 
flows in a bin become older, until the oldest flow in the bin 
is older than the time range of the bin, at which point the bin 
must be aged. The aging process is the key to BDFT; it 
allows the maintenance of the state for all flows. By keeping 
flows in counting Bloom filters, and aging the filters in 
time, no flow-specific information such as flow start time 
needs to be kept.  When a bin is expired, the flows that are 
currently in the bin are moved to the next longer duration 
bin, as shown in Figure 2. 
4) Search for a flow 
Searches are performed by an external agent submitting 
flow identification information which can be used to 
generate the k hashes. Searches are performed starting with 
the oldest bin first, and moving to sequentially younger bins, 
until a bin is found where all counters are greater than zero 
corresponding to flow’s hashes, at which point the flow is 
“found” (or a false positive was found). The reason is based 
on the assumption that the longer duration bins are the least 
likely to generate a false positive. The duration for the flow 
is an estimate calculated by determining the midpoint time 
for the bin the flow was found in. For example, if the flow is 
in a bin with a time range of 45-75 sec, a duration of 60 
seconds would be returned. 
Figure 3 depicts an example of the life of a flow as it is 
inserted, aged, and removed from BDFT. In this example, 
BDFT has bins with time ranges of 0-15 sec, 15-45 sec, 45-
75 sec, and 75-135 sec, and the flow lasts for 55 seconds. 
The flow arrives just after Bin 1 was aged, and therefore the 
flow will be in Bin 1 for its full 15-second duration.  
During normal BDFT operation, the timer to expire Bin 1 
is always running, and therefore, for example, a flow could 
arrive when Bin 1 is just about to expire or at any other 
time. In Figure 3, the “Expire Bins” box denotes the 
continuous process of checking all bins to see if they need to 
be expired. The following steps illustrate the BDFT 
operations for this example: 
? The new flow arrives; its hashes are calculated based 
on IP Src/Dst, Port Src/Dst, and protocol type 
? The flow is added to Bin 1 by incrementing the 
counters corresponding to the hashes 
? After 15 seconds Bin 1 expires and its flows are 
moved to Bin 2 
? After an additional 30 seconds Bin 2 expires and its 
flows are moved to Bin 3 
? After 55 seconds from the flow start, a TCP FIN is 
received for the flow, and the removal process begins 
? The flow’s hashes are calculated as above 
? The Bins are searched for the flow's hashes starting 
with Bin 1 
? The flow is found in Bin 3, so the counters 
corresponding to the hashes are decremented in Bin 3 
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Figure 2. BDFT aging process 
Figure 3. Flow chart of the life of a flow in BDFT
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B. BDFT Parameters 
Design and analysis of BDFT involves specific design 
goals and several parameters which affect algorithm 
performance. TABLE I shown in the previous sub-section 
presents an example of BDFT configuration. The key 
parameters include: 
? m – The size of the Bloom filter (in total entries). 
? n – The expected number of entries in the filter. Also, 
the number of items in the set. 
? k – The number of independent hash functions per 
Bloom filter. 
? c – The maximum count in an entry of a counting 
Bloom filter. 
In [4], detailed analyses of the Bloom filter were 
systematically conducted. We have also followed the 
fundamentals of [4] and conducted thorough mathematical 
analyses on the expected performance of BDFT based on 
each of the parameters, taken independently of the others. 
Independent analysis of BDFT parameters leads us to 
present a series of basic heuristics for choosing a full set of 
BDFT parameters, given the goals of the algorithm 
designer. We choose a heuristic approach due to the 
BDFT’s ability to adapt to a wide range of design goals and 
network traffic characteristics, based on the decisions of the 
designer.  
Some typical design goals include accuracy (or error 
probability), probability of a false positive, expected number 
of overflowed counters for the counting Bloom filter, 
processor and memory usage. Different design goals and 
traffic characteristics will affect the selection of BDFT 
parameters. For instance, if the ratio of the number of entries 
to maximum entries (n/m) is high, then the probability of 
false positive will increase. Formally, the probability of a 
false positive is also determined by the probability of 
selecting k bits that are set to true, as presented in [4]: 
Figure 4 illustrates the search error probability of a 
Bloom filter when the ratio of entries to total entries (n/m) 
and the number of hash functions are varied. 
The size of the counter for the counting Bloom filter is 
another example to consider in parameter selection. The 
standard Bloom filter with one bit (true/false) per entry does 
not support removal of items without generating false 
negatives, see Section VI for details. Counter overflows 
contributes to false negatives which is a critical issue for 
accuracy. The expected number of overloaded counters can 
be calculated as follows. Each entry in a Bloom filter can be 
considered independently when determining the probability 
that it will be incremented. To cause an overflow the 
counter must be selected c+1 times out of n inserts. We are 
interested in the probability of any overflow of the counter, 
as counter can overflow multiple times, defined as c+1, c+2, 
c+3 .... The probability of having x matches in n inserts 
follows the binomial distribution if the counts are assumed 
to be independent. For a given maximum count c, the 
probability of overflowing a single counter/entry is given by 
[4][8]: 
Figure 4. Probability of a false positive w.r.t. varying n/m ratios and 
the number of hash functions 
The number of expected overflows in a filter is then m× 
P[Counter Overflow]. The probability of counter overflow 
could be extremely small with 3-bit or 4-bit counters. For 
instance, the probability of counter overflow could be 
dramatically decreased (10-5 ×) from 2-bit to 3-bit counters 
and even down to ~ 10-15 with 4-bit counters [8]. For our 
experiments, if 3-bit or 4-bit wide counters are used, counter 
overflows could almost be eliminated entirely. 
Bin time ranges and sizes are one of the most complex 
decisions when designing a BDFT array. This is also a 
flexible aspect of the design, as BDFT can be customized to 
give fine-grained or coarse grained feedback on the duration 
of flows. TABLE I is an example of a fine-grained 
configuration. A coarse-grained design, for example, could 
consist of only 3 bins with time ranges of 0-20 sec, 20-110 
sec, and 110-3610 sec. The sizing of the bins depends on the 
flow duration distribution that is expected in the network. 
The distribution does not have to be exact, but should 
provide a general guideline for the number of flows 
expected in each bin.  
For example, the flow duration distribution described in 
Section VIII shows that 75% of valid flows in a traffic race 
last less than 15 seconds. Therefore, for a network where 
100,000 valid flows are expected to be active at any time, a 
maximum of 75,000 flows would be expected to be stored 
in a bin containing flows from 0-15 seconds. This bin would 
need to be sized accordingly to reduce expected error rates. 
Higher duration bins typically have fewer flows stored, and 
therefore can be sized smaller to reduce memory usage. Bin 
sizes should also be a multiple of a base size to increase the 
efficiency of the aging algorithm. 
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As a general guideline, to design a BDFT array with a 
high search accuracy means that the long duration bins 
should have a search accuracy of at least 99.9+%. The 
number of active flows in each bin can be estimated from 
the flow duration distribution. We determine the number of 
flows in each bin according to the following assumptions: 
? There are 1,000,000 terminating flows each hour. 
? Flows arrive at a uniform rate. 
? The flow duration distribution is uniformly 
distributed within a bin. 
From assumption 3, the average termination time of 
flows in a bin is half the bin duration (note that assumption 
3 is worst-case, in normal traffic the distribution is skewed 
towards shorter duration flows, resulting in fewer flows in 
the bin).  The number of flows that terminate in a given bin 
within a certain time can be directly read from the flow 
duration distribution. Also the flows that are longer duration 
than the current bin, but are passing through the bin must be 
taken into account. Given the above assumptions, the 
number of flows active in bin b is given by Little's law, 
where the Average Time in Bin is half of the bin duration: 
Flows Ending in Bin = Average Time in Bin × Arrival Rate 
(ending in bin)
Arrival Rate (ending in bin) = (1,000,000 flows/hour × P[Flow
Terminating in the Bin]) / 3600 seconds/hour 
Accounting for the contributions of longer duration flows 
to the flows in the bin requires summing all the flows which 
are in the bin but will not terminate here, and instead are 
moving to higher duration bins. Little's equation still 
applies, but the Average Time in Bin is now the full bin 
duration. Let n represent the number of bins and c be the 
current bin; 
Arrival Rate (not ending in bin) = (1,000,000 flows/hour × 
? ?????????????????????????? ? / 3600 seconds/hour 
TABLE I shows an example configuration of bin time 
ranges which match the requirements of the fine-grained 
design. The number of active flows expected in each bin 
was calculated using the abovementioned three equations. 
Once the bin time ranges and number of active flows in each 
bin has been determined, the bins can be sized. Heuristics 
for sizing the bins are as follows: 
? A short duration (0-15sec) medium accuracy bin 
(95%) should be used to filter the large number of 
very short duration flows. 
? The short duration bins will not be searched in many 
cases, and therefore can be designed to have a higher 
false probability error rate in order to save on memory. 
? The long duration bins should have high accuracy 
(99.9%) for good search accuracy. 
? The number of flows normally decreases 
logarithmically with the duration, so longer duration 
bins should cover more time and be reduced in size. 
? The binning process introduces inaccuracy when the 
actual duration of the flow is not the average duration 
of the bin, so longer duration bins should cover more 
time, and the shorter duration bins less time. This 
keeps the relative inaccuracy involved in the binning 
process to a minimum. 
In summary, parameter selection depends on various 
factors, particularly resource constraints and design goals. 
There are different possible configurations with respect to 
various scenarios and design goals. Parameter selection 
heuristics for Bloom filters and counting Bloom filters have 
been investigated by researchers [3][4][8][17]. This paper 
focuses on bin time ranges and sizing. Section VIII and IX 
present some experimental and computational analyses for 
two specific traffic traces vis-à-vis accuracy, overflow 
errors, and memory usage.  
VI. BDFT EXTENSIONS 
The standard BDFT as described in Section V will 
provide a basic level of performance suitable for some 
applications. For applications requiring higher performance 
in terms of accuracy there are various ways to increase the 
accuracy of BDFT substantially. This section presents 
several enhancements to both the accuracy and 
computational requirements of BDFT. Many of these 
enhancements come at very little cost in terms of 
implementation complexity or computing requirements, and 
therefore should be employed in most BDFT 
implementations. 
A. Enhanced Insertion and Removal 
The accuracy and computational performance of BDFT 
can be improved if it can be guaranteed that for each flow 
received, the insert and remove functions will be executed 
once and only once. Relying on SYN/FIN/RST directly can 
lead to an imbalance in BDFT due to timeouts and lost 
packets. Since BDFT increments counters on SYN packets, 
and decrements them on FIN/RST, this imbalance can cause 
incomplete removal of flows (SYN > FIN/RST) or potential 
removal of multiple flows which share hashes by setting one 
of the shared counters to zero (FIN/RST > SYN). Balancing 
the number of SYN packets vs. the number of FIN/RST 
packets can be accomplished using pre-filtering mechanisms 
such as Symmetric Connection Detection (SCD) [17][18]. 
SCD can be employed to ensure that there is only one insert 
per flow, so using SCD also has the additional benefit of 
reducing counter overflows. However, balancing SYN vs. 
FIN/RST also requires that only one removal notification be 
sent to BDFT per flow, regardless of the number of actual 
FIN/RST packets. The functionality required for FIN/RST 
can also be achieved using SCD or a simple variant. A 
Bloom filter could be employed to track all of the flows 
which have already sent a FIN or RST, by adding the flow 
to the filter and notifying BDFT of the removal if the flow is 
not already in the filter. BDFT’s accuracy can be increased 
substantially using these techniques, therefore the small 
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incremental memory cost to implement pre-filtering such as 
SCD in conjunction with BDFT is a good design tradeoff. 
B. TCP Timeouts - no FIN or RST 
BDFT relies on the receipt of FIN or RST packets to 
signal the end of a TCP connection and remove the flow 
from its present bin. However, it is possible for a TCP 
timeout to occur such that no FIN or RST packet is ever sent 
on the connection. For example, when an Internet 
connection goes down, or a route changes, packets no longer 
reach the router running BDFT. In this case the flow is 
“hung” in BDFT and will never be removed. Eventually 
hung flows overwhelm the long duration bins resulting in a 
dramatic loss in accuracy for both long duration and short 
duration flows. As a result, timeouts must be accounted for 
in environments where they are possible, typically about 
0.1% of Internet flows result in a timeout (see TABLE IV). 
VII. FALSE POSITIVE REMOVALS 
A false positive removal (FPR) occurs when a false 
positive leads to the removal of a flow (that may or may not 
exist) instead of the correct flow. This problem can affect 
Bloom filters when multiple filters are searched for removal. 
The mechanism that leads to a FPR is quite similar for both 
hash table types, but in both cases the sequence of events is 
fairly complex. For this reason, to the best of our 
knowledge, the FPR problem has not been identified before. 
The sequence of events which leads to a FPR is best 
explained by examples. 
In the case when multiple Bloom filters are searched to 
find the flow to remove (as in BDFT) a FPR is a serious 
error that can lead to multiple flows being “orphaned” in the 
filter(s). For example, a flow with hashes {1, 2, 3} is added 
to Bin 0. The flows in Bin 0 are then aged to Bin 1 (so Bin 1 
now contains flow {1, 2, 3}). Now two flows are added to 
Bin 0 with hashes {1, 2, 4} and {3, 5, 6}. At this point a 
search performed on Bin 0 for flow {1, 2, 3} will result in a 
false positive. If flow {1, 2, 3} ends at this point it will be 
identified for removal from Bin 0 due to the false positive, 
and therefore this is a false positive removal. The result 
would be two orphaned flows in Bin 0 and one in Bin 1. In 
Bin 0 the flows would now be {-, -, 4} and {-, 5, 6}, and in 
Bin 1 the flow would still be there as {1, 2, 3}. 
These orphans will likely never be removed from the 
filters, and end up polluting the filters. When flows {1, 2, 4} 
and {3, 5, 6} are removed they will likely result in false 
negatives, unless they end up creating a FPR in other bins, 
which can compound the problem. 
FPR is a serious problem. This paper does not deal with 
FPR. FPR could make a valuable area for future work.  
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
A. Trace Characteristics 
We obtained traces of Internet traffic from the well-
known networking research organizations CAIDA [16] and 
NLANR [9], with the two traces hereafter referred to as 
C_04 (CAIDA) and N_12 (NLANR). These two traces are 
representative of the diverse extremes of Internet traffic. 
This section highlights the main intrinsic characteristics of 
these two traces. In general, the C_04 trace represents 
normal “dirty” public backbone Internet traffic, with many 
packets being invalid attempts at port scanning or DDoS 
attacks. The second trace, N_12, represents the other end of 
the traffic spectrum from C_04, being fairly “clean” and 
containing a low number of active flows and very little or no 
attack and port scanning traffic. 
TABLE II. TRACE  CHARACTERISTICS
NLANR
2003-12
(N_12)
As a 
%
of
total
 CAIDA 
2003-04
(C_04)
As a 
%
of
total
Total    
    Packets  
Total TCP  
    Packets 
196,956,306 
56,992,573 28.94% 
202,510,985 
175,418,691 86.62% 
Total   Bytes 
Total TCP  
    Bytes 
Avg.   
   Bandwidth 
Avg. Bytes   
 Per TCP 
Pkt.
46,472,308,705 
41,482,633,988 
98.48 Mbps 
727.86 
89.26% 
95,944,872,321 
91,766,946,651 
203.33 Mbps 
523.13 
95.65% 
Duration 3600 seconds  3600 seconds 
Both traces represent one hour of Internet traffic. These 
traces were selected to demonstrate performance over long 
periods of time TABLE II demonstrates the basic 
characteristics of each trace. The average bandwidth in both 
traces is roughly similar at 100Mbps and 200Mbps, 
sufficient to demonstrate performance on high-speed links. 
The total number of packets is similar; however, the number 
of TCP packets is over three times higher in the C_04 trace. 
TABLE III. TRACE CHARACTERISTICS FOR TCP CONTROL PACKETS
N_12 As a %  of 
total
C_04 As a %  of 
total
Total 196.9M  202.5M  
SYN 732,075 0.37% 15,608,680 7.71% 
FIN  586,000 0.30% 6,084,826 3.00% 
RST 52,628 0.03% 3,914,433 1.93% 
TABLE III shows significant differences between the 
C_04 and N_12 traces. The percentage of total packets 
which are TCP packets with one of the main control flags 
(SYN, FIN, RST) turned on is over ten times lower in the 
N_12 trace. Another difference is the percentage of RST 
packets in the C_04 trace is over sixty times higher than the 
N_12 trace. Given that RST packets typically indicate 
abnormal connection termination, this large difference 
indicates that the C_04 trace has many connections that do 
not follow normal TCP rules, such as port scanning or DoS 
attack traffic. 
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TABLE IV. TRACE CHARACTERISTICS FOR TCP 5-TUPLE FLOWS
N_12
As a %  
of total C_04
As a 
%
of
total
Total Flows  352,410          11,215,873        
Total Established 
Flows
274,473 77.88%  555,927 4.96% 
Ave. Active Flows  11,284          901,245        
Timed Out Flows  430 0.16% 4376 0.78% 
Unique IPs  97,036  2,681,172        
TABLE IV is a fine-grained look at the flows in each of 
the traces, and highlights the substantial differences between 
the two traces. The large percentage of SYN packets in the 
C_04 trance can now be confirmed to be related to the large 
number of incomplete flows, over 95% in this case. Also, 
due to the large number of incomplete connection attempts 
(likely port scanning), there are a very high number of 
active flows on average in the C_04 trace compared to the 
N_12 trace. For these reasons, the C_04 trace is considered 
to be a good example of “dirty” Internet traffic and the 
N_12 trace is a good example of “clean” traffic (with almost 
80% of flows being valid in the N_12 trace). 
The distribution of flow durations is an important factor 
in the design of a BDFT array, as shown in Section V. The 
duration distribution allows an estimation of the required 
size of the bins in BDFT, and therefore an estimation of the 
total memory usage of the BDFT array. One of the few 
papers to discuss the number flows that last specific lengths 
of time is “Dragonflies and Tortoises” [6], where they find 
that 40% to70% of flows last less than two seconds. 
Figure 5 shows the flow duration distribution for the 
N_12 trace. Only flows that are fully established within the 
trace are counted. This distribution shows that 75% of fully 
established flows are less two seconds long. This duration 
distribution is characterized by the sharp falloff in the 
number of flows as the duration increases. 
Figure 5. Flow duration distribution for trace N_12 
Figure 6 reveals the flow duration distribution for the 
C_04 trace. Like the N_12 trace, this distribution has a large 
number of flows that last less than two seconds, 50% in this 
case.
Figure 6. Flow duration distribution for trace C_04
B. Experimental Setup 
To determine the accuracy of BDFT, we implemented an 
experimental framework that keeps track of the duration 
recorded by a perfect flow tracker with the estimated flow 
duration reported. The perfect flow tracker was 
implemented using standard per-flow tracking and 
measurement techniques. We defined a flow to be the 
standard 5-tuple of IP source and destination address, TCP 
source and destination port, and protocol type (TCP only). 
As mentioned earlier in Section VI, packets from the 
trace are also passed to a SCD filter [17][18] to BDFT as 
well as a simple FIN/RST-checking Bloom filter. The SCD 
filter was sized large enough to be nearly 100% accurate to 
eliminate any affect on the performance results from SCD 
errors. Mitigating timeout effects is still an open area of 
research, so for our implementation, we automatically 
remove flows after two minutes with no activity, as adopted 
in TCP standard. 
To present the accuracy of tracking duration with bins, 
we adopt the following definition of a success. A tracking 
success is defined to be an estimated flow duration result 
that is within 50% of the actual flow duration, for flows that 
are greater than 30 seconds in duration. This definition is 
based on the design goals of BDFT; it is intended to track 
long-duration flows to an approximate duration rather than 
an exact duration. In addition, the duration of actual flows 
and the duration of bins are not exact, depending on when 
the flows actually arrive, as explained in BDFT 
components. Take Figure 3 as a concrete example: if a flow 
arrives just after Bin 1 was aged, the flow will be in Bin 1 
for its full 15-second duration. On the other hand, if the flow 
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arrives just before Bin 1 ages, the flow will be moved to Bin 
2. Therefore, a tracking success is defined to be the 
estimated flow duration is within 50% of the actual flow 
duration. Tracking failures occur if a false negative or don’t 
know is returned, or the duration is outside the acceptable 
range (mostly caused by a false positive). 
The design of the BDFT array is presented in TABLE I 
for fine-grained tracking of flow duration. The basic bin 
sizing allocates 128k (128×1024 = 131,072) entries for the 
first bin, which we refer to as the base filter size. The base 
size uses 180,224 bytes of memory. See TABLE I for the 
table configuration and the explanation. We tested BDFT at 
multiples of the base filter size (and therefore the same 
multiple of all the other filter sizes) to analyze the 
performance of BDFT at various memory usage levels. Note 
that we deliberately use less than ideal number of hashes for 
the expected loads on the Bloom filters and also use smaller 
counters than typically suggested. We find in simulation that 
these choices generate greater overall results. 
C. Experimental Results 
TABLE V shows the performance of BDFT with various 
memory configurations. A critical factor for a flow tracking 
method is the memory used to achieve a desired 
performance level and the computational requirements of 
the method. BDFT was able to achieve practical accuracy 
performance at memory usage levels low enough to be 
practical for implementation on high-speed routers. 
TABLE V. BDFT PERFORMANCE
Trace Memory Usage (bytes) Accuracy 
C_04 90112  95.46% 
C_04 180224  99.19% 
C_04 360448  99.87% 
C_04 720896  99.97% 
N_12 2816  96.85% 
N_12 5632  99.79% 
N_12 11264  99.98% 
BDFT has two issues that can lead to buildup of orphan 
and stale flows in the tables. These issues are false positive 
removal (FPR) and flow timeouts. For our simulations, the 
effect of these issues is removed by accurately correcting for 
FPR and removing flows from the filters that have not seen 
activity for two minutes in the traffic traces. These 
corrections provide increased insight into the mechanisms 
that affect performance for a flow tracking approach. 
Without the correction, the accuracy reduces significantly 
for smaller memory usage. As an example, results for BDFT 
that are not corrected for FPR, but with timeout correction, 
are provided in TABLE VI.  
TABLE VI. BDFT PERFOMRANCE WITH FPR FOR C_04 
Memory Usage (bytes) # of Overflows Accuracy 
90112 902 79.24% 
180224 134 96.15% 
360448 16 99.59% 
720896 1 99.98% 
Also, note that a simple way to avoid FPR errors is to 
oversize the tables such that the chance of false positives is 
small. The use of SCD as a pre-filter reduces the number of 
flows that are timeouts by 95% on average [18]. 
BDFT accuracy results are in-line with our expectations.  
With only 0.257 bits of storage required per flow BDFT 
achieves 99.87% accuracy on the C_04 trace, and with only 
0.128 bits of storage required per flow BDFT achieves 
99.79% accuracy on the N_12 trace. Bits-per-flow is 
calculated by dividing the memory usage by the number of 
established flows. For instance, the third entry in TABLE V 
has 360,448 bytes (or 360,448×8 bits) for C_04 at 99.87% 
accuracy and the total number of flows for C_04 is 
11,215,873 as shown in TABLE IV. Bits-per-flow, 
therefore, is (360,448×8)/11,215,873 = 0.257 bits. These 
results also demonstrate an important point; in practice it is 
not necessary to use 4 bits per counter in a counting Bloom 
filter, which has been the standard number; in these 
simulations 2 bits per counter was sufficient to achieve 
excellent accuracy. However, it should be noted that the 
primary failure mechanism in overload conditions (e.g., the 
entry having 90112 bytes for C_04) is counter overflow 
(902 overflows as shown in TABLE VI). These results 
confirm that BDFT is a good choice to track flow state when 
CPU time is more expensive than memory. 
IX. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Computational cost plays a crucial role for monitoring of 
high-speed networks. This section first briefly presents the 
memory and computational efficiency of SCD. A 
comparison of BDFT with two other flow duration 
strategies is then conducted. Third, the computational cost 
of BDFT is further discussed. 
A. SCD Performance Cost 
To perform a computational evaluation of BDFT, the 
memory usage and computational overhead of SCD are 
considered, as SCD is used to determine if flows are 
successfully established. In terms of memory usage, with 
only 32k bytes, SCD can achieve 99.998% accuracy for the 
N_12 trace and 99%+ for the C_04 trace. By increasing 
memory usage to 512k, over 99.9% accuracy can be 
achieved for the C_04 trace [18]. As demonstrated in 
VIII.A, the C_04 trace is an example of a good worst-case 
test of SCD, as it has high invalid flow ratio combined with 
the high number of active flows. The N_12 trace represents 
the other end of the traffic spectrum, containing a low 
number of active traces and very little or no attack and port 
scanning traffic, thus making this trace an example of the 
best-case performance of SCD. As a comparison of memory 
usage, the per-flow tracker used 24MB of memory to store 
about one million flows, or forty-eight times more memory 
than the 99.9% accurate SCD.  
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In [18], it also demonstrated the computational efficiency 
of SCD, which was about 172 seconds to process the 3600-
second C_04 trace. The execution time was an 11× 
reduction compared to the naïve flow tracking approach. 
B. Other Flow Duration Strategies 
The accuracy of BDFT is a clear advantage. However, it 
is possible that another simpler implementation could 
achieve similar accuracy with less complexity. For this 
reason we selected two other strategies to track flow 
duration and compared the results with BDFT. In this 
section, we describe the operation of the two competing 
duration tracking strategies. 
To maintain similarity in the comparisons the memory 
usage and sampling rate were balanced between all three 
strategies, BDFT, Naïve Sampled, and TDBF [7] (see 
section II). 
1) Naïve Sampled 
A simple approach to tracking flow duration is based on 
the sampling idea used by NetFlow. NetFlow operates by 
keeping a flow record for every flow that it sees in the 
network. When a packet arrives, its corresponding flow 
record is looked up and the appropriate statistics and 
counters updated. If no flow record exists for the flow then a 
new one is created. Flow records are removed if no packets 
are received from that flow for a short period of time, 
typically 15 seconds. Likewise, flows records are also 
expired once they reach a certain age, typically 15-30 
minutes. When a flow record expires it is exported to an 
external collector computer for further processing. 
The pure naive idea to track flow durations is to process 
every packet and keep a record of every flow in the 
network. As part of each flow record timestamps could be 
maintained for the first and last packet in the flow, and the 
flow records could be expired after a long interval. 
Unfortunately this approach would share the same scaling 
problems as basic NetFlow. So in our implementation of a 
naïve duration tracker, we make several sacrifices to the 
overall accuracy to obtain time and space performance that 
is comparable to BDFT. 
For our naïve duration tracker implementation the tracker 
processes packets based on a sampling rate of one in twenty, 
which matches BDFT's effective sampling rate. The 
sampled packets are processed in a similar way to NetFlow. 
A flow record table is maintained which contains entries 
consisting of a flow identifier and the start and last packet 
timestamps. When a packet is sampled the table is searched 
for the flow and the timestamps updated if the flow is 
already in the table, or the flow is added to the table. If the 
table is full then the oldest flow in the table is expired, 
meaning it is removed from the table. 
Accuracy results for the naïve implementation are 
determined by searching the flow table every time a flow 
terminates. The estimated duration for the flow returned 
from the naïve tracker is compared with the actual time 
using the same comparison methods used for BDFT. 
2) Time-Decaying Bloom Filters (TDBF) 
The second approach to tracking the duration of flows 
involves the use of a single Time-Decaying Bloom Filter 
[7]. A TDBF allows the multiplicity of an item in a set to be 
tracked, with more recent insertions being weighted higher. 
We can modify the basic operation of the TDBF slightly 
to track the length of time that an item has been in a set. The 
basic idea is to initialize all counters corresponding to an 
item's hashes to a large initial value, e.g., 40000. Then, in 
our implementation, every ten seconds all counters are 
decremented. When a query is performed to determine how 
long the item has been in the set the duration is equal to 
(40000 - current counter value) × 10 seconds. The detailed 
operation of the modified TDBF can be explained through 
an explanation of its main operations, insert, search, and 
removal. 
To insert a flow into the TDBF all counters 
corresponding to the items hashes are set to their maximum 
value according to how many bits are available in a counter. 
For our implementation we used 16 bit counters for a 
maximum value of 65535. Counters are set to the maximum 
value regardless of their current value. 
To remove a flow from the TDBF all of the 
corresponding counters are set to 0. To determine the 
duration of a flow the counters corresponding to the flows 
hashes are read and the lowest value that is not 0 is selected. 
The duration can be calculated by the formula (65535 - 
lowest counter value) × 10 seconds. This formula is based 
on the fact that we decrement all counters every 10 seconds. 
If all counters are 0 then a failure to find the flow is 
reported. It is important to note that choosing the lowest 
counter that is not 0 breaks the fundamental operation of 
Bloom filters where a 0 would normally indicate that the 
item is not in the filter. Due to the nature of network traffic 
and assuming that queries will only be performed for flow 
IDs that are guaranteed to be in the filter we can assume that 
if any counters are not 0, then the flow has not been 
removed. This optimization in our specific case results in a 
100% improvement in accuracy. If the above assumption 
cannot be met, then flows which have one or more counters 
set to 0 cannot be assumed to be in the network and must be 
returned as a lookup failure. 
In terms of complexity when compared to BDFT, TDBF 
is somewhat simpler due to the fact that there is only a 
single Bloom filter instead of one per bin. 
3) Performance Comparison 
TABLES VII and VIII show the BDFT, TDBF, and 
Naïve results for comparison. It can be seen that BDFT 
outperforms both Naïve and TDBF in both traces. With only 
0.257 bits of storage required per flow, BDFT achieves 
99.59% accuracy on the C_04 trace, and with only 0.128 
bits of storage required per flow, BDFT achieves 99.55% 
accuracy on the N_12 trace. The numbers of established 
flows in an hour are 352,410 for N_12 and 11,215,873 for 
C_04, respectively, as shown in TABLE IV. The number of 
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overflowed counters column is higher than the theoretical 
expectations derived in Section V.B. This is due to real-
world factors not taken into account during the theoretical 
analysis, such as timed-out flows, and errors introduced by 
the SCD filtering.  
The flows which timeout end up “polluting” the higher 
duration bins with many dead flows. In our case, these bins 
were not designed to handle the increased number of flows 
due to the timeouts, and therefore can become overloaded to 
the point of having overflowed counters. This problem can 
be easily corrected by increasing the counter width from 2 
bits to 3 bits. TABLE IV shows the number of timed out 
flows for each trace. 
TABLE VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON FOR C_04
Algorithm Memory  
(bytes) 
# of Overflowed 
Counters 
Accuracy 
BDFT 90112 902 79.24% 
BDFT 180224 134 96.15% 
BDFT 360448 16 99.59% 
BDFT 720896 1 99.98% 
 Naïve  (1 in 20) 524288 N/A 6.07% 
Naïve (1 in 100) 524288 N/A 1.58% 
TDBF 131072 N/A 58.79% 
TABLE VIII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON FOR N_12
Algorithm Memory 
(bytes) 
# of Overflowed 
Counters 
Accuracy 
BDFT 1408 912 38.43% 
BDFT 2816 136 82.23% 
BDFT 5632 17 99.55% 
BDFT 11264 1 99.97% 
BDFT 22528 0 100.00% 
Naïve  (1 in 20) 524288 N/A 8.34% 
Naïve (1 in 100) 524288 N/A 3.82% 
TDBF 131072 N/A 58.79% 
The significant difference in per-flow memory 
requirements for the two traces is caused by the differences 
in the flow duration distribution for the two flows. Referring 
back to Figures 5 and 6, we observe that the distribution for 
the N_12 trace is tightly concentrated in the 0-4 second 
range, whereas C_04 is relatively evenly distributed to 
higher durations. When the flow durations are concentrated 
such that most flows end within one or two seconds, the 
overall loading on the first and therefore subsequent bins is 
greatly reduced. In this situation flows are added to the first 
bin and then quickly removed so the number of flows 
actually stored in the bin at any time is quite low, resulting 
in lower memory requirements. 
TABLES VII and VIII also illustrate two important 
additional points. BDFT is able to achieve 100% (or near 
100%) accuracy when the available memory is increased to 
the point where almost all counter overflows are eliminated. 
Therefore, even though BDFT is an approximate method of 
tracking flow duration, it is applicable in situations where 
close to 100% accuracy is required if sufficient memory is 
available. The memory requirements for achieving 100% or 
close to 100% accuracy were 10.37 bits/flow for the C_04
trace, and 0.657 bits/flow for the N_12 trace. 
C. BDFT Performance Analysis 
In general, there is a lack of thorough computational 
analysis for this area in the literature. Complexity analysis 
of algorithms is a commonly used method to analyze 
performance and scalability. But BDFT scales well with 
respect to the number of flows; this measure does not give 
much insight into its performance. Instead, this section 
presents an analysis for the computational cost of each 
BDFT operation. The analysis could be used as a baseline 
for comparing with other methods in the future. 
Several assumptions about the environment and 
implementation can also be made. First, we assume that 
BDFT is implemented in software, though it can be 
implemented in hardware. Next, assume that they are 
executed in a single thread on a processor that performs 
sequential memory access only. Third, ignore the effects of 
caching.
For BDFT, it is assumed that 3 hash functions are used 
and counters are sized large enough that they do not 
overflow. Note that we deliberately choose a number of 
hash functions less than optimal to save on the number of 
memory accesses (the lower number of hash functions 
reduces the probability of a counter overflow, so smaller 
counters can be used). The following explores the 
operations of insert, remove, search, and age. Results of 
those operations are summarized in TABLE IX. 
TABLE IX. EXPECTED COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Operation Memory 
Reads 
Memory
Writes 
Branches Total 
Insert 3 3 3 9 
Removal 6 3 6 15 
Search (rare) 21 0 21 42 
Aging
(periodic) 
2000 1000 1000 4000 
Insertion of elements into BDFT requires modification of 
the first bin only. The current counters corresponding to the 
items hashes must be read, incremented, and then updated 
with the new values, and a check performed for overflow. 
The step requires 3 memory reads and 3 writes, and 3 
comparisons.  
Removal of items requires searching the bins starting 
with the shortest duration bin first. Given a nominal BDFT 
bin setup for fine-grained monitoring of nominal Internet 
traffic, about 75% of searches will end with the first bin, 
about 15% will end in the second, and some flows will 
require searching all bins [6][17].  We take the expected 
case to be two bins. Searching one bin requires three 
memory reads, and three comparisons. The removal 
operation is the reverse of insertion; decrement the counters 
and write the new values to the filter. 
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012 49
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
Searching starts with the longest duration bin. Searching 
is the most expensive operation in BDFT, with the worst-
case requiring reading the counters corresponding to the 
hashes in every bin except the shortest. This would require 
3×(number of bins - 1) memory reads and the same number 
of comparisons, with about half the bins being the average 
case.
Aging of flows must be performed during BDFT 
operation. Depending on the implementation, aging bins 
may require merging counting Bloom filters of different 
sizes, without overwriting the data in the recipient filter. In 
this case, the merging process requires reading all of the 
counters in both filters, adding them together, and writing 
the results to the longer-duration filter. In special cases, the 
aging process can be optimized. For instance, if both filters 
are the same size, and the recipient filter can be overwritten 
(because its contents were just aged to a longer duration 
bin), then aging the filter is a simple pointer update. 
Aging occurs every 15 seconds, or as often as whatever 
the minimum duration state represents. In a nominal BDFT 
configuration, only the shortest duration filter needs to be 
processed every 15 sec, and the second shortest duration 
filter every 30 sec, and so on for all filters. The longer 
duration filters need to be processed only every 5-10 min. 
To calculate relative performance, it is assumed that the first 
Bloom filter in BDFT is of size 1000 and so is the second 
filter, and a merge operation must take place. 
In brief, BDFT provides very good computational 
requirements for the most frequent operations, e.g., insert 
and remove operations. Search operation can be done 
efficiently. Aging requires more operations, depending on 
the filter size. 
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper presented a method of per-flow state tracking–
BDFT. The method was analyzed to determine 
computational performance, and simulations were run with 
two real-world packet traces to determine memory usage 
and accuracy. Both computational performance and memory 
efficiency are critical to per-flow state tracking for high-
speed routers. Based on the results, the “binning” concept 
appears to offer good performance for tracking per-flow 
state for a specific class of state machines.  
Future research directions include a comparison of BDFT 
with other measurement methods, e.g., FCF ACSM [3], and 
a detailed investigation of the effect of false positives. The 
definition of a tracking success adopted in this paper is an 
estimated flow duration result that is within 50% of the 
actual flow duration, for flows that are greater than 30 
seconds in duration. A more accurate or more restrictive 
definition of a tracking success along with its associated 
performance cost could also be investigated. 
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Abstract—SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) has been widely 
adopted as a signaling protocol to establish, modify and 
terminate media sessions between end-users in the Internet. 
SIP introduces a retransmission mechanism to ensure the 
reliability of its real-time message delivery. However, 
retransmission can make server overload worse, leading to 
server crashes in SIP-based carrier networks (e.g. Skype). 
In order to study the impact of retransmission mechanism 
on SIP overload, in this paper, we create a discrete time 
fluid model to describe the queuing dynamics of an 
overloaded SIP server. Then we derive a sufficient stability 
condition that a SIP server can handle the overload 
effectively under the retransmission mechanism. Fluid 
model allows us to run fluid-based Matlab simulation 
directly to evaluate the overload performance. Event-driven 
OPNET simulation was also conducted to validate our fluid 
model. Our simulation results demonstrate that: (1) the 
sufficient stability bound is quite tight.  The bound indicates 
that effective CPU utilization as low as 20% can still lead to 
an unstable system after a short period of demand burst or 
a temporary server slowdown. Resource over-provisioning 
is not a viable solution to the server crash problem; (2) by 
satisfying the stability condition, the initial queue size 
introduced by a transient overload can avoid a system crash. 
Such stability condition can help the operator to determine 
whether and when to activate overload control mechanism 
in case of heavy load. A simple overload control solution is 
also proposed. 
Index Terms—-SIP, SIP Overload, SIP Overload Control, 
SIP Retransmission, Stability Condition, CPU Utilization 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [1] has been widely 
deployed for significantly growing session-oriented 
applications in the Internet, such as Voice-over-IP, instant 
messaging and video conference. As a signaling protocol, 
SIP is responsible for creating, modifying and 
terminating sessions in a mutual real-time communication 
[2]. 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project) has 
adopted SIP as the basis of the IMS (IP Multimedia 
Subsystem) architecture [3-5]. 
Fig. 1 illustrates a simplified configuration of a SIP 
network which consists of two basic elements: UA (User 
Agent) and P-Server (Proxy Server) [1]. A UA may 
perform two roles: in the UAC (User Agent Client) role, 
the originating UA sends requests; in the UAS (User 
Agent Server) role, the terminating UA receives requests 
and sends responses. The task of a P-server is to receive 
SIP requests and forward them to the terminating UA (or 
to another P-server that is closer to the terminating UA). 
Each P-server is assigned to serve multiple individual 
UAs. UA and P-server cooperate to establish, modify and 
terminate media sessions. 
Internet
Proxy 
Server
UA UA
Proxy 
Server
 
Figure 1. Simplified configuration of a SIP network. 
SIP is designed to be an application layer protocol 
independent of the underlying transport mechanism 
which may be TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) or 
UDP (User Datagram Protocol). SIP introduces a 
retransmission mechanism (which will be reviewed 
briefly in Appendix A) to maintain its reliability by 
retransmitting lost SIP messages either end-to-end or 
hop-by-hop [5, 6]. A SIP source uses a delay to detect a 
message loss. It would produce one or more 
retransmissions if the corresponding reply message is not 
received in a predetermined time interval. If a 
retransmission triggered by a delay caused by the 
overload, it would introduce the overhead rather than 
reliability into the network. Such redundant 
retransmissions increase the memory and CPU load for a 
SIP server, which may cause a system overload and 
deteriorate the signaling performance [6-20]. In an 
overload situation, the throughput drops down to a small 
fraction of the original processing capacity, thus poses a 
serious problem for a SIP network [12]. This kind of 
behaviour has happened in real carrier networks where 
large scale collapses of SIP servers have been observed in 
present of sporadic SIP traffic burst (e.g., emergency-
induced call volume) [13]. 
A SIP server can be overloaded due to various reasons 
such as poor capacity planning, dependency failures, 
component failures, avalanche restart, flash crowds, 
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 denial of service attacks, etc., as indicated by RFC 5390 
[21]. In general, a short period of demand burst or a 
server slowdown may bring a server overload and lead to 
server crash. The built-in SIP overload control 
mechanism has proven to be ineffective in practice, 
because it attempts to mitigate the overload by rejecting 
some calls, but the cost of rejecting a SIP session is 
comparable with the cost of serving a session. 
SIP retransmission mechanism should be disabled for 
hop-by-hop transaction when running SIP over TCP to 
avoid redundant retransmissions at both SIP and TCP 
layer [1]. However, TCP layer lacks awareness of 
application context at SIP layer. TCP flow control 
mechanism cannot prevent SIP overload collapse, as 
indicated by recent experimental evaluation on SIP-over-
TCP overload behaviour in [14]. Therefore, almost all 
real SIP networks run SIP over UDP mainly because the 
following reasons [9-23]: (1) TCP is optimized for 
accurate delivery by sacrificing its timeliness which is a 
critical requirement for real-time application such as SIP; 
(2) SIP works at application layer while TCP works at 
transport layer. Even TCP can provide reliability at 
transport layer, SIP messages can still be dropped or 
corrupted while being processed at application layer; (3) 
TCP keeps retransmitting outstanding packets until an 
ACK is received. Each retransmitted packet is pushed to 
the application layer to be a SIP message which costs 
extra CPU time and introduces more delay, therefore 
making CPU overload worse. 
The contributions of this paper are: (1) Deriving a 
sufficient stability condition that a SIP server can handle 
the overload effectively under the retransmission 
mechanism; (2) Developing a discrete-time fluid model to 
reduce significantly simulation effort; (3) Comparing the 
results of both fluid-based Matlab simulation and event-
driven OPNET simulation to demonstrate that the fluid-
based simulation is relatively accurate and scalable for 
evaluating the performance of a SIP network; (4) 
Performing fluid-based simulation and event-driven 
simulation to verify that the stability bound is quite tight, 
or an initial queue size (created by a transient overload) 
which is 5% higher than the bound will bring a server 
crash. An effective CPU utilization as low as 20% cannot 
prevent a SIP server from overload during a short period 
of maintenance service and such overload continues to 
spread even after the normal service resumes; (5) 
Proposing a simple overload control solution to prevent a 
SIP server from overload collapse. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews 
the related work on SIP overload and discusses 
simulation approaches. Section III analyzes the queuing 
dynamics of an overloaded SIP server under 
retransmission mechanism. Section IV derives a stability 
condition for SIP retransmission mechanism in the case 
of server overload. Section V evaluates the performance 
of an overloaded server. An overload control algorithm is 
proposed and validated in Section VI. Some conclusions 
are made in Section VII. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
A large scale collapse of SIP servers would result in 
widespread outage similar in impact to that recently 
reported by Skype [24]. Such a major risk has motivated 
a surge of research attention to SIP overload control. 
Experiment evaluations demonstrate that the 
retransmission mechanism can deteriorate the overload 
performance [12, 19]. Thus it is necessary to investigate 
the impact of the retransmission mechanism on the SIP 
overload. A demand burst or routine server maintenance 
such as database synchronization may accumulate the 
signaling messages to create a long queue. Excessive 
queuing delay, introduced by a long initial queue size, 
may continue to trigger the redundant retransmissions to 
crash the server after an overloaded server resumes its 
normal service with a low effective CPU utilization. It 
would be interesting to find a sufficient stability 
condition for the initial queue size, which indicates 
whether the SIP server can handle overload effectively. 
Such stability condition can help the SIP operator to 
decide whether and when to activate the overload control 
algorithm. It also can help researchers propose more 
effective solutions to avoid SIP overload collapse caused 
by the SIP retransmissions. 
Some attempts have been made to avoid overload 
collapse in SIP networks (e.g., [9-19]). For example, 
three window-based feedback algorithms were proposed 
to adjust the message sending rate of the upstream SIP 
servers based on the queue length [12]. Both centralized 
and distributed overload control mechanisms for SIP 
were investigated in [13]. Retry-after control, processor 
occupancy control, queue delay control and window 
based control were proposed to improve goodput and 
prevent overload collapse in [10]. However, these 
overload control proposals suggested that the overloaded 
receiving server advertises to its upstream sending servers 
to reduce their sending rates. Such pushback control 
solution would increase the queuing delays of newly 
arrival original messages at the upstream servers, which 
in turn cause overload at the upstream servers. Overload 
may thus propagate server-by-server to sources and block 
large amount of calls which means revenue loss for 
carriers. Similarly, a small buffer size has been proved to 
be a simple overload control mechanism at a cost of 
arbitrarily high call rejection rate and revenue loss in [25]. 
When retransmissions are caused by overload rather 
than message loss, they would bring extra overhead 
instead of reliability to the network and exacerbate the 
overload [19]. Different from all existing solutions 
discussed above, we propose to reduce the retransmission 
rate instead of reducing original message sending rate of 
the upstream servers. This will mitigate the overload 
while maintaining original message sending rate, which 
leads to less blocking calls and more revenue for carriers. 
Event-driven simulation has been widely used for 
evaluating network performance. Its computation cost 
grows linearly with network sizes and message volumes 
[26]. When event-driven simulation is used to evaluate a 
SIP network, each outstanding SIP message requires a 
timer being maintained. When an overload happens, 
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 outstanding messages are built up, and the simulator 
needs to increase the number of timers dramatically in 
order to track message retransmissions. Tracking and 
manipulating these timers consume large amount memory 
and CPU time which make the simulation process 
extremely slow, thus in some cases, cause the simulator 
to crash and terminate simulation unexpectedly. In order 
to simplify the CPU-consuming timer-tracking process, 
fluid-based simulation tracks time slot instead of 
individual messages. Messages arriving within the same 
time slot are aggregated and processed together. This will 
greatly simplify the complexity caused by large number 
of messages and allow smooth scalability by choosing 
different granularities as required. 
III. DYNAMICS OF SIP RETRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
A real SIP network consists of a series of 
geographically distributed P-servers and a large amount 
of UAs. Each P-server is responsible for setting up a 
session call between two UAs. It forwards the requests 
and also generates a provisional response to confirm the 
receipt of every request from the upstream sender (an 
originating UA or a P-server) [1]. It provides a 
retransmission mechanism to guarantee a reliable 
delivery of a SIP message [5]. However, the arrival of too 
many SIP messages may cause an unnecessary queuing 
delay, stimulate redundant retransmissions and accelerate 
the overload, thus eventually bring down the entire 
network [12]. Therefore, it is necessary to describe the 
queuing dynamics of an overloaded SIP server (e.g., [8, 
25]), before we derive a stability condition for SIP 
retransmission mechanism. 
 
Fig. 2. SIP network topology with an overloaded P-server (which is 
marked in diagonal lines) and its multiple upstream originating servers. 
When overloads happen in the network, at any time, 
one of the servers will be the most overloaded one among 
all the overloaded servers. Without loss of generality, we 
consider a typical SIP network which consists of an 
overloaded P-server and its multiple upstream originating 
servers [12], as shown in Fig. 2. For a clear presentation, 
we use difference equations to describe the queuing 
dynamics of an overloaded P-server. In our discrete time 
model, we make the following assumptions according to 
SIP RFC [1]: 
(a) We investigate the retransmissions which are 
mainly caused by long queuing delay of the overloaded 
server. Therefore, for the round trip response time 
between the overloaded server and its neighbouring 
server, the queuing and processing delays are dominant, 
while transmission and propagation delay are negligible 
[13]. This assumption is valid because signaling 
messages are typically CPU capacity constrained rather 
than bandwidth constrained; 
(b) Time is divided into discrete time slots. This 
makes it easy to describe how many retransmitted 
messages are triggered by a delay caused by the overload. 
The errors introduced by the discrete time slot can be 
made arbitrarily small by making the interval of a 
timeslot smaller and smaller. We use t and n to denote 
time and timeslot respectively; 
(c) The SIP RFC [1] does not specify the queuing 
and scheduling discipline to be deployed by a SIP server. 
We assume that a SIP server maintains a First-In-First-
Out (FIFO) queue for messages arriving at different time-
slots. This FIFO queuing model reflects the common 
practice by most vendors today [11]. Within the same 
time slot, original request messages enter the tail of the 
queue prior to retransmitted request messages. Such 
enqueuing priority has negligible impact if the interval of 
the time slot is very small. There is no enqueuing 
difference for the messages arriving at different time slots; 
(d) The time to process a response message or a 
timer timeout is typically much smaller than a request 
message [1]. We assumed that, within a time slot, the 
server has enough CPU capacity to process the incoming 
response messages, thus response messages will not be 
enqueued as long as they are treated with higher priority 
such as interrupt. They will not be dropped either when 
the queue for request messages are overflowed. The 
service capacity of the overloaded server includes the rate 
for processing response messages; 
(e) In order to focus our analysis on the overloaded 
server, we assume multiple upstream originating servers 
and the downstream server of the overloaded P-server 
have sufficient capacity to process all requests, 
retransmissions, and response messages immediately 
without any delay; 
(f) Practical buffer sizes vary with the actual service 
rates and system configuration plans. With the memory 
becoming cheaper and cheaper, typical buffer sizes are 
likely to become larger and larger. The buffer sizes for all 
servers are assumed to be large enough to hold all the 
incoming messages. Therefore there is no message loss at 
all servers. 
(g) The hop-by-hop Invite-100Trying transaction is 
the major workload contributor due to its role for call 
setup and its hop-by-hop retransmission mechanism [1]. 
Given the proportionate nature and the general similarity 
of the retransmission mechanisms between the “Invite” 
and “non-Invite” messages in a typical session [1], we 
will focus on the hop-by-hop Invite-100Trying 
transaction and ignore other end-to-end transactions in 
this paper. 
Fig. 3 depicts the queuing dynamics of an overloaded 
SIP server in a SIP network (as shown in Fig. 2). The 
overloaded server receives the original Invite requests 
with an aggregate rate λ(n) at time slot n, where λ(n) can 
be arbitrary. We can obtain the queue size q(n+1) at next 
time slot n+1 based on the information at the current time 
slot n, i.e., 
q(n+1)=[q(n)+λ(n)+r(n)−μ(n)]+.      (1) 
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 where q(n) denotes the queue size; r(n) denotes the 
aggregated retransmitted messages; μ(n) denotes an 
arbitrary service process for the request messages, which 
is equal to the server service capacity minus the service 
rate for the response messages. λ(n) plus r(n) give the 
total arrival messages at current time slot n. Adding q(n) 
and deducting μ(n) would generate a new queue size 
q(n+1) in the next time slot n+1, as described by Eq. (1). 
We use []+ to indicate that the queue size at each time slot 
should be nonnegative. 
 
μ
)(nλ  
100Trying Response 
… )(nr  
)(nq  
Invite Request 
 
Fig. 3. Queuing dynamics of an overloaded SIP server (λ(n) denotes 
aggregated original message arrivals, r(n) denotes aggregated 
retransmitted message arrivals from multiple upstream servers, q(n) 
denotes queue size, μ(n) denotes service rate). 
If the server does not receive the corresponding 
response message for an original request message at a 
specific time-out, it would trigger retransmission. There 
are maximum 6 retransmissions for every original request 
message [1]. Thus we can obtain the total retransmitted 
messages r(n) at current time slot n as 
∑ == 6 1 )()( j j nrnr ,       (2) 
where rj(n) denotes the jth–time retransmission for the 
original request messages arriving at time n−Tj, 
Tj=(2j−1)T1 and 1≤j≤6. 
At time (n−Tj), the original request message arrivals 
were λ(n−Tj) and the queue size was q(n−Tj). Since the 
overloaded server can process ∑ = +−jTk j kTn1 )(μ  
messages during the Tj time slots, the remaining 
messages at current time slot n become 
+
=∑ +−−−+− ])()()([ 1jTk jjj kTnTnqTn μλ , which 
should be nonnegative. This may include both the 
original arrival messages at time (n−Tj) and the queued 
messages right before the time slot (n−Tj). However, only 
the remaining original arrival messages λ(n−Tj) need to 
be retransmitted at current time n, we use min{} function 
to get the jth–time retransmitted messages at current time 
slot n, i.e., 
)}( 
,])()()(min{[)( 1
j
T
k jjjj
Tn
kTnTnqTnnr j
−
+−−−+−= +=∑
λ
μλ
(3) 
Eqs. (1) to (3) shows the dynamic behaviour of an 
overloaded SIP server. Due to its nonlinear characteristic, 
it may show complex, sometimes chaotic, patterns that 
bring a potential server collapse. 
IV. STABILITY CONDITION FOR SIP RETRANSMISSION 
MECHANISM 
The retransmission can provide a reliable delivery of 
SIP messages. However, it also increases the queuing size 
and enhances the overload. It would be interesting to 
derive a stability condition that the server can handle 
overload effectively. The messages accumulated by a 
transient overload (e.g., a demand burst or a server 
slowdown) create an initial queue size when the server 
returns to its normal service state. Such initial queue size 
may bring a queuing delay long enough for the 
retransmissions of old remaining original messages in the 
queue as well as all the new incoming original messages. 
We would like to investigate whether the SIP server can 
serve the original messages in the initial queue size and 
their retransmissions under a low effective CPU 
utilization. 
Without loss of generality, we consider the “Invite-
Trying” request-response pair with a deterministic arrival 
rate λ and a deterministic service rate μ; there are i 
retransmissions for the new arrival original messages; the 
initial queue size is q(0). 
Theorem 1: If the initial queue size q(0) created by a 
demand burst can satisfy a sufficient stability condition 
described by Eq. (4), then the SIP server is stable. {
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫≤≤≤+
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+
+
61,
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(4) 
Proof: 
To prevent messages from accumulating unlimitedly in 
SIP server, the total average incoming rate should be less 
than the service rate. Assume that there would be i 
retransmissions for an arbitrary original Invite request 
message, a conservative condition to maintain stability is 
(i+1)λ/μ ≤1, 
which is equivalent to 
μ≥(i+1)λ,        (5) 
i.e., 
i≤(μ−λ)/λ.        (6) 
To achieve the above sufficient stability condition, we 
need to guarantee that the original messages from both 
the initial queue size and the new arrivals are not 
retransmitted more than j times, where we denote j as 
j=⎣(μ−λ)/λ⎦. Then we update the equivalent stability 
condition in Eq. (6) as 
i≤j=⎣(μ−λ)/λ⎦.        (7) 
To avoid j+1 retransmissions for the original messages 
in the initial queue size, we obtain a stability condition 
for the initial queue size as 
q(0)/μ<Tj+1=(2j+1−1)T1, 
which is equivalent to 
q(0)<μTj+1.        (8) 
To avoid (j+1) retransmissions for any newly arrival 
original messages, the queue size in any time should 
satisfy 
q(t)<μTj+1.        (9) 
Eq. (4) can certainly satisfy Eq. (8). To show that Eq. 
(4) can satisfy the requirement of Eq. (9), we consider 
five cases in the following discussion. 
1. We first consider the queue sizes at each specified 
retransmission times Ti=(2i−1)T1 using Eqs. (1) to (3) as 
follows, 
q(T1)=q(0)−(μ−λ)T1+[q(0)−μT1]+, 
q(T2)=q(T1)−2(μ−2λ)T1+[q(0)−μT2]+, 
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 M  
q(Ti)=q(Ti−1)−2i−1(μ−iλ)T1+[q(0)−μTi]+,   (10) 
M  
q(T6)=q(T5)−32(μ−6λ)T1+[q(0)−μT6]+. 
2. We next consider the queue sizes between any 
two neighbouring retransmission times Ti-1 and Ti. Eqs. 
(1), (2) (3), (7) and (10) lead to 
q(t)=q(Ti−1)−(μ−iλ)(t−Ti−1)<q(Ti−1),    (11) 
The inequality in Eq. (11) indicates that the queue size 
is decreasing continuously with a slope of μ−iλ during 
the time period. However, at time t=Ti, the ith 
retransmission for the remaining [q(0)−μTi] messages 
from the initial queue size q(0) is triggered, resulting in a 
sudden increase in the queue size described by (10). Then 
when 0<t≤Tj, the condition described by (9) becomes 
q(Ti)<μTj+1 1≤i≤j≤6.     (12) 
Given the condition of Eq. (8), we assume the worst 
case with q(0)−μTi≥0. Using recursive substitution for Eq. 
(10), we can obtain 
∑∑ == − −−−−+= ik kik ki TTkqiTq 1 11 11 )12()(2)0()1()( μλμ
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Then we can obtain 
q(Ti)=(i+1)q(0)+((i−1)2i+1)λT1−(3×2i−i−3)μT1.  (13) 
Combining Eqs. (12) and (13), we can obtain the 
second condition in Eq.(4) as 
61
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(14) 
3. We then consider the case that Tj<t<Tj+1. From 
Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (7), (9) and (12), we have 
q(t)=q(Tj)−(μ−(j+1)λ)(t−Tj)≤q(Tj)<μTj+1.   (15) 
This means the queue size is non-increasing during the 
time period Tj<t<Tj+1. 
4. Next, we consider the case that t=Tj+1. Since Eq. 
(8) indicates [q(0)−μTj+1]+=0, from Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (7) 
and (12), we can obtain 
q(Tj+1)=q(Tj)−2j(μ−(j+1)λ)T1+[q(0)−μTj+1]+≤q(Tj)<μTj+1. 
(16) 
5. Finally, we consider the case that t>Tj+1. From 
Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (7) and (16), we have 
q(t)=q(Tj+1)−(μ−(j+1)λ)(t−Tj+1)≤q(Tj+1)<μTj+1.  (17) 
Combining Eq. (8), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16) and 
(17), we can reach a sufficient stability condition for the 
initial queue size described by Eq. (4).□ 
V. Performance Evaluation and Simulation 
Since violating the sufficient stability condition does 
not always bring the instability to a SIP system, we 
would like to investigate how tight the sufficient stability 
bound for the retransmission mechanism is when a SIP 
overload happens. To achieve this goal, we will evaluate 
the performance of an overloaded SIP server by 
performing fluid-based Matlab simulation using the fluid 
model described by Eqs. (1) to (3), where the time slot is 
50ms. In the mean time, in order to validate the accuracy 
and scalability of fluid-based simulation, we also 
performed event-driven OPNET simulation in a real SIP 
network as depicted by Fig. 2. In the OPNET simulator, 
messages were handled one by one instead of being 
aggregated over a time slot as in our Matlab simulation. 
Four originating servers generated original request 
messages with equal rate, and then sent them to four 
terminating servers via two P-servers. All the sending 
servers also maintained a list of all outstanding messages 
for tracking retransmissions. The mean service rate of P-
Server is set to be the same as the mean service rate of the 
corresponding P-server in MATLAB simulation. For 
OPNET simulation, messages were enqueued based on 
first-come-first-in principle. That is, Assumption (c) was 
unnecessary for OPNET simulation. The default timer for 
the first retransmission was T1=0.5s [1]. 
The retransmission messages triggered by the overload 
are redundant messages. Therefore, only the CPU 
consumed by the original messages can be regarded as 
effective use of resources. We define effective CPU 
utilization ρ as the ratio between the total mean arrival 
rate for the original messages and the mean service rate, 
i.e., ρ=λ/μ. 
Simulation Setting of Network Configuration 
Parameters: The mean arrival rate and the service 
capacity of a SIP server may be different across different 
real carrier networks. To reduce the overload probability, 
resource over-provisioning has been employed to 
maintain a low effective CPU utilization in the real 
carrier networks [12]. Therefore, for both Matlab and 
OPNET simulation, we make the CPU utilization low by 
selecting appropriate mean original message arrival rate 
of regular demands and mean service rate. For the fluid-
based Matlab simulation based on the fluid model, 
smaller time slot corresponds to more accurate simulation 
result, but a longer simulation time. In addition, the 
smallest time slot for arrival rate or service rate should 
guarantee at least one message per slot, e.g., the smallest 
time slot for 200 messages/sec is 5ms. Performance 
comparison between Matlab simulation and OPNET 
simulation in the following subsection demonstrates that 
a time slot of 50ms is relatively accurate for the fluid-
based simulation. 
To verify the sufficient stability condition for the 
initial queue size, we have considered two typical 
overload scenarios: (1) The overload was caused by a 
demand burst, while arrival rate and service rate were 
deterministic; (2) The overload was caused by a server 
slowdown, while arrival rate and service rate were 
Poisson distributed1. 
                                                            
1 Currently there is no measurement result for the workload in the real 
SIP networks. Poisson distributed message arrival rate and service rate 
are widely adopted by most existing research work (e.g., [13]). 
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 A. Overload Caused by Demand Burst 
In this scenario, a demand burst overloaded the server 
and created an initial queue size at time t=0s, emulating a 
short surge of user demands; normal original request 
messages arrived at the overloaded server with a constant 
rate λ=200 messages/sec, emulating regular user demands. 
The overloaded server maintained a constant service rate 
μ=1000 messages/sec. Thus the effective CPU utilization 
for regular user demands is ρ=λ/μ=20%. The simulation 
period is 50s. 
Eq. (7) gives j=⎣(μ−λ)/λ⎦=4. Then using Eq. (4), we 
can obtain the stability condition for the overloaded 
server as q(0)<min{15500, 8200, 6167, 5700, 
6220}=5700 messages. We will consider two sub-
scenarios with different initial queue sizes. 
1) Sub-scenario (a): In this sub-scenario, a demand 
burst created an initial queue size as q(0)=5500 messages 
< 5700 messages, obeying the stability condition 
described by Eq. (4). 
Figs. 4 and 5 show the dynamic behaviour of the 
overloaded SIP server using both Matlab simulation and 
OPNET simulation. One can observe that the curves 
obtained by Matlab simulation are very close to the 
curves obtained by OPNET simulation. The difference 
for instantaneous retransmission rate shown in Fig. 5 was 
caused by enqueuing priority within the same time slot 
(Assumption (c)). The similarity between Matlab 
simulation result and OPNET simulation result 
demonstrates that fluid-based simulation is a relatively 
accurate and cost-effective approach for performance 
evaluation of a SIP network, while it can simplify a CPU-
consuming timer-tracking process by tracking single time 
slot instead of individual message timer. 
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(b) enlarged partly view 
Fig. 4. Queue size q (messages) versus time for the overloaded server 
when the initial queue size obeys the stability condition. 
Fig. 4(b) shows that the queue size decreased linearly 
with 800 messages/sec at the beginning. 
At time t=T1=0.5s, the overloaded SIP server had 
processed 500 messages, the 1st-time retransmission for 
the residual 5000 original messages in the initial queue 
happened (as shown in Fig. 5). The new 100 original 
messages arriving between t=0s and t=T1=0.5s joined the 
queue together with 5000 retransmitted SIP messages, so 
the queue size became 10,100 messages (as shown in Fig. 
4(b)). The new arrival original messages at time t=0s 
started to trigger the first-time retransmissions (as shown 
in Fig. 5). Similarly, due to the 2nd-time and 3rd-time 
retransmissions, the queue size increased dramatically at 
time t=T2=1.5s and t=T3=3.5s respectively. 
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Fig. 5. Retransmission rate r and moving average retransmission rate 
ravg (messages/sec) versus time for the overloaded server when the 
initial queue size obeys the stability condition. 
At time t=8s, the retransmission rate of new arrival 
original messages increased from 600 messages/sec to 
800 messages/sec (as shown in Fig. 5), thus the total 
incoming traffic rate of both original messages and 
retransmitted messages was equal to the service rate 
μ=1000 messages/sec (or ρ′=5λ/μ=1). Between the time 
t=3.5s and t=8s, 900 new incoming original messages and 
2700 incoming retransmitted messages entered the 
overloaded SIP server, thus the queue size reached and 
stayed at a steady queue size as 14700+900+2700-
4500=13800 messages, well matching our theoretical 
analysis on the queuing dynamics in Section III. 
2) Sub-scenario (b): In this sub-scenario, a demand 
burst created an initial queue size as q(0)=6000 
messages > 5700 messages, violating the stability 
condition described by Eq. (4). 
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Fig. 6. Queue size q (messages) versus time for the overloaded server 
when the initial queue size violates the stability condition. 
Fig. 6 shows that the queue size decreased linearly 
except 4 spikes due to the dramatic retransmissions until 
the time t=19s. At time t=19s, the retransmission rate of 
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 new arrival original messages increased from 800 
messages/sec to 1000 messages/sec (as shown in Fig. 7). 
The total incoming traffic rate of both original messages 
and retransmitted messages was larger than the service 
rate μ=1000 messages/sec (or ρ′=6λ/μ=1.2>1). Therefore, 
after the time t=19s, the queue size increased linearly and 
continuously with 200 messages/sec (as shown in Fig. 6), 
which would bring a SIP server crash eventually. 
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Fig. 7. Retransmission rate r and moving average retransmission rate 
ravg (messages/sec) versus time for the overloaded server when the 
initial queue size violates the stability condition. 
3) Remarks: In case of the deterministic traffic pattern, 
slightly different initial queue sizes due to the demand 
bursts (the difference is less than 10% in the two sub-
scenarios) create totally different dynamic behaviour 
patterns. The slightly smaller initial queue size of 5500 
messages allows the server to handle the initial temporary 
overload effectively, while the slightly larger initial 
queue size of 6000 messages will result in infinitely 
increasing queue size, thus bring a SIP server to crash. 
This indicates that the sufficient stability bound described 
by Eq. (4) is quite tight when both original message 
arrival rate of regular demands and service rate are 
deterministic. 
When the original message arrival rate and service rate, 
are arbitrarily distributed, the operators can apply 
Theorem 1 to determine the stability condition using the 
mean values of the original message arrival rate and 
service rate. A moving average filter can be used to 
measure the mean values λ and μ. Our simulation result 
in the next subsection indicates that the sufficient stability 
bound is also tight for Poisson distributed arrival rate and 
service rate which has been widely considered as one of 
the typical traffic patterns in the real carrier networks [13]. 
B. Overload Caused by Server Slowdown 
In this application scenario, the overloaded SIP server 
worked in one of the two states (i.e., normal service state 
and maintenance state) alternately. During the 
maintenance period, the overload may happen due to the 
server slow down. The mean service time at the normal 
service state was m1=600sec; the mean service time at the 
maintenance state was m0=30sec; all were exponential 
distributed. The mean service rate at the normal service 
state was μ1=1000 messages/sec; the mean service rate at 
maintenance state was μ2=180 messages/sec; the mean 
arrival rate of the SIP messages was λ=200 messages/sec; 
all were Poisson distributed. The simulation period is 
2000s. The overall effective mean utilization was equal to 
.21.0)/()( 001101 ≈++= μμλρ mmmm  We will not show 
the OPNET simulation result because it was very close to 
the Matlab simulation result as the previous subsection. 
Figs. 8 to 11 show the dynamic behaviour of the 
overloaded SIP server under two different service states. 
Between the time t=812s and 823s, SIP server had 
short period of maintenance, service rate decreased (as 
shown in Fig. 11). The messages started to accumulate 
and the queue size increased to reach a peak around 3690 
messages at time t=823s (as shown in Fig. 8(b)). When a 
mean service rate was 180 messages/sec, the queue size 
larger than 90 messages brought a queuing delay longer 
than 0.5s, and started to stimulate the retransmission (as 
shown in Fig. 10). After the server resumed normal 
service at time t=823s, the initial queue size was less than 
5700 messages (the stability condition described by Eq. 
(4)). The server could process these accumulated 
messages in time, so the queue size decreased until the 
buffer was empty at time t≈833s (as shown in Fig. 8(b)). 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 105
Time (sec)
Q
ue
ue
 si
ze
 (m
es
sa
ge
s)
 
(a) full view 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Time (sec)
Q
ue
ue
 si
ze
 (m
es
sa
ge
s)
 
(b) enlarged partly view 
Fig. 8. Queue size q (messages) versus time for the overloaded server 
which performed normal service and maintenance service alternately. 
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Fig. 9. Original message arrival rate λ (messages/sec) versus time for 
the overloaded server which performed normal service and maintenance 
service alternately. 
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 However, maintenance with a relatively long period 
(or a equivalent large demand burst)) happened at time 
t=1452s, the queue size increased continuously and 
triggered more than 5 retransmissions that made the total 
arrival message arrival rate exceed the normal service 
rate (as shown in Fig. 11). After the server entered the 
normal service state at time t=1495s, the initial queue size 
was larger than 5700 messages. Since the stability 
condition for the initial queue size was violated, the SIP 
server cannot handle the overload effectively. The queue 
size tended to infinity (as shown in Fig. 9(a)), thus 
eventually crashed the server. 
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Fig. 10. Retransmission rate r (messages/sec) versus time for the 
overloaded server which performed normal service and maintenance 
service alternately. 
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Fig. 11. Service rate μ (messages/sec) versus time for the overloaded 
server which performed normal service and maintenance service 
alternately. 
In summary, although the effective mean utilization is 
as low as 20%, if the accumulated messages in the SIP 
server during the short maintenance period violate the 
stability condition for the initial queue size, the server 
cannot mitigate the overload effectively after it resumed 
its normal service. Goodput collapse persists and the 
server would crash eventually, well matching our 
theoretical analysis. 
VI. OVERLOAD CONTROL ALGORITHM 
The retransmitted messages triggered by the overload 
delay are redundant and may bring the overload collapse. 
Therefore, quite different from current existing overload 
control algorithms which adopt the push-back mechanism, 
our goal for mitigating the overload is to control the 
retransmission rate r, thus helping a server to cancel the 
overload eventually. To achieve our target, we use a 
retransmission probability p to determine whether to 
retransmit an original message when its retransmission 
timer fires or expires. When the total message arrival rate 
of a downstream server exceeds its message processing 
capacity, its queue size would increase continuously, 
which indicates that an overload occurs. A long queue 
size would make a long queuing delay for the new arrival 
original messages sent by its upstream servers, thus 
triggering corresponding redundant retransmissions. 
Therefore, we propose to control the retransmission 
probability p based on the average queue size qavg of the 
overloaded downstream server. Similar to existing push-
back overload control solutions, we introduce a minor 
change to SIP protocol by defining one extra field in 
every response message to carry the retransmission 
probability p calculated by the overloaded downstream 
server. Our simple overload control algorithm is given in 
Fig. 12. 
Setting qmin and qmax: Since the upstream servers only 
generate the retransmissions for the original messages 
whose retransmission timers fire or expire, and a queuing 
delay less than the 1st retransmission timer T1 at the 
overloaded downstream server will not trigger any 
retransmissions, we suggest minimum and maximum 
thresholds as 
q1min=0.2μ*T1,     (18) 
q1max=μ*T1,     (19) 
where μ is the mean service rate of the overloaded 
downstream server. 
 
Fig. 12. Overload control algorithm for controlling retransmission rate. 
A. Modeling of Overload Control Algorithm 
Since our overload control algorithm mitigates the 
overload by controlling retransmission probability, we 
need to create a respective fluid model for the fluid-based 
simulation. 
Since stochastic process of both message arrival rate λ 
and service rate μ may cause transient fluctuation in the 
instantaneous queue size q, we use an exponentially 
weighted moving average filter to obtain the average 
queue size qavg, i.e., 
qavg(n)=(1−wq)qavg(n−1)+wqq(n),    (20) 
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 where wq is the filter weight. 
According to the overload control algorithm described 
by Fig. 12, the retransmission probability p generated by 
the overloaded server can be computed as 
p(n)=min{[(qmax−qavg)/(qmax−qmin)]+,1}   (21) 
By integrating the retransmission probability p into the 
theoretical retransmission rate r, we can get the actual 
retransmission rate as rp. Therefore, we can reuse the 
fluid model (or Eqs. (1) to (3)) developed for the regular 
server in Section III by replacing the theoretical 
retransmission rate with the actual retransmission rate, 
i.e., we only need to update Eq. (3) as 
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B. Evaluation of Overload Control Algorithm 
In order to validate our overload control algorithm, we 
simulated a typical overload scenario caused by the 
server slowdown. We perform fluid-based MATLAB 
simulation using the fluid model we have derived. We 
performed our simulations with overload control 
algorithm and without overload control algorithm 
separately. 
The simulation period is 90s. The mean server rate of 
the overloaded server was μ=100 messages/sec from time 
t=0s to t=30s, and μ=1000 messages/sec from time t=30s 
to t=90s; the mean original message arrival rate was 
λ=200 messages/sec; all were Poisson distributed. The 
maximum and minimum thresholds for average queue 
size were set as qmax=500 messages and qmin=100 
messages respectively. The averaging filter weight wq 
was 0.1. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
x 104
Time (sec)
Q
ue
ue
 si
ze
 (m
es
sa
ge
s)
 
 
qNOLC
qOLC
 
Fig. 13. Queue size q (messages) versus time for the overloaded server 
when the overload control algorithm was/was not activated. 
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Fig. 14. Retransmission rate r (messages/sec) versus time for the 
overloaded server when the overload control algorithm was/was not 
activated. 
Figs. 13 and 14 show the dynamic behaviour of the 
overloaded server. We use “OLC”/“NOLC” to indicate 
that overload control algorithm “was”/“was not” 
activated at the upstream server of the overloaded server. 
Without overload control algorithm applied, the 
redundant retransmissions were triggered to increase the 
queue size of the overloaded server sharply. After the 
overloaded server resumed its normal service at time 
t=30s, the mean new original message arrival rate was 
less than the mean service rate. However, the long initial 
queue size continued to stimulate redundant 
retransmissions (see Fig. 14). These retransmissions 
made the aggregated mean arrival rate of both original 
messages and retransmitted messages exceed the mean 
service rate, thus continuing to build up the queue (see 
Fig. 13). The persisted overload would eventually lead to 
an overload collapse. 
With our overload control algorithm applied, the 
retransmission rate r was restricted (see Fig. 14). The 
overload was mitigated and the queue size of the 
overloaded server increased relatively slowly. After the 
overloaded server resumed its normal service, it only 
spent 4s to cancel the overload and the buffer became 
empty at time t≈34s (see Fig. 13). 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
We have investigated the SIP retransmission 
mechanism in case of the overload. We have derived a 
sufficient stability condition that SIP server can handle 
the overload effectively under the retransmission 
mechanism. To prevent the system from crashing, the 
initial queue size caused by a transient overload should 
satisfy the stability condition. Such stability condition can 
help the SIP operator to trigger the overload control 
algorithm ahead of time to avoid the SIP server collapse. 
We have performed simulation using both fluid-based 
simulation approach and event-driven simulation 
approach to evaluate the performance of an overloaded 
SIP server. Our study indicated that the behaviour of the 
SIP server is highly sensitive to the temporary overload 
due to the demand burst or the server slow down. The 
sufficient stability bound for the initial queue size caused 
by the overload is quite tight. Effective resource 
utilization as low as 20% cannot prevent an overloaded 
server from crash, if an initial queue created by a short-
term overload (due to a demand burst or a temporary 
server slowdown) exceeds the sufficient stability bound 
slightly. 
Event-driven simulation, adopted by most existing 
literature on SIP study, requires a series of retransmission 
timers to track outstanding messages, thus makes the 
experiment computationally expensive. As the network 
size increases to a large scale, the number of timers may 
build up to consume excessive memory and CPU time, 
thus crashes the simulator eventually. On the contrary, 
fluid-based simulation tracks time on a slot-by-slot basis. 
Events happening within the same time slot will be 
aggregated and processed together. Individual timers do 
not need to be tracked anymore. Thus fluid-based 
approach is much simpler than event-driven approach. 
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 The similarity between fluid-based Matlab simulation 
result and event-driven OPNET simulation result 
demonstrate that fluid-based simulation can be a 
relatively accurate and cost-effective approach for 
evaluating the performance of a SIP network. 
We also proposed a simple overload control algorithm 
to mitigate the overload by reducing the retransmission 
rate only, while keeping the original message rate 
unchanged to avoid blocking the calls unnecessarily. Our 
solution can help the carriers to maintain their revenue in 
case of the overload. The simulation has validated the 
effectiveness of our overload control algorithm. 
APPENDIX A. SIP RETRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
OVERVIEW 
SIP works in the application-layer for media session 
establishment and tear-down. To briefly describe a basic 
SIP operation, we only consider originating UA, P-server 
and terminating UA, as shown in Fig. A1. To set up a call, 
an originating UA sends an “Invite” request to a 
terminating UA via two P-servers. The P-server returns a 
provisional “100 (Trying)” response to confirm the 
receipt of the “Invite” request. The terminating UA 
returns an “180 (Ringing)” response after confirming that 
the parameters are appropriate. It also evicts a “200 
(OK)” message to answer the call. The originating UA 
sends an “ACK” response to the terminating UA after 
receiving the “200 (OK)” message. Finally the call 
session is established and the media communication is 
created between the originating UA and the terminating 
UA through the SIP session. The “Bye” request is 
generated to terminate the session thus cancel the 
communication. 
 
Fig. A1. A typical procedure of session establishment. 
SIP has two types of message retransmission: (a) a 
sender starts the first retransmission of the original 
message at T1 seconds, the time interval doubling after 
every retransmission (exponential backoff), if the 
corresponding reply message is not received. The last 
retransmission is sent out at the maximum time interval 
64xT1 seconds. Default value of T1 is 0.5s, thus there is a 
maximum of 6 retransmissions. The hop-by-hop “Invite”-
“Trying” transaction shown in Fig. A1 follows this rule 
[1]; (b) a sender starts the first retransmission of the 
original message at T1 seconds, the time interval doubling 
after every retransmission but capping off at T2 seconds, 
if the corresponding reply message is not received. The 
last retransmission is sent out at the maximum time 
interval 64xT1 seconds. Default value of T2 is 4s, thus 
there is a maximum of 10 retransmissions. The end-to-
end “OK”-“ACK” and “Bye”-“OK” transactions shown 
in Fig. A1 follows this rule [1]. 
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Abstract— Telecommunication networks have to deal with
fiber cuts, hardware malfunctioning and other failures on
a daily basis, events which are usually treated as isolated
and unrelated. Efficient methods have been developed for
coping with such common failures and hence users rarely
notice them. Although less frequently, there also arise cases
of multiple failures with catastrophic consequences. Multiple
failures can occur for many reasons, for example, natural
disasters, epidemic outbreaks affecting software compo-
nents, or intentional attacks. This article investigates new
methods for lessening the impact of such failures in terms of
the number of connections affected. Two heuristic-based link
prioritization strategies for improving network resilience
are proposed. One strategy is built upon the concept of
betweenness centrality, while the second is based on what
we call the observed link criticality. Both strategies are
evaluated through simulation on a large synthetic topology
that represents a GMPLS-based transport network. The
provisioning of connections in a dynamic traffic scenario as
well as the occurrence of large-scale failures are simulated
for the evaluation.
Index Terms— Network resilience, Large-scale failures, Mul-
tiple failures, GMPLS, Link criticality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s data transport networks are designed to with-
stand several types of failures, namely accidental or inten-
tional fiber cuts, loss of switching capabilities caused by
power outages, malfunctioning due to equipment aging,
and even operator mistakes. This ability to maintain
service continuity in the presence of failures owes to
efficient recovery techniques incorporated in their design,
as well as to diverse technologies that have been devel-
oped to that end. Several methods and techniques are
reported in the literature for dealing with failures [1], [2].
The fundamental underlying idea is that of redundancy,
whereby spare resources come into operation when the
active one fails.
The majority of the approaches to network recovery
assume that at any given time, only one failure is outstand-
ing, which is known as the single-failure assumption [3].
However, networks are equally prone to multiple-failure
events, that is, the concurrent failure of several com-
munication elements. For instance, earthquakes, flooding
This paper is based on “A Heuristic Analysis of Resilience to Multiple
Failures in GMPLS Networks,” by J. Segovia, E. Calle P. Vila` and J. L.
Marzo which appeared in the Proceedings of the 2010 Symposium on
Performance Evaluation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems
(SPECTS), Ottawa, Canada, July 2010. c© 2010 IEEE.
and natural disasters have the potential to disrupt a large
number of network elements simultaneously.
Although large-scale failure events may be relatively
rare, that fact does not lessen the economic loss they
cause, or the disruption the can bring onto thousands
or even millions of users. Unfortunately, in such failure
scenarios the redundancy-based recovery techniques that
are effective under the single-failure assumption are not
suitable anymore, simply because the cost of implement-
ing massive redundancy for rarely occurring events is
prohibitive [4].
Multiple failures has been studied in the context of
complex networks, graph theory and epidemics for some
time now, see for example [5], [6] and [7] and the refer-
ences therein. However, in the context of the reliability of
transport networks, which is our focus here, the number of
reported research is fewer, much more recent and almost
always concerned with multilayer networks, where several
failures visible in an upper layer are all caused by exactly
one failure at the physical layer.
In this article, we consider that a certain number of
physical links which represent a large portion of the
topology fail concurrently, and study how such large-scale
failure affects the network’s resilience. The elements that
fail do it randomly, without any constraint on locality.
Our network scenario corresponds to a GMPLS-based
transport network with dynamic traffic, where end-to-end
connection is the unit of service. We propose and evaluate
through simulations two strategies that can be used for
improving resilience from the perspective of the number
of connections that survive the failure.
In the next section, we review some recent instances
of large-scale failures that gained world-wide notoriety.
Section III presents basic concepts of network resilience
and a review of the relevant literature. Our two proposed
strategies for improving resilience is in Section IV, and
the simulations carried out are described in Section V.
Section VI presents the results and, finally, Section VII
gives concluding remarks.
II. NETWORK VULNERABILITY TO LARGE-SCALE
FAILURES
Most of the research in survivable optical networks as-
sume that failures occur independently from one another,
thus instances of failures such as fiber cuts and node mal-
functioning are usually modeled as isolated and unrelated
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events. Furthermore, as multiple failures are considered
possible but rare [8], the focus tends to be on single
failures, and on single link failures in particular, with only
a few studies tackling the design of networks capable of
withstanding up to double link failures. Nonetheless, one
specific form of multiple link failure that attracted much
attention is that which results from damages to physical
structures, such as ducts, that are shared by otherwise
unrelated fiber links. The concept of Shared-Risk Link
Groups [9] captures this situation and has been used
extensively in network survivability.
However, several more disrupting failures can be found
in the real world. These include the ones in which
the malfunctioning cover a large geographical area, thus
affecting several completely unrelated network elements
simultaneously, where unrelated means different network
operators, countries or users. Root causes of such large
scale failures are typically natural disasters, but can also
be virus or worms outbreaks as well as intentional attacks.
One recent example is the 2006 earthquake in the Taiwan
area. The damage it caused is detailed in [10]. Several
submarine cables were broken, and the communication
infrastructure of countries in the region suffered either
complete interruption or serious disruption for several
days. Although backup resources (multiple fiber cores
installed together) were in place, and automatic restoring
procedures were activated, the former proved useless as
the earthquake affected them as well, and the latter caused
even more trouble due to limitations in the management
system that precluded it from fully handling the multilayer
network, which ultimately forced human intervention to
complete the repairing.
Hurricane Katrina is also a recent example of a natural
disaster that had important consequences on the commu-
nication infrastructure of the affected area, which caused
damages to telecommunication networks worth several
billion dollars [11], [12]. Lastly, and out of the category
of natural disasters, is the politically-motivated attack on
web sites of Estonian government and businesses in 2007,
which crippled the country’s network for days.
What all these examples have in common is the in-
ability of the network to cope with pervasive failures,
although they are quite capable of handling isolated cases
of failure of links, nodes and other communication equip-
ment that happens continually. However, such failures go
unnoticed by users thanks to the recovery mechanisms put
in place.
III. BASIC CONCEPTS OF NETWORK RESILIENCE
This section first gives an overview of basic protection
schemes in transport networks, highlight their efficacy
for dealing with single failures and their fundamental
limitations to handle efficiently multiple failures. Then
a review of network robustness metrics found in the
literature is presented and their applicability to large-scale
failures is discussed.
A. Resilience through Redundancy: Benefits and Limita-
tions
Redundancy is key for improving reliability. On one
hand, physical components (e.g., optical cross-connects)
can be deployed in redundant configurations, so that
spare components come into operation when a failure
occurs. Likewise, specific spans (links) or segments can
be protected by provisioning additional (e.g., redundant)
path(s) so that traffic can be switched to such alternate
path(s) when the protected element fails. Many recovery
techniques have been proposed and several of them have
gained wide acceptance in the industry. A summary of
the ones more relevant to next-generation optical networks
can be found in [13] and [1]. Two basic recovery schemes
based on path protection are Dedicated Path Protection
(DPP) and Shared Path Protection (SPP), devised essen-
tially to protect against single failures.
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic operation of DPP, which
can be implemented through any technology that provides
path protection, for example SONET/SDH 1+1 (or 1:1)
Automatic Protection Switching or MPLS Fast Reroute
[14]. In this example, one (bidirectional) connection exists
between nodes 1 and 9. With DPP, two (link- or node-)
disjoint paths are exclusively assigned to the connection,
one acting as the working path and the other as the
backup path. Thus, it can survive any single (link or
intermediate node) failure. Now let’s assume that links
2–3, 3–5 and 5–7 are geographically close to each other
and that an event such as an earthquake affects them all
so that their failure are concurrent in time. Although the
network would continue being fully connected, DPP loses
its efficacy because both paths are failed and, by design,
dynamic recovery is not attempted. Note that the failed
elements need not be geographically related; any failure
that touches both paths will equally suffice. A possible
solution is to assign more than two paths, say k disjoint
paths. However, finding k such paths for arbitrary source-
destination pairs is not always possible, as it depends on
the topology and even on the routing strategy employed.
Furthermore, even if there were, they might not comply
with QoS constraints, for example on maximum hop count
[15]. Note that in our example, we could not have three
node-disjoint paths between nodes 1 and 9.
Nevertheless, DPP offers the fastest recovery and the
best protection in single-failure scenarios. In fact, it works
as expected even when there exist more than one concur-
rent failure network wide, for it operates at the connection
level. The drawback is the total capacity required to
support it, which is at least more than twice of what is
necessary for unprotected connections. This situation can
be alleviated by using SPP, which, in contrast to DPP,
shares a single backup path among n > 1 separate con-
nections, which can lead to substantial capacity savings.
The sharing groups must be carefully set up, however,
so that the working paths in each group are disjoint, a
computationally complex problem especially in dynamic
traffic scenarios [16]. If it is assumed that two or more
working paths in the same set rarely fail at the same
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(a) Failure-free state.
(b) Link 2–3 fails. Traffic is diverted to the backup path.
(c) Links 2–3, 3–5 and 5–7 fail. Both paths are affected (service
fails).
Figure 1: Basic operation of DPP. A working path (solid
line) and a backup path (dotted line) are provisioned for
a connection between nodes 1 and 9.
time, the protection will be effective. However, if they
do fail concurrently, one or more connections will not
be recovered. Thus, once the setting changes from single
failure to multiple failures, the sharing groups have to
be smaller to reduce risks, and so the capacity savings
diminishes as well.
DPP and SPP are just two of many existing protection
schemes. However, they illustrate very well that it is
possible to have effective redundancy-based protection at
varying degrees of resource consumption for the dominant
form of failure (i.e., single failures). At the same time, it
is clear that it is not economically viable to implement
massive redundancy for rarely occurring events (multiple
or large-scale failures) however devastating their effects
might be. Recent proposal of research in this area exploit
the concept of overlay networks, e.g. [4], [17], though
they target the commodity Internet instead of transport
networks. Our approach in this article is to analyze the
interaction of the topology with the routing to discover the
network elements (e.g., links) whose failure would cause
the largest service disruption and from there on devise
strategies of extra protection.
B. Network Robustness against Large-scale Failures
In networking, resilience is defined as the ability of the
network to provide and maintain an acceptable level of
service in the presence of faults [18]. The robustness of
a network is a measure of its resilience, which can be
appraised through a variety of approaches and metrics.
One classical approach is through the graph-theoretical
concept of connectivity, which determines the ability of a
given topology to keep all its pair of nodes accessible via
some path, as one or more nodes or links are removed.
The level of disruption can also be studied by analyzing
the flow variation in the network as a consequence of
failures. Furthermore, the interest may be in evaluating
the vulnerability to specific forms of failures, for exam-
ple random failures versus attacks [19]. A more recent
proposal is elasticity, which relates total throughput to
node removal in complex networks [20].
Another dimension of the problem of assessing net-
work robustness regards geographically correlated fail-
ures, which cause disruption to a large number of net-
work elements (fiber ducts, regenerators, complete nodes,
etc.) around a specific location. Correlated link failures
caused by random line-cuts are studied in [21] and
resilience metrics are proposed based on connectivity,
more specifically, on all-terminal reliability and average
two-terminal reliability. On the other hand, in [22] the
focus is in identifying the most vulnerable areas of a given
physical network, that is, the locations where large-scale
failures would provoke a severe reduction of capacity and
connectivity in the whole network.
C. Limitations of these metrics
The metrics just discussed, while clearly useful in the
general case of topology analysis, show some limitations,
however, when applied to data transport networks. This
stem from the fact that they largely depend on topo-
logical features, thus disregarding traffic dynamics and
operational constrains such as network load, heterogeneity
in link capacity, and routing strategy. Of the metrics
mentioned, only elasticity takes into account some of
these aspects. Moreover, when pre-planned protection is
the only mechanism considered, as we do here, network
connectivity is only marginally useful. As we have al-
ready pointed out, it is quite possible that the topology
remains connected after a multiple failure event, but even
so the number of lost connections reaches unacceptable
levels. Thus, instead of observing the state of the abstract
topology, it might be better to wonder about the fate of the
units of service of the transport network, i.e., connections.
Such approach is also taken in [23], but there the elements
under consideration are exclusively nodes which become
partially or totally disabled as a consequence of failures
described by an epidemic model.
In this article we propose using an alternate measure
of robustness, namely, the number of connections that
survive a large-scale failure or attack. This approach is
appropriate for connection-oriented networks precisely
because each connection embodies in its path the influ-
ence of the structural properties of the topology on the
traffic flow, as well as the network operator’s policy on
resource allocation, as implemented through routing.
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IV. PROPOSED HEURISTICS FOR LINK
PRIORITIZATION
Graph-theoretical studies on topology resilience usually
focus on events of vertex removal, which translated to
networking would mean complete node failure. However,
more often than not, a network node fails only partially.
In fact, the failure of one or more links attached to a node
can be considered a partial node failure, altogether a much
more frequent event. Therefore, from now on we will
focus on link failure, which we assume as encompassing
cable cuts as well as the malfunctioning of line cards,
regenerators or any component necessary for a successful
communication between two adjacent nodes, including
software components running on the nodes. Naturally, the
failure of all the links belonging to a node amounts to a
full node failure.
Suppose that all the links in a network have equal
probability of being hit by a certain failure, and that it
is possible to make them invulnerable at a fixed cost
per link. Suppose also that several links can be affected
at once, and that a budget is available for shielding a
limited number of them so as to reduce the total number
of affected connections when such a large-scale failure
event occurs. Which links should be part of this set of
invulnerable links? What is the criterion for selecting
them?
The combinatorial and non-deterministic nature of this
problem make it difficult to offer a computationally
simple and exact solution, and thus call for approximate
solutions instead. In this section we propose two heuristic-
based approaches to the problem. The first one takes
advantage of the concept of betweenness centrality, which
from now on we will identify as EDGEBC. The second
is based on link usage statistics collected as part of the
connection set-up phase, identified from now on as OLC
for Observed Link Criticality.
In both cases, the idea is that they produce a prioritized
list of links that we can choose from to satisfy the max-
imum number of links that are to become invulnerable.
We proceed now to explain both approaches and highlight
their strengths and limitations.
A. EDGEBC: The betweenness centrality approach
Betweenness centrality determines how often a node
or link on a given network topology lies along the
shortest path between all possible pair of nodes [24]. More
formally, the edge betweenness centrality Be, i.e., the
betweenness centrality of a link e, is defined as follows:
Be =
∑
s,t∈V,s6=t
σ(s, t|e)
σ(s, t)
(1)
where V and E are the set of nodes and the set of links,
respectively, σ(s, t) is the number of shortest paths that
exist between nodes s and t, and σ(s, t|e) is the number
of shortest paths between nodes s and t that use the link
e, with e ∈ E. Be can be normalized so that a value
close to 1 would mean that link e is present in almost
Figure 2: The COST266 topology [25]. Link thickness
indicates link importance in terms of edge betweenness
centrality.
all the shortest paths in the network. Likewise, a value
close to 0 would mean that its role as intermediary in the
communication is marginal. Note that the above definition
assumes the use of shortest paths, and thus it is sometimes
called the Shortest-Path Betweenness Centrality. Although
the cost function can vary, it is usually set to hop count.
Betweenness centrality has been used in network vul-
nerability studies to measure the impact of attacks that
target those nodes which seem to play a bigger role as
communication mediators in the topological sense, see for
example [19] and the references therein. That approach
is the converse of what we propose here, which is to
explore proactive link protection measures against random
failures.
Fig. 2 is a visual representation of the betweenness
centrality of the links of the well-known COST266 ref-
erence topology1, which has 37 nodes and 57 undirected
links. The higher the value of Be, the thicker the link line
is. One can see that thick lines appear scattered on the
topology, so that neither node position (periphery versus
“core”) nor degree of connectivity warrant a high Be.
Given that Be depends only on the topology, it can
be computed just once as long as the topology remains
unchanged. However, this very fact is also the source
of its weakness, for it cannot fully take into account
some fundamental aspects of an operational network. For
instance, from the point of view of routing, the network
topology suffers recurrent virtual and transient changes.
There is a virtual link removal when the corresponding
residual capacity reaches zero. Conversely, the link is re-
inserted later on when the connections that use it are
torn down. Therefore, the shortest path at any instant
depends on the network state: one particular connection
request might be assigned the ideal shortest path, but the
next one might not. In contrast, the definition in Eq. 1
1Available at http://sndlib.zib.de/
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assumes unlimited capacity and thus immutable shortest
paths. Consequently, for real-world data networks, Be can
only give an approximate centrality. Further complications
come from the variation in link capacity (not all links
have the same capacity) and from the imbalances in the
traffic matrix (the volume of communication between
node pairs need not be the same). Though it would
be feasible to recompute the betweenness centrality at
each virtual topology change –its running time is in
O(|V ||E|+ |V |2log |V |) [26]– it would not fully resolve
the divergence between the real centrality and the estima-
tion based on static data.
B. OLC: The Observed Link Criticality approach
This measure is based on the concept of criticality
in minimum-interference routing [27]. The difference is
that, instead of relying on an approximation based on
static data, we can directly take advantage of dynamic
information about resource usage that can be collected
in the GMPLS control plane. Specifically, each link e
can have associated to it a counter ce for the number of
connection paths that go through it, and that counter can
be updated as connections are accepted and released. That
way, the relative importance of e is M = ce
N
, where N
is the number of active connections at a certain instant.
From this, an estimation of the link importance can be
obtained as a simple moving average of M :
Ie =
M +M−1 +M−2 + . . .+M−k−1
k
(2)
where k is a constant for the number of consecutive
samples to use.
The disadvantage of this approach compared to
EDGEBC is that the network must already be in operation,
and preferably in a steady state, before it can be applied.
V. SIMULATION OF FAILURES FOR PERFORMANCE
COMPARISON
In this section, we detail the steps carried out to
compare through simulation the performance of EDGEBC
and OLC in terms of their ability to minimize the number
of affected connections when a large-scale failure occurs.
A. Simulation parameters
The topology used in this work is shown in Fig. 3. This
is a synthetic topology that represents a large transport
network consisting of 222 nodes and 371 links, and share
structural properties with reference topologies found in
the Survivable Network Design Library (SNDlib) [25].
The size differs significantly, however, as this topology
is more than three times larger than the ones found in
that repository. The main properties of this topology are
shown in Table I. As it represents the physical topology
of a transport network, the nodal degree range is 2 to 5,
the dominant degree being 3, as can be seen in Fig 4. For
simplicity, we assume that links are capable of carrying
Figure 3: The synthetic topology used in the simulations
TABLE I.: Main properties of the topology used in the
simulations
Property Value
Number of nodes 222
Number of links 371
Network diameter 20 hops
Average shortest path 9.06 hops
Average nodal degree 3.3
an arbitrary number of Label Switched Paths (LSPs)
[28] as long as free capacity is available, and that all
nodes support full wavelength conversion. To introduce a
minimum degree of heterogeneity in capacity, links have
either C or 2C units of total capacity. Half of them belong
to the first group and the rest to the second, where the
membership to either set was decided on a random basis.
In order to simulate the provision of service in the
network and the occurrence of large-scale failures, an
event-driven simulator that reproduces the process of
route selection in a path-oriented transport network was
developed. The simulator handles the reception of con-
nection requests between node pairs, triggers and coor-
dinates the proper routing and capacity allocation based
on the demand, keeps track of the usage of resources (the
residual capacity on each link), releases connections when
their holding time has expired, and collects the required
statistical data.
With respect to the traffic demand, the simulator ac-
cepts a series of connection requests between randomly-
selected source and destination nodes, which arrive ac-
cording to a Poisson process. As we are interested in
a dynamic traffic scenario, the capacity allocated to an
accepted connection, whose holding time is an exponen-
tially distributed random variable, is released as soon as
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Figure 4: Frequency distribution of nodal degrees
the connection terminates. The aggregated traffic between
any two pair of nodes is a fixed value or zero, meaning
that either they do not communicate, or contribute the
same amount of traffic as other pairs. This traffic matrix
is randomly generated. Any demand whose source and
destination are at four hops or less is disregarded (and
not counted as rejected), i.e., we discard connections
corresponding to “local traffic”. The capacity requested
by connections is a uniformly distributed random variable
in the range 1–10 units.
In accordance with the assumptions made in Sec-
tion IV, a minimum-hop routing algorithm is used. Links
that do not have enough residual capacity to satisfy the
arriving demand are filtered out before the exploration be-
gins. That is, the routing employs a Constrained Shortest
Path First algorithm, where the constraint is the minimum
capacity required per link.
To avoid creating unrealistically long paths, any request
whose feasible path exceeds 24 hops is also rejected. Note
that the average minimum path length in this topology is
about 9 hops, while the diameter is 20 (see Table I). The
blocking ratio is approximately 0.01 in all the experiments
reported. For each accepted connection, one path from
source to destination is created. As no protection is
provided at the connection level, no additional path is
created in addition to this working path.
B. Simulating a Large-scale Failure
Exactly one failure event is triggered during the simu-
lation, whose time is chosen randomly once a stable state
had been reached. In contrast, the extent of the failure and
the size of the set of invulnerable links are user-provided
input data, expressed as a percentage of the total number
of links in the topology.
To emphasize that this work focuses on far-reaching
failures, both in geographical coverage and size, from now
on we refer to the extent of the failure as the infection
level and, by analogy, to the percentage of invulnerable
links as the immunization level.
The simulations were performed with infection levels
5, 10, and 20, and immunization levels 10, 20, and
30. Thus, one simulation run corresponds to a specific
combination of: a) infection level, b) immunization level,
and c) procedure for the selection of invulnerable links,
which for simplicity is called immunization strategy from
now on.
For comparison purposes, a procedure based on random
selection of the links to be considered invulnerable was
also added, so that the immunization strategies are three,
as follows:
• RANDOM: failed links as well as invulnerable links
are chosen randomly.
• EDGEBC: failed links are chosen randomly. Link
immunization is based on their edge betweenness
centrality.
• OLC: failed links are also chosen randomly. The
immunization is based on average Observed Link
Centrality.
This gives 27 cases in total. The values presented in
Section VI are the average of 30 runs per case, each
one processing a new demand set consisting of 95000
randomly-generated connection requests.
From each run, the following results are obtained,
which constitute the figures of merit for comparing the
performance of the immunization strategies:
1) The percentage of active connections affected by
the failure.
2) The frequency distribution of path length of the
affected connections.
A connection is considered affected if: a) its duration
has not yet reached its declared lifetime, and b) at least
one link included in its path was hit by the failure.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The objective of these simulations is to compare the
effectiveness of the immunization strategies proposed.
However, there is the question whether these strategies
provide any improvement in resilience at all. To answer
this question and put in perspective the value of the
proposed strategies, we also simulated the zero immu-
nization case. As can be seen in Fig. 5, the result is
striking, since even when the infection level is minimal
(5%), almost half of the connections (42%) active at
the time the failure was triggered were affected. The
percentage of affected connections continues to grow as
the infection level increases, but a moderation is observed
in its progression. Nearly all connections (≈90%) are
affected with 20% of infection. Thus, we consider that
the infection scenarios worth exploring are between 5%
and 20%.
Table II shows the distribution of the frequency of
connection path length of one representative simulation
run. For the reasons explained in Section V, the path
length range is 5–24. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 discriminate
by path length the percentage of connections affected at
infection levels 5 and 20, respectively. Each sub-figure
presents the performance of one specific immunization
strategy at immunization levels 10, 20, and 30.
It can be observed that RANDOM is essentially insensi-
tive to the immunization level in both infection scenarios.
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Figure 5: Affected connections at three infection levels
when no immunization is in place
TABLE II.: Frequency distribution of connection path
length of a representative simulation run
Path Frequency Cumulative
length (%) frequency
5 8.5 8.5
6 9.4 17.9
7 10.2 28.1
8 10.3 38.4
9 10.2 48.6
10 9.4 58.0
11 8.4 66.4
12 7.6 74.0
13 6.4 80.4
14 5.2 85.6
15 4.3 89.9
16 3.5 93.4
17–24 6.6 100.0
It is interesting to note in Fig. 6c that there exists a case
in which the immunization level is six times the infection
level, but even then the effect is negligible. This behavior
is similar for all path lengths. Only for the longest paths
in Fig. 6c does performance vary with respect to the
immunization level, which is due to the fact that the
number of connections of such long lengths is very small
compared to the rest (see Table II).
In the rest of the cases, the behavior clearly depends
on the level of infection and immunization. For instance,
with 20% of infection (Fig. 7) and 10% of immunization,
EDGEBC and OLC offer similar results, outperforming
RANDOM in that case as well as in almost all the others.
However, when the immunization level is raised to 30,
OLC is the one whose reaction is more visible, producing
the lowest values for the number of affected connections.
This effect is observed in the three infection scenarios.
Table III summarizes the performance of the three
strategies. The column “% Aff. conn.” gives the percent-
age of connections affected by the failure. The remaining
columns put connections into three groups based on their
path lengths, and show what proportion of each group was
adversely affected. The groups are as follows: a) short
(5–8 hops), b) medium (9–18 hops), and c) long (19–24
hops). Each value is an average of the individual results in
the range. Every combination of infection level, strategy
TABLE III.: Performance of the three strategies, discrim-
inated by groups of path length, at selected combinations
of infection and immunization level
% % Immu- % Aff. Path length
Infect. Strategy nization conn. Short Medium Long
5 EDGEBC 10 34.6 25.6 42.8 67.3
20 30.8 23.1 37.3 62.1
30 25.1 20.4 29.2 53.6
OLC 10 33.7 25.4 41.1 60.7
20 28.6 22.9 33.8 54.1
30 23.4 19.7 27.2 42.2
RANDOM 10 40.5 29.5 50.1 70.8
20 42.0 29.7 52.1 69.1
30 41.6 29.0 52.4 69.2
10 EDGEBC 10 54.5 43.1 64.5 86.2
20 49.2 40.0 57.3 82.5
30 42.7 35.1 50.0 75.8
OLC 10 53.9 45.0 65.4 85.1
20 47.5 39.0 55.7 77.1
30 40.2 34.3 45.6 68.2
RANDOM 10 64.1 49.1 76.2 90.4
20 64.5 50.2 75.8 90.1
30 65.2 50.9 76.6 90.9
20 EDGEBC 10 79.9 69.9 88.2 98.5
20 71.6 62.6 79.6 96.0
30 65.2 56.6 73.2 93.9
OLC 10 78.8 70.4 87.9 96.4
20 70.7 61.8 78.6 94.7
30 62.2 55.4 68.9 90.0
RANDOM 10 87.1 76.7 94.6 99.4
20 87.4 77.0 94.9 99.6
30 86.4 75.9 94.1 99.0
and immunization level considered in this work has an
entry in the table.
Fig. 8 shows graphically what happens from the per-
spective of connection path length when the infection
level is 10 and the immunization level is 30. As can be
seen, the difference between RANDOM and the other two
is almost 20% for short paths. That difference jumps to
around 30% for paths of medium length, and shrinks back
to around 20% for long paths.
Additionally, the network’s two-terminal reliability ob-
tained after the failure event is presented in Table IV. The
values correspond to selected levels of immunization and
infection when the strategy is EDGEBC. We compute it
as the ratio of the number of origin-destination pairs for
which a path exists to the maximum possible number of
paths. Thus, the closer this value to 1.0, the lower the
network fragmentation is. As expected, our simulations
confirm that this reliability measure is quite insensitive to
the failure, for it remains very close to 1.0 in all cases,
indicating almost full connectivity. That is, it does not
reflect the degree of damage experienced by connections
after the failure.
In summary, these results show the high sensitivity
of a connection-oriented network to large-scale failures,
because even a relatively small infection level (%5) causes
disruption to almost half the connections in the studied
scenario. Moreover, the RANDOM strategy, which imple-
ments a immunization without a specific criterion, shows
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(a) EDGEBC (b) OLC (c) RANDOM
Figure 6: Performance comparison discriminated by path length at infection level=5%
(a) EDGEBC (b) OLC (c) RANDOM
Figure 7: Performance comparison discriminated by path length at infection level=20%
TABLE IV.: Average two-terminal reliability after the
failure event. Strategy: EDGEBC
Immunization Infection
(%) 5% 10%
10 0.9994 0.9973
20 0.9985 0.9970
that little or no benefit is obtained in terms of robustness
by choosing links disregarding their role in the overall
traffic flow.
With respect to the immunization strategies EDGEBC
and OLC, results show that both are capable of mini-
mizing the impact of these failures with the appropriate
election of the immunization level. Of the two, we can
see that OLC is the best performer, as with it the number
of affected connections is lower and, at the same time,
the number of surviving connections whose path lengths
are medium and long is higher.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, the problem of improving the resilience
of large transport networks to pervasive failures has been
Figure 8: Affected connections under the three strategies
when infection level=10% and immunization level=30%
addressed. The scenario is a GMPLS-based network sub-
jected to a pervasive multiple failure event, where several
links fail concurrently in random locations, provoking the
loss of all the end-to-end connections passing through
them. The ultimate aim is to identify elements (e.g., links)
to which extra network protection can be applied so that
the impact of such failure events, in terms of the number
of connections affected, is minimized.
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Two new strategies of link prioritization have been
presented, whereby a subset of links are made invulner-
able to the proposed type of failure. The first strategy
uses the well-known measure of betweenness centrality,
while the second is based on a new concept called
the Observed Link Criticality. Both have been evaluated
through extensive simulations. For comparison purposes,
a third approach based on random selection of links was
also included in the study.
The obtained results highlight how easily a large-scale
failure event can seriously disrupt the operation of a
connection-oriented network. At the same time, it shows
that robustness metrics such as two-terminal reliability
are not appropriate to assess the state of the network
from the point of view of its ability to provide service
(connections). For example, even when the network is
suffering a major service degradation, the average two-
terminal reliability reports a very high degree of connec-
tivity. Results also show that the two proposed strategies
succeed in decreasing the number of affected connections.
The one based on observed link criticality offers better
overall robustness and, at the same time, preserves a
higher number of connections of medium and long path
lengths.
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Abstract— Quality of Service (QoS) routing known as multi-
constrained routing is of crucial importance for the emerging
network applications and has been attracting many research
works. This NP-hard problem aims to compute paths that
satisfy the QoS requirements based on multiple constraints
such as the delay, the bandwidth or the jitter. In this paper,
we propose two fast heuristics that quickly compute feasible
paths if they exist. These heuristics are compared to the exact
QoS routing algorithm: Self Adaptive Multiple Constraints
Routing Algorithm (SAMCRA). For that, two main axes are
explored. In the first axis, we limited the execution time of
our heuristics. The simulation results show that the length of
the computed paths is very close to the optimal ones that are
computed by SAMCRA. Moreover, these heuristics satisfy
more than 80% of the feasible requests. In the second axis, to
enforce our hypothesis about the relevancy of the proposed
heuristics, we force our algorithms to compute paths until
a feasible path is found if such a path exists. The success
rate becomes then 100%. Moreover, the qualities of found
solutions as well as the combinatorial complexity of our
heuristics are still attractive.
Index Terms— Routing, multi-constrained, quality of Ser-
vice, heuristic
I. INTRODUCTION
Quality of Service (QoS) routing known as multi-
constrained routing, consists in computing paths that
meet a set of requirements such as delay, bandwidth,
and cost. Most of the emerging multimedia applications
become more stringent with QoS and require more guar-
antees. Wang and Crowcroft have proved that the multi-
constrained routing problem is NP-hard [1]. For solving
exactly or approximatively this problem, many solutions
are proposed in the literature. Among the exact solutions,
we mention the Depth First Search (DFS) approach which
returns a feasible solution to the problem if such a solution
exists [2]. Since the worst-case time complexity approach
is exponential, Shane et al. proposed in 2001 a heuristic
based on the DFS approach [3]. Another approach uses
the Constrained Bellman-Ford algorithm for the delay-
cost-constrained routing problem as done in [4]. The
main idea of this algorithm is at first find minimal cost
paths between the source and the other nodes. Then, the
algorithm maintains a list of paths that increase the cost
and decrease the delay. When the path with the smallest
cost and acceptable delay is found the algorithm returns
this path. However, in [5], it has been shown that a non-
linear length is necessary to solve the QoS routing prob-
lem, and the authors replace the cost function by a non-
linear length, and proposed the Self Adaptive Multiple
Constraints Routing Algorithm SAMCRA. SAMCRA is
an exact algorithm based on two main concepts: the use
of a non-linear length function and the non dominance
of paths. SAMCRA explores like Dijkstra’s algorithm all
nodes beginning by the source node and maintains a set of
non-dominated feasible paths at each node. The algorithm
stops when it computes the non dominated feasible path
with the smallest non-linear length between the source
and the destination nodes.
Since the optimal QoS routing with multiple constraints
is NP-hard, heuristics are required for real network ap-
plications. A heuristic version of SAMCRA is given by
TAMCRA [6], which was proposed earlier as a heuristic
to solve the unicast QoS routing. Unlike SAMCRA,
TAMCRA bounds the number of non dominated paths
that can be stored at each node by a predefined integer k.
Therefore, the found solution may not be the optimal one.
In 2001, Yuan and Liu proposed an extended version of
the Bellman-Ford algorithm that finds all optimal paths
then chooses a feasible one if such a path exists [7].
In [8], Jaffe defined an approximation algorithm, which
computes shortest paths based on a linear combination
of the weight values of each link in one new weight.
This algorithm was illustrated in the case of two metrics,
a generalization for multiple metrics was proposed in
[9]. H MCOP is one of the well-known multi-constrained
unicast algorithms that was introduced in [10]. This
algorithm is based on the execution of two modified
versions of Dijkstra’s algorithm in forward and backward
directions to compute the shortest paths between two
nodes. Other works aim to solve the multi-constrained
routing problem using Lagrange relaxation to mix the
metrics. In this category, we can cite the algorithms
proposed by Feng et al. in 2001 [11], 2002 [12], by Juttner
et al. in 2001 [13] and by Guo and Matta in 1999 [14].
Recently, the research community is exploring the
use of the metaheuristics to solve the multi-constrained
routing problem, such as genetic algorithms [15], tabu
search [7], and ant colonies [16].
Instead its effectiveness, the major drawback of SAM-
CRA resides in its complexity [17]. In this paper, we
investigate the possibility to replace SAMCRA by two
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simple heuristics that efficiently reduce the execution time
and return satisfying solutions. These heuristics are based
on the computation of the k shortest paths. For this, we
adapt the Yen’s algorithm [18], which has the smallest
combinatorial complexity [19]. The difference between
the two heuristics lies in the metric used for shortest paths
computation. Hop Count Approach (HCA) considers the
hop count metric of a path, while the second heuristic
Metric Linearization Approach (MLA) combines the QoS
metrics into one weighted metric.
In the following, we first give a formal definition of
the multi-constrained routing problem. In Section III, we
outline SAMCRA algorithm. In Section IV, we give an
overview of the proposed algorithms for computing the
k shortest paths. Our heuristics are presented in Section
V. In Section VI, the performance of our heuristics is
investigated through a large number of simulations.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A communication network is modeled as an undirected
weighted graph G(N,E), where N is the set of nodes
and E the set of links. Each link e ∈ E of the network is
associated with m QoS parameters denoted by a weight
vector:
→
w (e) = [w1(e), w2(e), ..., wm(e)]
T
. The QoS
metrics can be classified into additive metrics such as
delay, multiplicative metrics such as loss rate or bottle-
neck metrics such as available bandwidth. The end-to-end
constraints of a given QoS request, from a source node s
to a destination node d, are given by an m-dimensional
vector: −→L = [L1, ..., Lm]T . In general, bottleneck metrics
can be easily dealt with by pruning from the graph all
the links that do not satisfy the QoS constraints, while
the multiplicative metrics can be transformed into addi-
tive metrics by using a logarithm function. The additive
metrics cause more difficulties. Therefore, and without
loss of generality, we only consider additive metrics. The
length of a path p(s, d) corresponding to the metric i is
given by: li(p(s, d)) =
∑
e∈p(s,d)
wi(e). Thus, we define
a feasible path p(s, d) as follows:
li(p(s, dj)) ≤ Li, ∀i = 1, ...,m (1)
Using the Pareto dominance, a path p(s, d) dominates
another path p′(s, d) if:
{
li(p(s, d)) ≤ li(p
′(s, d)), ∀i = 1, ...,m
lj(p(s, d)) < lj(p
′(s, d)), for at least one j (2)
In [5], the authors formulated the multi-constrained
routing problem in two different ways.
MCP problem The Multi-Constraint Path (MCP) prob-
lem consists in finding a path p(s, d) that satisfies a given
constraint vector
→
L:
li(p(s, d)) ≤ Li, i ∈ {1, ...,m} (3)
MCOP problem Considering a length function l (e.g.
 2
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 step i
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Figure 1. An example of SAMCRA
l(p(s, d)) = 1
m
∑m
1 li(p(s, d))), the Multi-Constraint Op-
timal Path (MCOP) problem consists in finding among the
feasible paths, the path p∗(s, d) with the smallest length
l(p∗(s, d)).
To evaluate the quality of a path p(s, d), an interesting
non-linear length function was defined in [5]:
l(p(s, d)) = maxi=1,...,m(
∑
wi(e)e∈p(s,d)
Li
) (4)
This length function considers the value of the most
critical constraint of a path regarding the end-to-end
requirements.
III. SAMCRA
SAMCRA [5] is an exact multi-constrained routing
algorithm that solves the MCOP problem using the non-
linear length function and the dominance of paths.
For a node pair (s, d), SAMCRA returns the shortest
path that satisfies the constraint vector if such a path
exists. Thus, SAMCRA begins by the source node s.
At each iteration, the algorithm explores the neighbors
of the current node and chooses the closest node using
the non-linear length function defined in Equation 4. The
dominated paths are regularly dropped, while all non
dominated ones are memorized. SAMCRA ends when the
destinations d is reached, and there is no possibility to find
a better path for this destination.
For instance, let us consider the example in Figure 1,
where SAMCRA computes the path with the smallest
non-linear length between s and d. SAMCRA begins
by exploring the neighbors of s {2, 4} , and chooses
the node 4 with the smallest non-linear length. Then, it
explores its neighbors {2, 3, d}. The algorithm stops at the
4th iteration, when the node d is selected to having the
smallest non-linear length. In the same figure, we notice
that dominated paths like (s− 4− 3− d) are dropped as
well as the infeasible one (s− 2− 4).
IV. THE k SHORTEST PATHS ALGORITHMS
Routing is usually associated with the computation of
shortest paths (in number of hops for example). However,
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when the shortest path does not satisfy the constraints
of QoS, it becomes necessary to compute a set of k
shortest paths between a source node and destination node
to find a feasible path. The k shortest paths problem is
a natural and long-studied generalization of the shortest
path problem in which not one but several paths in an
increasing order of length are required. The k shortest
paths problem in which paths can contain loops turns out
to be significantly easier. An algorithm with a complexity
in O(|E| + k.|N |.log|N |) has been known since 1975
[20]; a recent improvement by Eppstein achieves the
optimal complexity in: O(|E| + |N |.log|N | + k) [21].
However, the problem of determining the k shortest paths
without loops has proved to be more challenging. The
problem was first examined by Hoffman and Pavley [22].
For undirected graphs, the most efficient algorithm was
proposed by Katoh et al. [23], which has a complexity
in O(k.(|E|+ |N |.log|N |)). Since undirected graphs can
be transformed on directed graphs, by replacing the undi-
rected link with two directed links with the same weights,
on the most general case, the best known algorithm is
that proposed by Yen in [18]. The Yen’s algorithm was
generalized by Lawler in [24] and has a complexity in
O(k.|N |(|E|+ |N |.log|N |)).
V. PROPOSED HEURISTICS
A. Motivation
It has been proved that the multi-constrained routing
problem is NP-hard [1]. SAMCRA is an efficient algo-
rithm that exactly solves this problem. Although its effec-
tiveness, SAMCRA can be expensive with a combinatorial
complexity in: O(k|N | log(k|N |)+k2m|E|) [17], with k
the number of non dominated paths that can be stored at
each node queue. Therefore, it may be more interesting
to use an approximate algorithm with less combinatorial
complexity expecting a feasible path between the source
and the destination nodes. Reducing the execution time
while giving satisfying solutions is our main motivation
to propose our fast heuristics. These heuristics are based
on the computation of the k shortest paths. The idea of
applying such an algorithm is that the shortest paths may
be feasible. For that, we propose the modification of the
well-known algorithm of Yen [18] to compute the paths
between two nodes in increasing order of their length until
(i) a feasible path that satisfies all constraints is found, (ii)
or a given limitation of computed paths is reached.
To solve the multi-constrained unicast routing, we pro-
pose two heuristics based on the computation of shortest
paths. Indeed, we argue that one of these computed paths
will be feasible. Moreover, these heuristics have a com-
binatorial complexity that is bounded by the number of
allowed computed shortest paths. The proposed heuristics
are using one additive metric. The first heuristic computes
the paths with the smallest number of links. The second
heuristic uses a combination of the QoS metrics in a single
one, using an efficient technique that will be explained in
detail in Section V-C.
Figure 2. An example of Yen’s algorithm processing
Both the proposed heuristics are based on Yen’s algo-
rithm, which we outline in the following.
B. Yen’s Algorithm
As shown in many studies [19], Yen’s algorithm is the
most pertinent and fast k shortest paths algorithm that
was introduced in [18].
For a given node pair (s, d) and a given integer k, this
iterative algorithm computes, using one additive metric,
the k shortest paths between these nodes. For that, it
begins by computing the first shortest path using the
Dijkstra algorithm. At the ith iteration, the algorithm
computes the ith shortest path by considering all possible
paths that deviate from the (i−1)th shortest path that are
not already computed.
For instance, let us consider the example in Figure 2,
where the first two shortest paths between the nodes 1
and 4 are required. The algorithm begins by computing
the shortest path P1. Then, it computes all shortest paths
that deviate from P1 at nodes 1 and 2. Two paths are
computed P ′ , P ′′ . The shortest one, here P ′′ with length
4, is the second shortest path P2.
C. Algorithmic Description of the Proposed Approaches
In this paper, we propose two fast heuristics that
compute shortest paths in an increasing order, given an
additive length function. These heuristics stop when (i)
a path satisfying all the QoS constraints is found or (ii)
an upper bound of the number of computed paths kmax
is reached. kmax is an important parameter, since the
combinatorial complexity and so the execution time of
our heuristics depend on its value. Indeed, when kmax
is small, these heuristics are fast, and the number of
satisfied request can be small. In parallel, when kmax
increases, the number of satisfied requests increases too.
Furthermore, the proposed heuristics use a single additive
metric obtained by two ways:
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Figure 3. Proposed heuristics diagram
Hop Count Approach (HCA): in this approach, the
algorithm searches for the shortest paths considering the
number of hops as the only metric to optimize.
Metric Linearization Approach (MLA): at first, it sub-
stitutes the weight vector →w (e) = [w1(e), .., wm(e)]T ,
by a scalar weight w′(e) =
∑
i=1,...,m αiwi(e). To
calculate the parameters αi, the MLA approach computes
p∗i (s, dj), i = 1, ...,m, the shortest path that optimizes
the metric i. Then, the parameter αi is calculated as
follows:
αi =
li(p
∗
i (s, dj))
Li
(5)
αi can be named the criticality degree of the constraint
Li. When αi is close to 1, that means p∗i (s, dj) is very
close to Li. Consequently, it is necessary at first to satisfy
the constraint Li.
Figure 3 summarizes the process of our heuristics HCA
and MLA. For a given graph G, a given node pair (s, d),
with a constraint vector ~L and a chosen approach, the
algorithm returns the fist feasible path between s and
d, if such a path is one of the kmax shortest paths
that are allowed to be computed. For that, the algorithm
chooses the approach to use and compute the combined
link weights in case of MLA. Then, it computes shortest
paths in an increasing order. The process stops when a
feasible path is found, or kmax iterations are already done.
A more detailed meta-code is presented in Algorithm 1
for MLA approach.
D. Limitations of the Yen’s algorithm
The proposed heuristics MLA and HCA are based
on the computation of the k shortest paths using the
Yen’s algorithm. However, Yen’s algorithm computes the
2deviation is a function that returns the furthest node at which a path
P deviates from a set of paths
2prefix retuns the sub-path of a path P, between the source node and
a defined node v
Algorithm 1 MLA meta-code
for (i = 1, ...,m) do
Compute p∗i (s, d)
αi =
li(p
∗
i (s,d))
Li
end for
for all e ∈ G do
w
′
i(e) =
∑
i=1,...,m αiwi(e)
end for
j ← 1, Find←false, k ← 1,
p1(s, d) = Dijkstra(s, d), P, P
′//paths
D = p1(s, d) // candidate set
X = φ //shortest paths set
while ((Find6=true) and (k ≤ kmax)) do
P ←shortest path in D
if (pj(s, d) is feasible) then
Find←true
else
j ← j + 1
v ← deviation1(pj(s, d), X)
while (v 6= d) do
P ← Dijkstra(v, d)
P ′ ← prefix2(pj(s, d), v) + P
D ← D + P ′
v ←successor(v, pj(s, d))
end while
end if
end while
k shortest paths without considering all the existing paths
as we will demonstrate it in Figure 4.
On the left side (a), at first HCA computes the three
shortest paths P1,P2 and P3, that have the same hop
count. When computing the fourth shortest path using the
deviation concept at node 2, the algorithm will choose one
of the two paths P ′ and P”. As the algorithm chooses
one of the two latter paths, it can not choose the other one
at the next iteration. This can lead to some cases where
not all paths are explored and the feasible path can be
skipped. For instance, if the constraints are given by the
vector
→
L (3, 3), only the path P ′ will be feasible, and this
path can be skipped by the original Yen’s algorithm.
On the right side (b), we suppose that →L= (4, 4).
MLA starts by computing the shortest paths considering
successively the two metrics. Here the path (s − 2 − d)
minimizes the first metric with the value 2, and the path
(s − 1 − d) minimizes the second metric with the value
2. Then, MLA computes the parameters α1 = 24 = 0.5
and α2 = 24 = 0.5. After adding the new weights to the
links, MLA computes the first shortest path P1. At the
second iteration, when computing the shortest path at the
deviation node s, MLA can chooses P ∗ or P ∗∗ since they
have the same length 4. However, only P ∗ is feasible.
This limitation prevents to compute feasible paths even
if this path is one of the shortest paths. To cure this,
we propose a modification of the Yen’s algorithm. We
replace the computation of the shortest path using Di-
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Figure 4. The relevance of enumerating all paths having the same length
jkstra’s algorithm by a modified version denoted Mod-
Dijkstra that computes all shortest paths that have the
same length at the same time, if more than one exist. For
this, instead of saving only one of the predecessors with
the smallest length at each node, the algorithm saves all
the predecessors that have the same smallest length.
E. Exact HCA and Exact MLA algorithms
Exact HCA (E-HCA) and exact MLA (E-MLA) are two
modified version of HCA and MLA respectively. These
algorithms are based ob three main modifications.
• at each deviation node, the algorithm of computation
of shortest paths computes all paths with the same
additive length (hop count for E-HCA and metric
linearization for E-MLA),
• the upper bound kmax of computed paths become
infinite (kmax →∞),
• the algorithm stops only when a solution is found
for feasible requests.
Considering the example of Figure 4, two iterations will
be sufficient for HCA to compute the feasible path P”
without skipping this path. In the first iteration, Mod-
Dijkstra returns the set P1, P2, P3. Then, at the second
iteration it returns both P ′ and P”. For MLA, the problem
is less recurrent because of the new weights computation.
Indeed, the paths have generally different lengths, and
MLA cannot skip paths that have the same length.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND SIMULATIONS
The performance of the two proposed heuristics and
SAMCRA are investigated through extensive simulations.
For that, we use a realistic network with 50 nodes and
82 links denoted by Real-Topology [25]. Each link is
associated with two additive weights. These weights are
randomly generated using a uniform distribution in the
interval [1, 1024].
Different classes of constraints are also considered.
For each pair of nodes (s, d), the constraint vectors are
generated in a way that they browse a defined space gener-
ation by areas from the strictest constraints to the loosest
ones. In Figure 5, where only two metrics are considered,
P1 and P2 denote the shortest paths between s and d
that minimizes the first and second metric respectively.
The shaded rectangle (B) delimited by l1(P1), l1(P2)
and l2(P2), l2(P1) circumscribes the region where the
constraints are selected. This region is divided in 10 areas:
area 1, area 2,..., area 10 (also denoted in the simulation
figures by 1,2,...,10). The constraints are randomly se-
lected within these areas. Outside the specified region,
the QoS constraints are less interesting to be examined.
Indeed, all constraints that are generated within space (A)
are infeasible, while all constraints generated in space (C)
are trivial and any polynomial algorithm will be sufficient
to find solutions. We note that strict constraints are close
to l1(P1) and l2(P2) (area 1), while loose constraints are
close to l1(P2) and l2(P1) (area 10).
In the followings, two series of simulation are per-
formed.
A. HCA and MLA performance evaluations
In this part, several series of simulations have been
performed. We randomly generate 100 instances of link
weights. For each instance of link weights, 100 pair
of nodes are randomly selected. Thereafter, 10 routing
requests are generated within each area, from the strictest
constraints (area 1) to loosest ones (area 10). After that,
the three algorithms: SAMCRA, HCA and MLA are exe-
cuted independently to find a solution. Four performance
measures are computed.
• Success rate: it is the number of satisfied routing
requests from 100 generated requests,
• Quality of computed paths:it corresponds to two
lengths. The non-linear length and the average length
of computed paths. The non-linear length is used by
SAMCRA (Equation 4) and corresponds to the sat-
isfactory degree of the most critical constraint. The
average length (lavg(p(s, d)) = 1m
∑m
1 li(p(s, d)))
equivalently considers all the metrics, and computes
the average quality of the computed paths.
• Relative complexity: it is the number of operations3
that are performed to find a feasible solution,
• Absolute complexity: it is the number of operations
that are performed before answering a given routing
request, instead the request is infeasible,
We note that all these performance measures have been
computed with 95% confidence intervals according to the
ten constraint generation areas. The upper bound kmax of
the computed shortest paths in our heuristics is fixed to
three.
• Success rate
3an elementary operation corresponds to the visit of one node
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Figure 6. The success rate of the three algorithms SAMCRA,HCA and
MLA
Figure 6 shows the success rate of the three algorithms:
SAMCRA, HCA and MLA. Foremost, we notice that
the success rate of the three algorithms is increasing. In
fact, for strict constraints there is few feasible requests,
and this number is increasing when constraints become
loose. Since SAMCRA is an exact algorithm, it gives the
highest success rate, while the upper bound of computed
paths in our heuristics is fixed to three. The success rate
of SAMCRA varies from 29% for strict constraints to
100% for the loose ones. For strict constraints, the gap
between SAMCRA and our heuristics does not exceed
4% with MLA and 7% with HCA. For loose constraints
(area 10), the difference becomes 12% with MLA and
16% with HCA. Indeed, the area 10 presents the trivial
constraints for which SAMCRA always finds a solution,
and the number of feasible requests is 100%.
The execution time is an important parameter when
evaluating any routing algorithm. To evaluate more deeply
the three algorithms, two kinds of complexity metrics are
proposed. The relative complexity for feasible requests
and the absolute complexity for the total generated re-
quests.
• Relative complexity
Relative complexity is calculated only if a solution is
found by the three algorithms. In Figure 7, we notice
that the relative complexity of SAMCRA is significantly
larger than both of HCA and MLA. Indeed, when the
constraints are not strict, SAMCRA has more paths to
explore before returning the optimal solution according
to the non-linear length, while both approaches HCA and
MLA stop at the first feasible path they find. This reduces
their execution time.
• Absolute complexity
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Figure 7. Relative complexity of the algorithms SAMCRA, HCA and
MLA
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Figure 8. The absolute complexity of the algorithms SAMCRA, HCA
and MLA
In Figure 8, we can state that the absolute complexity
of both proposed heuristics HCA and MLA is greater
than SAMCRA complexity for strict constraints. Indeed,
when the constraints are strict, SAMCRA rapidly rejects
non feasible requests, while both approaches explore the
maximum number of paths (here fixed to three) without
finding solutions. When constraints become less strict; the
two proposed approaches find feasible solutions before
computing the three paths, which significantly reduces
their execution time.
• Quality of computed paths
In Figure 9, the solutions found by our approaches HCA
and MLA are a little bit worse than those found by
SAMCRA with 6.67% and 2.39% respectively. Obvi-
ously, SAMCRA finds the path with the smallest non-
linear length, while both heuristics HCA and MLA stops
at the first feasible path, which can be worse than the
optimal one. Moreover, for strict constraints, the solutions
computed by the three algorithms are significantly equal.
In fact, for strict constraints, the number of feasible paths
is very small, and if HCA or MLA computes a feasible
path, this path has big chances to be the optimal one.
In Figure 10, the average length of MLA is better than
that of SAMCRA with 1.59%, and the average length
of HCA is very close to that of SAMCRA. Indeed, the
linearization of the metrics involves the computation of
paths based on both metrics, unlike SAMCRA which
does not consider the variation between the metrics and
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Figure 10. The average length of the paths computed by SAMCRA,
HCA and MLA
focuses on the most critical one. The following example
highlights the difference between non-linear length and
average length evaluation. For that, let us consider two
paths: the path computed by SAMCRA p1(s, d) : with
the lengths l1(p1(s, d)) = 0.6, l2(p1(s, d)) = 0.7
corresponding to the metrics 1 and 2 respectively, and
the path computed by HCA p2(s, d) : with the lengths
l1(p2(s, d)) = 0.1, l2(p2(s, d)) = 0.9. It is clear that
the non-linear length l(p1(s, d)) = 0.7 < l(p2(s, d)) =
0.9, while the average length lavg(p1(s, d)) = 0.65 >
lavg(s, d) = 0.5.
B. Exact-HCA and Exact-MLA Performance Evaluation
In the second series of our study the exact version of
the algorithms E-HCA and E-MLA has been analyzed.
In fact, after the modification of the Yen’s algorithm in
order not to skip paths with the same length, E-HCA
and E-MLA will explore all existing paths (kmax →
∞) if necessary, between the source and the destination
nodes. For this, they compute the paths in an increasing
order according to the previously explained metrics. E-
HCA uses the hop count metric, while E-MLA uses
the linearization metric. In this series of simulations, the
requests as well as the constraints are generated similarly
to the first series of simulations. Two measure parameters
are evaluated:
• Number of computed paths: is the average number of
computed paths to find a feasible solution for feasible
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Figure 11. Number of computed paths before finding a solution by
E-HCA and E-MLA
requests,
• Exact complexity : is the number of operations that
are performed to find a solution for all feasible
requests.
• Number of computed paths
Figure 11 shows the number of computed paths by E-
HCA and E-MLA before finding a feasible path. For strict
constraints, E-HCA needs 2.1 paths to find a solution
while E-MLA does not need more than 1.13 paths.
The number of computed paths is decreasing when the
constraints are less strict. Instead numbers of computed
paths by E-HCA and E-MLA are lower than the upper
bound kmax of HCA and MLA, E-MLA as well as E-
MLA computes paths until a feasible one is found. In the
10% of cases where HCA and MLA do not find feasible
paths they need to compute more than 3 paths. In the
other cases, the computed paths is almost the first or the
second one.
A simple demonstration can justify these small values.
Let us suppose that HCA needs 1.5 paths to find solution
for 23% of the generated requests as shown in Figure 6.
In addition, E-HCA needs to compute 5 paths for the 5%
to reach the success rate of 28% as SAMCRA. Since 23%
presents 82% of 28%, the average number of computed
paths Np will be computed as follows: Np = 0.82∗1.5+
0.18 ∗ 5 = 2.13. A similar demonstration can be done for
MLA.
• Exact complexity
In Figure 12, the exact complexity of E-HCA is bigger
than SAMCRA for strict constraints. This is due to the
modified version of Yen’s algorithm and the computation
of additional paths. This high complexity can also be
explained by the increasing number of explored paths and
the small number of feasible ones. Let us suppose that the
only feasible path is the second shortest one and there are
10 first shortest paths, and 10 second shortest paths. In
this case, at least 10 paths and at most 19 paths will be
explored before finding the feasible one. Since the number
of computed paths in E-MLA is less than 1.13 paths,
its exact complexity still the smallest one for both strict
and loose constraints. Indeed, E-MLA computes paths
using the linearization metric that simultaneously takes
into account the two considered metrics.
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Figure 12. The exact complexity of SAMCRA, E-HCA and E-MLA
The exact complexity of E-MLA is very interesting
since it is still smaller than SAMCRA, while having
100% of success rate. However, the compromise done
is regarding the quality of found solutions by E-MLA
which may not be optimal but still feasible and this can
be sufficient for most requests.
VII. CONCLUSION
To solve the QoS routing problem, we proposed two
fast heuristics HCA and MLA. These heuristics are simple
to implement and give attractive results regarding the
success rate, the quality of found solutions and they con-
siderably reduce the execution time. The execution time
is one of the most challenging parameters in the treated
NP-hard problem. For this, extensive simulations are
performed to compare our heuristics to the well-known
algorithm SAMCRA. Two main ideas are developed then
confirmed in this paper. The first idea is that HCA as
well as MLA have a bounded combinatorial complexity
that can be readjusted to reach a minimum success rate.
The second idea focuses on the combinatorial complexity
of HCA and MLA if they are transformed into exact
algorithms, and the obtained results are very satisfying.
Finally, since the current network applications become
more exigent, it is interesting to explore the heuristic
solutions to solve the NP-hard QoS routing problem.
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Abstract— This paper proposes an iterative algorithm for
estimating the least-cost paths in a wireless sensor network
(WSN) that is modeled by a Petri net. We assume that each
link between two sensor nodes (each transition in the net) is
associated with a positive cost to capture its likelihood (e.g.,
in terms of the transmission time, distance between nodes,
or the link capacity). Given the structure of the Petri net and
its initial/ﬁnal state, we aim at ﬁnding the paths (with length
less than or equal to a given bound L) that could lead us
from the initial state to the ﬁnal state while having the least
total cost. We develop an iterative algorithm that obtains
the least-cost paths with complexity that is polynomial in
the length L.
Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks, Petri nets, least-
cost, path estimation
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, major advances in wireless communica-
tion and digital electronics have led to the development of
sensors that can broadcast data over short communication
ranges. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed of
a number of sensor nodes that have sensing, processing,
and communication capabilities that enable all sensor
nodes to collaborate in order to achieve a particular
task [1]. In a WSN, sensor nodes are densely deployed,
have limited computational and power capacities, and use
basic communication protocols to exchange information
with their neighbors. In practice, WSNs have been widely
employed in a variety of applications including transporta-
tion systems, military systems, and health-care systems
[2]– [6].
As the size and complexity of WSNs increase, sig-
niﬁcant attention is paid to problems of modeling and
analysis of WSNs. Since information transmission be-
tween sensor nodes can be treated as the occurrences of
discrete events after some levels of abstraction, several
discrete event dynamic system (DEDS) approaches have
been proposed including ﬁnite state machines [7]– [9],
Markov chains [10], [11], and Petri nets [12]– [17]. In
This paper is based on “Least-cost path estimation in wireless ad
hoc sensor networks using Petri nets,” by L. Li and D. S. Kim, which
appeared in the Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on
Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication (ICUIMC),
Seoul, Korea, February 2011. c© 2011 ACM.
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literature, several aspects of problems related to WSNs
(e.g., sensor data processing, energy consumption, and
intelligent monitoring) have been studied using Petri net
models due to their powerful modeling and mathematical
analysis framework. In particular, the authors of [12]
proposed a fuzzy Petri net model to process sensor data
and handle ﬂexible and continuous queries. In [13], the
authors developed an attack-resistant and efﬁcient local-
ization scheme in WSNs based on Petri nets. The power
consumption of processors in WSNs was studied using
Petri nets in [14] and the energy consumption of wireless
sensor nodes based on Petri net models was analyzed in
[15]. A decentralized Petri net based wireless sensor node
architecture (PN-WSNA) was developed to construct a
ﬂexible and reconﬁgurable WSN for intelligent monitor-
ing systems in [16] and [17].
Other than the works mentioned above, in this paper
we study a different problem in WSNs based on Petri net
models, namely, the least-cost path estimation problem.
In literature, path estimation and path planning in WSNs
have been investigated using a variety of approaches. In
[18], the authors considered the dynamic shortest path
routing problem in mobile ad hoc networks. An genetic
algorithm was developed to tackle this problem and was
demonstrated its effectiveness through simulations. The
authors of [19] studied the path planning problem in
WSNs to deal with transmission delay using queueing net-
works. They proposed an approximate iterative algorithm
to calculate node packet arrival rate and designed the
pre-selection algorithm based on a path search tree. The
optimal paths can then be obtained based on the analysis
of the path delay. In [20], the authors proposed an shortest
path routing protocol for mobile WSNs. This protocol
was based on neighbor discovery and shortest path con-
struction. The authors of [21] developed an optimal multi-
path planning algorithm for intrusion detection in wireless
sensor and actor networks. They associated each link with
a cost that is related to packet transmission and employed
graphical algorithms to determine the optimal paths. In
[22], the authors considered the cluster routing problem
in WSNs and proposed a fuzzy reasoning algorithm based
on fuzzy Petri nets to improve the routing reliability and
enhance the energy efﬁciency.
In this paper we study the least-cost path estimation
problem in WSNs based on Petri net models. In particular,
we consider a setting where we have knowledge of the
structure of a Petri net and its initial state, and we are
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given a ﬁnal state (i.e., a target state to be reached)
together with a positive integer number L which serves
as the maximum allowable length for sequences of tran-
sitions whose ﬁrings can lead us from the initial state
to the ﬁnal state. We assume that each link in the WSN
(each transition in the net) is associated with a positive
cost that captures its likelihood (e.g., in terms of the
transmission time, distance between nodes, or the link
capacity). Given the above constraints (i.e., a Petri net
structure, the initial/ﬁnal state, and a length L), we aim at
ﬁnding the paths in the WSN (transition ﬁring sequences
in the Petri net) with length less than or equal to L
which: (i) are consistent with the structure of the Petri
net, (ii) lead us from the initial state to the ﬁnal state,
and (iii) have the least total cost (the total cost of a
transition ﬁring sequence is taken to be the sum of the
costs of all transitions in the sequence). We develop an
iterative algorithm that obtains the least-cost transition
ﬁring sequences with complexity that is polynomial in L.
This work is motivated by the problem of least-cost
path estimation in WSNs that are modeled by Petri
nets. For example, in a WSN, information transmission
involves the determination of detailed sequences of paths
from an initial state to a ﬁnal state. In our setup, the given
ﬁnal state captures the completion of the information
transmission, whereas the structure of the given Petri net
represents the interactions among different sensor nodes
(as imposed by the given WSN). We also associate each
transition in the given net with a positive cost which
could represent its likelihood of occurrence. Note that in
this paper, we focus on ﬁnding the least-cost transition
ﬁring sequences of length upper bounded by the given
value L, which follows from the reasonable assumption of
completing the information transmission in a WSN within
a bounded number of steps due to energy constraints of
sensor nodes.
In literature, estimation using Petri net models has
been studied extensively. For instance, in [23], [24] the
authors present an algorithm for obtaining an estimate
(and a corresponding error bound) for the state of a given
Petri net based on full knowledge of the observed ﬁring
sequence but without knowledge of the initial state; these
works also discuss how this state estimate may be used
to design a controller. In this paper we consider path
estimation other than state estimation and our approach is
different from those mentioned above. The authors of [25]
studied the least-cost ﬁring sequence estimation problem
in labeled Petri nets with unobservable transitions and
proposed an estimation algorithm with complexity that
is polynomial in the length of the observed sequence of
labels. In this paper we consider ordinary Petri net models
rather than labeled Petri net models.
Note that due to the structure of the given net, the
particular ﬁnal state might be reached from the initial state
through paths of different lengths. Therefore, in general,
we need to consider all states reachable from the initial
state in L or less steps in order to capture the actual least-
cost paths that could lead us from the initial state to the
ﬁnal state. Crucial to our algorithmic complexity analysis
is the fact that the number of states that are consistent with
a path of a certain length is upper bounded by a function
that is polynomial in this length (this follows from a
translation of the result in [26]). Using this observation,
we are able to show that our algorithm can obtain the
least-cost paths with complexity that is polynomial in
length L.
II. PETRI NET NOTATION
In this section, we provide basic deﬁnitions and ter-
minology that will be used throughout the paper. More
details about Petri nets can be found in [27], [28].
A Petri net structure is a weighted bipartite graph N =
(P,T,A,W ) where P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} is a ﬁnite set of
places (drawn as circles), T = {t1,t2, . . . ,tm} is a ﬁnite set
of transitions (drawn as bars), A⊆ (P×T )∪ (T ×P) is a
set of arcs (from places to transitions and from transitions
to places), and W :A→{1,2,3, . . .} is the weight function
on the arcs.
Let b−i j denote the integer weight of the arc from place
pi to transition t j, and b+i j denote the integer weight of the
arc from transition t j to place pi (1≤ i≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m).
Note that b−i j (b
+
i j) is taken to be zero if there is no arc
from place pi to transition t j (or vice versa). We deﬁne the
input incident matrix B− = [b−i j ] (respectively the output
incident matrix B+ = [b+i j ]) to be the n×m matrix with
b−i j (respectively b
+
i j ) at its i
th row, jth column position.
The incident matrix of the Petri net is deﬁned to be B≡
B+−B−.
A marking (state) is a vector M :P→ Z+0 that assigns to
each place in the Petri net a nonnegative integer number
of tokens (drawn as black dots). We use M0 to denote
the initial marking of the Petri net. A transition t is said
to be enabled if each of its input places pin has at least
B−(pin,t) tokens. We use M[t〉 to denote that transition
t is enabled at marking M. An enabled transition t may
ﬁre and if it ﬁres, it removes B−(pin,t) tokens from each
input place pin of t and deposits B+(pout ,t) tokens to
each output place pout of t to yield a new marking M′ =
M +B(·,t), where B(·,t) denotes the column of B that
corresponds to transition t. This is also denoted by M[t〉M′
and we say marking M′ is reachable from marking M via
the ﬁring of transition t.
Let σ = ti1ti2 . . . tik (ti j ∈ T ) be a transition ﬁring
sequence. We say σ is enabled with respect to M if
M[ti1〉M1[ti2〉 . . .Mk−1[tik〉; this is denoted by M[σ〉. Let
M[σ〉M′ denote that M′ is reachable via the ﬁring of tran-
sition sequence σ from M, and let σ(t) be the total num-
ber of occurrences of transition t in σ . More speciﬁcally,
σ = [σ(t1) . . .σ(tm)]T is the ﬁring vector that corresponds
to σ . Furthermore, we use |σ | to denote the number of
transitions in sequence σ . A cost function C : T → Z+
assigns to each transition in the net a positive integer cost.
Given a transition ﬁring sequence σ = ti1ti2 . . . tik, its total
cost is given by C(σ) = ∑kj=1C(ti j) = ∑
m
j=1C(t j) ·σ(t j).
Deﬁnition 1 Given an initial marking M0, the set of reach-
able markings with respect to transition ﬁring sequences
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of length L is given by Z(L) = {M′ | ∃σ : M0[σ〉M′ and
|σ |= L}.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem we deal with in this paper is the following.
Consider a WSN that is modeled as a Petri net N with an
initial state M0 and costs associated with each transition
(via a cost function C). Given a ﬁnal state M (i.e., a target
state to be reached) and a positive integer number L (i.e.,
an upper bound on the length of sequences of transitions
whose ﬁrings can lead us from the initial state to the ﬁnal
state), we aim at ﬁnding the transition ﬁring sequence(s)
with length less than or equal to L which: (i) is (are)
consistent with the structure of the Petri net, (ii) leads
(lead) us from the initial state to the ﬁnal state, and (iii)
has (have) the least total cost.
Clearly, the set of least-cost ﬁring sequence(s) {σmin}
is the solution to the following problem:
argmin
σ
C(σ) s.t. M0[σ〉M & |σ | ≤ L. (1)
Example 1 Consider the Petri net shown in Fig. 1
with places P = {p1, p2, p3, p4}; transitions T =
{t1,t2,t3,t4,t5}; and transition costs given by C(t1) = 1,
C(t2) = 4, C(t3) = 2, C(t4) = 3, and C(t5) = 5. The initial
marking is given by [2 0 0 0]T and the ﬁnal marking is
taken to be [1 0 1 0]T , whereas the upper bound on the
length of the transition ﬁring sequences is set to L = 2. In
other words, we need to ﬁnd, among all valid transition
ﬁring sequences of length equal to or less than 2 that
lead us from the initial marking to the ﬁnal marking, the
ones that have the least total cost. It is not hard to show
that there are two possible transition ﬁring sequences, t2
and t1t3, with total costs given by 4 and 3 respectively.
Therefore, we conclude that the least-cost transition ﬁring
sequence (within length 2) that leads us from the initial
marking to the ﬁnal marking is t1t3. 
t1, C(t1)=1
t2, C(t2)=4
t3, C(t3)=2
t4, C(t4)=3
t5, C(t5)=5
2
Figure 1. A Petri net with transition costs.
The problem in (1) could be solved by starting from the
initial marking, enumerating all transition ﬁring sequences
σ with length equal to or less than L, evaluating whether
they are enabled or not, if enabled then computing the
markings M′ resulting from their ﬁrings, determining
whether they satisfy M′ = M, and obtaining the valid
one(s) with the least cost. The problem with this approach
is that, in the worst case, the number of transition se-
quences considered is exponential in the length of L (e.g.,
we start with ∑Li=1mi possible transition ﬁring sequences).
However, by looking at this problem in a different way,
i.e., in terms of a trellis diagram [29], we will show that
one can use a dynamic programming approach to obtain
the solution more efﬁciently in an iterative manner. This
approach will take advantage of the fact that several of
these sequences visit identical markings at identical points
in time (and therefore need not to be explored separately).
Length of Transition Firing Sequences
Reachable
markings
1 2 3 L
Figure 2. Trellis diagram of the evolution of reachable markings.
In Fig. 2, We depict a trellis diagram that captures the
evolution of reachable markings as the length of transition
ﬁring sequences increases. In particular, {1,2, . . . ,L} de-
notes the length of transition ﬁring sequences with time
epochs (stages) corresponding to each time a transition
ﬁres. Each node in the trellis diagram (drawn as a big
black dot) denotes a marking that is reachable from
the initial marking through transition ﬁring sequences of
length up to the current time epoch, i.e., M ji ∈ Z( j) where
j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,L} and i is the index of a given marking
within the set Z. Arcs between nodes represent transitions
whose ﬁrings will lead from one marking to another.
Given the initial marking M0, the ﬁnal marking M, and the
upper bound L on the length of transition ﬁring sequences,
we need to ﬁnd the set of transition ﬁring sequences that
appear in the trellis diagram and have the least total cost
from the initial marking M0 to the ﬁnal marking M.
Deﬁnition 2 The set of least-cost ﬁring sequences (of
length j) that lead to the ith marking M ji at the jth stage
of the trellis diagram is given by LC( j)i = {σ ′ | σ ′ =
argminσC(σ) for σ such that M0[σ〉M ji and |σ |= j}.
By formulating the problem in terms of a trellis di-
agram, it is clear that each reachable marking in the set
Z( j+1) has to be reached via at least one reachable mark-
ing in the set Z( j). Moreover, a dynamic programming
approach can be used to compute the least-cost ﬁring
sequence(s) iteratively. The basic observation is that the
transition ﬁring sequences which have the least cost at
time epoch j+1 only depend on the least-cost transition
ﬁring sequences that reach a marking at time epoch j, and
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the transitions that can ﬁre at time epoch j+1 (from the
markings reached at time epoch j). By taking advantage
of this observation, one can search for the sequence that
has the least cost, one stage in the trellis diagram at a
time.
In our setup, at time epoch j, given each reachable
marking M ji ∈ Z( j) and its associated set of least-cost ﬁr-
ing sequences LC( j)i , we can compute the set of least-cost
ﬁring sequences LC( j+1)i associated with each reachable
marking M( j+1)i ∈ Z( j+1) at time epoch j+1 as follows:
LC( j+1)i = {σ j′tp | [σ j′ ,tp] = arg minσ j′ , tp(C(σ j′)+C(tp))}
where σ j′ and tp are such that,
∃i′ s.t. σ j′ ∈ LC( j)i′ and M ji′ [tp〉M( j+1)i. (2)
By calculating (2) iteratively in the length of the tran-
sition ﬁring sequences, we can efﬁciently ﬁnd the ﬁring
sequence(s) that has (have) the least cost to all reachable
markings in the trellis diagram. Note that we want to ﬁnd
a particular ﬁnal marking M that can be reached from the
given initial marking M0. Therefore, once we compute all
reachable markings at each stage in the trellis diagram,
we need to check whether marking M has appeared or
not. If M ﬁrst appears at a particular stage, the least-cost
ﬁring sequence(s) that may lead us from M0 to M is (are)
not necessarily these one(s), because M can potentially be
reached from M0 via a different transition ﬁring sequence
that has longer length but smaller cost (M may be reached
from the initial marking via transition ﬁring sequences of
different lengths). Therefore, we must keep track of all
reachable markings within L steps and select, among all
sequences whose ﬁrings can lead us from M0 to M, the
one(s) that has (have) the least total cost.
Note that each time the ﬁnal marking M appears in
the trellis diagram, we do not need to consider the
sequences that emanate from it in the later stage. Since
each transition in the net is associated with a positive
cost, these sequences emanating from M are guaranteed
to have higher cost even if they reach M again.
IV. OBTAINING LEAST-COST PATHS
A. Algorithm
In this section, we propose an iterative algorithm to
ﬁnd the least-cost ﬁring sequence(s), of length less than
or equal to the given bound L, that lead from the
initial marking M0 to the ﬁnal marking M. We use a
data structure C = (Mcurrent , leastcost,(tin,Mprevious)) to
capture the information we need to store for each node
in the trellis diagram. More speciﬁcally, at time epoch j:
Mcurrent denotes the marking that is associated with the
node (and can be reached from M0 through a transition
ﬁring sequence of length j); leastcost is the least cost
among all valid ﬁring sequences from M0 to Mcurrent ; (tin,
Mprevious) denotes that input transition tin that is enabled
at Mprevious such that the least cost ﬁring sequence goes
through Mprevious at time epoch j−1 and leads to Mcurrent
by ﬁring transition tin.
Note that if M can be reached from M0 via one or
more transition ﬁring sequences, the algorithm outputs
the one(s) that has (have) the least total cost; if no such
ﬁring sequence exists, the algorithm does not provide any
output. We describe the algorithm in details below.
Algorithm 1
Input: A Petri net N with positive costs associated
with each transition, a given initial marking M0, a ﬁnal
marking M, and a maximum length L for transition ﬁring
sequences.
1. C (0) = {(M0, 0, ( /0, /0))}.
2. Let j = 1.
3. Set C ( j) = /0.
4. For all R ∈ C ( j−1) and R.Mcurrent 
= M do
For all t such that R.Mcurrent [t〉
compute M′ = R.Mcurrent +B(·,t)
If M′ is a new marking that has not appeared in
C ( j)
C ( j) = C ( j) ∪ {(M′,R.leastcost + C(t),(t,
R.Mcurrent)}
Else
M′ has appeared in R′ ∈ C ( j)
If R.leastcost +C(t) < R′.leastcost
R′ = (M′,R.leastcost +C(t),(t,R.Mcurrent))
Else If R.leastcost +C(t) = R′.leastcost
R′ = (M′,R′.leastcost,R′.(tin,Mcurrent) ∪
(t,R.Mprevious))
End IF
End IF
End For
End For
5. j = j+1.
6. If j = L+1, Goto 7; else Goto 3.
7. Recover all ﬁring sequences from M0 to M using the
information stored and output the one(s) that has (have)
the least total cost. 
Given the Petri net structure its initial marking M0,
Algorithm 1 iteratively computes markings that are reach-
able from the initial marking along with the least cost
of transition sequences that lead from the initial marking
to each of these markings. At each time epoch j, the
algorithm looks at the set of all enabled transitions and
associates each new marking with the transition whose
ﬁring (from a reachable marking at stage j− 1) leads
to an overall transition ﬁring sequence that reaches that
marking with least total cost. The algorithm then stores
all reachable markings and their corresponding least-cost
transition(s), and goes to the next step (where the length
of the transition ﬁring sequence is increased by one).
After considering all valid transition ﬁring sequences with
length equal to or less than L (i.e., after we complete L
stages of the trellis diagram), the algorithm recovers all
transition ﬁring sequences from the initial marking M0
to the ﬁnal marking M, and outputs the one(s) that has
(have) the least total cost.
Example 2 Recall the Petri net with transition costs
shown in Fig. 1. Given the ﬁnal marking as M =
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[1 0 1 0]T , we want to ﬁnd the least-cost transition ﬁring
sequences within length 2 (i.e., L = 2) that could lead us
from the initial marking to this marking. After running
Algorithm 1 on this example, the corresponding trellis
diagram is shown in Fig. 3. The set of ﬁring sequences
that can lead us from M0 to M is given by σ = {t2,t1t3}.
The least-cost ﬁring sequence is σmin = t1t3 and has cost 3.
Note that although M12 and M21 have the same marking,
they correspond to different data structures in our algo-
rithm (because they are reached via sequences of different
length): one is given by ([1 0 1 0]T ,4,(t2, [2 0 0 0]T )) and
the other by ([1 0 1 0]T ,3,(t3, [1 1 0 0]T )). Also, after
the ﬁnal marking is reached at M12, we do not consider
transitions emanating from it because the sequence will
have higher cost when it reaches the ﬁnal marking again.

t1, C(t1)=1
t2, C(t2)=4
t3, C(t3)=2
t1, C(t1)=1
Figure 3. Trellis diagram after running Algorithm 1 for Example 1.
B. Complexity Analysis
Before discussing the complexity of our algorithm, we
would like to ﬁrst translate our problem into the context
of labeled Petri nets; then we will use results established
in [26] for labeled Petri nets to analyze the complexity of
Algorithm 1.
Given the (unlabeled) Petri net structure and its initial
marking, we can think of it as a labeled Petri net with
all transitions in the net associated with a same label l
through a degenerate labeling function E deﬁned below.
A labeling function E : T → Σ assigns to each transition
in the net a label from a given alphabet Σ. In our setup, we
assume that there is only one label l ∈Σ. Therefore, given
a transition ﬁring sequence σ = ti1ti2 . . . tiL of length L, the
corresponding label sequence is given by ω = E(σ) =
E(ti1) · · ·E(tiL) = l · · · l︸︷︷︸
L
= lL, i.e., a string of length L.
By thinking of the problem in this way, the upper
bound L on the number of transitions in a particular
transition sequence translates to an upper bound on the
number of labels in its corresponding label sequence.
Therefore, the problem can be represented equivalently
as follows: Consider a labeled Petri net N with initial
marking M0, positive costs associated with each transition
(via a cost functionC), and a single label l associated with
all transitions; given an observed label sequence ω = l · · · l
of length L that has been generated by an underlying
(unknown) ﬁring sequence ti1ti2 . . . tiL and a ﬁnal marking
M, ﬁnd the transition ﬁring sequence(s) that: (i) is (are)
consistent with the structure of the net, (ii) leads (lead) us
from the initial marking M0 to the marking M, (iii) has
(have) length less than or equal to L, and (iv) has (have)
the least total cost.
It was shown in [26] that given an observed sequence
of labels of length L, the total number of markings at
the Lth stage in the trellis diagram is upper bounded
by a polynomial function in L, namely Lb where b is a
constant associated with structural parameters of the given
Petri net1. We use this fact in our algorithmic complexity
analysis below.
The complexity of Algorithm 1 can be obtained as
follows. First, regarding space complexity, the storage
needed is proportional to the number of reachable mark-
ings (nodes). For each reachable marking (apart from the
marking information itself and the least cost to get to
it), we need to store the valid pairs of transitions and
reachable markings in the previous time epoch that could
lead to this marking and have the least cost. Since there
are total m transitions in the net, the number of transitions
that could lead to the current (reachable) marking from
distinct (reachable) markings in the previous stage is
bounded by m. Thus, for each reachable marking, the
information to be stored is proportional to m. Clearly,
since the number of reachable markings at the Lth stage
in the trellis diagram is upper bounded by Lb, the total
space needed to store all reachable markings at every
stage in the trellis diagram is ∑Lj=1O(m · jb) which can
be simpliﬁed as O(mL ·Lb) = O(mLb+1), i.e., the storage
required is polynomial in the length L of the transition
ﬁring sequences.
We now proceed to analyze computational complexity.
We use n j−1 to denote the number of reachable markings
at the ( j − 1)st stage of the trellis diagram (n j−1 =
O(( j− 1)b) and n j to denote the number of reachable
markings at the jth stage of the trellis diagram (n j =
O( jb)). Clearly, at time epoch j, the number of possible
transitions enabled from the ( j − 1)st stage is upper
bounded by n j−1 ·m where m is the number of transitions
in the net. For each marking (in the jth stage) yielding
from these transitions, we need at most n j comparisons
to decide if it has appeared or not (by searching through
the set of existing markings) and at most n j comparisons
to decide if it is equal to the ﬁnal marking M. Thus,
the computational complexity for ﬁnding the sequence
that has least-cost for all markings at the jth stage is
bounded by n j−1 ·m ·2n j, which has complexity O(m · j2b).
Thus, for reachable markings over all stages, the total
1More speciﬁcally, in [26] it is argued that b = c(d− 1) where c is
the number of nondeterministic labels in the net and d is the maximum
number of transitions corresponding to a label in the net. We say a label
is nondeterministic if there is more than one transition corresponding to
the label. In our setup, c = 1 and d = m, thus b = m−1.
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computational complexity is given by ∑Lj=1O(m · j2b),
which can be simpliﬁed as O(mL2b+1). Therefore, the
algorithm has complexity that is polynomial in the length
of the transition ﬁring sequences.
V. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate the algorithm via an
example of a WSN. Consider a WSN that is modeled
by the Petri net shown in Fig. 4. Initially, six pieces of
information are available (modeled by places p1 to p6
where each place has a token). Following a number of
different ways of transmission, the information transmis-
sion is completed (modeled by p12). Therefore, the ﬁnal
state is given by M = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1]T ).
The Petri net has 12 places P = {p1, p2, . . . , p12}, 8
transitions T = {t1,t2, . . . ,t8} and the initial state M0 =
[1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0]T . We assume that the
cost of each transition is given by the cost vector C =
[5 5 30 20 20 20 30 10]T . Our goal is to estimate the least-
cost transition ﬁring sequence(s) that leads (lead) us from
the initial state to the ﬁnal state under different length
constraints.
Figure 4. A Petri net model of a WSN.
Assume that we want to ﬁnd the least-cost transition
ﬁring sequences from M0 to M within length 4. In
this case, Algorithm 1 ﬁnds the set of least-cost ﬁring
sequences to be σmin = {t1t2t5t8,t2t1t5t8} with total cost
40. We provide the following table where Length denotes
the allowable maximum length of the transition ﬁring
sequences considered so far, Leastcost captures the least
total cost of sequence(s) that satisﬁes (satisfy) the maxi-
mum length constraint and leads (lead) to M from M0 (we
use ∞ to denote that M cannot be reached via transition
sequences of the given maximum length from M0), and
{σmin} is the set of least-cost transition sequence(s) that
has (have) least total cost and leads (lead) from M0 to M.
Length Leastcost {σmin}
1 ∞ /0
2 ∞ /0
3 60 t3t6t8
4 40 t1t2t5t8
t2t1t5t8
Remark 1 Note that the ﬁnal marking is reached via
transition ﬁring sequence t3t6t8 of length 3 with least cost
60; however, the ﬁnal marking can also be reached via
transition ﬁring sequences of longer length with smaller
cost (both t1t2t5t8 and t2t1t5t8 have length 4 with least cost
40). Therefore, in order to capture the least-cost transition
ﬁring sequences of length less than or equal to L, we need
to consider all markings reached from M0 within L stages
of the trellis diagram.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we consider the problem of ﬁnding the
least-cost paths in a WSN that is modeled by a Petri net.
In particular, we consider a setting where we are given an
initial state and a ﬁnal state along with a positive integer
L that serves as an upper bound on the length of paths
that lead us from the initial state to the ﬁnal state. We
assume that each transition in the given net is associated
with a positive cost (which could represent its likelihood
of occurrence by considering different constraints) and
we aim at ﬁnding the paths (of length less than or equal
to L) which: (i) are consistent with the structure of the
Petri net, (ii) lead us from the initial state to the ﬁnal
state, and (iii) have the least total cost. We develop an
iterative algorithm that obtains the least-cost paths with
complexity that is polynomial in L. This algorithm can
be used for least-cost path estimation in WSNs that are
modeled as Petri nets.
One direction for future work is to study the timed
Petri net model to incorporate temporal information of
sensor transmissions. Another interesting extension is
to incorporate the constraint of energy consumption of
sensor nodes in our Petri net model to optimize the
performance of WSNs.
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Abstract— Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been
widely used in various applications. Since their sensor nodes
are resource-constrained and their security primitives need
to store a set of security credentials to share a secure
channel, key management is one of the most challenging
issues in the design of WSN. Currently, various efficient
lightweight key management schemes (KMs) have been
proposed to enable encryption and authentication in WSN
for different application scenarios. According to different
requirements, it is important to select the trustworthy key
management schemes in a WSN for setting up a fully trusted
WSN mechanism. In this context, adaptive methods are
required to evaluate those schemes.
In this paper, we exploit Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP) to help with the complex decision. Specifically, we
consider the following performance criteria: scalability, key
connectivity, resilience, storage overhead, processing overhead
and communication overhead. Two case studies are added for
verifying our proposal. Via the two case studies, it is verified
that our method is able to help selecting a suitable scheme
for given requirements.
Index Terms— Analytic Hierarchy Process, Key management
scheme, Trustworthy decision, Wireless sensor network
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The advance in miniaturization techniques and wire-
less communications has made possible the creation and
subsequent development of the wireless sensor network
(WSN) paradigm [1]. The application area of WSN
includes military sensing and tracking, environmental
monitoring, patient monitoring and smart environment.
When a sensor node is installed in a dangerous and
untrusted area, its security becomes very important. Thus,
WSN security is a prerequisite for wider use [2]. The
communication channels between any pair of nodes inside
WSN must be protected to avoid attacks from external
parties. Such protection, in terms of confidentiality, in-
tegrity and authentication, is provided by some security
This paper is based on “A Generic Evaluation Method for Key
Management Schemes in Wireless Sensor Network,” by R. Na, Y. Ren,
Y. Hori and K. Sakurai, which appeared in the Proceedings of the
5th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management
and Communication (ICUIMC), Seoul, Korea, February 2011. c© 2011
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primitives. A key management scheme is an important
security primitive for WSN. The task of generating and
distributing those keys has to be done by a global key
management system [3]. For the above reasons, designing
a trustworthy key management scheme is a necessary
work. Meanwhile, to select a appropriate key management
scheme is a necessary work.
In this paper, we design an evaluation method which
supports the decision-making processes of selecting a
trustworthy key management scheme in a WSN. We
focus on the calculation of how much the existing key
management schemes can be appropriate to perform a
particular application. The trust of the trustworthy deci-
sion is based on the firm belief in the reliability under
the assumed wireless sensor network scenario. The key
management schemes must satisfy traditional needs of
security, such as availability, integrity, confidentiality,
authentication and non-reputation [6] in a typical wireless
network. Compared with the typical wireless network,
the key management has other special challenges such
as resilience, expansibility and efficiency [7] in WSN
because of its specificity.
B. Related Work
Recent research works focus on producing an efficient
system to evaluate these key management schemes. In
recent years, there has been a significant progress on
key management schemes in WSN. Researchers have
proposed a large number of key management schemes
in WSN which focus on different security requirements.
Each scheme has its own advantages and disadvantages.
Even though quite a number of key management schemes
in wireless sensor network exist now, they can be di-
vided into six categories. The six categories are stated
as follows: Dedicated pair-wise key management solution
in distributed wireless sensor network (DWSN), reusable
pair-wise key management solutions in DWSN, group-
wise key management solutions in DWSN, pair-wise
key management solutions in hierarchical wireless sensor
network (HWSN), group-wise key management solutions
in HWSN and network-wise key management solutions in
HWSN [3]. If changing into another perspective, because
WSN is energy limited network and pre-distributed key
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management scheme is energy-efficient scheme, most of
the key management schemes in WSN are based on pre-
distribution key management schemes. Commonly used
key management schemes in WSN are listed as follows:
random pre-distribution key management scheme based
on key-pool [8]; pre-distribution key management scheme
based on polynomial [9]; pre-distribution key manage-
ment scheme based on block design [10]; pre-distribution
key management scheme based on position [11]; pre-
distribution key management scheme based on matrix [12]
and so on [13].
Some researchers proposed certain evaluation indexes
for qualitative evaluation of these key management
schemes in WSN [3]. However, such proposals have
limited utility unless they take node replication attacks
and robustness into consideration. Their proposals fail to
address all of the criteria that a key management scheme
in WSN should satisfy to.
In this paper, we propose a generic method to evaluate
key management schemes, which can help researchers to
select the scheme quantitatively according to different net-
work requirements. The most related work to our research
on security evaluation is Hwang et al. [5]. It employs the
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method in guiding
information security policy decision making. It uses the
application of AHP as a method to develop information
security decision model for information security policy.
Meanwhile, after comprehensively surveying all of the
criteria for KMs evaluation in WSN, we propose an AHP-
aided method to select the optimum key management
scheme for an assumed WSN.
C. Challenging Issues
The following reasons motivate us to propose the AHP-
aided method for evaluating key management schemes in
wireless sensor network.
1) The security of a WSN depends on the existence
of efficient key management solutions [3]. Many
key establishment techniques have been designed to
address the trade off between limited computational
resources and security requirements, but it is not
easy to determine which scheme is the best one in
an assumed scenario.
2) All these key management schemes have their own
advantages and disadvantages. All of them can be
suitable for different needs. Comprehensive consid-
eration of the parameters selection is not a simple
problem.
3) To select the most proper key management scheme
quantitatively from a large amount of existing
schemes is not an easy issue [15].
4) Despite the utmost importance of a generic evalua-
tion method for these key management schemes, it
is surprising that we find almost nothing in literature
on this subject.
D. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose an evaluation method to
evaluate the key management schemes, which can help us
to select the scheme quantitatively according to different
network requirements. The contributions of our paper can
be summarized as follows:
1) We use an analytical hierarchy process (AHP)
model to construct a framework to do the deci-
sion making. AHP can help with a quantitatively
decision. Thus, we can overcome the difficulty in
selecting a proper key management scheme for
wireless sensor network having multiple criteria
decision making.
2) Based on our proposal, we provide evaluation and
analysis of the existing key management schemes.
We show that our method can build an intuitive
method to select a proper scheme and to present
key management schemes in the order of suitability,
based on the previously given network require-
ments. In a word, we provide a feasible quantitative
evaluation system to select the best key manage-
ment scheme from various schemes.
3) Finally, we classify several typical key management
schemes and make a comparison among the trade
off in those schemes. At the same time, we can
obtain quantitative analysis results via two kinds
of case study. In other words, our method can be
helpful in a complicated network environment.
This work is organized as follows: Section II describes
basic definitions and notions used in wireless sensor
network for key management schemes evaluating. At the
same time, corresponding case study is proposed. Section
III provides our quantitative system which based on linear
algebra and focused on matrix. Section IV discusses the
system in details via two case studies. Finally, we draw
conclusions in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Brief reviews of AHP
In a set number of application domains, the Analyt-
ical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a decision approach
designed to aid in the solution of complex multiple
criteria problems. It was developed by Thomas L.Saaty
in the 1980s [4]. This method has been found to be an
effective and practical approach that can make complex
and unstructured decisions. The AHP has been used in a
large number of applications to provide certain structures
on a decision making process. When used in the sys-
tems engineering process, AHP can be a powerful tool
for comparing alternative design concepts. The decision-
maker judges the importance of each criterion in pair-
wise comparisons. The outcome of AHP is a prioritized
ranking or weighted of each decision alternative. There
are three steps for considering decision problems by
AHP: constructing hierarchies, comparative judgments,
and synthesis of priorities.
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Figure 1. Classification of Key Management schemes
1) Construction hierarchies: User of the AHP first
decomposes his decision problem into some hier-
archy of more easily comprehended sub problems,
each of them can be analyzed independently.
2) Comparative judgments: After the hierarchy is
built, the decision makers systematically evaluate
various elements of the hierarchy by comparing
each one of them to another one of them at a time.
In making the comparisons, the decision makers
can either use concrete data about the elements
or use their judgments about the elements’ rela-
tive meaning and importance. The AHP converts
these evaluations to numerical values that can be
processed and compared over the entire range of
the problem.
3) Synthesis of Priorities: Numerical priorities are
calculated for each of the decision alternatives.
These numbers represent the alternatives’ relative
ability to achieve the decision goal. Something are
presumable missing in allowed range.
The above three steps show a brief review of AHP
hierarchy for the decision making process.
Futhermore, details on both the synthesis of priorities
and the measurement of consistency are claimed as fol-
lows [4]:
• n: the order of the matrix. The AHP authors use
n for explaining the size of these matrixes in AHP
method. In section III, the matrix of hierarchies and
the matrix of judgements will be used in our AHP-
aided method.
• λ: the eigenvalue of the matrix. Maximum value of
λ is expressed by λmax. If we want to calculate the
consistency ratio, we should calculate the eigenvec-
tor of the relative weights λmax for each matrix with
order n.
• RI: the average Random Index for consistency
checking. RI is a known random consistency index
obtained from a large number of simulations which
run and vary depending upon the order of matrix.
Tables I shows the value of the RI for matrix with
the size from order 1 to 10 [16].
• CI: the Consistency Index. CI for each matrix of
TABLE I.
AVERAGE RANDOM INDEX (RI) BASED ON MATRIX SIZE
Size of matrix(n) Random consistency Index(RI)
1 0
2 0
3 0.52
4 0.89
5 1.11
6 1.25
7 1.35
8 1.40
9 1.45
10 1.49
order n can be calculated by using the formula:
CI = (λmax − n)/(n− 1).
• CR: the Consistency Ratio. CR is calculated by
using the formula: CR = CI/RI .
As constructing hierarchy is the first step of AHP,
the pair-wise comparisons generate a matrix of relative
rankings for each level of the hierarchy. The number of
criteria depends on the number elements at each level.
The order of the criteria at each level depends on its
lower level number of elements. After all criteria are
developed and all pair-wise comparisons are obtained,
eigenvectors of the relative weights (the degree of relative
importance among the elements), global weights and the
maximum eigenvalue λmax for each matrix are calculated
by using Expert Choice software (Expert Choice, 2000).
The software is easy to use and understand. It provides
visual representations of overall ranking on a computer
screen.
The value of λmax is an important validating parameter
in AHP. It is used as a reference index to screen infor-
mation via calculating the consistency ratio CR of the
estimated vector. This step is in order to validate whether
the pair-wise comparison matrix provides a completely
consistent evaluation or not.
n-order matrix means the order of matrix n equals n.
In section III, our proposal which is based on AHP will
use 5-order matrix and 6-order matrix. Thus, we present
the consistency check of them in this section in advance.
When n = 5, we can calculate the eigenvalue of the
matrix λ for consistency check. The processes are as
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follows:
1) Selecting n = 5 from Table I as an example, the
average random index RI is 1.11.
2) Because the matrix should be validated to pass
the consistency check, the consistency ratio CR
need to be smaller than 0.1. Meanwhile, CR equals
CI/RI .
3) Thus, the consistency index CI needs to satisfy:
CI < 0.1× 0.11 = 0.011
4) Furthermore, as CI = (λ− n)/(n−1) = (λ−5)/4
and CI < 0.011, the maximum eigenvalue λ is
smaller than 5.444.
5) The 5-order matrix will pass the consistency check
when λ < 5.444.
Similar to the process where n = 5, we do consistency
check while n = 6. The result is as follows:
1) When there is n = 6, the average random index is
RI = 1.25. Accordingly, the maximum eigenvalue
λ is smaller than 6.625.
2) The 6-order matrix will pass the consistency check
when λ < 6.625.
B. Classification of key management schemes in WSN
Key management schemes (KMs) in wireless sensor
network (WSN) can be categorized into several types.
Figure 1 explains the classification of KMs in WSN. WSN
are organized in distributed or hierarchical structures
in generally. WSN communication usually occurs in ad
hoc manner, and shows similarities to wireless ad hoc
network. When nodes in hierarchical WSN communicate,
data flow may be classified into three parts: pair-wise
(unicast) among pairs of sensor nodes and from sensor
nodes to base station, group-wise (multicast) within a
cluster of sensor nodes and network-wise (broadcast) from
base stations to sensor nodes. Likewise, data flow in
distributed WSN is similar to data flow in hierarchical
WSN with a difference that network-wise (broadcast)
messages can be sent by every sensor nodes.
As Table II shows, S. A. Camtepe et al. 2008 [3]
classified the currently existing key management schemes
based on the network structure. The network structure
is classified into two types: Distributed WSN (DWSN)
and Hierarchical WSN (HWSN). In DWSN, key man-
agement schemes (KMs) in DWSN are categorized into
three types: dedicated pair-wise KMs, reusable pair-wise
KMs and group-wise KMs. Meanwhile, KMs in HWSN
are categorized into three types: pair-wise KMs, group-
wise KMs and network-wise KMs. Our evaluation work
follows this classification.
III. OUR PROPOSAL BASED ON AHP
In order to determine which key management scheme
is the best for an assumed WSN scenario, we propose a
method based on AHP.
In different proposed key management schemes, there
have different parameters assumption even distinct as-
sumption. It is not possible to give strict quantitative
comparison criteria due to distinct assumptions made by
these key management solutions. However, the following
criteria can be used to evaluate and compare these key
management schemes in WSN [3]. Our target is to give
quantitative comparisons among various KMs in WSN
based on these five criteria.
• Scalability: Ability of a key management solution to
handle an increase in the WSN size.
• Key connectivity: Probability that a pair or a group
of sensor nodes can generate or find a common secret
key to secure their communication.
• Resilience: Resistance of the WSN against node
capture and node replicate. The adversary often
captures or replicates a sensor node, such as in some
well-known network attacks in the WSN (e.g., sybil
attack and wormhole routing attack). Keys which are
stored on a sensor node or exchanged over radio links
should not reveal any information about the security
of any other links.
• Storage overhead: Amount of memory units re-
quired to store security credentials.
• Processing overhead: Amount of processing cycles
required by each sensor node to generate or find a
common secret key.
• Communication overhead: Amount and size of
messages exchanged between a pair or a group of
sensor nodes to generate or find a common secret
key.
We can see that processing overhead is based on the
hardware selecting. Considering the power consumption,
especially comparing with communication overhead [35],
processing overhead is not the main power consumption
for WSN. Thus, it is appropriate if we omit the processing
overhead of KMs in our AHP-aided evaluation proposal.
Numerical priorities, derived from the decision makers’
input, are shown for each item in the hierarchy of AHP
method. To make comparisons, the scale of numbers indi-
cates that how much one element is more important than
another element. The indication is based on the criterion
or property with respect to which they are compared.
Then, based on the five criteria which are used to eval-
uate and the key management scheme comparison in an
assumed network scenario by quantitative calculation, we
present the framework of AHP based method for selecting
the most suitable key management scheme among these
schemes.
Figure 2 is the framework of our AHP-aided method.
In the top of this figure, there is an assumed network
scenario. Under the scenario, six criteria are listed. Under
the criteria, six key management schemes which are called
alternatives are listed. Each of the alternatives belongs to
one category of key management schemes. In this figure,
the criteria are used to select the optimum alternative for
the assumed network scenario.
Our proposal consists of three steps. Figure 3 shows the
procedure of our proposal. First step is establishment of a
structural hierarchy. The center of this step is to construct
pair-wise comparison matrix A for assumed network
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TABLE II.
CLASSIFICATION OF KMS [S. A. CAMTEPE. 2008]
Notions Steps
DWSN Dedicated pair-wise KMs H.Chan et al. 2003 [8],D.liu et al. 2003 [23], B. Dutertre et al. 2004 [24], D.
Huang et al. 2004 [25].
Reusable pair-wise KMs L.Eschenauer et al. 2002 [18], D. Hwang et al. 2004 [26], R. D. Pietro et al. 2003
[27], S. A. Camtepe et al. 2004 [28].
Group-wise KMs C.Blundo et al. 1992 [9], M. Ramkumar et al. 2004 [29].
HWSN Pair-wise KMs S. zhu et al. 2003 [19], G. Jolly et al. 2003 [30]
Group-wise KMs M. Shehab et al. 2005 [20], A. Chadha et al. 2005 [31] .
Network-wise KMs S. Slijepcevic et al. 2002 [21], A. Perrig et al. 2002 [32], D. Liu et al. 2003 [33],
M.Bohge et al. 2003 [34]
Figure 2. Framework of AHP based method for selecting a key management scheme
scenario. The importance preference of each criterion
is the input. Output is the weighted vector of criteria.
Second step is establishment of comparative judgments.
Likewise, the center of this steps is to construct series
of pair-wise comparison matrix B for each criterion. The
importance value of each key management scheme is the
input. Output is the weighted vectors of schemes. After
finishing the first and second steps, the third step is to do
consistency check, calculate values of weight coefficient
for each scheme and do final decision.
We describe the first step in subsection: Establishment
of a structural hierarchy. We describe the second step and
the third step in subsection: Establishment of compar-
ative judgments respectively. Specifically in subsection:
Establishment of comparative judgments, we present the
network scenario and its parameters.
A. Establishment of a structural hierarchy
Two inputs are presented firstly. One is the importance
evaluation of each criterion. Five criteria are involved
here: scalability (S), key connectivity (K), resilience (R),
storage overhead (M) and communication overhead (C).
The other is importance evaluation of each scheme.
The importance evaluation of each criterion points out
criteria establishing among the elements of the hierarchy
by making a series of judgments based on pair wise
comparisons of the criteria. For example, when we want
to select an optimum key management scheme for army
areas, choosers might say they prefer higher security and
less normal nodes can be captured. Numerical priorities
are derived from the decision makers’ input.
In the next step, we present two types of matrix series.
One is pairwise comparison matrix A for network scenario
which is constructed based on each criterion’s importance
evaluation. The other one is pairwise comparison matrix
B for criteria which is constructed based on each scheme’s
importance evaluation.
After constructing the two type matrix series, we can
obtain two outputs. One is the weighted vector of criteria
and the other one is the weighted vector of schemes. In the
next section, the consistency check, calculating values of
the weight coefficient for each scheme and final decision
will be illustrated. In this section, we focus on explaining
the matrix construction proceeds.
The formulation of AHP-based model for selecting
the best key management scheme in the assumed WSN
scenario is presented as shown in Algorithm 1. Based
on the properties and mechanism of AHP, we provide
a solution to evaluate the key management schemes in
a mathematical analysis method. Our solution can be
applied to select an optimum key management scheme
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Figure 3. The inputs and outputs of our former proposal
within a particular network scenario. Basically, there are
two steps for considering decision problems by AHP.
Firstly, the two types of matrix series have been con-
structed based on the inputs.
1) One is pairwise comparison matrix A = (aij)6×6
for network scenario which is constructed based on
each criterion’s importance evaluation.
In judgment matrix, we set aii = 1. Furthermore,
if we set aij = η, then we set aji = 1/η.
Here, A = (aij)6×6, aij = wi/wj , wi is the relative
importance, aij > 0, aij = 1/aji, aii = 1, i, j =
1, 2, . . . , n.
The other one is pair-wise comparison matrix B =
(bı)5×5 for the five criteria which are constructed
based on each scheme’s importance evaluation.
2) After constructing the two types of matrix series,
we can obtain two outputs.
One is the weighted vector of criteria
−→
A and the
other is the weighted vector of schemes
−→
B .
3) Then we can calculate the values of weight for each
scheme
−→
Wκ =
−−→
WA · −−→WB , κ = 1, . . . , 6.
Finally, We can obtain the output of the decision
of which scheme is the best choice
−→
Wmax =
max(
−→
Wκ).
B. Establishment of comparative judgments
In this subsection, we first describe the network sce-
nario and provide the matrix A, which is pairwise im-
portance comparison of each criterion. Then both the
parameters of the assumed network scenario and the series
of matrix B are presented. The series of matrix B is
pairwise importance comparison of each scheme.
We assume there is a scenario of judgment as follows:
In [22], the government wants to enforce its homeland
security using the WSN to aggregate the information on
the borderline. In such a scenario, the perimeter surveil-
lance is one of the most promising WSN applications.
Algorithm 1 Our proposal
1: Input: importance values of each criterion A =
(aij)6×6, importance values of each scheme B =
(bı)5×5.
2: Output: the decision of the evaluation for the key
management schemes
−→
W = (Wκ)1×6, κ = 1, . . . , 6.
3: while Assumed network scenario:
−→
A&
−→
B do
4: while the importance value of each criterion:aij
do
5: Construct the pairwise comparison matrix A ;
6: Calculate the weighted vectors of the matrices−−→
WA;
7: end while
8: while the importance values of each key manage-
ment scheme:bı do
9: Construct the pairwise comparisons matrix B;
10: Calculate the weighted vectors of the key man-
agement scheme
−−→
WB ;
11: end while
12: if
−−→
WA&
−−→
WB then
13: Calculate the values of weight for each scheme−→
Wκ =
−−→
WA · −−→WB ;
14: end if
15: Output the decision of which scheme is the best
choice
−→
Wmax = max(
−→
Wκ) ;
16: end while
WSNs can be easily deployed permanently (e.g., public
places) or on-demand (e.g., high risk events) in a very
short time, with low costs and with little or no supporting
communications infrastructure.
First of all, the sensor nodes must work at a low
energy consumption to survive in a long time without
energy supply and keep collecting and transmitting the
information without breaking down. Under such a cir-
cumstance, Communication Overhead (C) becomes the
most important criterion which should be considered be-
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cause communication is the most energy-consuming. For
instance, Mica2Dot has a 7.3MHz Atmel ATMEGA128L
low-power micro-controller which runs TinyOS, 128KB
of read-only program memory, 4KB of RAM, a 433MHz
Chipcon CC1000 radio which provides a 19.2 Kbps data
rate with an approximate indoor range of 100 meters [3].
Secondly, an attacker may capture part of sensor nodes
or introduce its own malicious nodes inside the network,
hence security must be taken into account in WSN design.
Keys stored on a sensor node or exchanged over radio
links should not reveal any information about the security
of any links. Considering the Resilience (R), higher
resilience means lower number of compromised links.
Therefore, the resilience is an important issue in such a
hostile environment.
For instance, as well as each pair-wise key coming
from one node, node Si (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) stores the
corresponding pair-wise keys for other N-1 sensor nodes
in the WSN. Thus, each sensor Si stores a key-chain
KCi = {Ki,j |i 6= j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N} of size |KCi| = N − 1
out of N(N − 1)/2 keys. However, not all N − 1 keys
are required to be stored in nodes’ key-chain and not all
N − 1 keys are required to have a connected key graph.
Thus, R is less important to C [3].)
Thirdly, Storage Overhead (M) is important because
storage is necessary in order to support the store-and-
forward operating principle. The data should be stored
when several nodes run out of battery. And as a result, the
network becomes partitioned. In this case, it is important
not to lose the potentially measured data over a long
period of time.
Finally, the size of the WSN is pre-determined in most
of homeland security application so that the key connec-
tivity (K) and scalability (S) is not an important issue for
the government’s judgments. And the location of nodes
is usually fixed, which means each network scenario is
assigned a scalability rank. Hence, key connectivity is
more importance than scalability. Moreover, without key
connectivity, the scalability will be affected due to the
low communication efficiency [3].
As above, we conclude our importance is set in the
increasing order of: (low) Scalability < Key connectivity
< Storage overhead < Resilience < Communication
overhead (high). From another aspect, we know that
there are five levels in AHP. Their scale are claimed as:
equal importance, weakly more important, strongly more
important, very strongly more important and absolutely
more important. They are described as follows:
• Level 1 Two criteria are of equal importance.
Storage Overhead and Resilience are of equal im-
portance.
• Level 2 This level which is between Level 1 and
Level 3 means an intermediates value. Communica-
tion Overhead is a little more important than Storage
Overhead. Resilience VS Key Connectivity: Because
Storage Overhead has the same importance as re-
silience, storage overhead is a little more important
than Key Connectivity.
TABLE III.
PAIRWISE COMPARISON JUDGMENT MATRIX OF THE FIVE CRITERIA
S K R M C
S 1 1/3 1/7 1/5 1/9
K 3 1 1/2 1/2 1/3
R 7 2 1 1 1
M 5 2 1 1 1/2
C 9 3 1 2 1
• Level 3 Metric i is weakly more important than
metric j. Key Connectivity is weakly more important
than Scalability. Communication Overhead is weakly
more important than Key Connectivity.
• Level 5 Metric i is strongly more important than
metric j. Storage Overhead is strongly more impor-
tant than Scalability.
• Level 7 Metric i is very strongly more important
than metric j. Resilience is very strongly more
important than Scalability.
• Level 9 Metric i is absolutely more important than
metric j. Communication Overhead is absolutely
more important than Scalability.
As the same as original pair-wise comparison values in
AHP, the value between each two of the five levels means
that it has an intermediates value. It is used to represent
compromise between the levels list above. Reciprocal is
suitable here for inverse comparison. The decision makers
give their decision from quality aspect. They do not need
the exact input. The decision makers need to give the
relative importance of each two performances. Based on
these relative importance items, we get the compared
matrix.
Taking previous expert judgement of the five criteria
into AHP-based method, we can obtain the specific levels
of the above five criteria. Scalability (1) < Key connec-
tivity (3) < Storage overhead (5) < Resilience (7) <
Communication overhead (9). The most important thing in
AHP is how to select items and how to give the framework
of decision. First, we describe the relative importance
of each of the five criteria. Then based on these the
relative importance, a five level hierarchy decision process
is described in Table III. As shown in Table III, we present
the numerical based on the AHP pair-wise comparison
table [4]. The criteria listed on the left are compared
with each criterion listed on top one by one. Due to
the priority of the existing alternative key management
schemes, it relates to the assumed network scenario with
definite comparison judgment matrix.
In judgment matrix, aii is set to equal 1. Furthermore,
we set aij to equal η, then aji equals 1/η, where A =
(aij)6×6, aij = wi/wj , aij > 0, aij = 1/aji, aii =
1, i, j = 1, 2, . . . n. Next, we calculate the consistency
ratio CR = 0.0088 < 0.1, which means that the pair-
wise comparison judgment matrix of five criteria keeps
consistency well [17].
From Table III, we normalize to obtain the relative
weight or eigenvector of each rating scale. Using expert
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TABLE IV.
MATRIX BS : PAIR-WISE COMPARISON MATRIX OF THESE KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES’ SCALABILITY METRIC
H.Chan et al. [8] L.Eschenauer et al. [18] C.Blundo et al. [9] S. zhu et al. [19] M. Shehab et al. [20] Slijepcevic et al. [21]
[8] 1 1 2 2 2 2
[18] 1 1 2 2 2 2
[9] 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1
[19] 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1
[20] 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1
[21] 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1
TABLE V.
RELATIVE WEIGHTS OF EACH METRIC FOR PAIR-WISE COMPARISON MATRIX OF THESE SCHEMES
BSAvg. BKAvg. BRAvg. BMAvg. BCAvg.
H.Chan et al. [8] 0.25 0.25 0.049 0.273 0.180
L.Eschenauer et al. [18] 0.25 0.25 0.049 0.273 0.450
C.Blundo et al. [9] 0.125 0.125 0.095 0.265 0.192
S. zhu et al. [19] 0.125 0.125 0.269 0.041 0.069
M. Shehab et al. [20] 0.125 0.125 0.269 0.038 0.069
Slijepcevic et al. [21] 0.125 0.125 0.269 0.110 0.039
ΣAvg = 1 ΣAvg = 1 ΣAvg = 1 ΣAvg = 1 ΣAvg = 1
Choice software, the relative weights of Scalability (S),
Key connectivity (K), Resilience (R), Storage Overhead
(M) and Communication Overhead (C) are calculated,
which are equal to 0.03, 0.119, 0.269, 0.218 and 0.352
respectively.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, six key management schemes based on
five criteria are compared. Because the importance scale
of the five criteria can be various values, two case studies
for further comparison are presented in this section.
We select six typical schemes: H.Chan et al. 2003 [8],
L.Eschenauer et al. 2002 [18], C.Blundo et al. 1992 [9],
S. zhu et al. 2003 [19], M. Shehab et al. 2005 [20] and S.
Slijepcevic et al. 2002 [21] for the schemes comparison in
next step. The six key management schemes are selected
because each of them belongs to one kind of classification
of KMs for WSN. Each of the six key management
schemes has its own advantages and disadvantages. Both
of their advantages and disadvantages are classified from
the five criteria.
In our case study, we prove our method from three
steps. The first step we assume one criteria preference
and one network parameters, then we show our method
step by step in details. This proceeding is presented in
both subsection: Case Study 1 and subsection: Result
of Case Study 1. The second step, we alter to another
criteria preference as the alternation requirement from
network scenario and calculate the result for analysis of
the final values. We can see what is the alternation as
the change of criteria preference. For the third step, we
change the network size for further more explanation.
This proceeding is presented in both subsection Case
Study 2 and subsection: Result of Case Study 2. Finally,
we compare the result of both case study 1 and case study
2 in subsection: Comparison between Case Study 1 and
Case Study 2.
A. Case Study 1
We assume the network and key’s parameters as fol-
lows: In each 1 km2 square unit area, for providing
available WSN model, the relationship between commu-
nication distance l and limiter power overhead E of each
sensor node is E ∝ ln (2 < n < 4), n is effected by
external influence and n is usually set to 3 for calculation.
Accordingly the communication radius of each node is set
to 100 m [36]. Thus, the available nodes number is set to
N = 100 for each 1 km2 square unit area. Let p denote
the probability of sharing a key in pair-wise keys between
any two nodes. Let d = p×(N−1) be the expected degree
of a node.
L.Eschenauer et al. 2002 [18] has shown that: A key
pool which has 10,000 keys means the key pool size KP
equals 10,000. When KP = 10, 000, only need store 75
keys in a node’s memory to ensure that the probability
p can satisfy p = 0.5. p means the probability that the
nodes share a key in their key rings. If the pool size
becomes ten times larger, for example, KP = 100, 000,
while the number of keys required for keeping the same
probability p = 0.5 is only 250. The basic scheme is a key
management technique which has the characters: scalable,
flexible and be suitable for large networks. Thus, the key
pool size KP = 10, 000 keys, the keys number 75 keys
and the probability p = 0.5 can be taken as an example
in our case study 1.
In the key set up phase, each node ID is matched
with Np. Np is randomly selected node identities with
probability p = 0.5. p = 0.5 is always used for a qualified
value for evaluation [6]. Thus we can get Np = 50.
At the beginning of the AHP evaluation, the matrix key
distribution scheme generates a m × m key matrix for
a WSN with size N = m2. During key pre-distribution
phase, each node is assigned a position (i, j), receives
both the keys in i-th column and the keys in j-th row
of the key matrix as the key-chain, which totally has 2m
keys. Here m denotes the number of keys in master key
list of a node and m =
√
N = 10. t is the size of group in
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TABLE VI.
QUOTED SYMBOLS IN CASE STUDY 1
Quoted Symbols Symbol’s Name
E Power overhead
l Communication distance
n l’s exponent
N Nodes number
p Probability of two nodes share a key
d Expected degree of a node
S Key pool size
m Side of Key matrix
t Size of sub-group network
λ Size of adversary coalitions
Np The number of each nodes stores a
random set which dedicated pair-wise keys to
achieve probability p that two nodes share a key
the assumed network scenario. If we assumes one group
here, t is set to 100. λ is the size of adversary coalitions
and equals 50.
All the quoted symbols in this section are concluded
in Table VI. At the same time, the six key management
schemes we have marked with black front in Table II.
For instance, the six key management schemes in-
formed in our paper are listed in Table II. If we take
their scalability into consideration, the basic numerical
value of each key management scheme’s scalability can
be obtained from their original paper: V alue(S) [8] = 2,
V alue(S) [18] = 2, V alue(S) [9] = 1, V alue(S) [19]
= 1, V alue(S) [20] = 1, V alue(S) [21] = 1. Thus, we
can obtain the pair-wise comparison matrix of these key
management schemes’ scalability value and we show the
matrix (BS) as in the form of Table IV.
Accordingly, this matrix-Table IV is normalized to ob-
tain the relative weight of eigenvector via the rating scale.
As a consequence, the relative weights of key manage-
ment scheme in H.Chan et al. 2003 [8], L.Eschenauer et
al. 2002 [18], C.Blundo et al. 1992 [9], S. zhu et al. 2003
[19], M. Shehab et al. 2005 [20] and S. Slijepcevic et al.
2002 [21] are calculated and equal to 0.25, 0.25, 0.125,
0.125, 0.125 and 0.125, respectively. On the other hand,
the consistency index CI is calculated and is equal to 0,
which means that the matrix-Table IV passes consistency
check. Namely, the matrix-Table IV keeps consistency
well and the expert preferences are reasonable.
As the similar processing of scalability matrix BS cal-
culation, we can go through a similar process on the other
four criteria: key connectivity, resilience, storage overhead
and communication overhead. Finally, the relative values
of all the five criteria are calculated and summarized in
Table V.
Then, as we obtain both the judgment matrix (Matrix
A) and the matrixes for key management schemes with
respect to each criteria’s comparison (Matrix BS , BK ,
BR, BM and BC), we can calculate the final vectors
of each key management scheme for the assumed WSN
scenario. Recalling our overall weights, we can get a
final value for each key management scheme now. The
value for H.Chan et al. [8] is 0.175555. The solution of
equations is as follows:
−→
A · −−→WA = λ−−→WA
−→
B · −−→WB = λ−−→WB
−→
W [8] =
−−→
WA · −−→WB
Thus, the value of H.Chan et al. [8] (
−→
W [8] )is calculated
out.
• With H.Chan et al. [8],
−→
W [8] = 0.039 × 0.25 +
0.119 × 0.25 + 0.269 × 0.049 + 0.218 × 0.273 +
0.352× 0.180 = 0.175555
Similarly, the value of the other five key management
schemes are calculated in turns and concluded as follows:
• With L. Eschenauer et al. [18],
−→
W [18] = 0.039 ×
0.25+0.119×0.25+0.269×0.049+0.218×0.273+
0.352× 0.450 = 0.270595
• With C. Blundo et al. [9],
−→
W [9] = 0.039× 0.125 +
0.119 × 0.125 + 0.269 × 0.095 + 0.218 × 0.265 +
0.352× 0.192 = 0.170659
• With S. Zhu et al. [19],
−→
W [19] = 0.039 × 0.125 +
0.119 × 0.125 + 0.269 × 0.269 + 0.218 × 0.041 +
0.352× 0.069 = 0.125337
• With M. Shehab et al. [20],
−→
W [20] = 0.039×0.125+
0.119 × 0.125 + 0.269 × 0.269 + 0.218 × 0.038 +
0.352× 0.069 = 0.124683
• With S. Slijepcevic et al. [21],
−→
W [21] = 0.039 ×
0.125 + 0.119 × 0.125 + 0.269 × 0.269 + 0.218 ×
0.110 + 0.352× 0.039 = 0.129819
B. Result of Case Study 1
Comparing the final value of the six schemes, we obtain
the order of the six schemes’ values. Their values decrease
in the following order: L. Eschenauer et al. [18], H.Chan
et al. [8], C. Blundo et al. [9], S. Slijepcevic et al. [21],
S. Zhu et al. [19] and M. Shehab et al. [20]. Among the
value of the six schemes, L. Eschenauer et al. scheme
[18] has the biggest value and M. Shehab et al. scheme
[20] has the least one.
The scheme with the biggest value means that it is the
optimum scheme. The optimum scheme L. Eschenauer et
al. [18] is superior to the traditional key pre-distribution
schemes. Because it presents a new key management
scheme for a large scale distribution sensor network.
All such schemes must be extremely simple given the
sensor-node computation and communication limitations.
Their approach is scalable and flexible: trade-offs may
occur between sensor-memory cost and connectivity, and
design parameters can be adapted to fit the operational
requirements of a particular environment.
The scheme with the least value means that it is not a
suitable scheme for the assumed WSN scenario. We know
that scheme M. Shehab et al. [20] is suitable for limited
computation and energy capability sensor network. This
proposed key generation algorithm is based on low cost
hashing functions that enable the efficient key generation.
Its key distribution protocol is also energy efficient. Thus,
this scheme satisfies with the energy limitation problem
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TABLE VIII.
ANOTHER RELATIVE WEIGHTS OF EACH CRITERION FOR PAIR-WISE COMPARISON MATRIX OF THE SIX SCHEMES
BSAvg. BKAvg. BRAvg. BMAvg. BCAvg.
H.Chan et al. [8] 0.25 0.125 0.049 0.041 0.069
L.Eschenauer et al. [18] 0.25 0.25 0.269 0.273 0.450
C.Blundo et al. [9] 0.125 0.125 0.095 0.265 0.192
S. zhu et al. [19] 0.125 0.25 0.269 0.273 0.180
M. Shehab et al. [20] 0.125 0.125 0.269 0.038 0.069
Slijepcevic et al. [21] 0.125 0.125 0.049 0.110 0.039
ΣAvg = 1 ΣAvg = 1 ΣAvg = 1 ΣAvg = 1 ΣAvg = 1
TABLE VII.
FURTHER ONE MORE CASE ABOUT PAIRWISE COMPARISON
JUDGMENT MATRIX OF THE FIVE CRITERIA
S K R M C
S 1 1/3 1/7 1/5 1
K 3 1 1/2 1/2 3
R 7 2 1 1 7
M 5 2 1 1 5
C 1 1/3 1/7 1/5 1
of wireless sensor network. The trade-off between energy
and security is the biggest problem in wireless sensor
network, so it cannot satisfy the requirement in our
assumed network scenario.
C. Case Study 2
Both subsection A and subsection B in section 4 are
the results of our case study 1. Case study 1 considers
the preference setting for the evaluation criteria and the
assumed WSN network scenario. For more clear expla-
nation, further work with more discussion can be done
well from two aspects: the first one is to change the
criteria preferences even to do all the permutation of
the criteria. Under other criteria preferences, we can see
what is changed from the final optimum scheme result.
Under the all permutation of criteria, we can obtain the
different result of optimum scheme according to different
preference.
The other one is to change the parameters of WSN
network scenario, such as the network size and the key
pool size. Accordingly, we can do analysis on the final
scores of these key management schemes in wireless
sensor network which can help us come to be familiar
with these schemes and make the decision for selecting
optimum scheme easily.
First, we analyze one more case on the pairwise com-
parison judgement matrix of the criteria. If the WSN
is for civil use which can provide enough energy and
can keep the advantage of WSN, we can obtain the
preference of criteria as follows: (low) Scalability (1)
= Communication overhead (1) < Key connectivity (3)
< Storage overhead (5) < Resilience (7) (high). The
judgement matrix of criteria preference is shown in Table
VII accordingly.
Keeping the same network parameters of WSN network
scenario, we can calculate the final value under the one
more case study which is according to one more criteria
preference. The final values of the six typical schemes
are sorted in decreasing order: L. Eschenauer et al. [18]
= 0.1935, H.Chan et al. [8] = 0.17757, S. Slijepcevic et
al. [21] = 0.1679, C. Blundo et al. [9] = 0.1636, S. Zhu
et al. [19] = 0.1468 and M. Shehab et al. [20] = 0.1459.
Both the best scheme and the worst scheme in this
result is the same as case study 1. However the order of
the six values has been changed. Scheme C. Blundo et al.
[9] and scheme S. Zhu et al. [19] change their order to
each other. Thus, we can see the affect from the changing
of the criteria preference .
Then, we analyze the affection from WSN network
parameters setting. Previous network size N = 100. If
more nodes have been added in and we also want to keep
the same probability p = 0.5 for the probability of that
two nodes share a key, it is an interesting problem on
the optimum scheme alteration for the current network
scenario. As shown in L. Eschenauer et al. [18], it is
worth mentioning that only k = 75 keys are needed
for probability p = 0.5 that any two nodes can share
a key in their key ring as KP = 10, 000. Thus, we
assume the new network scenario as follows: Network
size N = 1000. As we know, there is the expected degree
of a node d = p×(N−1) = 500. Accordingly we get the
successfully connected nodes number Np = 500, the size
of adversary coalitions λ = 50, t = 200 which means five
grids here. In matrix key distribution scheme, m = 10 as
m =
√
N . We let all the schemes keep the same key pool
KP = 10, 000 as given in scheme L. Eschenauer et al.
[18]. Then, the alternation has been showed in Table VIII.
D. Result of Case Study 2
Under the criteria preference setting in Table III and
the WSN network parameters setting in Table VIII, we
apply our AHP-aid method to calculate the combining of
both Table III and Table VIII. We can calculate the final
value and come to the conclusion that scheme S. Zhu et
al. [19] takes advantage of the other schemes. Here the
optimum scheme is S. zhu et al. [19] which is different
from previous optimum scheme L. Eschenauer et al. [18].
This is the effect of network nodes number alternation
from N = 100 to N = 1000. Scheme S. zhu et al. [19]
is an efficient security key management scheme for larger
scale sensor network. It can reduce the communication
overhead between each communication unit. Thus, the
more larger network size the more obvious the advantages
are. This can be shown to be the same as the original
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TABLE IX.
PARAMETERS COMPARISON BETWEEN CASE STUDY 1 AND CASE STUDY 2
n N p d KP k m t λ Np Optimum scheme
Case Study 1 3 100 0.5 50 10,000 75 10 100 50 50 L. Eschenauer et al. [18]
Case Study 2 3 1000 0.5 500 100,000 250 100 200 50 500 S. Zhu et al. [19]
paper assumption [19]. It consistent to our new network
requirement.
E. Comparison between Case Study 1 and Case Study 2
In the above four subsections, we describe two groups
network scenario. We called them Network scenario Net1
and Network scenario Net2, respectively. Firstly, we
conclude both of the network scenario. Then Table IX
is used to show clearly the parameters’ value of the
two network scenario. Lastly, we explain the different
parameters’ value between the two network scenarios.
Network Scenario Net1: Recall from Section IV.A,
the parameters of network scenario and key management
scheme have been presented. The parameters can be
concluded in the following:
p = 0.5, N = 100, Np = 50, d = 50, KP = 10, 000,
k = 75, m = 10, λ = 50, t = 100.
Network Scenario Net2: L. Eschenauer et al. [18]
scheme infers that if the pool size is ten times larger,
for example, KP = 100, 000, then the number of keys
required is still only 250 for keeping the value p = 0.5
which is the same as in the first group network scenario.
The basic scheme is a key management technique that
is scalable, flexible and can be used for large networks.
Then we can present another WSN scenario: we enlarge
the key pool size and the network nodes number.
We refer to the key pool size from scheme L. Es-
chenauer et al. [18]: KP = 100, 000 keys, only k = 250
keys is needed for probability p = 0.5 such that any two
nodes can share a key in their key ring. The available
nodes number is enlarged to N = 1, 000. Because of the
same probability p = 0.5 and assumed N = 1, 000, we
can obtain that Np = 500, d = 500, t = 200 (five grids
for the hierarchical structure), m = 100.
Table IX concludes the parameters used in both case
study 1 and case study 2. The value of n, p and λ are
the same in both case studies as shown in Table IX.
Keeping the value of p as the same as precondition, the
other parameters in case study 2 change to different values
[18]. In both case studies, the basic changed values are
the network size N and the key pool size KP . The key
pool size KP is changed from 10,000 to 100,000 and the
nodes number N change from 100 to 1000. k is changed
as KP changed. Np, d and t are changed. Because the
changing of the size of network grids t causes the number
of network grids to change, m is changed as the network
grids is changed.
All the changed values above cause the two case
studies to perform different final decision. Case study 1
selects L. Eschenauer et al. [18] scheme as the optimum
scheme. Meanwhile, case study 2 selects S. Zhu et al.
[19] scheme as the optimum scheme. From the two case
studies, the relationship between our method decision and
the changing of the parameters are drawn. Obviously,
the quantitative decision from our method brings into
correspondence with the original case situations.
V. CONCLUSION
From the analysis, we can see all the key management
schemes have their own shortcomings. For this reason, it
is a very critical issue to select trustworthy and suitable
key management scheme according to assumed scenario
requests. Such evaluation analysis can help to provide
some valuable information for designing the key man-
agement in WSN.
In this paper, we present a quantitative evaluation
system for key management scheme which is based on
the six aspects: scalability, key connectivity, resilience,
storage overhead, processing overhead and communica-
tion overhead. We analyze it and show that this system
can be used to select suitable key management scheme
under assumed wireless sensor network scenario require-
ments. Furthermore, we show six typical key management
schemes from the six classified aspects. Under assumed
network scenarios, we can obtain the value order of the
six schemes. Importantly, we obtain the best scheme and
the worst one via their final calculated values.
Formalized decision should be made where there are
a limited number of schemes choices. However each
scheme has a number of attributes and it is difficult
to formalize some of those attributes. Obviously, AHP-
aided method can prevent subjective judgment errors and
increase the likelihood that the results are reliable. AHP-
aided method provides useful insight into the trade-offs
embedded in a decision making problem.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank lab colleagues for care-
fully reading the paper and providing detailed suggestions
on paper structure and comments on the English writing.
Also many thanks to the anonymous reviewers in the JNW
editorial committee for their insightful comments on this
work.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Lopez, J. Y. Zhou, Overview of wireless sensor network
security, Wireless Sensor Network Security, (J. Lopez and
J. Y. Zhou Eds), IOS Press, 2008.
[2] Y. Jeong, S. Lee, Hybrid Key Establishment Protocol
Based on ECC for Wireless Sensor Network, In proceeding
of the 4th international conference on Ubiquitous Intelli-
gence and Computing, Volume 4611, pages 1233-1242,
Hong Kong, China, July, 2007.
98 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
[3] S. A. Camtepe, B. Yener, Key management in wireless
sensor network, Wireless Sensor Network Security, (J.
Lopez and J. Y. Zhou Eds), IOS Press, 2008.
[4] T. L. Saaty, The Analytic Hierarchy Process, McGraw-Hill,
New York, 1980.
[5] J. Hwang, I. Syamsuddin, Information Security Policy De-
cision Making: An Analytic Hierarchy Process Approach,
In proceeding of 2009 Third Asia International Conference
on Modelling and Simulation, pages 158-163, May, 2009
[6] Y. Xiao, V. K. Rayi, B. Sun, X. Du, F. Hu, M. Galloway,
A survey of key management schemes in wireless sensor
networks, Computer Communications, special issue on
security on wireless ad hoc and sensor network, Volumn
30, pages 2314-2341, September, 2007.
[7] C. J. Jia, Research on security of wireless sensor network,
PhD thesis, ZheJiang University, July, 2008.
[8] H.Chan, A. Perrig, D. Song, Random key pre-distribution
schemes for sensor networks, In proceeding of IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 197-213, May,
2003.
[9] C. Blundo, A. D. Santis, A. Herzberg, S. Kutten, U.
Vaccaro, and M. Yung, Perfectly-secure key distribution
for dynamic conferences, In proceeding of Advances in
cryptology (CRYPTO 92), pages 471-486, August, 1992.
[10] D. Chakrabarti, S. Maitra, B. Roy, A key pre-distribution
scheme for wireless sensor networks: Merging blocks in
combinatorial design, In ISC 2005 Proceedings, Lecture
notes in computer science, ISSN 0302-9743, Volumn 3650.
Springer, pages 89-103, 2005.
[11] T. Ito, H. Ohta, N. Matsuda, T. Yoneda, A key pre-
distribution scheme for secure sensor network using proba-
bility density function of node deployment, In proceedings
of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor
networks, pages 69-75, November, 2005.
[12] L. Gong, D. J. Wheeler, A matrix key distribution schemes,
In Journal of Cryptology, Volumn 2-1. pages 51-59, 1990.
[13] B. Dutertre, S. Cheung, J. Levy, Lightweight key man-
agement in wireless sensor networks by leveraging initial
trust, Technical Report SRI-SDL-04-02, System Design
laboratory, SRI International, April, 2004.
[14] C. Fei. Pair-wise Key Management in Wireless Sensor
Network, In Journal of Computer Simulation, Volumn 22-
5, 2005.
[15] H. Soussi, M. Hussain, H. Afifi, D. Seret. IKEv1 and
IKEv2: A Quantitative Analyses, In proceeding of Interna-
tional Conference on Information Security(ICIS WEC’05),
Istanbul, Turquie, 24-26 June, 2005
[16] E. H. Forman. Decision by Objective,
http://mdm.gwu.edu/Forman/DBO.pdf.
[17] AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) Calcula-
tion software by CGI, http://www.isc.senshu-
u.ac.jp/ thc0456/EAHP/AHPweb.html.
[18] L. Eschenauer, V. D. Gligor, A key-management scheme
for distributed sensor networks, In proceeding of ACM
Conference of Computer and Communication Security,
pages 41-47, November, 2002.
[19] S. Zhu, S. Setia, S. Jajodia, Leap:Efficient security mech-
anisms for large-scale distirbuted sensor networks, In pro-
ceeding of ACM Conference of Computer and Communi-
cation Security, pages 62-72, October, 2003.
[20] M.Shehab, E.Bertino, A.Ghafoor, Efficient hierarchical key
generation and key diffusion for distribution for distributed
sensor networks, In proceeding of IEEE International
Conference of Sensor and Ad Hoc Communication and
Network, pages 76-84, September, 2005.
[21] S.Slijepcevic, M.Potkonjak, V.Tsiatsis, S.Zimbeck,
M.B.Srivastava, On communication security in wireless
ad-hoc sensor network, In proceeding of IEEE WETICE,
pages 139-144, November, 2002.
[22] A. Casaca, D. Westhoff, Scenario Definition and Initial
Threat Analysis, In report of UbiSec and Sens, Deliverable
D0.1, June, 2006
[23] D.Liu, P.Ning, Location-based pairwise key establishments
for static sensor networks, In proceeding of 2003 ACM
Workshop on Security in Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks
(SASN’03), pages 72-82, October, 2003
[24] B.Dutertre, S.Cheung, J.Levy, Lightweight Key Manage-
ment in Wireless Sensor Networks by Leveraging Initial
Trust, In Technical Report SRI-SDL-04-02, System Design
Laboratory, SRI International, April, 2004.
[25] D. Huang, M. Mehta, D. Medhi, L. Harn, Location-aware
key management scheme for wireless sensor networks, In
proceeding of ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and
Sensor Network, pages 29-42, October, 2004
[26] D. Hwang, B. Lai, I. Verbauwhede, Energy-memory-
security tradoffs in distributed sensor networks, In pro-
ceeding of ADHOC-NOW, LNCS, pages 70-81, July, 2004
[27] R. D. Pietro, L. V. Mancini, A. Mei, Random key assign-
ment for secure wireless sensor networks, In proceeding of
ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks,
October, 2003.
[28] S. A. Camtepe, B. Yener, Combinatorial design of key
distribution mechanisms for wireless sensor networks, In
9th European Symposium on Research Computer Security,
pages 293-308, September, 2004
[29] M. Ramkumar, N. Memon, An efficient random key pre-
distribution scheme, In proceeding of Global Telecommu-
nications Conference (GLOBECOM ’04), 29 Nov.-3 Dec.
2004, 2004.
[30] G. Jolly, M. C. Kuscu, P. Kokate, M. Younis, A low-energy
key management protocol for wireless sensor networks, In
proceeding of Eighth IEEE International Symposium on
Computers and Communication, pages 335-340, June 30-
July 3, 2003
[31] A. Chadha, Y. Liu, S. K. Das, Group key distribution via
local collaboration in wireless sensor networks, In pro-
ceeding of IEEE International Conference of Sensor and
Ad Hoc Communication Network, pages 46-54, February,
2006
[32] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, J. D. Tygar,
Spins: Security protocols for sensor networks, In Wireless
Networks Journal, Volumn 8-5, 2002
[33] D. Liu, P. Ning, Efficient distribution of key chain com-
mitments for broadcast authentication in distributed sensor
networks, In Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium, February, 2003
[34] M. Bohge, W. Trappe, An authentication framework for
hierarchical ad hoc sensor networks, In ACM WiSe, pages
79-87, September, 2003
[35] M. Gabriela, C. Torres, Enegry Consumption in wireless
sensor network using GSP, Thesis for master degree,
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
[36] G. B. Zhou, Z. C. Zhu, G. Z. Chen and N. N. Hu, Energy-
Efficient Chain-Type Wireless Sensor Network for Gas
Monitoring, In proceeding of The Second International
Conference on Information and Computing Science, pages
125-128, May, 2009
Ruan Na was born in AnQing, AnHui, China
on 1986. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Kyushu Univer-
sity, Japan. She received her MS and BS degrees in communi-
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012 99
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
cation from China University of Mining and Technology, China,
in 2010 and 2007, respectively. Her research interests include
security, wireless sensor network and communication systems.
Yizhi Ren received the B.S. degree in com-
puter science from Anhui Normal University in 2004, and the
M.S. degree and doctorate in computer software and theory
from School of Software, Dalian University of Technology in
2006 and 2010, respectively. From 2008 to 2010, he was as
a Joint Training PhD student in Kyushu University in Japan,
supported by China Government Scholarship. Now, he worked
for Software Engineering School of Hangzhou Dianzi University
as an assistant professor. His main research interests include
network security, social computing.
Yoshiaki Hori received B.E., M.E, and D.E.
degrees on Computer Engineering from Kyushu Institute of
Technology, Iizuka, Japan in 1992, 1994, and 2002 respectively.
From 1994 to 2003, he was Research Associate at the Common
Technical Courses, Kyushu Institute of Design. From 2003 to
2004, he was Research Associate at the Department of Art and
Information Design, Kyushu University. From 2004, he was
Associate Professor at the Department of Computer Science and
Communication Engineering, Kyushu University. Since 2009,
he has been Associate Professor of Department of Informat-
ics, Kyushu University. His research interests include network
security, network architecture, and performance evaluation of
network protocols on various networks. He is a member of IEEE,
ACM, and IPSJ.
Kouichi Sakurai received the B.S. degree
in mathematics from the Faculty of Science, Kyushu University
and the M.S. degree in applied science from the Faculty of
Engineering, Kyushu University in 1986 and 1988 respectively.
He had been engaged in the research and development on
cryptography and information security at the Computer and
Information Systems Laboratory at Mitsubishi Electric Cor-
poration from 1988 to 1994. He received D.E. degree from
the Faculty of Engineering, Kyushu University in 1993. Since
1994 he has been working for the Department of Computer
Science of Kyushu University as Associate Professor, and now
he is Full Professor from 2002. His current research interests
are in cryptography and information security. Dr. Sakurai is a
member of the Information Processing Society of Japan, the
Mathematical Society of Japan, ACM and the International
Association for Cryptology Research.
100 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
Interference Analysis of TD-SCDMA System and 
CDMA2000 System 
 
Chen Hao1,2 
1 School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 
2 Computer Science and Information Engineering College，Tianjin University of Science & Technology, Tianjin 
300222 ,China 
Email: haochen111@yahoo.com.cn  
 
Yang Tong 
Tianjin Mobile Communications Co., Ltd., Tianjin 300052, China 
Email:  yangtong@tj.chinamobile.com         
                                       
 Teng Jian-fu  
   School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 
Email:  jfteng@tju.edu.cn  
 
 He Hong  
Tianjin Key Laboratory for Control Theory and Application in Complicated Systems, 
Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China 
Email: heho604300@126.com  
 
Abstract—In this paper, the feasibility of co-channel 
coexistence of Time Division- Synchronous Code Division 
Multiple Access （ TD-SCDMA ） and Code Division 
Multiple Access 2000（CDMA2000）systems operating in a 
macro cell environment is investigated. The deterministic 
analysis and simulation method are used to evaluate the 
performance compromising of both systems. Based on a 
more efficient calculation scheme, a novel deterministic 
equation is proposed and used to provide a better 
interpretation of the relationship between aggressor and 
victim in the interference system. The evaluation and 
simulation results show consistency with the corresponding 
experiment results. Furthermore, the interference 
characteristics of Omni-antenna and smart antenna in TD-
SCDMA and CDMA2000 are compared, providing an 
important guideline to reduce the interference of two 
systems. 
 
Index Terms—TD-SCDMA; CDMA2000; smart antenna 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple 
Access and Code Division Multiple Access 2000 
operated by China Mobile and China Telecom are the 
dominating mobile protocols[1][2], which are important 
to Chinese telecommunication industries. Frequency 
bands of TD-SCDMA are assigned to 1 880-1 920 MHz 
and 2 010-2 025 MHz, while CDMA2000 frequency 
bands are 1 920-1 980 MHz and 2 110-2 170 MHz. At 1 
920 MHz, the two systems operate in the adjacent 
channels with a 0.825MHz protection band and their 
interference is inevitable. Therefore, it is important to 
evaluate the interference of two systems in the adjacent 
channels. Specific interferences[1][2][3]include: the 
CDMA2000 mobile stations interferes TD-SCDMA base 
and mobile stations; at the same time, TD-SCDMA base 
stations and mobile stations conflict with CDMA2000 
base stations.   
The specific form of interference is shown in Fig.1 
 
The interference study is based on the coexistence of 
both modes[4]. Such coexistence can increase the 
capacity and provide great flexibility for operators. Some 
previous studies examined the coexistence of UTRA-
FDD and UTRA-TDD systems in adjacent channels by 
hierarchically overlapping coexistence of micro TDD 
cell and UTRA-FDD cells sharing the same frequency 
allocation[5] [6][7]. However, the coexistence of TDD 
and FDD systems operating in a macro cell environment 
and sharing the same frequency band has not been 
investigated yet. The focus of this paper is to estimate the 
capacity of such a coexistence of CDMA2000 and TD-
SCDMA network and to evaluate its interference. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Deterministic 
analysis[2] is discussed in section II. Simulation 
methodology[3] and scenario are introduced in section 
III. Simulation results and analysis are given in section 
IV. Section V concludes the paper. 
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II  DETERMINISTIC ANALYSIS  
A. ACIR Approach[1] 
Deterministic analysis is usually used to analyze the 
worse interference cases. Using this method, we will use 
minimum Coupling Loss (MCL) data as the result. Based 
on  these data, the interference analysis between the 
third-generation communication systems can be obtained. 
Based on link budget, deterministic analysis is used to 
evaluate the effect of the interfering system on a single 
link of the victim system. Since the traditional 
deterministic equation may easily mislead the beginners, 
a novel deterministic equation is developed here, which 
enable us to easily calculate the relationship between 
aggressor and victim in interference system with a 
clearer understanding than the previous equation.  
We now introduce some methodologies before 
describing the detailed analysis. The above method 
mainly calculates the ACIR result, which is obtained by 
using ACLR and ACS values (as listed in Tab. 1).  ACIR 
can be evaluated by: 
ACSACLR
ACIR 11
1
+
=                  (1) 
Adjacent Channel Leakage power Ratio (ACLR) [2]: 
The ratio of the transmitted power to the power measured 
after a receiver filter in the adjacent RF channel.  
Adjacent Channel Selectivity (ACS) [2]: Adjacent 
Channel Selectivity is a measure of a receiver's ability to 
receive a signal at its assigned channel frequency with 
the presence of a modulated signal in the adjacent 
channel. ACS is the ratio of the receiver filter attenuation 
on the assigned channel frequency to the receiver filter 
attenuation on the adjacent channel frequency.  
ACIR stands for Adjacent Channel Interference Ratio 
which is defined as the ratio of the transmitted power to 
the power measured after a receiver filter centered on the 
adjacent channels. From Eq.(1) and Tab.1, the values of 
ACIR can be calculated as listed in Tab.2 
 
Tab.1 ACLR and ACS requirements for TD-SCDMA and CDMA2000 based on 3GPP protocol 
Frequency 
Offset 
Δf/MHz 
CDMA2000 
MS ACLR 
CDMA2000 
BS ACS 
TD-SCDMA 
MS ACLR 
TD-SCDMA 
BS ACLR 
TD-SCDMA 
MS ACS 
TD-SCDMA 
BS ACS 
 30.5dB   55dB   38.5dB   45.8dB   38dB   52.5dB 
 
Tab.2    ACIR values of TD-SCDMA and CDMA2000  
Interferer CDMA2000 MS CDMA2000 MS TD-SCDMA MS TD-SCDMA BS 
Victim TD-SCDMA MS TD-SCDMA BS CDMA2000 BS CDMA2000 BS 
ACIR (dB)    29.8     30.5    38.5 45.3 
Tab.3, we give the relevant data of co-existence and co-sited requirement in 3GPP protocols. Tab.3 is obtained based 
on Tab.1 and Tab.2 
Tab.3   Co-existence and Co-sited requirement based on 3GPP protocol 
 CDMA2000 BS ACS /2.25MHz TD-SCDMA BS ACLR   ACIR 
Co-existence 55dB        70dB   54.9dB 
Co-sited         55dB        110dB    55dB 
As seen in Tab.3, since the ACIR requirement of co-
sited (or co-existence) is larger than that of the ACIR 
calculated between TD-SCDMA BS and CDMA2000 BS 
(54.9 dB is larger than 45.3 dB), the conventional layout 
can not meet the requirements of co-existence or co-
station. 
B  MCL Method  
Traditional deterministic equation usually focuses on 
adjacent frequency, so the equation given in (2) may 
easily mislead the beginners. 
rTX IACIRPMCL −−=                 (2) 
where 
TXP  : transmitter power of the base station(or mobile 
station) 
rI  : maximum acceptable interference level at the 
receiver 
MCL  : minimum coupling loss 
In fact,  actually represents interference 
dimension，while MCL denotes overcome interference 
dimension .Therefore, a new equation with clear physical 
meaning will be developed. 
TXP
Based on the combination of interference between 
systems, the overall interference can be calculated, and 
then the MCL is computed. Adjacent frequency 
interference, spurious interference, intermodulation 
interference is existing in the victim bandwidth. They 
deteriorate the quality of communication. Blocking is out 
of the receiving bandwidth and it generates interference 
system receiver saturation and obstacles to the 
communication. 
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Normally, there is a great difference between 
interference strength. The total interference power is 
dominated by the strongest interference power. Even in 
the most extreme cases, that each interference power 
value is almost equal, then total interference power will 
increase 6.02 dB, but still consistent with (3) and (4) and 
in the margin of allowance. 
)10101010log(10 10101010
BlockingIMDSEIACI IIII
totalI +++=  
(3)      
totalICL ≥                                                                  (4) 
totalI : total of interference power       
ACII :  adjacent frequency interference power 
SEII : the spurious emissions power    
IMDI :  intermodulation  power 
CL：coupling loss 
When the ACI exists, the equation is simplified 
ACItotal II =                            (5) 
When , the CL is MCL. totalICL =
Our study will only focus on Eq.(3),(4)and(5) 
to calculate MCL. The new equations are deduced to 
show in Eq. (6) 
rTXACI IACIRPI −−=    (6) 
 
 
ACIICL ≥  , if and only if  , CL is equal ACIICL =
 MCL.  
The physical meaning of the Eq. (6) is more clearer  
than that of Eq.(2) 
The relationship among  and NF, ROT , KTW is rI
listed in Eq. (7) 
)1010log(10 1010
NFKTWROTNFKTW
rI
+++
−×=       (7) 
Where  NF：noise floor ROT: raise over thermal   
KTW: thermal noise power 
Based on 3GPP protocol, PTX and bandwidth 
conversion values can be found. ACIR have been 
calculated in the table 2. The other parameters can be 
obtained from the protocol of 3GPP 25.942. MCL can be 
calculated from Eq. (6) and (7), and the values are 
summarized in the Tab. 5 
 
Tab.4     Parameters of TD-SCDMA System and CDMA2000 System 
Item Unit CDMA2000  MS  
interfering  
TD-SCDMA MS 
TD-SCDMA BS 
  interfering  
CDMA2000 BS 
CDMA2000 MS  
interfering  
TD-SCDMA MS 
TD-SCDMA MS 
interfering  
CDMA2000 BS 
PTX dBm      21      36       21     30 
ACIR dB     29.8      45.3        30.5     38.5 
bandwidth 
conversion 
dB      1.1      -1.1       1.1     -1.1 
KTW dBm     -113      -113      -113     -113 
NF dB      7        7        7      7 
ROT dB      3        3        3      3 
 
Tab.5       MCL of TD-SCDMA System and CDMA2000 System 
Item Unit CDMA2000  MS  
interfering  
TD-SCDMA MS 
TD-SCDMA BS 
  interfering  
CDMA2000 BS 
CDMA2000 MS  
interfering  
TD-SCDMA MS 
TD-SCDMA MS 
interfering  
CDMA2000 BS 
MCL dB     97.22    96.72       96.52     97.52 
 
The propagation environments are considered in the 
 Macro-cellular model. 
The path loss of the propagation[1][8] can be  
evaluated in Eq. (8) 
RL 10log6.371.128 +=                     (8) 
R is the base station- UE separation in kilometers 
L: path loss  ΔG：Antenna gain 
LogF：Log Normal fade margin   
Pathloss_Maro＝L＋LogF                     (9) 
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Tab. 6    Parameters of propagation 
Item Unit CDMA2000  MS  
interfering  
TD-SCDMA MS 
TD-SCDMA BS 
  interfering  
CDMA2000 BS 
CDMA2000 MS  
interfering  
TD-SCDMA MS 
TD-SCDMA MS 
interfering  
CDMA2000 BS 
ΔG dBi      -6.0      16.0       11.0     11.0 
L=ΔG+MCL dB     91.22      112.72        107.52     108.52 
LogF dB      10      10.0       10.0     10.0 
Pathloss_Macro dB    101.22      112.72      117.52     118.52 
R can be calculated in the Tab.7 ,according to Eq. (8) and (9) 
     Tab.7  R of Macro-cellular environment  
Item Unit CDMA2000  MS  
interfering  
TD-SCDMA MS 
TD-SCDMA BS 
  interfering  
CDMA2000 BS 
CDMA2000 MS  
interfering  
TD-SCDMA MS 
TD-SCDMA MS 
interfering  
CDMA2000 BS 
R km    0.193    0.389       0.523     0.556 
As deterministic analysis is appropriate for the worst 
case, the probability of the worst case is low[5]. So MS 
to MS, MS to BS and BS to MS can use conventional 
layout. If there is interference, adjusting the position of 
BS and narrowing the distance and service radius of BS 
can reduce or avoid the interference. However, BS to BS 
interference requires high, co-existence and co-sited 
scenario that is difficult to satisfy. Thus, it needs to adopt 
the following improvement. 
1: The level of technology needs improvement and 
ACIR of equipments needs upgraded, especially the ACS 
of the BS of CDMA2000. 
2: It is shown that adjacent channel interference is 
caused by the deterioration of the sensitivity volume of 
CDMA2000 BS. Narrowing CDMA2000 BS base station 
service radius and spacing improves the uplink signal of 
the MS power to resist the TD-SCDMA BS strong 
adjacent channel interference. 
In summary, when CDMA2000 system and TD-
SCDMA system are deployed in adjacent frequencies, 
ACI is the important and major part of the total 
interference. SEI, IMD and Blocking are more relaxing 
than ACLR and ACS requirements relative to the 
adjacent frequency interference. So just considering 
these two systems, SCI can satisfy the coexistence 
requirement, and SEI, IMD and Blocking requirements 
can be satisfied. 
III. SIMULATION SCENARIO  
A  Macro-cell Scenario [2] 
Since for the macro scenario a hexagonal cell structure 
is assumed, Monte-Carlo method has been chosen for 
evaluation. Each Monte-Carlo (MC) simulation cycle 
starts with the positioning of the receiver station 
(disturbed system) by means of an appropriate 
distribution equation for the user path. The interfering 
(mobile) stations are assumed to be uniformly distributed. 
The density of interferers is taken as parameter. To start 
up we assume that only the closest user of the co-existing 
interfering system is substance of the main interference 
power. At each MC cycle the pathloss between the 
disturbed receiver and the next interfering station as well 
as the pathloss for the communication links are 
determined according to the pathloss formula given in 
the next clause. Depending on the use of power control 
the received signal level C at the receiver station in the 
disturbed system is calculated. Finally the interference 
power I is computed taking into account the transmit 
spectrum mask and the receiver filter. C/I is then 
substance to the statistical evaluation giving the CDF. 
B  Pathloss formula[2][8]  
The pathloss calculation for the Macro Vehicular 
Environment Deployment Model is implemented to 
simulate the MS↔ BS case (10 dB log-normal standard 
deviation). Both 3000 m and 577 m cell-radii are 
considered. The simulation support an Omni directional 
pattern antenna. Considering TDD the mobile to mobile 
interference requires a model valid for transmitter and 
receiver antennas having the same height. In order to 
cover this case the outdoor macro model is based on path 
loss formula from H.Xia considering that the height of 
the BS antenna is below the average building height.  
C  Evaluation of FDD/TDD interference yielding relative 
capacity loss 
C.1 Definition of system capacity[9] 
The capacity of the system is defined as the mean 
number of mobile stations per cell that can be active at a 
time while the probability that the C/I falls below a given 
threshold is below 5%[10]. All mobiles use the same 
service.  
C.2 Calculation of capacity 
A relative capacity loss is calculated as: 
gle
multi
N
NC
sin
1−=                      （10） 
where  is the maximum mean number of 
mobiles per cell that can be activated at a time in the 
single operator case, i.e. without adjacent channel 
interference.  is the maximum mean number of mobiles 
gleNsin
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per cell that can be activated at a time in the multi 
operator case, i.e. with adjacent channel interference 
originating in one interfering system in an adjacent 
transmit band. 
IV. SIMULATION PARAMETERS, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Simulation parameters 
TD-SCDMA system and CDMA2000 system 
simulation parameters are listed in Tab. 8 and Tab.9 
  
Tab. 8 TD-SCDMA system simulation parameters in Macro environment 
Parameter UL DL 
Simulation times Snapshot（>=800） Snapshot (>=800) 
BS-UE : 70 BS-UE : 70 
UE-UE :40 UE-UE :40 
 
MCL （dB） 
     BS-BS :45 BS-BS :45 
Receiver antenna gain （dBi）   11    11 
BS-BS: 0  (LOS)  
10 （NLOS） 
BS-BS: 0  (LOS)  
10 （NLOS） 
BS－UE：10 BS－UE：10 
 
 
Log Normal Fade(dB) 
UE－UE：0 (LOS)  
10(NLOS) 
UE－UE ：0(LOS) 
 10(NLOS) 
Reference sensitivity level (dBm) -110 -108 
Power  Control Based  C/I Based  C/I 
Power  Control  Error 0％ 0％ 
Outage   Eb/N0 <-0.5dB Eb/N0 <-0.5 dB 
noise power(dBm) －106 －104 
Maximum base station transmit power  
(dBm) 
 36 
Maximum terminal transmit power  (dBm) 30  
Power control range(dB) 65 30 
User distribution random uniform distribution random uniform distribution 
        
Tab.9   CDMA2000 system simulation parameters in Macro environment 
  Parameter UL DL 
Simulation times Snapshot（>=800） Snapshot (>=800) 
BS-UE : 70 BS-UE : 70 
UE-UE :40 UE-UE :40 
 
MCL（dB) 
      BS-BS :45 BS-BS :45 
Receiver antenna gain （dBi） 11  11 
BS-BS: 0 (LOS) 
 10 (NLOS) 
BS-BS: 0(LOS)  
10(NLOS) 
BS－UE：10 BS－UE：10 
 
 
Log Normal Fade(dB) 
UE－UE :0(LOS )  
10(NLOS) 
UE－UE: 0(LOS) 
 10(NLOS) 
Reference sensitivity level (dBm) -110 -108 
Power  Control based  C/I based C/I 
Power  Control  Error 0％ 0％ 
Outage Eb/N0 <-0.5dB Eb/N0 <-0.5dB 
noise power(dBm) －108 －104 
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Maximum base station transmit power  
(dBm) 
 30 
Maximum terminal transmit power  (dBm) 21  
User  distribution random uniform distribution random uniform distribution 
B. The process of simulation 
According to scenario flowcharts, this paper uses the 
Monte-Carlo method and related software to stimulate the 
interference of TD-SCDMA system and CDMA2000 
system. The Fig. 2, 3 and 4 show the simulation map, 
simulation parameters and simulation results, respectively. 
 
Fig. 2 simulation map    
 
Fig.3 simulation parameters 
 
Fig. 4 simulation results 
 
C. Simulation results and analysis 
C.1 The work simulates interference of TD-SCDMA 
MS to CDMA2000 BS and is divided into three 
simulation cases. 
 (1) In the omni-directional antenna and smart 
antenna[11][12], respectively 
(2) Changing cell radius but not changing base station 
distance. 
(3) Changing base station distance but not changing 
cell radius[13] 
Simulation environment is the Macro-cell, and the 
whole area cell radius is 577m. There are three kinds of 
situations: the distance between operators is 0, 288 m and 
577m, respectively.  
  In uplink, the number of users as a single TD-
SCDMA system in 95% of the customer satisfaction 
degree reach 75%. According to data of simulation result, 
the graph can be drawn in Fig. 5 and 6. 
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TD-SCDMA MS interfering CDMA2000 BS with smart antenna
0
20
40
60
80
100
10 15 20 25 30 35
ACIR(dB)
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 L
os
s co-siting
BS Distance=288m
BS Distance=577m
 
Fig.5 TD-SCDMA MS interfering CDMA2000 BS 
with smart antenna 
    TD-SCDMA MS interfering CDMA2000 BS with Omni-directional antennas
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Fig.6 TD-SCDMA MS interfering CDMA2000 BS 
with Omni-directional antenna 
Result Analysis:  
(1) It can be seen that when ACIR increases, capacity 
loss continues to drop. The distances of BSs affect 
interference. For the same ACIR, the smaller are the 
distances of BSs, the smaller is capacity loss. As a result 
interference of systems is smaller. 
(2) The two figures based on the use of smart antennas 
and omni-directional antennas are compared. For the 
same ACIR values, cellular capacity loss in using smart 
antenna is smaller than the cellular capacity loss in using 
omni-directional antenna. It illustrates that using smart 
system can inhibit interference of systems. 
(3) Although the use of smart antennas can inhibit 
interference of systems, interference depression is still 
limited. A single TD-SCDMA terminal to CDMA2000 
BS interference will have great inhibition in smart 
antenna. But the use of smart antenna can increase the 
number of TD-SCDMA terminals inside the cellar. Thus, 
improvement to overall interference of system is limited 
with smart antennas .  
C.2 This effort simulates different cell radius situations 
for smart antenna. 
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Fig.7 TD-SCDMA MS interfering CDMA2000 BS 
with different radius 
 
Results:  
Visibly, with the cell radius increasing, interference of 
TD-SCDMA MS to CDMA2000 BS increases, too. When 
the cell radius increases, TD-SCDMA MS in the edge of 
service covering the area needs more uplink power. It 
will maintain edge communication of TD-SCDMA 
system, Thus, TD MS forms larger interference to 
CDMA2000 BS. 
According to the extreme worst results calculated by 
deterministic analysis methods, a certain degree of 
interference exists in the adjacent frequencies in 
CDMA2000 MS to TD-SCDMA MS, CDMA2000 MS to 
TD-SCDMA BS and TD-SCDMA MS to CDMA2000 
BS. These interferences can be avoided and narrowed by 
adjusting BSs relative position. Considering the MS 
distribution and power control, simulation calculation is 
used to calculate the probability of interference 
interrupting communication. It can be found that in the 
typical cases, when the devices meet the 3GPP standard 
requirement, the probability is relatively low. So long as 
the site engineering design can analyze adjacent 
frequency interference area according to specific 
situations and turn the interfering system to secondary 
area, the systems can meet the co-existence need. 
However, adjacent frequency interference of TD-
SCDMA to CDMA2000 BS is large, Monte-Carlo 
simulation and deterministic analysis results show that 
the conventional site engineering is difficult to meet the 
two systems co-existence when 3GPP standards of 
equipment are used. To achieve the two systems 
coexistence or co-sited, the following measures can be 
taken. 
Measure 1:  the frequency of the two systems is 
reasonably arranged and system frequency interval is 
increased. By increasing the frequency interval, the 
greater ACIR of two systems can be realized. It will 
reduce MCL requirements. Increasing frequency interval 
also facilitate additional filter to provide a greater 
isolation between transmitter and receiver. 
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Measure 2: It increases system frequency of interval, 
avoiding co-sited. If using Omni-directional antenna, it 
should try to keep the adjacent sites of the two systems in 
the same direction. Using the antenna, decoupling can 
increase coupling loss. If different systems must be co-
sited, antenna feeding system layout should be designed 
carefully. The methods such as spacing isolation and 
antenna decoupling are to be used to increase isolation 
loss between transceiver and transmitter. 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we concentrate on interference analysis 
and coexistence study of TD-SCDMA and CDMA2000 
systems operating in adjacent frequency bands. A 
thorough theoretic investigation and detailed system level 
simulation scenarios are presented. Most representative 
interference are evaluated. The results show that the 
interference between base stations is severe and some 
additional protection measures are needed. Meanwhile, 
TD-SCDMA system has the ability to resist interference 
to some extent, but it brings relatively severe interference 
to CDMA2000 system. It is also found that for TD-
SCDMA system sites, different antennas and cell radius 
schemes have various impacts on CDMA2000 capacity, 
which should be carefully considered during TD-
SCDMA deployment to ensure its coexistence with 
CDMA2000 system. 
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Abstract—Aiming at improving the precision of nodes’ 
localization, this paper analyses the source of the 
localization error when using the least square algorithm, 
and proposes the principle to choose the benchmark anchor 
nodes in reducing the power of equation. Based on this 
principle, the algorithm choosing the nearest node as the 
benchmark anchor node in LSM and the algorithm 
choosing the synthetic nearest node as the benchmark 
anchor node in LSM are put forward. It is proved by the 
simulation in MATLAB that the improved LSM can 
effectively improve the precision of the nodes localization.  
 
Index Terms—wireless sensor networks, node localization 
precision, lest square algorithm 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, wireless sensor network has been 
implicated in many domains, such as environmental 
monitoring fields, battlefields [1-4]. As the localization of 
the nodes is very important to make the application of 
WSN effectively, it is very important to improve the 
precision of the localization algorithms in WSN. 
Generally, the sensor nodes are deployed randomly 
and their locations may not be acquired prematurely. The 
localization of the sensors has evoked a tremendous 
attention in these occasions. At the same time, the node 
energy consumption is one of the key factors which 
should be considered in WSN, so the algorithm of the 
localization must shorten its computing time. 
The localization algorithms of the nodes in WSN are 
mainly divided into two methods range-free and range-
based. The localization of range-free algorithm is on the 
basis of the network connectivity. Although both the cost 
and the consumption of its equipment are very low, the 
localization accuracy is very low, usually its’ accuracy is 
only 40% of the communication radius. Additionally, the 
distribution of nodes can also influence the performance 
of localization algorithms. And the localization methods 
in range-based algorithms include time of arrival(TOA), 
angle of arrival(AOA), time difference of arrival(TDOA)  
and received signal strength(RSSI) [5]-[7]. AOA is used 
to get the coordinates of the sensor nodes by measuring 
the distance and the angles between unknown nodes and 
anchor nodes. RSSI is used to calculate the distance by 
calculating the energy diminishment. The characteristic 
of those algorithms is to get the geometric relation 
between the nodes and the coordinates in a physical way, 
and thus realize the nodes’ localization. 
In order to reduce the influence of the measuring 
distance error and the distance estimation error, great 
deals of methods have already been developed to solve 
the localization of nodes in WNS. Some existent 
localization algorithms adopt cycle accuracy method [8-
13]. Such as Savarese proposed two localization 
algorithms: cycle accuracy-Cooperative ranging [8] and 
Two-Phase localization [9] that can decrease the 
influence of distance error; in 2002, Savvides [10] 
proposed n-hop multilateration primitive localization 
algorithm, where Kalman filtering technique is used to 
calculate the accurate coordinates circularly, it reduces 
the accumulation error; Bergamo averaged the measuring 
distance results to increase the localization accuracy with 
the attenuation of analogy signal [11]; in 2005, in order to 
improve the accuracy of localization, Guha used the 
method of non-convex constraints and time detecting to 
estimate the nodes’ localization [12]; in 2006, Cao 
proposed a localization refinement algorithm based on 
Cayley-Menger determinant [13]; in 2007, based on 
Second-order Cone Programming, Srirangarajan solved 
the accuracy problem in the case that anchor position of 
the nodes is not accurate localization [14].  
In this paper, an improved localization algorithm based 
on the least squares algorithm is proposed. Firstly, the 
paper analyses the reason of the extra error when 
subtracting the equation of distance between the 
benchmark anchor nodes and the ordinary nodes from the 
others in the LSM algorithm. Secondly, the paper 
proposes the principle of choosing the benchmark anchor 
nodes for reducing the errors by the distance’ errors of 
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Figure1. The model of Nodes’ localization 
the benchmark anchor nodes. Lastly, the localization 
errors of these three algorithms are compared by using 
simulation in MATLAB, the coordinates’ errors of the 
nodes decrease.  
II.  THE MODEL OF NODES’ LOCALIZATION 
The localization in wireless sensor networks usually 
calculates the coordinates of nodes through measuring the 
distances between the nodes to be measured and the three 
anchors around. According to the neighboring nodes’ 
localization information and the measuring distance 
among the nodes, the node coordinates can be calculated. 
It respectively uses the three anchor nodes to be the 
centre of three circles, similarly uses the distance between 
unknown nodes and anchor nodes to be the radius of 
three circles, and the coordinates of this point which the 
three circles have intersected is exactly that of the node 
under test. 
Assuming the coordinate of the unknown node to be (x, 
y); the coordinates of three anchor nodes are respectively 
set to be (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3); the distance between 
the unknown node and the three anchor nodes are set to 
be d1, d2, d3, the model of the localization figure is as 
shown in figure1. 
According to this model we can get the equations as 
follow. 
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Subtracting the third equation from the first and the 
second in (1), we can get the following expression. 
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Solving the equations simultaneously, the coordinate 
of the unknown node D can be obtained.  
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III.  LEAST-SQUARE ALGORITHM FOR LOCALIZATION 
REFINEMENT 
We can get three circles by using the three anchor 
nodes to be the centre, and using the distance between the 
unknown node and the three anchor nodes to be the 
radius. These three circles can intersect into a point, and 
the coordinate of the unknown node can be obtained. 
Because of the environmental influence on distance 
measurement, such as, the signal of wireless are mainly 
influenced by transmission medium, the multi-path 
transmission, signal reflections, antenna gain, etc, the 
error is produced. When the error appears, these three 
circles will not have one common intersection.  
Therefore, we cannot get the coordinates of the nodes. 
In order to solve this problem, the least square algorithm 
has been used, which is very concise and practical to the 
WSN which attaches importance to energy consumption. 
Assuming the coordinate of the unknown node to be (x, 
y), every anchor node coordinate is respectively given to 
be (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3)… (xn, yn), then we can get the 
following expressions. 
        







=−+−
=−+−
=−+−
222
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
)()(
....
)()(
)()(
nnn dyyxx
dyyxx
dyyxx
.        (3) 
Respectively subtracting the last equation from the 
others in (3), we get the following expression,  
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    The X* can be solved. 
                               
*1* )( BAAAX TT −= .                           (5) 
where 












−−
−
−
−
−
×=
jnjn
jn
j
j
j
yyxx
yy
yy
xx
xx
A
MM
1
2
1
2 . 














−−−+−
−−−+−
−−−+−
=
−
)()()(
)()()(
)()()(
2222
1
22
n
22
2
22
2
22
2
22
1
22
1
22
1
*
jnjnj
jjj
jjj
ddyyxx
ddyyxx
ddyyxx
B
M
. 
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012 111
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-
 
 
LSM
LSM
-
DS
 
Figure2. Comparing the error between LSM and LSM_DS 
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We can solve the linear equation and get the 
corresponding value of X as (6).  
IV. LSM_DS(CHOOSING THE BENCHMARK ANCHOR 
NODES OF THE NEAREST NODE) 
Using the least square method can reduce the influence 
of the measurement error of the distance between the 
anchor node and the nodes to be measured. However, 
before using the least square method, we need to iterate 
all the equations of the distance between the anchor nodes 
and the nodes to be measured, and in the iteration process, 
we need to subtract all the equations from the benchmark 
equation. Because the measurement error of the distance 
in the benchmark equation has great impact on the 
accuracy of localization, it is important to choose the 
suitable benchmark node.   
As the benchmark equation has a great part in the 
iteration equation, so it is practicable to choose the 
anchor nodes with the minimum measurement error of 
the distance as the benchmark node.  
It can be presented by the (7) and (8).  
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The simulation (with 100 ordinary nodes) results are 
shown by the Figure2. 
 Comparing the errors between LSM and LSM_DS, we 
get the results are shown in Figure.2. The ordinate 
represents the error; the abscissa represents the number of 
nodes; the solid line represents the error curve of LSM, 
and the dashed line represents the error curve of 
LSM_DS.  
We can see from the Figure2 that the LSM_DS 
algorithm only improves a part of the precision, but the 
ensemble precision is not improved. It is incomplete to 
improve the localization precision by choosing the anchor 
nodes with the minimum measurement error of the 
distance as the benchmark node. Therefore, we must 
reconsider the choice of benchmark node.  
V. LSM_DR (CHOOSING THE BENCHMARK ANCHOR 
NODES OF THE MINIMUM RELATED DISTANCE NODE) 
Supposing the node “J” is the benchmark node. As 
choosing the benchmark anchor nodes of the nearest node 
in the iteration process, the choice of reference equation J 
is the expression of the node whose distance is the 
shortest between the unknown node and the anchor node, 
Founding by actual simulation, this approach does not 
effectively reduce the node location error under the error 
rate in the same distance cases, so the choice of reference 
equation J needs further improvements. 
A. The Analysis of  Derivation Process  
According to expressions in part IV, when the error 
appears, the (4) and (5) are changed to (8) and (9). 
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In order to expound clearly, we suppose the fellows: 
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And both sides are computed the Euclidean norm, we 
can get: 
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By using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the following 
inequality can be obtained. 
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Based on the above conclusion, we can get: 
222
* EFFEXX
F
⋅≤=− . 
When the Euclidean norm of error vector E is the 
minimum, the Euclidean norm of vector FE can be 
smaller, that is to say: 
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Because the Euclidean norm of vector (X-X*) equals 
that of EF, and the Euclidean norm of vector (X-X*) can 
be transformed to (11). 
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According to (11), the Euclidean norm of vector (X- X*) 
is just the error between the calculating value of the node 
and the real value of it. Based on the above proof, the 
lower the error measurement is, the higher the recognition 
precision can be got. So a theorem can be given.  
Theorem 1: If the Euclidean norm of E is the smallest, 
the error between the calculating value of the node and 
the real value of it can be lower. 
So the problem is transformed to find an anchor node, 
the measurement error of which can make the Euclidean 
norm of E be the minimum. 
In (7), when the equation of benchmark node minus the 
equation of other nodes, the right expression of (7) is: 
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In order to discourse clearly, let the following 
expression be: 
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    So the B can be transformed to (13). 
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    Let 
EBB += * . 
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As we know, measurement error is proportional to the 
distance, and let iii de γ= . 
So the (12) can be transformed to (14). 
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In the measuring range, the impact factor caused by the 
distance measurement errors can be approximately set to 
the same value, so let γγγ == ji . 
Equation (14) can be transformed to (15). 
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.                         (15) 
And the error vector can be got. 
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And both the right and left of (16) are squared. 
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According to the Theorem 1, only if the Euclidean 
norm of E can be the smallest, Node identification 
accuracy will be higher. 
B.  Algorithm process 
• Step1: Find the all anchor nodes in the perception 
of distance 
• Step2: For each anchor node, compute its distance 
from the rest nodes, and get its iJ . 
• Step3: Choose the minimum from niJ i ...2,1, =  
and its corresponding node is the benchmark node. 
• Step4: Degree reduction. 
• Step5: Refinement using the least square 
algorithm. 
We choose the anchor node with minimum related 
distance as benchmark anchor node. In the LSM_DR 
algorithm, the anchor node which has the smallest iJ  is 
chosen to be the benchmark node, and the simulation is 
shown by the Figure3. 
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Figure3. Comparing the error between LSM and LS_DR. 
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Figure4. Comparing the errors among LSM, LS_DS and LS_DR. 
    In Firure3, the ordinate represents the error; the 
abscissa represents the number of nodes; the red solid line 
represents the error curve of LSM; the dashed line 
represents the error curve of LSM_DR. As shown in 
Figure3, we can see that the majority of nodes’ 
localization error is reduced. 
VI. SIMULATION 
By using random deployed 100 ordinary nodes with 
seven anchor nodes around them, the distances between 
the ordinary node and the anchor nodes are unequal and 
disproportionate, the distance error is a random positive 
number and it is less than the 30% of the distance. The 
simulation by using LSM, LSM_DS and LSM_DR about 
localization is shown as the Figure4 and the Table1.  
As shown in Figure4, the ordinate represents the error; 
the abscissa represents the number of nodes; the red solid 
line represents the error curve of LSM; the dashed line 
represents the error curve of LSM_DS; the dotted line 
represents the error curve of LSM_DR.  
As shown in table I, we can see that the average error 
of LSM_DR is the smallest among the three algorithms; 
the simulation has proved that the LSM_DR can obtain 
more accurate localization while making the algorithm 
concise. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aims at improving the localization precision 
of nodes when using the least squares algorithm in WSN. 
Firstly the paper analyses the reasons why the extra error 
exists when subtracting the equation of distance between 
the anchor nodes and the ordinary nodes from the others 
in the LSM algorithm, and then proposes the principle of 
choosing the benchmark anchor nodes by using the 
distance’ errors of the benchmark anchor nodes in order 
to reduce the errors. The localization errors of these three 
algorithms are compared by using simulation in 
MATLAB, the result shows that the coordinator’s errors 
of the nodes decrease, and the improved algorithm 
proposed in this paper can effectively improve the 
precision of the nodes localization. 
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Abstract— The increased popularity and usage of wireless 
technologies has opened the doors for new emerging 
applications in the domain of networking. One emerging 
and promising areas is the domain of Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANETs). A mobile ad hoc network is a 
collection of wireless mobile nodes that form a dynamic 
network without the need for infrastructure or centralized 
points. 
    The dynamic nature of ad hoc networks presents many 
security challenges. Secure routing is a promising area for 
achieving better security for the network by protecting the 
routing protocols against malicious attacks. Several secure 
routing protocols have been proposed in the literatures that 
were successful in avoiding and preventing some types of 
security attacks in MANETs.    However, MANETs are still 
vulnerable to other types of attacks. Hence, there is a need 
for introducing an efficient mechanism to detect malicious 
nodes. 
    In this paper, a new mechanism is proposed that 
improves the performance of routing protocol against the 
malicious attacks. Since a malicious node behaves in 
abnormal ways, this mechanism proposes observing nodes 
behavior such as nodes’ mobility, and avoiding 
communication through these nodes which may lead to 
more secure routing. 
 
Index Terms— Malicious Nodes, MANETS, Behavioral 
Analysis. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A mobile ad hoc network is a network that consists of 
mobile nodes that communicate wirelessly and does not 
have an infrastructure. Nodes in mobile ad hoc network 
communicate through either single-hop or multi-hop 
modes. Therefore, in this environment, each node acts as 
a router as well as a host.  
A major function in mobile ad hoc networks is the 
route discovery process [1], in which a route from a 
specific source to a specific destination is discovered in 
order to transfer data packets via this discovered route. 
Many routing protocols such as DSR [2] and AODV [3] 
have been proposed in the literature for route discover 
and data transmission. In the data transmission phase, 
each intermediate node in the network participates in 
forwarding data and control packets to other nodes. Most 
ad hoc routing protocols such as AODV and DSR were 
not originally designed to be secure against malicious 
attacks; as they rely on simple implicit trust-your-
neighbors relationships [4]. 
However, and due to the increase popularity of the ad 
hoc networks, some nodes may act in the network in a 
negative way. These nodes are called malicious nodes, 
and may perform attacks in the network to jeopardize the 
network resources. Due to the dynamic nature of the 
MANETs topology and the absence of infrastructure, 
MANETs are more vulnerable to attacks [5]. This 
dynamic structure of nodes may disturb the trust 
relationship among nodes. The lack of central points 
makes the detection process of attacks difficult as it is 
hard to monitor the traffic in a dynamic and large scaled 
network [5]. All these characteristics of MANETs allow 
the attackers to easily target the network and savatage its 
resources by disturbing and jamming the communication 
between legitimate nodes. Malicious nodes can perform 
adversarial attacks that can damage the basic aspects of 
security, such as integrity, confidentiality and privacy [7]. 
Security is more critical in some applications such as 
military, law enforcement, and rescue missions [6]. 
Consequently, security in MANETs has attracted further 
attention [8].   
A. Security Goals 
In MANET, all networking functions, such as routing 
and data transmission, are performed by the nodes 
without the need for a central point to control and 
organize the resource management process. Therefore, 
security is very challenging [5] [7]. Security 
vulnerabilities for a network consist of the following 
aspects: Confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-
repudiation, and access and usage control. 
B. Attack Patterns on Ad Hoc Routing Environment 
Attacks in MANETS can be classified into two types, 
passive and active attacks [5]. In the passive attacks, 
attackers do not disrupt the normal routing operations; it 
listens to the routing traffic to acquire some valuable 
information. On the other hand, an active attacker injects 
packets into the network, eavesdrops and tries to 
compromise the network resources by performing a 
Denial Of Service (DOS) attack [8]. 
Encryption techniques and mechanisms are used to 
encrypt the sent messages and therefore prevent the 
passive attackers from understanding the content of the 
message even if it gets it. On the other hand, the active 
attacks are more serious and can cause severe problems 
since an attacker may drop, inject, and fabricate 
messages. To avoid this type of attacks, the best solution 
is to detect the attackers (malicious nodes) and avoid 
them [8]. Common attack patterns identified in MANETS 
are [9]: Tunneling, Spoofing, Blackhole attack, 
Wormhole attack, Routing table overflow attack,  
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 As mentioned before, due to the highly dynamic nature 
of MANETs, they are more vulnerable to attacks. Thus, 
several solutions based on securing the routing protocols 
have been proposed such as: Security-Aware Routing 
Protocol (SAR) [4], Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance 
Vector Routing Protocol (SAODV) [8], Secure Routing 
Protocol (SRP) [12], Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc 
Network (ARAN) [14], Ariadne [15].  
The main goal of most of the above mentioned 
proposed protocols is to ensure security in the 
communication process between nodes and preclude any 
attack patterns. However, none of these protocols 
succeeded in preventing all kinds of attacks. Therefore, 
there is need to design a secure routing protocol that 
overcomes the shortcomings of these protocols. 
We note that the malicious node attacks on the 
network are recrudescent and cannot be limited. A 
common solution to handle this limitation is to detect and 
avoid the malicious nodes in the network and hence 
communicating via reliable routes [17]. Moreover, we 
also note that a malicious node may have abnormal 
behavior compared to normal nodes in the network such 
as it may have higher mobility than other nodes that 
enables it to perform its suspicious actions. Therefore, the 
node reliability increases as the node dwell in a specific 
region for a long time [17]. Thus, avoiding 
communications via malicious nodes could improve the 
network throughput. Besides the nodes’ mobility, there 
are other factors that must be taken into account in order 
to detect and avoid harmful nodes such as node traffic 
patterns. 
The main goal of this paper is to enhance and revamp 
the performance of the secure routing protocols for 
MANETs by detecting and avoiding malicious nodes. 
The proposed scheme identifies malicious paths between 
the source and the destination nodes. A malicious path is 
a path that may contain one or more malicious nodes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents a brief review of the existing secure routing 
protocols in mobile ad hoc networks and some of the 
techniques used to secure MANETs. Section 3 describes 
the proposed scheme. Section 4 presents the experimental 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and 
outlines future work.  
II.  RELATED WORK 
A considerable amount of research has been conducted 
in the area of MANETs security [23, 24, 25]. Some 
proposed schemes introduce new routing protocols that 
take security into account and hence, these secure routing 
protocols can prevent some types of attacks. Other 
proposed schemes can detect and deal with malicious 
nodes. The following sections discuss some of the 
techniques that have been proposed concerning security 
in MANETs. 
A. Ad Hoc Secure Routing Protocols 
The current routing protocols for MANETs, such as 
AODV and DSR, have vulnerabilities that allow can 
permit various attacks on the network. Therefore, several 
secure routing protocols were proposed in literature that 
uses security as a metric in order to have more reliable 
routes.  
SAR [4] is implemented in top of the reactive routing 
protocol AODV. SAR introduces a new security metric in 
the route discovery and maintenance operations that 
allows the node to capture and enforce cooperative trust 
relationships.  
 In SAR, the source broadcasts a trust level to its 
neighbors using the Route Request (RREQ). Then, the 
intermediate nodes can either rebroadcast this RREQ 
packet or drop it. The intermediate node only rebroadcast 
if the node itself has the required security level. The same 
applies to the Route REPly (RREP) packets. In case of 
receiving multiple RREP packets, the source picks the 
path of the first RREP packet [4]. Consequently, the path 
between the source and destination may not be the 
shortest but it is secure enough.   
The main challenge of this approach is the definition 
of the trust level [10]. Security level could be derived 
from the organization hierarchy, such as ranks in the 
army or a company. Furthermore, to achieve secure 
routing, SAR needs other mechanisms to ensure the 
messages integrity and the identity of the nodes [11]. 
The main drawback of this approach is that malicious 
nodes may not adhere to the protocol specification. For 
example, if malicious node does not satisfy the security 
level required in the RREQ packet decided to 
rebroadcasts the RREQ packet instead of dropping it. In 
such case, according to the sender’s requirements, the 
arrival of RREQ at the destination node does not 
necessarily guarantee that the traversed path is secure. 
The authors of [4] did not provide a mechanism to 
prevent such behavior.  
SRP [12] is secure routing protocol that is based on the 
reactive routing protocol DSR. SRP requires a Security 
Association (SA) between the source and the destination 
nodes. SA is used to authenticate both RREQ and RREP 
packets through using Message Authentication Code 
(MAC). In SRP, the source initiates a RREQ packet that 
contains request sequence number and random request 
ID. Those identifiers are later used to calculate the MAC 
with the shared secret key (KS, T) [12]. In addition, the 
route request packet stores the identities of the traversed 
intermediate nodes. 
To limit flooding in SRP, intermediate nodes keep 
track of the RREQ forwarding rate for each neighbor. It 
rebroadcast RREQ for neighbors with smallest rate. 
However, this approach may yield another type of attacks 
[13]. For example, SRP reward selfish nodes by 
prioritizing their requests over other active non-malicious 
nodes. SRP is also vulnerable to DOS, tunneling and 
wormhole attacks [13]. 
In [14], the authors proposed on demand Authenticated 
Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) protocol. ARAN 
uses certificates to ensure authentication, message 
integrity, and non-repudiation of routing messages. 
ARAN is developed on top of AODV. The source node 
broadcasts a signed RREQ packet that is authenticated by 
all intermediate nodes from the source to destination.  
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012 117
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
 ARAN uses a trusted third party with public key that is 
known to all nodes. The third trusted party signs the 
certificate for all nodes in the network. The certificate 
contains the node’s IP address, its public key, and time 
stamp of the certificate issuing and expiring times [14].  
The RREQ packets are verified and signed by all its 
recipients. Finally, the destination node replies to the first 
not taking into account path optimality. Moreover, in the 
case of route maintenance ARAN applies the same 
procedure. Route Error (RERR) packets are signed and 
verified similar to the RREQ and RREP packets.  
Although ARAN prevents spoofing attacks, however, 
it is vulnerable to the wormhole attack [10]. DoS attacks 
[15], and the tunneling attacks [16]. Furthermore, a 
considerable network overhead is injected in the network 
as a result of certifying all route request packets. 
The authors in [15] proposed the Aridane protocol that 
is based on DSR reactive routing protocol. Ariadne signs 
routing messages using digital signatures. To identify the 
sender, MAC is appended to the packet.  
Ariadne protocol specifies a mechanism for securing 
route maintenance operation; it ensures the validity of 
route error messages for the broken links in MANETs.  
 Ariadne is vulnerable to the invisible node attack [16]. 
Furthermore, Aridane protocol is vulnerable to other 
fabrication attacks, which cause the construction of 
nonexistent routes [10]. To overcome the shortcomings of 
these, endairA [9] has been proposed. endairA is similar 
to Aridane. The main difference is that endairA signs 
RREP packets instead of the RREQ ones. 
In endariA [10], each node (namely node A) monitors 
its successor (namely node B) in the source route and 
checks whether node B forwards to node C all packets. 
SAODV [8] is a secure routing protocol developed on 
top of the reactive protocol AODV. In SAODV there is a 
central key management unit that provides each node 
with a public key. Moreover, for message authentication, 
it uses digital signatures and it uses hash chains to protect 
hop counts. Once a source node has a RREQ message, it 
uses the hash function to calculate the top hash value, 
once a node receives the RREQ message; it verifies the 
hop count and the signature before updating its route 
table. Once the destination receives the RREQ message, 
it prepares and signs a RREP message. In case of like 
failure, a RERR message is generated as in the original 
AODV. The RERR messages are secured with digital 
signatures. SAODV is vulnerable to DOS, tunneling and 
wormhole attacks [13]. 
B. Schemes for Detecting Malicious Nodes 
The authors in [17] proposed a novel trust computation 
and management system, called TOMS. The proposed 
model introduces the concept of community, in which a 
node that is a central and all its one-hop neighbors 
establish a community. The authentication between the 
central node and its neighbors is achieved through 
cryptographic techniques. Once a new node joins a 
community, the central node assigns an initial trust value 
to this new node. The trust value depends on two factors. 
First, the time that node ni dwell in another community. 
Second, the past activity record of the node.  
TOMS employs technique (called Trust Assistant 
Policy (TAP)) to provide an efficient mechanism for the 
central nodes in evaluating its neighboring nodes’ trusts. 
Furthermore, TAP is used to detect the central nodes that 
are malicious.  
The authors in [18] enhance the security of DSR 
protocol by enhancing the trust-based route selection 
mechanism. The selection of the best route is based on 
two scenarios. In the first scenario, the average of the 
trust values for all nodes in a route is computed. In the 
second scenario, it estimates the nodes’ trust values 
according to the average of the past experiences values. 
Each node in the modified DSR protocol consists of five 
modules.  
The authors in [19] propose a protocol that calculates 
the reputation of a node by observing the node’s 
behavior, the observed value is later altered based on 
additional observations from other nodes. The estimated 
reputation values are exchanged among all nodes in the 
network. The main goal of this protocol is to detect 
selfish nodes. In this protocol, node i observes the 
behavior of its neighboring node j and stores the acquired 
information into a local table called Neighbor Reputation 
Table (NRT). The NRT contains information regarding 
one hop neighbor nodes. Moreover, a Global Reputation 
Table (GRT) is also used to stores information about all 
nodes in the network. 
The authors in [10] proposed an approach that 
monitors, detects, and isolates selfish nodes. It deals with 
both directed (unicast) and broadcast packets. 
III.  PROPOSED SCHEME 
The proposed protocol, named Trust Scheme, aims to 
detect malicious nodes in MANETs and then avoids 
transmitting messages through them. Therefore, nodes 
transmit data via trusted paths to enhance network 
performance. The Trust Scheme evaluates the behavior of 
all nodes by establishing a trust value for each node in the 
network that represents the trustworthiness of each one. It 
calculates the trust value of a node by directly observing 
the behavior of the node and then passing this value with 
other observations from other nodes in the network. The 
behavior of the neighboring nodes is used as an 
indication to distinguish between normal nodes (nodes 
that act as expected) and malicious nodes.  
Each node in the network observes the behavior of its 
neighbors. It observes node's mobility, number of 
neighbors each node has, number of packets generated 
and forwarded by the neighboring nodes, and the past 
activity of the node. Those parameters are then used to 
determine which nodes are misbehaving in the network. 
Then, the observer node builds a table called Local Trust 
Table (LTT) that records a local trust value for each 
neighboring node estimated from these observations. We 
note that only using the trust value in LTT may not be an 
accurate measure to decide that a node is a malicious one. 
Therefore, each node constructs a Neighbor Trust Table 
(NTT) that stores the trust value for all nodes not only the 
neighbors but also the far ones.  
 
118 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
 Figure 1: Trust Scheme Framework
 
 
Figure 2: Observation Manager for Node i 
 
Figure 3: Exchange Manager for Node i 
 
For a given node i, all nodes participate in computing 
its trust values in NTT by exchanging NTTs between 
neighbor nodes. Figures 1, 2 and 3 present the general 
framework of the Trust Scheme. Each node in this 
scheme consists of three modules: Observation Manager, 
Exchange Manager and Trust Manager.  
The following sections discuss how to estimate the 
local and global trust values. 
A. Local Trust Table (LTT) 
As mentioned above, each node in the network 
constructs a local trust table that keeps track of the 
information observed directly about each neighbor in 
order to calculate the trust value for a node. The LTT for 
a node contains an entry only for a node's neighbors.  
Every node calculates the local trust value for its 
neighbors as shown in the following formula: 
 
local୲୰୳ୱ୲	 = 	a1*mobility + 	a2*nbrs + 	a3*dataୱୣ୬୲	
+ 	α4*	old୲୰୳ୱ୲						(1)	 
 
Where,ܽ1, ܽ2, ܽ3	ܽ݊݀	ܽ4 are tuning constants that are 
determined during simulation. The sum of these constants 
equals 1. And, nbrs is the number of neighbors each node 
has, datasent is the forwarded and generated packets sent 
by the observed node and the oldtrust is the last trust value 
of the node; it presents the past activity of a node. 
Mobility is measured based on the number of changes in 
the one-hop neighborhood of a node. Figure 4 shows a 
simple scenario. Node A directly observes the behavior 
of its one-hop neighbors; B, C and D. It stores the values 
of the observed parameters in its local trust table.  
  
 
Figure 4: A simple scenario 
 
The structure of LTT for node A is shown in Table 1. 
It includes entries for nodes B, C and D, and their 
behavior values. Node A computes a local trust value for 
each node based on the stored values as described in 
Formula 1. 
  
TABLE 1: LTT FOR NODE A 
Node Mobility nbrs datasent oldtrust localtrust 
B 0.5 0.8 0.34 1.3 2.94 
C 0.4 0.6 0.56 1.64 3.2 
D 0.3 0.2 0.18 1.05 1.73 
B. Neighbor Trust Table (NTT) 
LTT stores only information about one-hop nodes. 
Every node also has a Neighbor Trust Table (NTT) that 
stores the trust values for all nodes in the network. Table 
2 shows the structure of NTT for node A. Its structure is 
simple. It contains entries for all nodes in the network 
and their global trust values. B, C and D are direct 
neighbors for node A. E and F are not neighbors. So, 
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 NTT do not have local trust values for them. This table 
distributed among neighbors in order to compute and 
update the trust value for each node. If the node is a 
direct neighbor, its trust value is calculated using the 
local trust value and the remote information that is 
obtained from neighbor nodes.  
The new trust value that is stored in NTT will be: 
݊݁ݓ	ݐݎݑݏݐ = ݓ݈ ∗ ݈݋݈ܿܽ௧௥௨௦௧ + ݓݎ ∗ ݎ݁݉݋ݐ݁			(2) 
Where, 
 ݓ݈	and	ݓݎ  are weights and  ݈݋݈ܿܽ௧௥௨௦௧  has higher 
weight (wl).  
For far nodes that are not neighbors for a node, the 
new trust value will be: 
݊݁ݓ	ݐݎݑݏݐ = ݎ݁݉݋ݐ݁			(3) 
The remote information is: 
ݎ݁݉݋ݐ݁ = ݓ1 ∗ ௘ܶ௦௧ + ݓ2 ∗ ௥ܶ௘௖ 
Where Tୣ ୱ୲ is the value stored in NTT, and T୰ୣୡ	is the 
recommendation ( local୲୰୳ୱ୲ ) received from a neighbor 
different from the owner of the table.  
 
TABLE 2: NTT FOR NODE A 
Node Local trust Test Trec Globaltrust 
B 2.94 0
.5 
1.
02 
0.65 
C 3.2 0
.9 
1.
4 
0.83 
D 1.73 0
.87 
0.
34 
0.380 
E X 1
.2 
2.
3 
0.81 
F X 0
.45 
1.
67 
0.546 
 
C. Exchanging the NTT 
As mentioned above, every node of the network 
constructs an local trust table (LTT) that keep track of the 
trust values for one hop neighbors, and a Neighbor Trust 
Table (NTT) that keep tracks of trust relation with 
neighbors and far nodes. The information in the NTT is 
exchanged with neighbors. The Trust Scheme allows 
scattering the trust values for all nodes throughout the 
network. And thus, all nodes participate in deciding 
which nodes considered as malicious not only one node 
has the decision.  
The information in the NTT is not broadcasted over 
the network. A node sends its own table only to one hop 
neighbors. Every node receives an updated version of the 
table from its neighbors, computes new trust values, and 
then it sends the updated NTT to its neighbors. 
IV.  SIMULATION RESULTS  
In order to evaluate the performance of the Trust 
Scheme, the Network Simulator (NS2) version 2.32 with 
wireless extension is used. NS-2 is a discrete event 
simulator targeted at networking research [20]. It is one 
of the most popular simulation packages used in the 
literature because of its availability (free license), and 
possibility to implement and test new protocols and 
applications [19]. NS-2 is a commonly used package to 
simulate several schemes (such as routing and multicast 
protocols) in wired and wireless domains as it supports 
several networking protocols and standards [19]. Also, it 
implements modules for wireless stations, which can 
move in a 2D environment. To simulate the network, an 
OTcl script is used to initiates the event scheduler, and 
sets up the network topology using the network objects. 
A. Simulation Environment 
In the simulation experiments, the underlying scheme 
is used with DSR. Moreover, a network with 1000m x 
800m area and 25, 50 and 100 mobile nodes was 
simulated. The simulation time is 1000 seconds. The 
mobile nodes move within the network space according 
to the Random Waypoint model. The communication 
patterns used are 6 Constants Bit Rate (CBR) connections 
with a data rate of 10 packets per second. 10%, 20%, 
30% and 40% of the total number of nodes were chosen 
randomly as malicious nodes. Those malicious nodes 
drop, alter and forward packets.  
B. Performance Metrics 
For evaluating the Trust Scheme against the standard 
DSR and RP [19], three commonly used metrics are used 
to evaluate the performance of the three protocols [21], 
and [22]: Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), Routing 
Overhead, and Average Delay. Moreover we will use the 
True vs. False detected malicious nodes to show the 
strength of the proposed scheme. 
 
TABLE 3: SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
 
C. Simulation Results 
The Trust Scheme is studied using the above defined 
metrics. The standard DSR and RP are also evaluated. 
The standard DSR does not have a mechanism to detect 
and avoid malicious nodes. It considers all nodes as 
trusted. RP only detects selfish nodes that do not 
participate in transmitting packets in order to save their 
energy. It does not detect the other types of malicious 
nodes. All the graphs are plotted from the data averaged 
from the 30 runs. 
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 As we discussed when defining the performance 
metrics, packet delivery ratio is measured by dividing the 
total number of data packets received, by the total 
number of data packets originated by the sources. Packet 
delivery ratio presents an important metric for 
performance evaluation of a mobile ad hoc routing 
protocol because the number of data packets successfully 
delivered depends mainly on path availability, which in 
turn depends on how effective the underlying routing 
algorithm is in a mobile scenario. 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 plot the packet delivery ratio of the 
Trust Scheme, RP and the standard DSR in the presence 
of malicious nodes with different number of mobile 
nodes. A higher value of PDR indicates that most of the 
packets are being delivered and is a good indicator of the 
protocol performance as well.  
The graphs demonstrate that the Trust Scheme always 
performs better than the standard DSR and RP in the 
three scenarios. This is because in the Trust Scheme, the 
malicious nodes are detected and hence avoided. This 
means that only trusted paths are used for transmitting 
packets. Thus, most sent packets delivered to the desired 
destination. In RP, only the selfish nodes are detected, so 
it performs lesser than the Trust Scheme and better than 
the standard DSR. 
Figures 8, 9 and 10 depict the routing overhead for the 
three protocols that are generated by the malicious nodes. 
They demonstrate that the routing overhead significantly 
increase as the percentage of malicious nodes increases in 
the network. The standard DSR has the highest overhead.  
Trust Scheme has an almost equivalent routing 
overhead when compared with RP but at less number of 
mobile nodes. However, Trust Scheme still performs 
better than RP for the routing overhead when there are 
more mobile nodes and hence more number of malicious 
nodes. The reason is that, in this scheme, the routing 
packets are reduced since nodes do not rebroadcast the 
routing packets received from the malicious nodes, they 
immediately drop any routing packets received from 
malicious nodes and also the other two protocols will 
keep flooding route discovery to all neighbors. This 
brings many transmissions of control packets.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Packet delivery ratio for 25 mobile nodes 
 
 
Figure 6: Packet delivery ratio for 50 mobile nodes 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Packet delivery ratio for 100 mobile nodes 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Overhead for 25 mobile nodes 
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Figure 9: Overhead for 50 mobile nodes 
 
Figure 10: Overhead for 100 mobile nodes 
 
Figures 11-13, show the simulation results of the 
performance metric, average delay. As can be seen from 
the figures, the trust scheme always outperforms the other 
two protocols in terms of the average delay.  
As the routing overhead increases the delay 
experienced by data packets increases. However, as seen 
in Figures 8 to 10, it is evident the trust schemes achieves 
lower overhead and as a results it achieves lower packet 
delivery times. 
Now, we present the behavior of Trust Scheme and RP 
in terms of the true number of detected malicious nodes 
and the false number of detected malicious nodes.  
Figures 14-16 show the true number of detected 
malicious nodes. As shown, Trust Scheme was successful 
in detecting more number of malicious nodes in the three 
scenarios. 
On the other hand, Figures 17-19 show the number of 
false detected malicious nodes. Again, Trust Scheme 
outperforms RP. It detects less number of false malicious 
nodes.  
 
 
Figure 11: Average Delay for 25 mobile nodes 
 
 
Figure 12: Average Delay for 50 mobile nodes 
 
 
Figure 13: Average Delay for 100 mobile nodes 
122 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
  
Figure 14: True detected malicious nodes for 25 mobile nodes 
 
 
Figure 15: True detected malicious nodes for 50 mobile nodes 
 
 
Figure 16: True detected malicious nodes for 100 mobile nodes 
 
 
Figure 17: False detected malicious nodes for 25 mobile nodes 
 
 
Figure 18: False detected malicious nodes for 50 mobile nodes 
 
 
 
Figure 19: False detected malicious nodes for 100 mobile nodes 
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 V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Securing mobile ad hoc networks is a challenging task. 
In this paper, we have proposed a new approach that 
detects the misbehaving nodes that intend to jeopardize 
the network resources and affects its performance. This 
approach proposes observing the behavior of mobile 
nodes depending on different factors. Based on these 
factors, each node in the network can recognize the 
malicious nodes and thus prevent them from participating 
in the communication.  
The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated 
using NS-2 simulator and compared the performance 
with the standard DSR and Reputation protocol. In the 
standard DSR all nodes participate in the communication; 
it does not differentiate between malicious and normal 
nodes. On the other hand, RP only detects and avoids 
selfish nodes that do not always participate in forwarding 
packets via the network in order to save its energy.  
The Trust Scheme outperforms the other two protocols 
and improves the network efficiency. In the presence of 
variable number of malicious nodes and different 
numbers of mobile nodes, Trust Scheme outperforms 
DSR and RP in all performance metrics. The routing 
overhead is considerably low, resulting in higher packet 
delivery ratio as well as less delay in packet delivery.  
Research in the area of MANETs security is still 
active. Further work is needed to enhance the 
performance of the secure routing protocols for 
MANETs.   
The evaluation of Trust Scheme and the other two 
protocols, DSR and RP, discussed in this work with some 
more performance metrics must be considered as future 
research work. Also, different scenarios can be used such 
as evaluating the same protocols using different mobility 
speed, and different pause time. Moreover, the Trust 
Scheme can be extended to include observing more 
factors such as the accuracy of the received packets. The 
observer node observes the correctness of the packets 
received from a specific node and thus detecting the 
misbehaving nodes based on the number of received and 
inaccurate packets.  
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Abstract— A promising idea for optimising the power con-
sumption of mobile communication devices represents the
usage of an additional ultra-low-power receiver unit, which
is able to control the main transceiver in order to reduce
the standby power consumption of the overall system. Such
a Wake-Up-Receiver (WuRx) unit senses the medium and
switches on the communication interfaces in case of an
external request. Otherwise, all system components for
the network communication are completely switched off.
Especially in the domain of resource-limited and embedded
devices, WuRx technologies enable novel communication
paradigms.
But on the application layer, not all scenarios allow
the efficient usage of such WuRx technologies. Dependent
on environmental parameters, technological limitations and
conceptual requirements, different strategies are necessary
to ensure energy-efficient system operation.
In this article, we present a critical analysis of the capa-
bilities and the conceptual limitations of WuRx approaches.
Therefore, we identify critical parameters for WuRx con-
cepts, which limit the efficiency in real world scenarios. Our
goal is to classify sufficient fields of application. Furthermore
we evaluate the influences of these parameters on the system
behaviour. In addition, we introduce heterogeneous energy
harvesting approaches as an efficient way for the system
optimisation. The proposed technologies are capable to be
integrated into small-sized wireless sensor platforms and
prolong the system uptime significantly.
The presented simulation results are focusing on actual
smart metering scenarios and wireless sensor networks.
Based on these measurements, we were able to apply further
optimisation steps within the system configuration on the
application layer. In this context, we focus on application-
specific key issues, like the trade-off between measurement
quality and quantity, the usage of data buffering approaches
and QoS capabilities.
Index Terms— Wake-Up-Receiver, WuRx Technology,
Energy-Efficiency, Wireless Sensor Networks, Energy
Harvesting, Communication Strategies, Asynchronous,
Resource-limited Systems, Embedded Systems, Critical
Parameters, Routing, Topology Optimisation
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is omnipresent in all areas of
our everyday life. Due to the technological enhancements,
the device costs shrink and at the same time the hardware
capabilities increase substantially. At the same time, lim-
ited energy resources still represent one the most challeng-
ing bottlenecks within mobile devices. In order to provide
a sufficient battery runtime for the mobile devices, energy-
efficient hardware components and operational concepts
are essential. Especially in the field of mobile devices,
the integrated communication interfaces and the interface
management consume a huge part of the available energy
resources.
Figure 1 illustrates the problem. The exemplary mea-
surements are based on wireless sensor network node
with an ultra low power TI MSP430 microcontroller [1].
The diagram visualises the microcontroller power con-
sumption during the different operational modes during a
sensor communication scenario.
Figure 1. MSP430 working load in different operational modes, starting
with the sensor measurement, the radio initialisation, radio listen mode
(most power consuming), the transmission and the power management
mode for preparing the deep sleep mode [2].
In order to solve or bypass the problem, the research
focus on the optimisation of the transmission character-
istics on the different communication layers [3][4]. Ac-
cordingly, during the last decade, engineers try to find an
application-specific trade-off between the network latency
and the average power consumption of the transceiver.
In contrast to these traditional optimisation approaches,
wake-up-receivers (WuRx) pursue another concept and
enable a different communication paradigm.
If we take a look on standard communication scenarios,
most of the time, the transceiver is waiting for external
requests or incoming data. During that time, the listen
mode consumes a lot of energy. Especially in the field of
low-power communication standards, like ZigBee, Z-Wave
or Bluetooth, listening and receiving data is more power
consuming in comparison to the required energy for
sending data. To eliminate this kind of conflict, Wake-up
Receivers (WuRx) represent a dedicated, energy-efficient
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receiver unit, which replaces the main transceiver during
listening periods. The WuRx is able to detect special
wake-up signals from its environment and accordingly
wakes up the main transceiver only on demand. The
WuRx concept is illustrated in figure 2 and 3. In many
cases, engineers only have to combine an off-the-shelf
transceiver with an additional WuRx to realise a more
efficient communication platform.
Data
Tx
Rx
Listen
Transmission Request: Ready to send
Listen for Acknowledgement
ACK: Clear to send
Listen
ACK
Figure 2. Conventional communication process between transmitter (Tx)
and receiver (Rx). The receiver has to sense the medium. Dependent on
the transmission parameters and the characteristics/duty cycle of the
used radio standard, this listening mode consumes a lot of energy.
WuRx
Data
Tx
Ultra-Low-Power Listening
Wake-Up Signal
Rx
Listen
ACK
ACK
IRQ
Figure 3. Wake-up receiver communication. The main network interface
is waiting in a standby mode and will be activated by the WuRx
on demand. The WuRx is designed as an ultra-low-power component,
which only has to detect a predefined, coded wake-up signal from its
environment.
Especially in the field of long term monitoring scenar-
ios, like smart metering or next generation wireless sensor
networks, such approaches promise enormous capabilities
for energy-saving approaches [5][6]. Complex synchroni-
sation procedures on both hardware or software level are
not required anymore. Based on the WuRx technology, we
change the way of communication from a synchronised,
timer-based transmission to an asynchronous operation
with wake-ups on demand (shown in figure 4).
Accordingly, we switch from a protocol-based duty-
cycling to a WuRx-controlled duty-cycle. Thus, WuRx
technologies provide powerful features for developing
distributed, autonomous systems in an asynchronous ap-
plication environment.
Main 
Transceiver
Software / Timer
…
Rx/Tx
? Synchronised communication 
Main 
Transceiver
WuRx (Ultra-
Low-Power)
…
Rx/Tx
Event
IR
Q
? Asynchronous communication 
Figure 4. Different communication concepts with and without WuRx. A
traditional application scenario on the left site requires any kind of time
synchronisation in order to coordinate sleep-/transmission timings. The
WuRx application on the right site does not need such a synchronisation
technique. Special wake-up events activate the system on demand.
II. RELATED WORK
The research for WuRx technologies started several
years ago with first approaches to modify off-the-shelf
mobile devices. In [7], the authors upgrade a given hand-
held with a conventional low-power transceiver module,
which operates as a wake-up unit for the main 802.11
WiFi interface. The power consumption of the additional
receiver averages 7 mW in the receiving mode.
The work of [8] focuses on a radio-triggered hardware
component to enable wake-up capabilities (see Figure
5). A primary aim for this approach was the avoid-
ance of software-based synchronisation and scheduling
techniques. Thus, the proposed operation concept creates
asynchronous network behaviour in order to respond
specific trigger events on demand. Now, the system is
able to optimise the sleep and stand-by times without
additional costs on the software level.
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Figure 5. Typical system hardware architecture of an embedded system
with a wake-up receiver unit.
Further research optimises different key parameters
within the wake-up receiver units. This includes the power
consumption, the frequency band [9] and the receiver
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sensitivity [10]. Related off-the-shelf WuRx are operating
in the ISM band at 2.4 GHz, 868 MHz as well as
on the 125 KHz low frequency band for RFID-based
applications. The power consumption ranges from 20 to
700 µW for the normal listening mode. In [11], the
authors present a 2 GHz WuRx with 52 µW and -72
dBm sensitivity.
The problem of traditional, electronic WuRx technolo-
gies correlates with the respective system design and the
required energy for each hardware component. To avoid
these disadvantages, nanett [2] researches for an NEMS-
based wake-up receiver approach (Nanoelectromechanical
System). In contrast to related WuRx technologies, the
introduced nanett project is based on a pure mechanical
resonator, which generates the wake-up interrupt for the
microcontroller and the main transceiver. The most im-
portant benefit of this approach is the operation without
complex and energy-consuming electronic circuits. Ac-
cordingly, the goal is a power consumption of less than
10 µW in the listening mode.
III. SYSTEM OPTIMISATION
In order to prolong the system uptime for any kind
of autonomous application scenario, several researchers
try to combine WuRx technologies with additional en-
ergy harvesting components in the system architecture
[12][13]. In general, we differ thermal, vibration and solar
energy converter units, shown in figure 6.
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Figure 6. Typical energy harvesting technologies - Thermoelectric
converter (left); Photovoltaic converter (right). Vibration-based converter
elements (center) can be separated into: Piezoelectric harvesters (top);
Electromagnetic harvesters (center); Electrostatic harvesters (bottom).
In this context, one challenge represents the efficient
usage of the harvested energy as well as the stored energy
resources (illustrated in figure 7). There are three possible
energy paths. The first one from the harvester units
directly to the application, another one from the harvesters
to a given energy storage and the energy path from the
available energy storages to the application. Dependent
on the actual harvesting level, a power management unit
has to decide about an optimal energy path. Furthermore,
such information about the actual harvesting level are also
helpful on the application layer. Based on these meta-
information, the application is able to adapt its operational
mode or the scheduling scheme for the data measuring as
well as the communication tasks. In case of a high energy
budget, the measuring interval will be increased. On the
other side, in case of a critical energy level or minimal
harvesting capabilities, the network communication will
be reduced and the measured data sets are temporarily
stored in a local buffer.
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Figure 7. The power management is responsible for an efficient usage
of the available energy resources and the harvesting components. In
combination with an intelligent application design and modern WuRx
technology, the system availability increases significantly.
IV. CRITICAL SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Based on the introduced wake-up receiver capabilities
and the mentioned approaches for optimising the sys-
tem design, we are able to identify and to define key
parameters for a sufficient and efficient usage of WuRx
capabilities [14].
A. Operational modes on the application layer
The system specification on the application layer rep-
resents the most important and most critical parameter
for any kind of WuRx technology. The WuRx is able to
hold the system in a ready-to-receive mode. The power
consumption of the main transceiver can be minimised.
In consequence, only asynchronous and event-based ap-
plication scenarios are capable for the usage of WuRx
technologies. Thus, the entire, distributed system operates
with predefined trigger-events for waking up the nodes. In
more detail, we define two dedicated operational modes
for a given distributed, WuRx-enabled system.
The first one represents a local and autonomous mode,
in which all communication interfaces are disabled. Each
node is sensing its environment with specific sensors
components. If required, data can be stored within a local
data buffer. In case of an emergency (e.g. system failure
or critical battery level), each node is able to establish an
ad hoc communication channel to its neighbourhood.
The second operational mode is responsible for the
transmission of events or measured data. Accordingly,
this mode includes all possible communication procedures
like the network exploration, network optimisation, the
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route path calculation or the exchange of basic system
information. The mode is initialised by a wake-up signal,
which will be broadcasted through the entire topology.
Figure 8 illustrates these two modes and represents the
basic operational concept of every asynchronous applica-
tion scenario with WuRx capabilities.
DB DB 
Data 
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Data 
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Figure 8. Two dedicated operational modes for an asynchronous, WuRx-
enabled application scenario. On the left site the autonomous oper-
ational mode without network communication (excepting peer-to-peer
transmission channels in case of an emergency). On the right side the
communication / network mode (in this case to a predefined data sink
with external database uplink). The initial network exploration provides
a suboptimal topology (represented by the thin lines), the optimised
network topology is illustrated by the fat lines.
During the runtime, the overall, distributed system
has to manage different tasks. Dependent on the system
specification, the task schedule and the mapping of each
task to predefined system components is essential. In our
WuRx scenario with two dedicated operational modes, the
tasks are organised as illustrated in figure 9.
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Figure 9. Based on the WuRx capabilities and the two dedicated
operational modes, all global coordination task are controlled by the data
sink. This includes the net exploration to find all available nodes, the net
optimisation to minimise the communication paths and the communica-
tion overhead. Each sensor node is only responsible for the management
of all energy resources and the sensor data measurements. In order to
optimise the measurement quality, the nodes try to calculate its own
position in relation to other nodes. Asynchronous communication events
are initialised by the data sink.
B. Data per Time Ratio
The second critical system parameter for efficient
WuRx scenarios represents the ratio of data volume
and time. All the mentioned WuRx technologies are
strongly influenced by the given network load and the
respective information distribution over the time. A
huge amount of data or continuous data transmissions
destroy the conceptual benefits of WuRx technologies.
Wake-up concepts aim the energy-efficient handling
of asynchronous trigger-events and minimal data. In
consequence, our goal is to reduce the network load
and to increase the periods of an autonomous operation
without active network communication. In order to
optimise this ratio, the developers are able to adjust
several parameters, which have a direct influence on the
data per time radio.
1) Trade-off Measurement Quality/Quantity:
Dependent on the application scenario, the developer
has to decide about the required measurement quality
regarding to the number of data sets and the size of
each data set during a time interval. In this context,
little variations could have a huge impact on the system
availability. Each measuring sample of the given sensors
consumes energy. Local data aggregation and data fusion
techniques help us to shrink the data volume, but also
take computing time and energy.
2) Data Buffer and Energy Resources:
In many cases, the given WuRx application scenario has
to monitor its environment. Accordingly, the measured
data sets have to be stored within a local data buffer
during the autonomous operational mode. The size of this
buffer is limited. In consequence, the size has a direct and
strong influence on the data per time ratio.
A small buffer size limits the maximum period for an
autonomous measuring or otherwise limits the measuring
quality. On the other side, large data buffers increase the
overall transmission time and generate bottlenecks during
a multi-hop transmission. In case of an emergency, it is
more difficult to backup the complete buffer without data
loss.
In this context, the available energy resources
still represent a key factor for the system behaviour.
Additional energy harvesting components in the system
architecture, like thermal, vibration or solar energy
converter units, help us to extend the energy resources
[12][13].
3) Real-time Aspects, QoS:
Each application scenario also implies further require-
ments regarding to the maximum time delay between
the detection and the processing of an event. This also
includes the decision about a centralised or a distributed
data handling. In this context, we also have to consider
the possible prioritisation of specific events, like abnormal
measurements or emergency calls. Such quality of service
(QoS) aspects or in some cases real-time aspects have
a huge impact on the system behaviour and the system
availability.
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C. Network topology and Routing
With focus on the second operational mode with an
interconnected topology, the size and the distribution of
the network topology represents another key parameter. In
order to wake-up a huge number of nodes, it takes much
more time to explore the topology than operating in a
small size measuring system with 20 or less nodes. The
complexity for calculating efficient route paths increases
significantly. During this time, all transceivers have to be
active. Advanced topology optimisation approaches [15]
and lightweight routing algorithms [16] are essential to
handle these challenges.
In this context, the spatial distribution of the nodes
represents another important parameter. In case of a high
node density, the communication between two nodes
could influence the WuRx units of other nodes. Robust
transceiver and WuRx hardware components as well as
capable communication standards and protocols minimise
these kinds of disturbances.
V. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
Within the nanett project [2] our research focuses on
the evaluation of critical system parameters for WuRx
applications.
Figure 10. The SimANet framework. The GUI includes several con-
figuration and administration tools. SimANet focuses on high-level
simulation scenarios in mid- and large-scaled network topologies.
In a first step, we simulate the influences of the main
critical parameters. For this purpose, we use the SimANet
framework [17][18], which provides a lot of features
for a functional analysis in the context of mobile ad
hoc and sensor networks. SimANet allows the abstract
modelling of wireless communication standards and in-
terfaces. Also several movement models and an energy
model are available. Based on the SimANet core, we
create a sensor network topology with and without WuRx
capabilities. Figure 10 show the GUI-based version of
SimANet. Furthermore, SimANet is also runnable in a
massive parallel computing environments like the CHiC
Cluster (Chemnitz High Performance Computing Linux
Cluster). CHiC provides more than 512 AMD Opteron
64bit computing cores with 2.6GHz and each 4GB of
memory. The network infrastructure uses a high-speed
fiber optics Infiniband topology.
Accordingly, SimANet provides an excellent scalability
to run different kinds of simulation scenario. Regarding
to the proposed results, SimANet operates on a normal
PC workstation with an 3Ghz Pentium IV and 2GB of
memory.
For all the simulation, the used energy model operates
with logical energy units. Each process for the han-
dling and transmission of data decreases a nodes energy
resources dependent on parameters like the used radio
standard or the required electromagnetic field strength
for reaching the selected node. The used values for the
simulation scenarios are based on a real-world 802.15.4
low power transceiver and an conventional, off-the-shelf
WuRx unit. The specified transmission characteristics are
mapped to the abstract communication interface model of
SimANet [16].
Within the following simulation scenario, we focus on
the operational modes and on the data per time ratio.
Furthermore, we want to find an optimal trade-off for
these parameters.
First of all, we analyse a single hop communication in
order to take a closer look on the transmission timings
and the standby power consumption of the nodes. The
diagrams visualise the differences between a conventional,
non-buffered communication and WuRx-enabled systems.
All relevant information for interpreting the results are
shown in Figure 11.
?E
?t
Saved energy resources
Total transmission time  ttotal = twake_up + ttransmission
Mode A
Mode B
System runtime tSystem
Runtime improvement
System uptime in days
Figure 11. Single hop communication example. Comparison between
a conventional ZigBee communication and buffered communication
scenarios both with and without WuRx capabilities. The different
operational modes for the local data measuring and the data transmission
are marked. Our goal is to maximise the system availability and to
minimise the power consumption during the autonomous measuring
mode A, represented by the term ∆E
∆t
.
Figure 12 represents the compressed results of four
different communication scenarios.
The conventional, continuous transmission provides
a maximum battery lifetime of 260 days. The second
scenario with a local buffering and the compressed trans-
mission prolongs the lifetime to 300 days. An addi-
tional WuRx provides features for switching off the main
transceiver. The optimisation level depends on the WuRx
technology and reaches up to 300 additional days of
operation. As we can see, for a single hop communication,
a long autonomous operational period provides the best
results.
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Figure 12. Comparison of different communication concepts. The initial
charge state of each node is assumed with 2500 logical units. The results
include a conventional communication with a single ZigBee transceiver,
a buffered ZigBee communication as well as two WuRx-based scenarios.
Furthermore, we have to analyse the situation in case of
a larger topology. Here, other effects influence the results.
Routing procedures in a multi-hop environment, limited
data throughput in combination with local data bursts and
interferences have to be considered.
C)
B)
DB
Sink
DB
Sink
DB
Sink
A)
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Sink
D)
Figure 13. Application scenario - operational schedule with four steps.
A) initial wake-up signal from the data sink in order to collect data
from each sensor node. B) recursive wake-up signal from active nodes
to explore the topology. C) Multi-hop data transmission of the measure-
ment data over the established network topology. D) Communication
finished, return to the autonomous mode without network infrastructure
and waiting for new WuRx events.
Therefore, the next scenarios focus on several long
term measurements within a multi-hop communication
topology. The simulations include a uniform and a random
distributed network topology with 20 nodes (see Figure
14 and 15) and predefined energy resources for each node
of 2500 units. We used a simple hop-optimised, reactive
routing protocol and no further topology optimisation
approaches.
The test scenario is illustrated in 13 and represents a
typical data gathering application in the wireless sensor
network domain. A predefined data sink collects the
measured sensor data from each nodes in a cyclic pe-
riod. In contrast to conventional communication concepts,
our simulation implements the two proposed operational
modes for WuRx-enabled devices. Thus, all the node are
sensing the environment in a autonomous mode without
network connection. The wake-up signal for the dedicated
communication mode is initialised by the data sink. After
receiving this signal, the nodes activate their main radio
transceiver. Accordingly, they are able to establish a
network infrastructure to transmit the measurement data
to the sink. Finally, if the communication process has
completed, the nodes switch off the main transceiver and
return to the autonomous mode. Hence, the power man-
agement only has to supply the sensor components and
the WuRx unit. The overall system power consumption is
reduced to a minimum.
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Figure 14. Uniform node distribution. The data sink is marked as star.
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Figure 15. Random node distribution. The data sink is marked as star.
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Figure 16. Simulation results for the uniform node distribution.
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Figure 17. Simulation results for the random node distribution.
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During the tests cycles, we varied the local buffer
size of the nodes and the transmission interval to the
data sink. We started with a scenario of 2 Packets every
hour and increasing this interval up to 6 hours with
12 packets. Accordingly, the data per time ratio for a
long time window remains constant. Based on different
ratio between the two operational modes, we analyse
the system uptime. Further indicators for the systems
efficiency represent the entire system availability and the
spatial distribution of the available energy resources on
the nodes (Figure 16 and Figure 17).
Both simulation scenarios provide interesting results.
First of all, the diagrams clarify the trade-off between
local buffering approaches and data transmission cycles.
For the uniform node topology, the transmission scheme
of 6 buffered packets every 3 hours provides the best
results. In contrast to that, the random node distribu-
tion provides the best result for a buffering scheme of
12 packets in 6 hours. Accordingly, the overall system
availability varies between 70 and 136 days. In other
words, an optimal configuration is able to double the
system availability. Anyway, in cases of a continuous
data transmission or real-time requirements for the event
handling, the system is not able to benefit from the
mentioned WuRx technologies.
Another interesting simulation output represents the
energy distribution in the networks. Especially in the
uniform topology, the data forwarding process generates a
lot of network traffic within a few nodes around the data
sink. Based on these data bursts, the energy resources
of the corresponding nodes decrease rapidly and the
topology splits into disjunctive sets. Within the random
topology, this problem strongly depends on the node
distribution. In any case, advanced routing approaches for
WuRx-enabled application scenarios are essential and part
of our actual research work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discuss the capabilities of WuRx
technologies and the requirements for an efficient usage.
We define sufficient application scenarios and critical
system parameters. Besides environmental parameters and
technological restrictions of the hardware system, the ap-
plication itself has a significant influence on the efficiency
of WuRx technologies. We clarify, that the existence
of an asynchronous, event-triggered application scenario
represents the key requirement for an efficient usage of
a WuRx unit. In this context, we introduce a separation
into two different operational modes in order to use the
benefits of a WuRx unit. The first one represents the local,
autonomous operation and the second one is the inter-
connected operation within the network topology. Based
on these modes, we simulate the differences between
several communication scenarios with and without WuRx
capabilities. Our simulation results confirm the impact of
the critical parameters on the system availability.
Further research work focuses on adapted routing and
topology optimisation approaches in the context of WuRx
applications. Enhanced simulation scenarios with several
hundred nodes will help us to evaluate these approaches.
Further WuRx improvements of the power consumption
and the wake-up latency will be done within the nanett
project.
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Abstract—DHT (Distributed Hash Tables) has been applied to the 
structured P2P system to achieve information retrieval and 
positioning efficiently. KAD is a large-scale network protocol based 
on the XOR metric in practice, which uses DHT technology to 
improve network salability without central server. However, the 
increasing malicious pollutes routing tables to reduce seriously the 
query performance. Thus, an improved adaptive algorithm based 
on social network is proposed in order to improve routing table 
updating algorithm. Firstly, the data structure of routing table is 
adjusted to store value of centrality and prestige. Secondly, the 
request nodes can adaptive select nodes to send messages. Then 
when a find process is terminated, the node will calculate the two 
values for all participating nodes using the corresponding centrality 
and prestige algorithms based on XOR metric. Finally, the node 
updates the routing table depend on the above result. The above 
algorithm was implemented in an open source project named 
LibTorrent to test effectiveness. This experiment last a month to 
verify the change of the search success ratio in a KAD network with 
about 30% malicious nodes. The results show that the optimized 
adaptive routing algorithm can effectively resist the attack for 
routing table and improve the search success ratio of the node. 
Moreover, this lightweight algorithm is conducive to the 
deployment in practice without extra network burden.  
 
Index Terms—DHT, KAD, routing algorithm, Link Analysis 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
P2P system can be subdivided into centralized P2P 
system, unstructured P2P and structured P2P system 
according to the overlay networks of organizing [1]. The 
first generation centralized P2P system disappeared from 
view because of inherent weaknesses. As a result of DHT 
technology, structured P2P system such as CAN 、
Kademlia 、 Tapestry and Chord, makes information 
retrieval and location have been greatly improved 
efficiency compared with unstructured P2P system. 
Hence, structured P2P is a main direction development of 
P2P system. KAD is a kind of DHT technology based on 
XOR metric, which has been widely adopted in practice 
file shared software，such as eMule/aMule[2]、 
 
BitTorrent DHT、Azureus[3]、MainLine and so on. 
KADEMLIA is widely used routing protocol based on 
XOR metric, which has some obvious advantages 
compared with others [4].The distance between two 
nodes in the network is obtained using the XOR 
calculation. Before a node joins the DHT network, it 
requires a random 160 bit (or 128 bit) number as their 
identity using hash algorithm (MD5 or SHA1). When a 
node wants to share a file, it also uses the same hash 
algorithm for the file with any length to generate a 160 bit 
digest a value as the key word. A pair including key word 
with the publisher information (IP and Port) will be 
released to store in k nodes whose id values closest to the 
key word. To speed up the retrieval efficiency, each node 
in the network will create and maintain a routing table 
that stores a part of the information for all nodes. The 
routing table for KAD is organized by some k buckets [5]. 
When a node starts a request, it will pick up α nodes 
whose ID is closest to the object file hash value from the 
routing table to send the request parallel. Responders pick 
up β  nodes whose values are closest to key value in their 
routing tables and back to the requester with messages 
including β nodes. Then, the requester selected some 
closest targets from α*β nodes depending on metric 
distance. The search process will be repeated iteratively 
until the target is found or failure. This failure means not 
more closer nodes can be found. This prefix matching 
mechanism ensure each search can at least halve the XOR 
distance，and the maximum number of search times not 
exceed log2N, N denotes the number of nodes in the 
network. This algorithm made a better trade-off in 
performance and overhead. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
Some previous papers focus on how to improve the 
lookup performance [6, 7]. Sergio Marti et al propose 
SPROUT algorithm to route using social links, which can 
increase the probability of successful routing [8].Liu et al 
present a approach to build a interest-based communities, 
which can short the deliver path and improve the routing 
efficiency [9].George Danezis and Prateek Mittal present 
the Sybilinfer algorithm for labeling the nodes in social 
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network to identify the Sybil[10].Yu et al analysis 
reliability among nodes depend on social link to 
determine which are Sybil in the network. They suggest 
using the SybilGuard algorithm to limit the influence of 
the Sybil attacks. Liu et al begin to study the nodes in the 
routing table based on KAD network, they present a 
social link based on IP distance Metric to improve routing 
performance in KAD network [11]. But, this algorithm is 
not suitable for the KAD network based on XOR metric. 
Moreover, a node with internal IP address can’t be 
properly ranked. 
III. ROUTING ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION 
The main difference between DHT and traditional 
network is that each node in DHT was been seen as a 
client and server. Each node not only can 
download/upload files, but also provide route services. 
Therefore, the performance of routing table will play a 
vital role for node search. The routing table in each node 
has provided the redundancy to response to frequent 
churn that nodes free join or leave the network. In order 
to maintain the availability, each node needs to interact 
with other nodes and update the corresponding entry in 
the routing table. Each routing table in a node saves part 
of the nodes’ information whose distance from himself 
between 2i and 2i+1, say d= [2i, 2i+1). The i denotes the 
changes range from 0 to 160，say i= [0,160]. An entry in 
routing table called a K-bucket can store no more than k 
nodes information. According to the found time, those 
nodes are arranged. The node with first seen was placed 
on the head, and latest seen was placed on the tail in each 
bucket. 
A.  State model for a node 
Each node will create and update routing table, along 
with node joins network, sends request, provides service 
and leaves network. It is necessary to model a node in 
order to understand behavior. It shows the state transition 
for a node in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  the node process transition 
It can be seen from above figure, each node in starting 
phase, idle phase, running phase and download/upload 
phase requires obtain information by interacting with 
other nodes to complete routing table crate and update. 
The main operations for interaction among nodes are 
following: 
 Starting state: It means a node issues a request to 
require a node in the DHT network in order to join 
the network. The responder can provide 20 nodes 
information in back message, and the requester 
inserts 20 nodes into the routing table. Then the 
node continues to fill the routing table after it 
sends some messages to find its own to the 20 
nodes and receive the back messages. Meanwhile, 
the 20 nodes update the routing table with 
requester information. How to ensure the 
reliability of the fixed nodes is the premise of the 
node can successfully join the network. Practically, 
some fixed nodes instead of selected nodes 
randomly always are used as guide nodes to 
prevent nodes from isolation attack. Although this 
method is simple and effective, it increases the 
dependence of these fixed nodes and borrows the 
bottleneck and single point of failure problem. 
Therefore, the really matter is how to reduce the 
dependence on the fixed nodes to improve the join 
efficiency of nodes initialization process.  
 Idle state: The term indicates that the node is in 
the absence of requesting or providing services to 
other nodes. The node in this state is only to 
randomly select some nodes from the routing table 
to ping. If no response messages, the target nodes 
will be removed by requester from the routing 
table, which ensures that most nodes are online. 
Unfortunately, taking to account the efficiency, 
the node is only to select part of nodes to detect. In 
other words, not all nodes in the routing table at a 
time online. 
 Running state: Nodes request or provide service 
for other nodes in network. The nodes issue 
request or response for the request message that 
want to find a value or node. 
 Download/upload state: Access to the information 
for the target nodes who own the source files, 
request nodes will start to download and upload 
process. When nodes have finished the download, 
they will announce to K nodes whose id is closest 
to the file’s hash value with store operation. The 
pair with node IP and Port will be stored in the k 
different locations so that others can find the value 
with high probability. 
B.  Four Operations for a node 
Node in the idle state, running state will call or receive 
RPC (Remote Process Call) operation to achieve the 
maintenance of its own routing table. Four operations 
including in RPC are Ping, Find Node, Find Value and 
Store. Their functions as follow [13]: 
 Ping: The function is to detect whether a specified 
node is still online.  
 Find Node: The function is to ask a node return k 
nodes closest to a required ID from the routing 
table. 
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 Find Value: The operation is similar to Find Node. 
The function is to ask nodes whether own the key 
value as same as require value. 
 Store: The function is to inform K nodes to store 
<key, Value> information as to others search. 
  The node who has received the one of above process 
calls may update the routing table. But the updating 
operation will be successfully depends on the following 
figure. 
 
 
Figure 2.  the process after receiving the RPC operation 
The process can ensure the node fill corresponding 
bucket in routing table as soon as possible. When the 
number of a bucket reach limit and new request come, the 
node will ping another node that is first to be inserted into 
the bucket early. 
IV. THE IMPROVEMENT FOR ROUTING TABLE 
MAINTENANCE MECHANISM 
A. Analysis of the current problems 
From the above analysis, the routing table maintenance 
mechanism is relatively efficient. It fully takes into 
account the dynamic and overhead for interactive with 
nodes. However, there are two problems for the 
mechanism as following:  
 Has received the RPC command, the node only to 
test the node that in a bucket head. Its means 
whether the node will update the routing table 
depends on the head node rather than others in a 
bucket. Besides, the node can randomly select 
nodes in some buckets that haven’t updated any 
node to ping on a regular basis. Obviously, it is 
not feasible that ping all nodes when the node 
need to update. Considered an extreme case, a new 
node can’t be inserted into a bucket even if the 
other k-1 nodes are not online. This is not unsafe 
for a node if some malicious nodes launch the 
routing attacks. Because, these malicious nodes 
with multiple IP can stick to ping a victim node so 
that make themselves added into the routing table. 
At the same time, when a malicious node has been 
moved to the head in a bucket, the attacker can 
prevent new nodes from inserting into the bucket. 
 A requester sends the request for finding value or 
find node, and responder randomly select α nodes 
from routing table. A requester will update the 
corresponding node information without checking. 
This means that a responder can more easily make 
requester use some victim nodes update the 
routing table. The search process will be repeated 
until one (or more) node is found or no closer 
nodes are returned. It is easy to known that a node 
find a target node after 1/2log2N (N is the number 
of all nodes) on average. Thus, a node may has 
received 1/2log2N*α malicious nodes information 
for a search process.  
The maintenance of routing table should be improved 
to keep more reliable nodes in the routing table. Thus, it 
is the point that how to assess the reliability of node. It is 
more likely for a reliably node to provide search service 
in routing process. As a result, the improvement strategy 
of routing table maintenance consists of two parts in this 
paper: node evaluation algorithm and the node adaptive 
selection algorithm.  
B.  routing improvement algorithm based on link analysis 
DHT network and social relationship network is very 
similar. It is helpful to assess the node in the DHT with 
link analysis in the social network. If nodes are viewed as 
nodes, the activity or relationship between nodes can be 
represent as links, which the DHT network model will be 
become a direction grapy. The characteristics of nodes, 
such as behavior, authority, position and so on, will be 
easy to study based on the grapy. Actually, both centrality 
and prestige are measures of prominence of a node in the 
network [12]. The higher of degree of a node, it’s more 
reliable for the other nodes in the network. To explain the 
term of node reliability, the definitions of centrality and 
prestige are introduced in this paper. 
Node prestige: A prestige node is object of extensive 
links as a responder. Generally, a requester sends 
message to the node with higher prestige value, which 
gets the correctly back nodes with higher probability. 
Node centrality: A centrality node is one who has more 
links, which is more important compare to other with 
relatively fewer links. Generally, a requester sends 
message to the node with higher centrality value, which 
gets the back nodes with shorter the distance for 
destination node.  
From above definition, the focus of routing table 
updating is converted to calculate the value of centrality 
and prestige. To achieve this goal, the following 
measures will be implemented: 
 Changes the routing table structure 
To compute and store the value of centrality and 
prestige, the value of centrality and prestige of a node 
will be added respectively in each k bucket. A five-tuple 
of <ID, IP, Port, Auth, Cent> can be used to represent the 
node. 
 Changes the RPC operations  
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There is no difference for a request node sending Ping 
or store command. When the node sends the find value or 
finds node command, it is essential for the requester to 
evaluate the centrality and prestige of those nodes that are 
extracted from a return message. A requester may update 
the routing table depend on the result of evaluation. The 
details of improved process are as follows:  Node A 
selected some nodes to send the request. Each responder 
provides β nodes for requester. As a result, a responder 
has an in-link and β out-links. If the number of return 
nodes can not meet the requirements, the requester will 
start retransmission mechanism.  
 How to select the nodes for a requester and 
responder depending on the adaptive algorithm. 
 The requester does not update some nodes 
immediately and pick up some closer nodes by 
comparing the return nodes to repeat the 
previous step. 
 When the target node or value is satisfied, the 
search process is termination. 
 The value of centrality and prestige for each 
return node is calculated depend on the number 
of in-link and out-link. 
 According to the value of centrality and 
prestige, the requester starts to update 
corresponding buckets. 
The node adaptive selection must be referred to above 
process in order to explain more clearly. That is how to 
select some nodes in the beginning and how to update 
some nodes at the end. 
Firstly, a requester picks up some evaluated nodes that 
are composed of nodes with higher prestige and nodes 
with higher centrality value for first requesting. Then, an 
equation to describe the relationship, say Pr =dp/dc, 
α=dp+dc. 
The Pr is the proportion of prestige and centrality value. 
The higher the value of Pr means the node set owns more 
security. On the contrary, the set node owns more 
efficient. 
For the first requesting, the requester selects α-1 
central nodes and a prestige node. If it failed, the node 
will automatically pick up α-2 central nodes and 2 
prestige nodes, and so on. To obtain a higher value of 
prestige and centrality, a responder was encouraged 
providing some better nodes. Actually, it is no obviously 
different for requester and responder to select the prestige 
and centrality nodes from the routing table. The 
adjustment process is automatic, so it is called adaptive. 
But, it is allowed for user to adjust parameters in order to 
get a reasonable node set with different security and 
efficiency in practices. 
Secondly, after the requesting is finished, the requester 
begin to update some nodes depend on the two values. 
The Pu is the ratio of the amount of being updated 
prestige nodes (dp') to centrality nodes (dc') in a bucket, 
say Pu = dp'/dc'. 
C. Algorithm Implementation 
The improved algorithm for ranking all nodes in a find 
process is based on the prestige and centrality algorithm 
[12]. The requester needs to calculate the values at the 
end of find instead of each step. After entered the KAD 
network, the node will initialize threshold values of 
prestige and centrality for each node to 1 separately. In 
this paper, the algorithm of degree centrality is adjusted 
to calculate the centrality value. The value of a node is 
defined as )(iCc  
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Where n is the number of nodes in a find process. Let t 
is the target node and s is the requester, the ),( jidx  
denotes XOR distance from i to t. The direct out-link 
need to be calculated for i, which is the centrality of those 
nodes who have been provided by i can be got. The value 
of the formula ranges from 0 to 1 because of the 
normalization with ),(*)1( tsdxn  .The )(iCc  depends on 
two factors of the XOR distance and the number of nodes. 
According to XOR metric characteristic, ),(),( tidxjidx   
indicates that j has exceeded the target node. So, ),( jidx  
must be adjusted with ),(-),( jtdxtidx  to reflect the 
extent of  j close to t. From the DHT characterizes, it is 
easy to understand that a node more likely to know the 
nearer node. Hence, a node can be ranked with higher 
value because it provides a successor closer to target. 
Similarly, the proximity prestige value is calculated as 
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Where || Ii  is the size of set that all nodes who can 
link directly or indirectly to I. The value of the above 
measure ranges form 0 to 1. The )(iPp  depends on two 
factors of the XOR distance and the number of nodes 
related to i. Note the distance is inverse proportional to 
the prestige value. Reviewing the characters of k buckets, 
a node can know more with their neighboring nodes. For 
example, the two values can be calculated in the figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.  the simplified routing process from A to T 
The 4 bits number in brackets instead of 16 is the node 
ID in order to simplify the routing process. After node A 
finished the find operation, those related nodes including 
A, B, C, F, G and T to node A can be selected out to 
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calculate, say n=6 and ),( jidx =14. Two values for all 
nodes are given in the following table. 
TABLE I.   
TWO VALUES FOR ALL RELATED NODES  
  A B C F G T 
Cc(i) 0 0.129 0.157 0.029 0.014 0 
Pp(i) 0 0.04 0.05 0.038 0.033 0.132 
 
Note that the value of ),( GAdx  has been adjusted to 
13 because of ),(),( TAdxGAdx  .As can be seen from 
the table, the value of )(BCc is smaller than )(cCc , 
which indicates that node linked by B is closer to T. the 
value of )(BPp  is bigger than )(CPp , which indicates 
that C is more reliable than B. Through the above 
algorithms, the requester can get the value of prestige and 
centrality for the all participating nodes. As a result, the 
requester will decide which of nodes will be replaced. 
V. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT 
To test the validity of this way, an open source project 
named LibTorrent was selected for this work. LibTorrent 
is a feature complete BitTorrent implementation focusing 
on efficiency and scalability [13, 14]. There are two 
experiments are used to test the search success ratio and 
result for resisting the routing attack. Two different 
versions of the client program are created, in which a 
client program is created using original routing algorithm 
and another client program is created using above 
improvement routing algorithm. A total of 1,000 normal 
nodes involved in this testing in the DHT network. Half 
of the total number of the nodes uses the former client 
program, while the rest of the nodes use the second 
program where some parameters are set, for example α=
β =3 in method improved-1, dp=1 and dc=2 in method of 
improved-2.There are about 300 nodes who insist in 
polluting other node’s routing tables enter the network. 
Test process lasted for one month. Relevant data are 
collected after each nodes issue about 300 find value 
commands in the DHT network. It shows the difference 
for the search success rate in figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4.  the search success ratio with different algorithm 
In the same net circumstances, the result of malicious 
poisoning routing table is tested in another group of 
experiments. A total of 1000 normal nodes randomly 
request with 300 malicious nodes that use sending ping 
message and forwarding message with some unexpected 
nodes to poison others.  The amount of 50 malicious 
nodes are entered the DHT network every other day. The 
half of 1000 nodes update routing table depending on the 
improved routing algorithm. The amount of malicious in 
every node’s routing table is added up for comparing the 
effects of two algorithms against attacks. These statistical 
data are shown in figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.  the comparative effects against malicious nodes attack 
From the above result can be seen that the 
improvement algorithm obviously improved the search 
success ratio and resisted the routing table attacking by 
preventing those malicious nodes from inserting. If a 
malicious node can not contribute for other’s request, the 
node will be removed from routing table because of lower 
the prestige or centrality value. Moreover, the two values 
not change even if the malicious initiative to send RPC 
message to a specified requester. In addition, the 
algorithm is a lightweight algorithm without increasing 
the client burden significantly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyzed some matters for using RPC 
command to update routing table and presented a 
lightweight routing algorithm based on link analysis to 
resist routing table attack, which can make more actively 
nodes remain in the routing table. Some parameters are 
automatically adjusted in this algorithm to adapt to 
different network environment without extra bandwidth. 
The result of the experiment showed that this algorithm 
can rank the nodes in the routing table. As a result, the 
requester can make a trade-off between efficiency and 
security. With IPV6 implementation, node can obtain a 
unique ID by Hashing IP address. This rank algorithm 
will play a more important role for create and update 
routing table in order to route with more efficiency and 
reliability. 
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Abstract- This report is written to provide a method of 
building secure VPN by combination of L2TP and IPSec in 
order to meet the requirements of secure transmission of 
data and improve the VPN security technology. It remedies 
the secured short comes of L2TP Tunneling Protocol 
Tunneling Protocol and IPSec security. Simulation and 
analysis show that the construction method can improve the 
security of data transmission, and the simulation results of 
VPN is valuable for security professionals to refer. 
 
Index Terms- L2TP, IPSec, VPN, tunneling  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  Since the last century, 80 years, computer and data 
network as the theme of modern technology has made 
great breakthrough, and its application has been deep into 
every corner of society. In particular the emergence of the 
late 80s Internet, in just a few years the world will be tens 
of thousands of local area networks and even thousands 
of computers has become a transnational, trans-regional 
between the information superhighway. The rise of the 
global Internet data communications network as a single 
entity, information sharing, communication convenient 
and efficient, leading to the traditional information 
technology resources with a breakthrough capacity[1]. 
VPN (Virtual Private Network) as an important way for 
enterprises to use the Internet. 
VPN: virtual private net can achieve different network 
components and connections between resources. Virtual 
private network to use internet or other public 
infrastructure of the Internet for users to create tunnels, 
and provide the same private network security and 
security features[2]. Throughout the VPN technology, 
you can see, security and service quality is the VPN 
technical support, the needs of business users to promote 
wider use of IPSec VPN's, carriers are great efforts to 
build MPLS VPN, VPN technology allows the 
development of China's future with more diverse , 
flexibility, technical services and demand trends closely. 
VPN using a variety of security protocols, in the public 
network to establish a secure tunnel to provide private 
network capabilities. In ensuring quality of service at the 
same time, security is the primary VPN features. 
   In the current study VPN, L2TP and IPSec is the most 
widely used two kinds of tunneling protocol. L2TP 
supports multiple transfer protocols and remote access, 
but security is not strong. IPSec. IP layer can provide a 
strong security mechanism, but features such as 
multi-protocol support package deficient. Therefore, the 
integrated use of both, can both support each other to 
build a multi-protocol encapsulation, but also to provide 
authentication and encryption VPN[3]. 
L2TP and IPSec are on paper the two tunneling protocol 
to do a systematic exposition, and then each of the two 
tunneling protocol is proposed based on the principle of a 
combination of both to build a secure VPN approach, that 
is the first to use IPSec to encrypt data, and then data will 
be encrypted L2TP tunnel encapsulation. First introduced 
the model of this combined method to analyze structural 
model of the theory and obtained through the model 
structure to improve transport security, and then to write 
simulation software MATLAB source code of the 
program, the mode of data transmission speed the 
simulation, and finally by analyzing the simulation results 
show that the performance of this design 
 
II.  VPN MEANING 
Virtual Private Network, VPN is in the public 
network (such as the Internet) to establish a dedicated 
data communication network technology. In the virtual 
private network, the connection between any two nodes 
do not need to end the traditional private network of 
physical links required, but to use the resources of a 
dynamic group of public networks, private network out, 
the user is good with a special way to pass. More simply, 
VPN is the use of shared public network to establish a 
specific user data transmission channel, the user's remote 
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012 141
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
doi:10.4304/jnw.7.1.141-148
 PE-based 
P2P
CE-based 
VR VPN BGP/MPLS VPN 
CE-based 
IPSec  
VPN 
P2MP
PE-based 
IPLS VPLS VPWS 
VPN 
L2VPN L3VPNL1VPN 
branch offices, business partners, such as linking mobile 
workers to provide end to end, a certain security and 
service quality-assured data communications services 
network technology. VPN can be connected using the 
network, it can be a single point device. With the 
traditional use of shared resources for voice company 
dedicated voice messaging service similar to the idea, 
VPN want to use the shared data protected network 
resources to provide dedicated data services. 
   "Virtual" means a better understanding of: the 
establishment of tunnels or virtual circuits to different 
physical networks or devices and is no longer using the 
physical establishment of a long line proprietary data 
network, but to build on widely distributed data network, 
such as ATM / FR / IP network. "Virtual" is relative in 
terms of DDN, although it seems to yourself from the 
user network, and in fact the user is superimposed on the 
public network in a virtual dimension. Between VPN and 
non-VPN, shared between multiple VPN network 
infrastructure, is different from the private network VPN 
main difference, it is "virtual" lies. 
   In order to facilitate the "special" definition of the 
concept, first define the Closed User Group, CUG 
concept. Closed for the group that many users of the 
site-specific formation of a closed user groups, 
user-based "switch" during the network's business to 
ensure communications and to prevent unauthorized 
access to these sites to other sites[4-5]. Within a specific 
CUG can use private addresses, the address space 
between different CUG can be reused. CUG This feature 
prevents unauthorized packets to a specific CUG spread 
within the network to prevent fraud and tampering of data 
packets in transit and other security attacks, and can be of 
different types of packets different treatment, statistics 
and billing, etc. . 
  The "private" at least two different ways of 
understanding: 
 1) CUG + QoS guarantee. The "special" as the circuit is 
connected to a closed user group or community, with 
QoS guarantee, but does not provide authentication and 
encryption and other security services. "Exclusive" means 
more emphasis on service performance in how not to 
consider security issues. Telecommunications experts and 
manufacturers generally are used to this understanding, 
such as ATM VPN, FR VPN, and the back will highlight 
the L2TP VPN. 
2) CUG + security guarantees. The "special" as the 
connection is closed user group or community, but this 
time "dedicated" means more emphasis in the security 
services, in terms of performance only "best effort (best 
effort)" service, IP traffic between sites in the competing 
network resources. Computer experts and manufacturers 
generally prefer such an understanding, as will be 
described later IPSec VPN. 
III.  VPN CATEGORIES 
According to protocol type, VPN is generally divided 
into two categories: Based on the Layer Two Tunneling 
Protocol Layer-based VPN tunneling protocol VPN. 
 1) Based on Layer Two Tunneling Protocol: Layer Two 
Tunneling Protocol OSI model corresponds to the data 
link layer, using the frame as a data exchange unit. Layer 
Two Tunneling Protocol commonly used are PPTP, L2F, 
L2TP. 
 2) Based on the third layer tunneling protocols: Layer 
Two Tunneling Protocol OSI model corresponds to the 
network layer, use the package as a data exchange unit. 
The third layer tunneling protocol used has PISec, GRE. 
The second and third floor is the main difference between 
tunneling protocol user data in the first layers of network 
protocol stack is encapsulated. 
   Operators may participate in a variety of ways to a 
VPN to the management and implementation and, 
therefore, there are several types of VPN service, as 
shown in Figure 1, which is from the technical level 
(protocol stack) by the angle of the VPN type[6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 VPN service types 
 
In the standard formulation, IETF, and more 
concerned about L3VPN L2VPN, research results are 
relatively more, IETF L1VPN although the research done, 
but the results much. ITU-T study in L1VPN put more 
effort to develop a large number of L1VPN standards. 
 
IV. VPN TUNNELING 
 
  In order to have transparency in  IP networks 
transmit data packets, and provide some security and 
service quality assurance, then all the VPN must use one 
or more tunneling protocol. Tunnel technology uses a 
protocol to another protocol technology transfer, through 
the tunnel protocol. Tunneling Protocol provides for the 
establishment of the tunnel, maintenance, and deletion 
rules and how to package the enterprise network data 
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 transmission in the tunnel, the following describes two 
commonly used tunneling protocol. 
 
A. Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) 
  
   L2TP: Layer2 Tunneling Protocol PPTP and L2F 
protocols combines the advantages of a more 
comprehensive functional and technical[7]. It is also a 
PPP-based tunneling protocol, by IP, ATM, Frame Relay, 
and other public transport network to establish the tunnel 
to send the PPP packets.L2TP uses the client / server 
architecture, composed of two basic components, first, 
the client L2TP LAC (L2TP Access Concentrator), is 
used to initiate the call and the establishment of the 
tunnel; second server LNS (L2TP Network Server), 
provides a tunnel transmission services, but for all the 
end of the tunnel. In a traditional connection, the end user 
dial-up connection is the LAC, and the end of L2TP 
extends the PPP to the LNS. 
 
B. IP Security (IPSec) 
 
  IPSec (IP Security) is the IETF IPSec working group 
in order to provide communication in IP layer security 
protocol developed by a family. It includes some security 
protocols, key agreement parts and security alliance. 
Section defines the security protocol for communications 
security protection mechanisms; key agreement part of 
the definition of how to protect the security protocol 
negotiation parameters, and how to communicate the 
identity of the entity identification; security alliance to 
store all the details of the consultations to be recorded. 
  Security protocol, including Encapsulation Security 
Payload, hereinafter referred to as ESP and the 
Authentication Header (AH) two. ESP protocol which 
provides for communication confidentiality, integrity 
protection; AH to provide integrity protection for the 
communications protocol[8]. The AH and ESP, has two 
operating modes: transport mode and tunnel mode. 
IPSec protocol typically used have been designed with 
the algorithm-independent. Algorithm selection in the 
Security Policy Database (SPD) is specified.  
 
V.  VPN SECURITY TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
 
A. IPSec VPN Connection Models 
 
  In Figure 2, Site-to-site VPN configuration, each node 
is connected to separate networks, these networks are the 
other non-safety or public network isolation. As the 
security requirements of these networks partition, so 
unless otherwise deploy VPN client on the network node 
is not able to exchange data. This type of VPN 
configuration is "closed" Site-to-site network topology. 
Conversely, if connected to a network partition between 
the end nodes can freely exchange data and use other 
networks to forward and receive data. However, these 
non-secure data exchange. Therefore, IPSec can be used 
to guarantee some or all of the data exchange security. 
This type of VPN configuration is known as "open" 
Site-to-site network design. The key between the two is 
that, IPSec is used to implement data exchange gateway 
security. At the same time, more importantly, the 
realization of data exchange security safety net and 
connected to the security of end nodes is independent. 
    
 
Figure2 Site-to-site VPN topology 
In the Client-to-Site VPN network topology (see 
Figure 3), "open" and "closed" model is applicable. 
Isolated from the IPSec gateway (or its near) the 
connection between the nodes may be or not to be 
limited. In the "open" the Client-to-Site network 
topology, in the end nodes and the network path between 
the IPSec gateway is secure. In the "closed" network 
topology, in the end node and the gateway between the 
network access is secure. However, the client node and 
the IPSec gateway adjacent to (or after) the data 
exchange between the nodes only connected to the IPSec 
gateway to proceed. 
  Both network topology, the client node and the IPSec 
gateway architecture is similar ties in the traditional 
PSTN remote access dial-up networking. End nodes first 
establish a connection to the gateway, then the two nodes 
to communicate as IPSec. In addition, the gateway 
provides IP as a client node, this status allows the client 
to work with the other nodes IP and IPSec gateway 
directly connected end nodes adjacent to the network 
access. Client communication between nodes and the  
 
User Node 
LAN-B 
VPN 
GW-B 
ISPGW 
VPN 
GW-A 
LAN-A 
User 
Node 
ISPGW 
ISPGW 
ISPGW 
ISPGW 
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012 143
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
  
      
 
 Figure 3 Client-to-site VPN topology 
 
gateway is the same security is guaranteed by the IPSec. 
However, other IPSec client node and the gateway for 
communication between adjacent nodes are not safe. 
 
B. GRE tunnel model 
 
   GRE tunnel is a traditional point to point connection. 
GRE as shown in Figure 4 applied to the enterprise 
network, you need the central node in the enterprise and 
between the various branches of the structure more than 
point to point GRE tunnels. When large enterprise 
branch offices, the allocation huge workload; and, if new 
branches, the central node on the need for additional 
configuration, an increase of the burden of network 
maintenance; In addition, branch offices with ADSL 
dial-up, etc., the branches of public Web address also 
increased the uncertainty of the center node 
configuration complexity. Although the dynamic VPN 
technologies, such as DVPN (Dynamic Virtual Private 
Network), can learn the public address branches and 
dynamically in the center tunnel between the nodes and 
branches, but the dynamic VPN technology is currently 
no uniform standard, various vendors private agreement 
with Dynamic VPN, can not communicate. Multipoint 
GRE tunnel solves the above problems, is ideal for 
branch offices of many corporate networks. 
Configuration in the central node multipoint GRE 
tunnels, the traditional branch-point GRE tunnel 
configuration, you can achieve a number of branches in 
the center between the node and dynamically created 
tunnel. 
 
 
                            Figure 4 multipoint GRE tunnel topology 
 
    Multipoint GRE tunnels do not need to manually 
configure the tunnel destination address, but according to 
the received packet dynamic learning GRE tunnel 
destination address[9-11]. As shown below, the terminal 
device on the client device receives a GRE packet sent 
from the IP packet header to obtain the source address of 
the outer and inner payload (IP packet) source address, 
respectively, as the tunnel packet destination address and 
destination address (the branch network within the 
network address), the establishment of a tunnel entry. 
Among them, the packet destination address mask length 
can be manually configured. Forward through the 
multipoint GRE tunnel packet, the device according to 
the packet destination address, find the entry in the 
tunnel corresponds to the tunnel destination address, use 
this address as the external IP header encapsulation GRE 
destination address, as shown in Figure 5. 
VI.  L2TP AND IPSec VPN INTEGRATION 
 
   L2TP and IPSec have the following deficiencies: 
L2TP: 
L2TP supports IP, IPX, Appletalk, and other network 
protocols, to support any of the wide area network 
technologies such as ATM, X.25 frame relay and any 
Ethernet technology. However, the L2TP protocol does 
not provide its own security mechanism, so the public 
network through the L2TP tunnel to transmit 
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                        Figure 5 Dynamic Tunnel destination address
 
PPP business, L2TP control messages and data packets 
are vulnerable to attack.  L2TP protocol has the 
following security issues: 
1) L2TP is only defined on the end of the tunnel to 
authenticate an entity, rather than flowing through the 
tunnel authentication data of each packet, so that the 
tunnel could not resist inserting and address spoofing 
attacks. 
2) Since there is no integrity check for each packet, there 
may have been DoS attacks, and send some bogus control 
information, resulting in L2TP tunnel or the PPP 
connection closes. 
3) L2TP itself does not provide any encryption means, 
when the data require encryption, you need other 
technical support. 
4) Although the PPP packets can provide confidential, 
but the PPP protocol does not support automatic key 
generation and automatic updates, so that eavesdropping 
attacker is likely to eventually break the key, resulting in 
the transmitted data. 
Because the L2TP protocol has security problems, so 
when the specific arrangements for L2TP, and other 
agreements to be combined to maximize the reduction of 
L2TP security risks. 
IPSec: 
  IPSec is the IETF IPSec working group to provide 
communications to IP layer security protocol developed 
by a family. It includes some security protocols and key 
agreement part of the IP data can flow integrity, 
confidentiality, anti-replay protection, etc., can also 
provide flexible connectivity level, identify the source of 
the data packet level. Currently, the Internet often use the 
Internet in building LAN IPSec between VPN, but not 
used for building remote access type independent VPN, 
main reasons are: 
1) IPSec, while providing a strong host-level 
authentication, but it can only support a limited user-level 
authentication. Type in the remote access VPN in a 
remote end user to enter the internal network must be 
strict authentication. IPSec protocol currently can not 
easily and effectively implement this feature. 
2) in the IPSec security protocol, always assume that the 
packet is encapsulated IP packet, it is not yet support 
multi-protocol encapsulation. 
3) the current IPSec support only a fixed IP address to 
find the corresponding pre-shared keys, certificates and 
other identifying information, does not yet support 
dynamic allocation of IP addresses. The company staff 
are often away on business use of the telephone dial-up 
access to Internet network, when users are using 
dynamically assigned IP address, so can not 
authentication, access to the internal network. 
  After the above analysis, it is natural to have such 
thoughts: the L2TP protocol and IPSec protocols 
combine to make up L2TP using IPSec security 
deficiencies at the same time make use of L2TP IPSec in 
the user-level authentication, authorization and other 
deficiencies. 
 
A. L2TP and IPSec integration of design 
 
  The following building through the use of L2TP and 
IPSec-based VPN secure remote access example, to 
specific examples described. In this example, assume that 
the remote terminal and the internal network are using IP 
protocol, IPSec installed in the remote access terminal, 
the terminal used for remote access to internal network 
users to communicate with the internal IP packet before 
the IPSec security processing and then into PPP packet, 
L2TP encapsulation placed ISP access server-side, 
corporate intranets and the Internet connection protocol 
gateway that supports IPSec and L2TP protocol support. 
  First, the public network through a remote terminal 
access to dial-up ISP access server, PPP, PPP connection 
established between two points, ISP RADIUS server 
Dest Tun Dest 
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 using the tunnel completed by user identity authentication, 
if the user determine the user VPN, RADIUS server to 
the ISP access server provides the information needed to 
build the tunnel, the establishment of ISP and internal 
network access server gateway between the L2TP tunnel 
PPP connections through this tunnel extends from the 
remote terminal to the internal network gateway, the 
gateway receives a packet --- used for the control of user 
authentication information, the use of PPP protocol and 
improve user-level authentication function, the entrance 
to the internal network to the remote access user identity 
authentication, authentication is successful, the remote 
user and the gateway between the internal network --- 
transmission channel to set up, can be used for 
transparent transmission had already been dealt with 
IPSec security of user data, then the remote terminal and 
the gateway between the IPSec tunnel built in the IPSec 
security institutions under the protection of remote users 
and corporate intranets Users can secure data 
transmission. At this point the remote directly into the 
terminal just as the internal network within the same as 
the internal users to use the internal network 
resources[12-13]. 
   L2TP tunnel work in two modes: the voluntary tunnel 
(Voluntary Mode) tunnel mode and active mode 
(Mandatory Mode). The LAC will be installed in 
different L2TP position, gave rise to two different modes 
of L2TP. 
  The first mode is integrated into the remote L2TP 
client, then client computer acts as a LAC. In this mode, 
the user independently of the L2TP configuration and 
management. Another model is installed in the L2TP 
NAS, usually ISP. In this mode, the client computer can 
not serve as the tunnel endpoint, but by the remote access 
server (such as NAS) as the tunnel endpoint, the user can 
transparently be L2TP service. 
  Agreement by the combination of IPSec and L2TP 
VPN security to improve the basic idea is: to integrate 
remote users or LAC IPSec client software, while the 
LNS is also integrated IPSec. Service software 
(integrated IPSec protocol LNS called Sceuer Remote 
Access Server, SRAS), which use IPSec. To improve the 
security of remote access communications[14-15]. IPSec 
protocol integrated in two ways, one is to IPSec remote 
access integrated into the host, known as the L2TP 
protocol secure voluntary model; one is integrated into 
the LAC on the IPSec, L2TP protocol as a mandatory 
security model. 
 
1). Based on combination of L2TP and IPSec tunnel 
mode forced 
 
  Shown in Figure 6, when operating in forced mode, 
L2TP, L2TP tunnel is established between the LAC and 
LNS, but according to the security before LZTP analysis 
shows, LAC - LNS security between can not be 
guaranteed. L2TP tunnels in order to ensure better 
transmission of data security, we can use IPSec to 
provide security. In the LAC (SIP) and the LNS at the 
realization of IPSec, such as the LAC and LNS two 
security gateways, the public packet transmission 
network to provide security services. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 Figure 6 uses the IPSec tunnel mode force protection 
 
2). Based on combination of L2TP and IPSec tunnel 
mode of the voluntary 
Similarly, when the L2TP working in a voluntary mode, 
the client computer as LAC, the client computer at the 
realization of IPSec. Specific structure shown in Figure7. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure7 the voluntary use IPSec tunnel mode 
protection 
 
B. L2TP and IPSec packet combining Encapsulation 
Format 
   The logical structure of the L2TP, L2TP tunnels to 
ensure security, you can achieve in the LAC and LNS at 
IPSec, so the LAC and LNS into two security gateways 
to public data transmission network to provide security 
services reported. Assumes that all tunnels and link have 
been established. 
Specific data flow is as follows: 
1) IPSec package 
IPSec-based security policies, IP packet by adding the 
IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload ESP header, trailer, 
and IPSec authentication trailer (Auth trailer), the IPSec 
encryption package. 
2) PPP Package 
IPSec packet processing by the PPP protocol 
encapsulation into PPP packets. 
3) L2TP encapsulation and IP encapsulation 
L2TP encapsulates PPP in groups of form L2TP packet, 
L2TP  Tunnel 
IPSec  Tunnel 
L2TP  Tunnel 
IPSec  Tunnel 
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 and then add the formation of UDP packet UDP header, 
and then the formation of IP packets transmitted via the 
Internet in the PI. 
  Since IPSec has two modes: transport mode and tunnel 
mode, so the combination of IPSec and L2TP  
 
 
 
   Figure 8 L2TP + IPSec transport mode encapsulation 
  
package also has two modes, transport mode structures 
were shown in Figure 8 . 
 
C.L2TP a combination of VPN and IPSec works 
 
Remote users to communicate with the VPN as follows: 
1) the remote user initiates a local call, then start a PPP 
connection to the LAC, LAC determine the type of 
business is the standard Internet services (such as www) 
or to the internal network. If it is required to access the 
intranet to find the corresponding LZTP tunnel and IPSee 
tunnel. And LAC on the PPP encapsulation and L2TP 
packets IPSee processing to generate L2TP + IPSec 
packets[16]. 
2) Once the tunnel is established successfully, the call to 
assign a Call ID. LAC LNS also send a link to the logo, 
the logo contains all the parameters have been negotiated. 
3) LNS receives the packet, the first in the PI layer IPSec 
decryption and authentication processing, and then to the 
L2TP software. L2TP L2TP software will first remove 
and then sent to a virtual PPP interface, the interface to 
the PPP to the PPP head again after the call to the IP 
layer. Finally, according to the internal PI PI layer header 
sent to the VPN destination address within the network 
server. 
  The design, the remote user access to integrated IPSec 
protocol LAC, established a PPP connection, L2TP 
tunnels and IPSec tunnels, and their different scope, PPP 
role of the physical connection between the remote user 
and the LAC; PPP logical connection on remote between 
the user and the LNS; L2TP tunnel between the role of 
the LAC and LNS; IPSec tunnel between the role of the 
LAC and LNS. 
 
D. transmission time of three simulation packages 
 
Let the maximum transmission unit 500 bit, data transfer 
speed 20 bit / s, use slice transmission. Transmission time 
through the simulation of Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11, 
we can clearly see the load of the same length the 
circumstances under which the method of combining 
L2TP and IPSec transmission time the system overhead.  
This shows that the more complex security protection, the 
greater the overhead, improve security, system 
performance will be reduced. However, the security of 
data transmission has been greatly improved. Repeat this 
at the expense of visible transmission rate of packages to 
improve security to nature, this method is a relatively 
time-consuming, but in today's information age, 
especially in emerging network security risk situation, 
transmission time to increase the cost of some Data 
security is very necessary[17]. 
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Figure 9 Transmission mode of transmission time 
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Figure 10 the tunnel mode of transmission time 
simulation of Figure 
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Figure 11 AH and ESP combined mode of transmission 
time simulation of Figure 
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    Table 1 Different modes of data transmission time (s) 
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
A secure VPN solution must be able to authenticate 
users and to strictly control that only authorized users can 
access VPN; be able to provide auditing and billing 
functions, show who and when to access what 
information; VPN solution must be able to assign a 
private network for users address and ensure the safety of 
the address; pass through the public Internet, data must be 
encrypted; VPN solution must be able to generate and 
update the client and the server's encryption key; On the 
integrated use of L2TP and IPSec, can only support each 
other to build a multi-protocol encapsulation, but also to 
provide authentication and encryption VPN. VPN 
solution must support the widespread use of the public on 
the Internet's basic protocols in ensuring quality of 
service at the same time, security is the primary VPN 
features. 
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Abstract: Along with the development of RFID technology, 
RFID tag is used for identifying object in more and more 
areas. RFID becomes one of the most important technologies 
in application and development of Internet of Things. 
Currently, in the applications of Internet-Internet of things, 
one of the most important issues is that the information 
carried by tag code can't be shared in different tag code 
standard systems and the tag code in different systems is 
incompatbile. In order to solve this issue, a new RFID tag 
code transformation approach for Internet of Things is 
proposed by this paper. With this approach, information 
sharing and exchanging between different tag codes 
standard systems becomes feasible and the global 
Internet-Internet of Things applications will be accelerated. 
 
Index Terms: Internet of Things, RFID technology, Tag code 
transformation, indirect transformation, incompatible tag 
codes, information sharing 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Along with the development of RFID technology [1], 
RFID tag is used to identify objects in more and more 
areas. With the advantages in the fields of logistics 
management [8] [9] and product packaging [10], RFID 
technology will be used instead of bar code technology in 
these fields and that will make it everywhere in future. At 
the same time, along with the development of the Internet, 
the trend of Internet development is to connect all the 
things in the world. Obviously, one of the most important 
technical foundations for the development of Internet-In- 
ternet of Things is RFID technology. From the Internet 
reports 2005[2], ITU indicated that one network which 
connects all the things in the world can be built by using 
RFID technology and Internet technology, and the 
information sharing and exchanging between different 
objects will be realized. Currently, the common definition 
of Internet of Things is that the Internet of Things is a 
ubiquitous network which combines various information 
sensing devices with the Internet. In order to exchange 
information between things and things (or between people 
and things), the RFID tags, sensors and bar codes, which 
attached to various things connected to the Internet by 
using code reader. Currently, one of the most important 
issues in the applications of Internet of Things is that 
different tag code standard systems are incompatible. To 
accelerate applications of global Internet of Things, we 
should transform the tag code between different code 
standard systems and solve the issues about the 
information sharing which between different systems and 
networks. 
This paper is organized as follows: First, the existing 
basic problem of Internet of Things applications is 
introduced. Then the major tag code standards in the 
applications of internet of things and the related research 
works are described. After that, a new tag code 
transformation approach for Internet of Things is 
proposed and the performance of the approach is analyzed. 
Finally, our conclusion and future work is presented. 
II.  EXISTING TAG CODE STANDARDS 
There are several different tag code standards in the 
applications of Internet of Things, which will bring more 
difficulties to locate items and share information. For 
example, under the pervasive computing environment 
[11], the information carried by EPC tag in things is not 
understood by things in uCode standard system, and vice 
versa. Currently, the major international coding standards 
in the worldwide are EPC coding standard [4] proposed 
by EPCglobal[3] and uCode coding standard[5] proposed 
by uID-center. The national coding standard used within 
one country is mobile RFID coding standard proposed by 
NIDA, which is used for mobile RFID service [ISO/IEC 
CD 29174].As the code standards are playing important 
role in the fields of logistics management [8] [9] and 
product packaging in different countries and different 
industries, it can be imagined that there will still co-exist 
multiple coding standards in the future. In the next section, 
we will introduce these three main coding standards 
respectively. 
A. EPCglobal’s EPC standard  
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 EPCglobal is a non-profit organization co-founded by 
EAN and UCC in 2003.It dedicated to the development 
and promotion of relevant standards based on EPC net- 
work. EPCglobal’s electronic product code standard [4] 
system is composed by different types of code standards. 
According to the code length, EPC code is divided into 
three types: EPC-64, EPC-96 and EPC-256. In order to 
ensure that the EPC code can uniquely identify all the 
items in the world while the prices of EPC tag are kept as 
low as possible, EPC-96 type code is recommended by 
EPCglobal. With this code type, it provides unique 
identity for each of 268 million companies in the world. 
Today, EPCglobal has launched several type of code 
scheme, such as: EPC-96 I Type, EPC-64 I type, EPC-64 
II type, EPC-64 III type, EPC-256 I type, EPC-256 II type 
and EPC-256 III type. Different code schemes are listed 
separately in tableI. 
TABLE I.  EPC CODE SCHEME 
Coding System Type Header field EPC Manager Object Classification Serial Number 
EPC-64 
I 2bits 21bits 17bits 24bits 
II 2bits 15bits 13bits 34bits 
III 2bits 26bits 13bits 23bits 
EPC-96 I 8bits 28bits 24bits 36bits 
EPC-256 
I 8bits 32bits 56bits 160bits 
II 8bits 64bits 56bits 128bits 
III 8bits 128bits 56bits 64bits 
            
 In EPC code, the EPC managers are responsible to 
maintain and allocate the value of Object Classification 
field and Serial number within its scope. From table I, we 
know that the length of EPC manager field is 28 bits in 
EPC-96 I type coding scheme. This allows the EPCglobal 
to assign numbers to about 268 million manufacturers in 
the world. The length of Object Classification field is 24 
bits and the capacity of this field can meet the 
requirement of assigning numbers to current inventory of 
the entire UPC units. Serial number field (whose length is 
36 bits) provides unique identifier to all objects in the 
same type. The capacity of serial number field is 
68719476736, which can be provided for each 
manufacturer about 1.1x1018 unique product IDs by the 
combination with the object classification field ---this 
greatly exceeds the current total of all the identified 
products in the world. 
In EPCglobal tag data specification, EPC-96 type code 
includes: GID-96, SGTIN-96, SSCC-96, GSRN-96, SGL 
N-96, GRAI-96 and GIAI-96.These codes are derived 
from the codes which are defined in GS1 Specification 
(the detailed information is shown in [7]). For the detailed 
information, please refer to the document about EPC- 
global tag data standards [4]; 
B. uID-center’s uCode standard  
uCode standard[5] is proposed by Japanese uID-center. 
T-Engine forum initiated the establishment of uID-center. 
The goal of uID-center is to establish and promote 
automatic identification technology in worldwide and 
build a ubiquitous computing environment. The basic 
length of uCode is 128 bits which can be expanded to 256 
bits, 384 bits or 512 bits based on the different 
requirements. Since the uCode’s length is 128 bits, which 
can meet the current and future requirements of growing 
of the number of objects, the uCode-128 scheme is 
recommended by uID-center. In this paper, the code 
transformation model is applied on this code scheme. 
Commonly, uCode is composed of five portions: version 
field, TLDC (Top Level Domain Code) field, CC (class 
code) field, DC (domain Code) field and IC 
(identification Code) field. The detailed code structure 
shown in table II: 
 
TABLE II.  uCode-128 CODE SCHEME
From table II, we know that the length of version field 
is 4 bits. The default value of version field in current 
uCode scheme is “00002”.the length of TLDC is 16 bits. It 
is used to marking the top level domain which the uCode 
belongs to. And the maximum capacity of TLDC field is 
65536.The UID-center is responsible for the management 
and value allocation of top-level domain field. UID-center 
can allocate the value of TLDC field to different countries 
or international organizations. In the current specification, 
several TLDC numbers are reserved by UID-center. The 
detailed information is shown in table III
 
TABLE III. RESERVED VALUES OF TLDC FIELD 
TLDC Application 
0xe000 Certificate standard encoding space 
0xfffe Identity for space and time 
0xffff eTRON identity 
Code scheme Version  Top Level Domain code Class Code Domain Code Identification Code 
uCode-128 4 bits 16 bits 4 bits Defined by CC Defined by CC 
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The length of CC field is 4 bits. The first bit is used to 
indicate the total length of uCode(the number “1” 
indicates that the total length of uCode is 128 bits and 
the number “0” indicates that the total length of uCode is 
256 bits or more). The last three bits is used to indicate 
the partition of DC field and IC field. The detailed 
information is shown in table IV:
 
TABLE IV.  CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PREDIFINED VALUE OF CC FIELD AND THE PARTITION OF DC AND IC FIELD 
type Class code  Length of Domain Code Length of identification code 
N/A 10002 Reserved 
A 10012 8 96 
B 10102 24 80 
C 10112 40 64 
D 11002 56 48 
E 11012 72 32 
F 11102 88 16 
N/A 11112 Reserved 
 
From table IV, we know that partition of DC field and 
IC field are indicated by the value of CC field. Generally 
speaking, the value of DC field is allocated by the 
manager of TLDC field. Then the value of IC field is 
allocated by the manager of DC field. uCode is usually 
expressed by binary numbers and compatible with the 
codes which are defined in GS1 specification[7]. 
C. NIDA’s mRFID standard 
mRFID code standard[6] is proposed by NIDA which 
aims at providing mobile RFID service in South Korea. 
The standard is now adopted by ISO certification 
organization [ISO / IEC CD29174]. Generally speaking, 
there are three different types of mRFID code: mCode, 
micro-mCode and mini-mCode. mCode is recommended 
by mRFID specification. The application scenario of 
Micro-mCode is similar with two dimension bar code. 
Mini-mCode is used in the area of small-capacity RFID 
tag. In this paper, the code transformation is applied on 
mCode. At the same time, mCode is also compatible with 
the code defined in GS1 specification [7]. 
The maximum length of mCode is 128 bits. Commonly, 
mCode is expressed in hexadecimal value string. mCode 
is composed of six fields: TLC(Top level Code)field, 
Class field, CC(company Code) field, ICC(item Category 
Code)field, IC(Item Code)field and SC(serial Code)field. 
The detail code structure is shown in table V: 
TABLE V. THE STRUCTURE OF MCODE 
mCode Description 
TLC 
(12 bits) 
Class 
(4 bits) 
CC+ICC+IC+SC Length 
(bits) 
Class 
name 16 bits 16 bits 16 bits 16 bits 16 bits 16 bits 16 bits 
000H Reserved N/A  
001H 
~ EFFH 
0H IC  48 A 
1H CC IC  64 B 
2H~3H Reserved  64 C,D 
4H CC IC SC  96 E 
5H CC IC SC  96 F 
6H CC ICC IC  96 G 
7H~EH Reserved N/A  
FH Reserved for class extension N/A  
F00H 
~ FFFH 
Reserved for other code structure N/A  
 
From table V , we know that the length of TLC field is 
12 bits. The value of TLC field is allocated to different 
countries or organizations by KISA which is authorized 
by NIDA. When the value of TLC field is 000H or from 
F00H to FFFH, mCode is reserved. The length of Class 
field is 4 bits and it indicates the partition of CC, ICC, IC 
and SC field in mCode. When the value of Class field is 
0H, mCode only has a 32 bits IC field. When the value of 
Class field is 1H, mCode has a 16 bits CC field and a 32 
bits IC field. When the value of Class field is 4H, mCode 
has a 32 bits CC field, a 16 bits IC field and a 48 bits SC 
field. When the value of Class is 6H, mCode has a 16 bits 
CC field, a 16 bits ICC field and a 48 bits IC field.  
III. TAG CODE TRANSFORMATION  
A. Current Research for Tag Code Transformation  
Currently, researchers focus on the code transformation 
in Internet of Things to transform GS1 codes, and codes 
based on ISO14443 [13] and ISO15693 [13] into EPC 
code [4] as they are compatible [12]. That helps more and 
more deployments of applications in EPCglobal network. 
However, after development of years, uCode and mCode 
are becoming popular and important as EPC. uCode, 
mCode and EPC will become three major standard 
systems in Internet of Things. As we all know, the RFID 
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fields of logistics management and product packaging in 
different countries and different industries. It can be 
imagined that there will still co-exist multiple coding 
standards in the future. As we mentioned before, the 
incompatibilities of those code standards hinders the 
development and applications of Internet of Things. The 
transformation between any two of those code standards 
become extreme important so that the information they 
carry is able to be shared and exchanged. The method [12] 
that to transform GS1 codes or ISO14443, ISO15693’s 
code into EPC code directly is not able to be applied for 
the code transformation among EPC, uCode and mCode. 
One of the major reasons is that the method [12] is only 
applied between compatible systems. However, for 
incompatible tag code systems, the method in article [12] 
is not applicable. For example, the domain code field in 
uCode includes manufacturer information and product 
classification information. But, the EPCmanager field in 
EPC only contains manufacturer information. Moreover, 
the length of fields in different code systems is very 
different. To solve the problem of code transformation 
among incompatible tag codes and achieve the goal of 
sharing information among different tag code standard 
systems, we proposed an new tag code transformation 
method based on GS1 code in our transformation process: 
first, we transform tag code into GS1 code from any of 
EPC, uCode and mCode, then the new code will be 
transformed to the required code. 
B. Tag Code Transformation Approach based on GS1code 
In this paragraph, we proposed a new tag code 
transformation approach for Internet of Things, which 
provides the information sharing and exchanging between 
incompatible tag codes standard systems and greatly 
accelerate the building and applying the global Internet of 
Things .Since the applications in EPC standard and uCode 
standard are used in more areas than those in mCode 
standard, we will transform the above three codes into 
EPC and uCode respectively. In this approach, there are 
two processes, one is to transform mCode and uCode into 
EPC, the other one is to transform mCode and EPC into 
uCode. In the next section, we will describe these two 
processes respectively. 
Process.1 Transform uCode, mCode into EPC 
In EPC network, information sharing and exchanging 
are mostly based on EPC code. The true global Internet of 
Things includes various code standards, in which the EPC 
system is more popular. To share and exchange the 
information in the tag code, we transform uCode and 
mCode into EPC. In the next section, we will demonstrate 
this process. 
(1) Transform uCode-128 into EPC-96 
As we mentioned before, the code structure between 
uCode-128 and EPC-96 are very different. We can't 
transform uCode-128 into EPC-96 directly. However both 
uCode-128 and EPC-96 are compatible with GS1 Code 
[7], we can first transform uCode-128 into a GS1 code 
with some extension components. Then, we transform 
GS1 Code into relative EPC-96.The whole transformation 
process is shown as follows: 
Assume: the intermediate code in transformation process 
is a GS1 code G (for the detail code structure, please refer 
to document [GS1 GS] [7]) which extends the AI21 and 
AI250 component. At the same time, we assume mCode 
and uCode follow the GS1 code standard. 
Input: a 128 bits uCode U 
Output: a 96 bits uCode E 
Transformation process: 
Begin  
With the definition of uCode code standard, we can 
extract each field in code U. such as: U.Version, U.TLDC, 
U.CC, U.DC and U.IC; 
G.AI250:=Transformation (U.Version)10+Transformation 
(U.CC)10;//transform string U.Version and string U.CC 
into decimal string, then, combined the decimal string; 
G.CountryCode:=Transformation (U.TLDC) 10; 
//transform string U.TLDC into a decimal string 
If (G.CountryCode.length>the length which defined in 
GS1 specification) stop transformation process; 
Temp: =Transformation (U.DC)10;//transform string 
U.DC into a decimal string; 
If (temp.length>the length which defined in GS1 
specification) stop transformation process; 
G.factoryCode:=substring (Temp); //with the GS1 
specification exacted the value of factoryCode field from 
string temp; 
G.ProductCode:=substring (Temp);  
//with the GS1 specification exacted the value of 
productCode field from string temp; 
G.AI21:=Transformation (U.IC) 10; // transform string 
U.IC into a decimal string; 
E.EPCmanager:=Transformation(G.countryCode+G.fact
oryCode) 2;//concatenated G.countryCode and String 
G.factoryCode, considering the result to be a decimal 
integer and transform the result into a binary string; 
If (E.EPCmanager.length<28) filled zero in front of 
string; 
E.objectClassification:=Transformation 
(G.productCode)2;//transform string G.productCode into a 
binary string; 
If (E.objectClassification.length<24) filled zero in front of 
string; 
E.serialNumber:=Transformation (G.AI21)2;//Transform 
string G.AI21 into a binary string; 
If (E.serialNumber<36) filled zero in front of string; 
E.header:=Transformation (G.AI250)2; // transform string 
G.AI250 into a binary string; 
In order to make the E.header value not conflict with the 
predefined values in EPC specification, we can add a 
certain numeric string in front of the string E.header. Of 
course, we need delete this string in the transformation 
process which transforms EPC into uCode. 
 End; 
Since the check digit in GS1 code is not used in 
transformation process, we do not need to compute the 
check digit in our transformation process. The whole 
transformation process is shown in Figure1:       
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Figure1. The process of transforming uCode into EPC 
 
(2) Transform mCode into EPC-96 
From table V, we know that the value of Class field in 
mCode indicates the mCode structure. For example, when 
the value of Class field is 0H, the mCode only contains a 
32 bits IC field. When the value of Class field is 5H, 
mCode contains a 16 bits CC field, a 16 bits IC field and 
a 48 bits SC field. In the transformation process, if some 
fields in mCode do not exist, we do not need to consider 
these fields in transformation process. In the following 
section, we will describe our transformation process using 
mCode in which the value of Class field is 5H. First, we 
transform a 96-bits mCode into a GS1 Code with some 
extension components. Then, we transform the GS1 code 
into a relative EPC. The whole transformation process is 
shown as follows: 
Assume: the intermediate code in transformation process 
is a GS1 code G (detailed code structure refers to 
document [GS1 GS] [7]) which extends the AI21 and 
AI250 component. At the same time, we assumed that 
mCode and uCode follow the GS1 code standard. 
Input: a 96 bits mCode M (in which the value of Class 
field is 5H) 
Output: a 96 bits uCode E 
Transformation process: 
Begin 
With the definition of mCode code standard, we can 
extract each field in code M.such as: M.TLC, M.Class, 
M.CC, M.IC, M.SC; As mCode is expressed in 
hexadecimal value string, the value of these field are 
hexadecimal value string. 
G.AI250:= Transformation (M.class)10;//transform string 
M.class into a decimal string 
G.countryCode:=Transformation (M.TLC)10;//transform 
string M.TLC into a decimal string 
If (G.countryCode.length>the length which defined in 
GS1 specification) stop transformation process; 
G.factoryCode:=Transformation (M.CC) 10; 
//transformation string M.CC into a decimal string 
G.productCode:=Transformation(M.IC)10;//transform 
string M.IC into a decimal string; 
If (G.productCode.length>the length which defined in 
GS1 specification) stop transformation process; 
G.AI21=Transformation (M.SC)10;//transform string 
M.SC into a decimal string; 
E.EPCmanager:=Transformation(G.countryCode+G.fact
oryCode)2;//concatenated G.countryCode and string 
G.factoryCode, considering the result to be a decimal 
integer and transform it into a binary string; 
If (E.EPCmanager.length<28) filled zero in front of 
string; 
E.objectClassification:=Transformation 
(G.productCode)2;//transform string G.productCode into a 
binary string; 
If (E.objectClassification.length<24) filled zero in front of 
string; 
E.serialNumber:=Transformation (G.AI21)2;//transform 
string G.AI21 into a binary string; 
If (E.serialNumber<36) filled zero in front of string; 
If (E.serialNumber>the length which defined in EPC 
specification) stop transformation process; 
E.header:=Transformation (G.AI250)2;//transform string 
G.AI250 into a binary string; 
If (E.header.length>the length which defined in EPC 
specification) stop transformation process; 
In order to make the E.header value not conflict with the 
predefined values in EPC specification, we can add a 
certain numeric string in front of the string E.header. 
End;  
Since the check digit in GS1 code is not used in 
transformation process, we do not need to compute the 
check digit in our transformation process. The whole 
transformation process is shown in Figure 2: 
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     Figure2. The process of transforming mCode into EPC 
Process.2 Transform EPC, mCode into uCode
To achieve the information exchanging between uCode 
code standard system and other code standard systems 
and help the interaction of uID network with other 
networks, we can transform EPC and mCode into uCode. 
The transformation process is exactly the opposite process 
described in process.1 Section A. So in here, we may only 
describe the transformation process how to transforms the 
mCode into uCode. Because of the big difference between 
the structures of mCode and uCode, we can't transform 
mCode into uCode directly. Fortunately, we can use GS1 
code with some extension components as an intermediate 
code in transformation process. As we mentioned before, 
the value of Class field indicates the code structure of 
mCode. In the following section, we will describe the 
whole transformation process using mCode in which the 
value of Class field is 5H. The process of transforming 
mCode into uCode is shown as follows: 
Assume: the intermediate code in transformation process 
is a GS1 code G (for detailed code structure, please refer 
to document [GS1 GS] [7]) which extends the AI21 and 
AI250 components. We also assume that mCode and 
uCode follow the GS1 code standard. 
Input: a 96 bits mCode M (the value of Class field is 5H). 
Output: a 128 bits uCode U 
Transformation process: 
Begin 
With the definition of mCode standard, we can extract 
each field in code M. such as: M.TLC, M.Class, M.CC, 
M.IC, M.SC; mCode is expressed in hexadecimal value 
string; 
G.AI250:=Transformation (M.class)10;//transform string 
M.class into a decimal string; 
G.countryCode:=Transformation (M.TLC)10;//transform 
string M.TLC into a decimal string; 
If (G.countryCode.length>the length which defined in 
GS1 specification) stop transformation process; 
G.factoryCode:=Transformation (M.CC) 10; 
//transform string M.CC into a decimal string 
G.productCode:=Transformation (M.IC) 10; 
//transform string M.IC into a decimal string 
If (G.productCode.length>the length which defined in 
GS1 specification) stop transformation process; 
G.AI21=Transformation (M.SC) 10; 
//transform string M.SC into a decimal string 
U.classCode:=Transformation (G.AI250)2; 
//transform string G.AI250 into a binary string 
If (U.classCode.length>the length which defined in 
uCode specification) stop transformation; 
U.classCode:=”1”+U.classCode;//added the character '1' 
to the front of string. 
U.version:=”XXXX”;//among which, at least has one bit 
character is ‘1’; 
U.domainCode:=Transformation(G.factoryCode+G.produ
ctCode)2; 
//concatenated G.factoryCode and string G.productCode, 
considering the result to be a decimal integer, then 
transform it into a binary string; 
If (U.domainCode.length<the length which defined in 
uCode specification) filled the zero in front of string; 
Else if (U.domainCode.length>the length which defined 
in uCode specification) stop transformation process. 
U.TLDC:=Transformation (G.countryCode) 2; 
//transform string G.countryCode into a binary string 
If (U.TLDC<the length which defined in uCode 
specification) filled the zero in front of string; 
Else if (U.TLDC>the length which defined in uCode 
specification) stop transformation process; 
U.IC:= Transformation (G.AI21)2; 
//transformation string G.AI21 into a binary string 
If (U.IC<the length which defined in uCode specification) 
filled the zero in front of string; 
Else if (U.IC>the length which defined in uCode 
specification) stop transformation process; 
End; 
Since the check digit in GS1 code is not used in 
transformation process, we do not need to consider the 
check digit in our transformation process. The whole 
transformation process is shown in Figure 3: 
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Figure.3 The process of transforming mCode into uCode 
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
To prove the effectiveness of our tag code transforma- 
tion approach, we conducted simulation experiments with 
our approach. Because the existing code transformation 
approach [12] can not apply to the code transformation 
between incompatible tag codes. So in here, we only 
verify the effectiveness of our code transformation 
approach. In our experiment, the hardware platform 
specifications are: CPU is Intel Pentium Dual Core 
2.16GHz; memory capacity is 2GHz. Operating system is 
Windows XP Professional. With Myeclipse7.1 
development tool, we built a prototype system of our tag 
code transformation approach. With the prototype system, 
we verified the effectiveness of our approach. Here is our 
experiment process: First, with the different tag code 
standards, we generate numbers of tag codes. Then, we 
transform these tag codes into different tag code standards 
with our prototype system. In this case, the performance 
analysis result using our approach is obtained, shown in 
Table VI.
 
TABLE VI. THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF TAG CODE TRANSFORMATION APPROACH 
 
 
In the experiments of transforming uCode to EPC, it 
spends 31ms on transforming of 100 codes, 47ms on 500 
codes, 63ms on 1000 codes, 157ms on 5000 codes, 
297ms on 10000 codes, 1375ms on 50000 codes and 
2719ms on 100000 codes. The data above show the 
effectiveness of our code transformation approach. 
Though, these data are obtained under experiment 
environment, there would not be much different in the 
real application. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Along with the development of RFID technology, the 
applications of Internet of Things gradually obtain more 
and more attentions in academic and industrial research. 
There exist many different tag code standards in the 
Internet of Things. Moreover, the information carried by 
different tag code standard systems can't be exchanged. 
Our tag code transformation approach in Internet of 
Things provides a solution for this issue. With this 
approach, the information exchanging between 
incompatible codes standard systems become possible. 
And that accelerates the development and applications of 
global Internet of Things. In the future, we would like to 
cover all the tag code standard systems, for example, 
including ISO RFID standards. So that things in Internet 
can share and exchange information with each other. 
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Abstract—Security is one of key factors which influence the 
development of mobile P2P systems. However, traditional 
security techniques cannot be applied directly to a mobile 
P2P network due to some of its characteristics such as 
heterogeneous nature of the peers, limited-range as well as 
unreliability of wireless links. In the paper we propose a 
distributed trust evaluation model, which helps the systems 
to operate normally with high probability. The model uses a 
polling protocol and seven metrics to real-time evaluate the 
reputation of mobile peers. The model exhibits three 
interesting features not seen in previous works. Firstly, it 
considers voting for peers from the perspectives of both 
trust and distrust. This appears to be the first attempt to 
incorporate distrust in the polling algorithm. Secondly, it 
credits/penalizes a peer according to its interaction 
behaviors, the size of interaction and the vote accuracy. This 
mechanism of credit and penalization is expected to deter 
dishonesty or misbehavior by the entities involved. Thirdly, 
it effectively solves the trust problem when no prior 
interaction history exists, an issue that has not been 
addressed in many models. In the end, the model is shown to 
be efficient and robust in the presence of attackers through 
simulation.  
 
Index Terms—trust, P2P, distributed, mobile 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the deployment of high bandwidth 3G (and 
expected deployment of 3.5G and 4G) cellular networks 
and wireless LANs, there is an increasing interest in 
wireless P2P networks. A wireless mobile network is a 
cooperative network where each node requires 
collaborating with each other to forward packets from a 
source to a destination. It is often termed an 
infrastructure-less, self-organized, or spontaneous 
network. In mobile P2P systems, each peer acts as both 
client and server to share its resources with other peers, 
and communicates with each other via unregulated, short-
range wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.11, 
Bluetooth, or Ultra Wide Band (UWB) [9]. It is obvious 
that mobile P2P systems are different from the wired 
ones, since each object is able to move around and each 
has a limited radio range. Compared to a fixed peer-to-
peer system, the mobile network environment is more 
distributed, with wider participants and more autonomic 
than the fixed P2P system. 
However, traditional security techniques cannot be 
applied directly to the mobile P2P systems due to the 
limitations of the wireless medium, expensive bandwidth, 
and the limitations of the mobile devices due to small 
memory and limited computation power [1]. Therefore, 
computation-intensive techniques like public-key 
cryptography are not expected to be used in mobile P2P 
systems. Such a distinction is also beyond the ability of 
the conventional key management scheme because we 
cannot guarantee the secrecy of each peer’s private key. 
In addition, mobile devices are susceptible to a variety of 
attacks for example, eavesdropping, denial of services, 
wormhole, and Sybil attack. Even a few malicious peers 
can easily spread deceitful data and make the systems be 
in confusion without great efforts. Therefore, some smart 
trust management schemes are needed to identify 
trustworthiness of mobile peers in order to distinguish 
between malicious peers and innocuous peers, and to 
strengthen reliable peers and weaken suspicious peers. 
The idea of constructing a trust-based scheme is 
motivated from existing human societies in the world. 
Embedded in every social network is a web of trust; with 
a link representing the trustworthiness between two 
individuals. When faced with uncertainty, individuals 
seek the opinions of those they trust. The intent is to 
develop a similar trust management mechanism for P2P 
Systems, where peers maintain trust value for other peers. 
This trust value is used to evaluate the trustworthiness of 
other peers. This establishes a web of trust in the 
network, which is then used as an inherent aspect in 
predicting the future behavior of peers in the network. 
Because mobile P2P systems pose some unique 
challenges, not every current trust evaluation models [2-
6] are applicable to mobile P2P systems properly. In the 
paper we propose a distributed trust evaluation model, 
which helps the systems to operate normally with high 
probability. The model uses a polling protocol and seven 
metrics to real-time evaluate the reputation of mobile 
peers. The model exhibits three interesting features not 
seen in previous works. Firstly, it considers voting for 
peers from the perspectives of both trust and distrust. 
This appears to be the first attempt to incorporate distrust 
in the polling algorithm. Secondly, it credits/penalizes a 
peer according to its interaction behaviors, the size of 
interaction and the vote accuracy. This mechanism of 
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credit and penalization is expected to deter dishonesty or 
misbehavior by the entities involved. Thirdly, it 
effectively solves the trust problem when no prior 
interaction history exists, an issue that has not been 
addressed in many models. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes related work. Section 3 presents the proposed 
trust model. Section 4 contains experimental study. 
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
Trust-management approach for distributed systems 
security was first introduced in the context of Internet as 
an answer to the inadequacy of traditional cryptographic 
mechanisms. Some of the notable earlier works in this 
domain have been trust-management engines such as RT 
framework [10]. Since then many trust models based on 
reputation have been proposed for P2P networks, such as 
EigenTrust [2], PowerTrust [3], Bayesian network-based 
trust model [4] and so on. Yet, little has been done to 
show how trust and distrust can be incorporated into a 
trust model to yield an outcome that is beneficial to trust 
computation. In fact, even a small amount of information 
about distrust can tangibly help judge about a peer’s trust. 
The proposed mechanism does borrow some design 
features from several existing works in literature but as a 
complete system differs from all the existing reputation-
based systems. 
EigenTrust [2] model is designed for the reputation 
management of P2P systems. The global reputation of 
peer i is marked by the local trust values assigned to peer 
i by other peers, which reflects the experience of other 
peers with it. The core of the model is that a special 
normalization process where the trust rating held by a 
peer is normalized to have their sum equal to 1. The 
shortcoming is that the normalization could cause the loss 
of important trust information. Runfang Zhou and Kai 
Hwang [3] proposed a power-law distribution in user 
feedbacks and a computational model, i.e., PowerTrust, 
to leverage the power-law feedback characteristics. The 
paper used a trust overlay network (TON) to model the 
trust relationships among peers. PowerTrust can greatly 
improve global reputation accuracy and aggregation 
speed, but it can not avoid the communication overhead 
in global trust computation. 
A Bayesian network-based trust model [4] proposed by 
Wang and Vassileva uses reputation built on 
recommendations in P2P networks. The work 
differentiates between two types of trust, trust in the 
host’s capability to provide the service and trust in the 
host’s reliability in providing recommendations. A new 
trust model based on recommendation evidence is 
proposed for P2P Networks by Tian Chun Qi et al [5]. 
The proposed model has advantages in modeling dynamic 
trust relationship and aggregating recommendation 
information. It filters out noisy recommendation 
information. Though the trust model filters out noisy 
recommendation information, the algorithm is complex 
algorithm considering the complexity of the algorithm 
design and the workload in the system running. 
Thomas Repantis and Vana Kalogeraki [6] propose a 
decentralized trust management middleware for ad-hoc, 
peer-to-peer systems, based on reputation. In the work, 
the middleware’s protocols take advantage of the 
unstructured nature of the network to render malicious 
behavior, and the reputation information of each peer is 
stored in its neighbors and piggy-backed on its replies. 
The proposed approach allows peers to calculate a local 
trust for other peers with the reputation information 
which is collected by flooding reference trust requests to 
peers’ friends. However, in large scale mobile P2P 
networks, flooding mechanism is not scalable. 
Recently, there are many approaches studying trust 
management of wireless systems. The significant efforts 
done so far are to manage trust with the help of 
Certificate Authority (CA) or Key Distribution Center 
(KDC). A CA/KDC is responsible for setting up the 
foremost trust relationships among all the nodes by 
distributing keys or certificates [7]. Then, CA’s 
functionality is substituted by t sub-CAs using threshold 
cryptography, and these t sub-CAs will issue partial 
certificates afterwards. In the solution, a group of n 
servers together with a master public/private key pair are 
firstly deployed by CA. Each server has a share of the 
master private key and stores the key pairs of all nodes. 
The shares of master private key are generated using 
threshold cryptography. Thus, only n servers together can 
form a whole signature. For any node wanting to join the 
network, it must first collect all of the n partial signatures. 
Then the node can compute the whole signature locally 
and thus get the certificate. However, this strategy suffers 
from difficulty on collecting t certificates efficiently. 
In the distributed CA scheme [8], Kong et al. 
mentioned that the trust between a to-be-member node 
and t member nodes in its neighborhood can be 
established by out-of-bound physical proofs, such as 
human perception or biometrics. However, we can find 
that this method is far from practical. It is obviously 
impossible for a node acquiring t nodes to trust it in its 
local communication range, because the trust evidence 
should be evaluated and authenticated, or there should 
exist off-line trust relationships between this node and the 
t member nodes. In an infrastructureless mobile network 
environment, the evaluation of trust evidence will be very 
hard. 
A novel trust evaluation model to be proposed in this 
paper has addressed these weaknesses. Namely, the 
model has defined clear criteria for trust calculation. A 
mobile peer can select one or more peers to interact based 
upon the criteria such that the aggregated trust value of 
these selected peers satisfies the trust level specified by 
the mobile peer owner. The trust level is, in turn, 
determined by the value of the interaction to be 
performed. In addition, the mobile peer owner calculates 
and updates trust values associated with each of the peers 
involved in an interaction by Trust Updating algorithm.  
III.  THE TRUST METRICS 
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In the section we firstly present the definition and type 
of trust, then introduce seven trust factors which 
influence the trust in such a mobile environment. 
A.  The definition and type of trust 
Trust plays a role across many disciplines, including 
sociology, psychology, economics, political science, 
history, philosophy, and computer science. As such, work 
in each discipline has attempted to define the concept. 
The problem with defining trust is that there are many 
different types of trust and it means something different 
to each person, and potentially in each context where it is 
applied. In order to facilitate making computations with 
trust in mobile P2P systems, we propose the following 
definition: trust in a peer is a commitment to an action 
based on a belief that the future actions of that peer will 
lead to a good outcome. This definition forms the 
foundation for identifying main factors that influence the 
trust in mobile P2P systems, and how it can be used in 
computation. Our trust model has two types of trust: 
direct trust and recommendation trust. Direct trust is the 
trust of a peer on another based on the direct interacting 
experience and is used to evaluate trustworthiness when a 
peer has enough interacting experience with another peer. 
On the other hand, recommendation trust is used when a 
peer has little interacting experience with another one. 
Recommendation trust is the trust of a peer on another 
one based on direct trust and other peers’ 
recommendation. 
To figure axis labels, use words rather than symbols. 
Do not label axes only with units. Do not label axes with 
a ratio of quantities and units. Figure labels should be 
legible, about 9-point type. 
Color figures will be appearing only in online 
publication. All figures will be black and white graphs in 
print publication.  
B.  The trust factors 
The mobile network environment is more distributed, 
with wider participants and more autonomic than the 
fixed P2P network. Since there is no centralized node to 
serve as an authority to monitor and punish the peers that 
behave badly, malicious peers have an incentive to 
provide poor quality services for their benefit because 
they can get away. An important question raised is how 
can a mobile peer owner decide one or more peers to 
interact with it? In other words, what should be the 
selection criteria on which the mobile peer owner makes 
the interaction decision. Obviously, the mobile peer 
owner should select the peers that have an acceptable 
level of trust. In our distributed trust model, a peer’s trust 
is measured by a trust level. The value is the result of the 
peer’s aggregated interactional behaviors (reflected by its 
responses) over a specific past period. The trust level 
reflects the truthfulness of the peer in performing the 
interactions.  
The value is the function of the following parameters. 
Satisfaction or dissatisfaction degree in 
interactions: When a mobile peer finishes an interaction 
with another peer, the mobile peer will evaluate its 
behavior in the interaction. The result of evaluation is 
described using satisfaction or dissatisfaction degree 
which is in the range (-1, 1). Satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction degrees express how well and how poor 
this peer has performed in the interaction, respectively. 
Satisfaction or dissatisfaction degree can encourage 
interacting sides to behave well during interactions. 
However, it is sufficient to measure a peer’s 
trustworthiness without taking into account the number of 
interactions. 
Number of interactions performed: Some peers have 
a higher interaction frequency than some other peers due 
to a skewed interaction distribution. A peer will be more 
familiar with other peers by increasing the number of 
interactions. A simple aggregation of feedbacks may fail 
to capture the true record of a peer’s interactional 
behavior. For example, a peer that has performed dozens 
of interactions but cheated on 1 out of every 4 occasions 
will have a higher aggregated trust value in comparison 
with a peer that has only performed 10 interactions and 
has been faithful in all of these occasions. In other words, 
the total number of interactions that the peer has 
performed over the specific past period is also an 
important indicator of its trust and should be taken into 
account for the calculation of its trust value. In our 
model, the average feedback value, measured as the ratio 
of the sum of the feedbacks the peer has received over 
time period Th to the total number of interactions the peer 
has taken part over the same period, is used instead of a 
simple sum. 
Size of interactions: Size has different meanings in 
different P2P environments. In a P2P file sharing 
network, the size of interaction expresses the file size 
shared in each interaction, while in a P2P business 
community, it shows the sums of money involved in each 
interaction. We know that helping with an interaction 
with a value of $1000 certainly worth more credits than 
that with a value of $10. Similarly, failure to perform an 
interaction of £1000 should be penalized more than 
failing a $10 one. Size of interactions is an important 
factor that should be considered in the trust model. For 
peers without any interacting history, most previous trust 
models often define a default level of trust. But if it is set 
too low, it would make it more difficult for a peer to 
show trustworthiness through its actions. If it is set very 
high, there may be a need to limit the possibility for peers 
to “start over” by re-registration after misbehaving. In 
our trust model, the introduction of the size of 
interactions effectively solves the trust problem of peers 
without any interacting history. An example of Size of 
interactions is given in Table 2.The details will be 
described in the next part. 
Time: The influence of an interacting history record to 
trust always decays with time. The more recent 
interactions have more influence on trust evaluation of a 
peer. For instance, if peer X has interacted with peer Y 
for a long time, the change of trust degree influenced by 
the interaction three years earlier is weaker than that of 
today. In our trust model, we introduce time factor to 
reflect this decay, that is, the most recent interaction 
usually has the biggest time factor. 
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Vote accuracy: We use a distributed polling algorithm 
[1] to collect peer’s reputation information in our model. 
Vote accuracy factor reflects the accuracy that a peer 
votes for other peers. For example, if a peer correctly 
votes for other peers, it will have a high vote accuracy 
factor. The purpose of introducing this factor is to 
encourage peers to vote actively and correctly in our 
model. As if their suggestions are more worthy of belief, 
people are always honest in the real society. 
Punishment function: The measurement of trust is the 
accumulation of the effects of interactions, both positive 
and negative. We not only consider the decay of 
influence of the interaction experiences with time, but 
also punish malicious actions. Punishment should be 
involved by decreasing its trust degree according to the 
amount of malicious behaviors. Therefore we introduce 
the punishment factor in our model to be used to fight 
against subtle malicious attacks. For instance, if a peer 
increases its trustworthiness through well-behaving in 
small-size interactions and tries to make a profit by 
misbehaving in large-size interactions, the peer would 
need more successful small-size interactions to offset the 
loss of its trust degree. 
Risk: Every peer has its own security defense ability 
which is reflected by risk factor, such as the ability to 
detect vulnerabilities, the ability to address any viruses 
and to defend against intrusions. 
IV.   A DISTRIBUTED TRUST EVALUATION MODEL 
To dynamically select a subset of trusted peers among 
a set of N peers, {trusted peeri, i ∈{1, ..., N}}, based 
upon their real-time interactional behavior to assist a 
mobile peer to perform security sensitive tasks, a 
distributed trust evaluation model is required. It includes 
two steps: trust computing and updating. A mobile peer 
can select one or more peer to interact if the aggregated 
trust value of these selected peers satisfies the trust level 
specified by the mobile peer owner. The mobile peer 
owner updates trust values associated with each of the 
peers involved in an interaction based upon the feedback 
received.  
A.  Assumptions 
The Distributed Trust Evaluation Model is designed 
based upon the following assumptions: 
TABLE I.   
A EXAMPLE OF TABLE TV  
 
Every mobile peer owner maintains a table TV (Trust 
Valuation) containing trust value associated with each of 
the peers that the agent owner has dealt with in the past 
period th. An example TV is given in Table 1. In the 
table, each row corresponds to one peer containing six 
attributes: {Pi-ID, Trusti, Sati, TotalInteri, Faili, Size}. 
The Pi-ID is the unique identifier of peeri. Trusti is its 
aggregated trust value, respectively. The Trusti attribute 
indicates the level of peeri’s trustworthiness (or honesty) 
in performing its job. It is assumed that the initial value 
of Trusti is set to zeros indicating that the mobile peer has 
not yet had any experience in dealing with the peer. The 
initial value is greater than the values indicating a 
malicious peer (≤ -1). In this way, a newly deployed peer 
will not be treated unfairly. Sati refers to the average 
value of Trusti, i.e. Sati =λ×Trusti, ( -1≤ λ ≤1). The 
parameter, λ, represents the impacts of Trusti in 
calculating the value of Sati, respectively. The choice of 
value given to the parameter is of the mobile peer 
owner’s preferences. For example, if a mobile peer owner 
feels that Trusti should weigh more, then he may assign 
0.7 for λ (the value is used in the example given in table 
1). The higher the value of Sati, the more confidence the 
mobile peer owner has in the peeri. TotalInteri refers to 
the total number of interactions taken part by the peeri 
with the mobile peer owner during the past period th. Faili 
is the total number of occasions when peeri fails to 
respond during the period. 
Size has different meanings in different P2P 
environments. In a P2P file sharing network, the size of 
interaction expresses the file size shared in each 
interaction, while in a P2P business community, it shows 
the sums of money involved in each interaction. We also 
assume that table TV is sorted in a descending order 
according to the satisfaction (Sat) values. Thus, the peer 
with the highest satisfaction value shall be in the first row 
of the table. The mobile peer may decide an upper-limit 
for the trust value according to his/her preferences. 
Tables TV is controlled by the validity periods th, to 
maintain the freshness of the relevant data and to reduce 
memory and computational expenses. Trust evaluation 
model 
B.  Trust evaluation model 
Consider the situation where mobile peer X wants to 
interact with peer Y in order to accomplish a certain task. 
Peer X won’t interact unless it is sure that peer Y is 
trustworthy. In order to find out whether peer Y is 
trustworthy, peer X calculates a trust value for peer Y. 
There are two ways in which to calculate trust value: 
direct and recommendation. When peer X has enough 
interaction experience with peer Y, peer X uses direct 
trust to calculate the trust value for peer Y. On the other 
hand, when peer X doesn’t have enough interaction 
experience with peer Y, peer X uses recommendation 
trust to calculate the trust value for peer Y. In our paper, 
an interaction experience threshold is predefines based on 
the size of interactions in a P2P network. For example, 
the threshold is lower when downloading a 1M 
confidential file than a 200M confidential file. If peer X’s 
interaction experience with peer Y exceeds this 
predefined threshold, peer X chooses direct trust to 
calculate the trust value for peer Y, otherwise, it chooses 
recommendation trust. 
Direct Trust Value: Direct trust is denoted 
as ( ( ), )xD T y S . Where ( )xT y is the direct trust value 
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that peer X calculates for peer Y. S expresses peer Y’s 
level of size of interaction which is granted by peer X. 
The level of size of interaction in a P2P business 
community is shown in Table 2. 
TABLE II. 
THE LEVEL OF SIZE OF INTERACTION 
Level Bottom limit Top limit
1 0m 1m
2 1m 2m
…. ….….
n 1nm − nm
 
In Table 2, 0 1 2 nm m m m≤ ≤ ≤ ≤? , where 
m denotes the size of interaction in a P2P business 
community, e.g., $100, $1000, $10000, etc. The level of 
size of interaction satisfies the following rules. 
(1) The lowest level is given to a new peer that doesn’t 
have any interaction history. 
(2) A certain level is updated if the number of successful 
interactions reaches the predefined number in the 
level. The predefined number is decided by the peer 
itself. The lower the current level is, the more the 
number of successful interactions it needs. 
(3) The predefined successful interaction number in a 
certain level is increased if interactions fail due to 
malicious activities. 
By introducing the notion of level, new peers are given 
the chances for interactions, which solves the trust 
problem when no prior interaction history exists, an issue 
that has not been addressed in many models. At the same 
time, it prevents new peers from cheating big time by 
having interaction chances. The direct trust value ( )xT y is 
defined as: 
( )
0
( , ) ( , ) 1( ) ( ( ) ) ( )
( ) 1
N y
x n
i
S x y M x y ZT y pen i Risk y
N y e
α β
−
=
∗ ∗
= ∗ + +
+
∑  (1) 
where α and β and are weighting factors that satisfies 
the condition 1α β+ = . ( )N y denotes the total number 
of interactions that peer X has performed with peer Y 
and ( , )S x y denotes the peer X’s satisfaction degree of 
interaction in its ith interaction  with peer Y which is in 
the range of (-1, 1). ( , )M x y is the ratio between the size 
of the ith interaction and the average size of interactions 
which reflects the importance of the ith interaction among 
all the interactions that peer X has performed with peer 
Y. Therefore, ( , ) i
v
mM x y
m
=  where im  is the size of the 
ith interaction and vm is the average size of all 
interactions. We use Z to denote the time factor. 
1( , ) , (0,1)i now
now i
Z u t t Z
t t
= = ∈
−
              (2) 
where it is the time when the ith interaction occurs and 
nowt is the current time. 1
1 ne−+
 is the acceleration factor 
where n denotes the number of failures. It can make 
trust value drop fast when an interaction fails. As this 
factor increases with n , it helps avoid heavy penalty 
simply because of a few unintentional cheats. 
Finally, ( )Risk y is used to express the risk 
factor. ( )pen i denotes the punishment function and 
 
( )pen i = 
 
 
Recommendation trust value: When two peers have 
litter interaction experience, other peers’ recommendation 
is needed for trust establishment. Recommendation trust 
is the trust of a peer on another one based on direct trust 
and other peers’ recommendation. Recommendation trust 
is calculated based on an enhanced polling protocol to be 
described below. Let we assume that peer Y requests an 
interaction with peer X and the size of the interaction 
is Q . First, peer X computes peer Y’s direct trust denoted 
as ( ( ), )xD T y S . 
1)  
(1) If Q S≤  and ( )xT y reaches a certain value (which 
is set by peer X), peer X considers peer Y to be 
trustworthy. It will then decide to interact with peer 
Y. 
(2) If Q S≤  but ( )xT y fails to reach a certain value, 
peer X chooses to join a group based on its interest. 
Then it checks its own group and location with GPS 
and floods a HELLO message, to announce itself to 
other peers by using Echo protocol [11], then 
requests all other members of the group to cast a 
vote for peer Y from the perspective of trust and 
distrust in the level of Q . For any new peer without 
any interaction history, its trust value would be 0 
and would be granted the lowest level of the size of 
interaction. Without voting, it will be permitted to 
interact at the lowest level. 
(3) If Q S≥  but ( )xT y fails to reach a certain value, 
peer X immediately refuses to interact with peer Y. 
(4) If Q S≥  and ( )xT y reaches a very high value, 
peer X chooses to join a group based on its 
interest and then requests all other members of the 
group to cast a vote for peer Y from the 
perspective of trust and distrust at the level of Q . 
Second, after the other peers receive the poll request 
message, they will decide whether to cast the vote based 
on the following formula. Let E denotes a voting peer, 
then 
( )
1
( , ) ( , ) 1( ) ( ( ) )
( ) 1
N y
e n
i e
S e y M e y ZDT y pen i
N y e−
=
∗ ∗
= +
+
∑     (4) 
where ( )eDT y is the poll value of e in Y. 
( )N y denotes the total number of interactions E  has 
conducted with Y at level Q . ( , )S e y  denotes peer 
E ’s satisfaction degree in the ith interaction  with y from 
the perspective of trust or the dissatisfaction degree from 
1, if the ith interaction fails 
0, if the ith interaction succeeds 
(3) 
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the perspective of distrust. ( , )M e y  is the ratio between 
the size of the ith interaction and the average size of 
interactions. ( )pen i  is the punishment function. 
Lastly, X calculates the recommendation trust which is 
given as: 
                     ( ) ( ')xRT y T T= −                                 (5) 
 
T  is the vote result from the perspective of trust and 
'T  the vote result from the perspective of distrust. T is 
given as  
 
                      
( )
1
( )
( )
N w
i
R w p
T
N w
=
×
=
∑
                                (6) 
where ( )N w denotes the total number of votes 
and ( )R w denotes peer w ’s vote accuracy factor which 
is in the range of (0, 1). p is related to ( )wDT y such that 
if ( ) 0wDT y > , 1p = , else 0p = . 
V.  EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
Experiments have been carried out to study the 
effectiveness and the benefits of our proposed model. In a 
real environment, there may exist some vicious attacks 
including malicious recommendations or cheating in the 
accumulation of trust in small-size interactions. In 
addition, it should solve the trust problem when there is 
no interaction history or little trust value. 
TABLE III. 
DEFAULT PARAMETERS IN SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
802.11Communication protocol
[50,100]Life time (s)
averse, neutral, seekingRisk attitude
0% - 70% of all peersNumber of malicious Peers
20 Maximum speed (m/s) 
500×500 Simulation area (m2)
70 Communicating range (m) 
300 Number of  Peers 
 
The simulation environment is set up as follows: we 
create 300 peers that will perform interacting in a mobile 
p2p resource sharing system. 300 mobile peers are 
uniformly distributed at the area whose size is 
500 500m m× . Communicating range of a mobile device is 
70m. The simulated experiments were run on a dual-
processor Dell server and the operation system installed 
on this machine is Linux with kernel 2.6.9. To make our 
simulation as close to the real mobile p2p systems where 
peers often go offline, we simulate the offline peers by 
assigning every peer a random lifetime (or Time-To-
Live) within the step range [50, 100]. After reaching the 
lifetime, the peer will not respond to any service request, 
and won’t be counted in the statistics either. After one 
more step, the peer comes alive again with a new life 
time randomly chosen from the range [50, 100]. In this 
analysis, we assume that all mobile peers have a same 
amount of battery power and participate in 
communication positively regardless of their roles. Each 
peer acts as both client and server to share its resources 
with other peers, and communicates with each other via 
IEEE 802.11. The default parameters in simulation 
experiments are showed in the table 3. 
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Figure 1.  The relationship between the wrong recommendation 
number and the recommendation trust 
A.  Malicious recommendation 
In the first experiment we evaluate the trust evaluation 
model in terms of its efficiency of excluding malicious 
recommendations in the network. We implement and 
simulate a file sharing system. In this analysis, we assume 
that all mobile peers have a same amount of battery 
power and participate in communication positively 
regardless of their roles. So, we consider only a 
consistency evaluation factor. Figure 1 shows the 
simulation result in which the broken line denotes the 
recommendation trust value Tm that includes malicious 
peers’ recommendations and the solid line denotes the 
real recommendation trust value Tr that doesn’t include 
any malicious recommendations. In this simulation, a 
same malicious recommendation event occurs every 10 
seconds. 
As we can see Figure 1 (a), normal recommendation 
trust value is 0.3, but a malicious recommendation result 
is 0.9 by few malicious peer which broadcasts three times 
as high as a normal recommendation result. This indicates 
the vulnerability of a system without a trust evaluation 
scheme. Figure 1 (b) shows the process of filtering 
inconsistent data of a malicious node which acts 
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inconsistently after certain seconds with a proposed trust 
evaluation scheme. We can see that Tm fluctuates around 
Tr but the scale of the fluctuation is very small. The 
earlier the system detects a malicious node, the lower the 
malicious recommendations of it can affect the 
aggregated result. 
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Figure 2.  The relationship between the direct trust value and the 
number of interactions 
B.  Cheating in the accumulation of trust 
In our trust model direct trust has the property of rising 
slowly and dropping fast. The introduction of level of 
size of interaction limits interactions to certain levels. 
Consequently, attack is prevented when malicious peers 
cheat in large interactions through improving trust value 
using many small interactions. Our second experiment 
verifies the effectiveness of the proposed model by 
simulating the relationship between the direct trust and 
the interaction number of malicious peers. In the 
experiment, we firstly conducted 100 interactions. If there 
is no fraud, the direct trust value is 0.9 as shown in Figure 
2. We can see when the peer has a behavior of fraud in 
the 105th interaction, its direct trust value would drop to 
0.85. The peer has 35 small interactions from the 105th 
interaction to 140th interaction, but there is a difference 
between the current direct trust value and the previous 
105th one. In the 140th interaction, the peer has another 
malicious behavior resulting in its direct trust value 
dropping faster. When it has one more cheating behavior, 
its trust value continues rapid dropping. All together, 
though the peer has successfully conducted 60 small-size 
interactions, the direct trust value could not recover the 
original trust value. The main reason is that after one 
malicious behavior, a peer needs to successfully conduct 
many more honest interactions to make up for the loss of 
trust value. If it conducts small-size interactions, it needs 
to have more interactions to offset the loss of its trust 
degree. 
C.  Group Cheat 
In the third experiment, we assess the performance of 
our mechanism under two attack models: independent 
cheat and group cheat. Our experiment also points out 
that the trust model is also sensitive to the group cheat. In 
the experiment, we add a number of malicious peers to 
the network such that malicious peers make up between 
0% and 70% of all peers in the network. Figure 3 shows 
what is happening. In this figure, we compare the 
independent cheap and group cheat. Under independent 
cheat, the malicious peers firstly accumulate trust values 
through small interactions, gaining a relatively high trust. 
After trusted by most adjacent peers, the peer takes 
advantage of its high trust value to attack another peer, 
which means to always provide an inauthentic file to 
another peer when selected as download source.  
Group cheat is that there is a group in which the peer 
of the group provides an authentic file to each other and 
provides an inauthentic file to the peer outside the group. 
The rate of inauthentic downloads under  independent 
cheat or group cheat increases at the beginning, then 
starts to drop when the number of malicious peers reaches 
to 30%-40% of all peers in the network. The reason is 
that the trust computing mechanism used in our 
experiments punishes this behavior by lower the trust 
values quickly. Since malicious peers found by the 
mechanism will lose choice selected as download 
sources. As a result, the rate of inauthentic downloads 
will drop. However, due to the good rating coming from 
the cheating group, the rate of inauthentic downloads 
under group cheat drops more slowly than the one under 
independent peer. Yet one thing remains assured: the rate 
under group cheat is still dropping and will drop to 5%. 
Even if no malicious peers are present in the system, 
downloads are evaluated as inauthentic in 3%-5% of all 
cases – this accounts for mistakes users make when 
creating and sharing a file, e.g., by providing the wrong 
meta-data or creating and sharing an unreadable file. 
Ra
te
 o
f i
na
ut
he
nt
ic
 d
ow
nl
oa
ds
 
Figure 3.  Simulation results of peers under independent cheat and 
group cheat 
D.  The trust problem for a new peer 
For peers without any interacting history, most 
previous trust models often define a default level of trust. 
The problem is that if this level is set too low, it may be 
difficult for the new peer to prove its trustworthiness 
through actions. If this level is set too high, there may be 
a need to limit the possibility that peers would have to 
“start over” by re-registration after misbehaving. In our 
trust, the introduction of the size of interaction effectively 
solves the trust problem of peers without any interacting 
history. 
We assume that peer X is a new peer which has no 
interaction experience with other peers. If it wants to 
interact with peer Y, in our trust model, its trust value is 0 
and it would be granted the lowest level of size of 
interaction. Without any voting, peer X would be 
immediately permitted to interact at the lowest level. 
Therefore our trust effectively solves the trust problem 
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for a new peer. As the new peer is granted the lowest 
level of size of interaction, it is prohibited from cheating 
in larger size interactions by giving interaction chances. 
E.  The influence of the time factor 
The experiment shows that our proposed model can 
truly reflect the influence of interaction history to trust 
which always decays with time, as shown in Figure 4. 
Many previous trust models failed to consider the decay 
influence, so the calculation of trust values is not very 
accurate. As the result, trust values are usually computed 
higher than the real ones in those trust models. Our 
proposed model can well solve this problem. 
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Figure 4.  The relationship between time and trust value  
VI.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The realization of trust mechanism in mobile p2p 
systems is quite different due to some characteristics of 
mobile environment, which indicates the trust between 
participants can not be set up simply on the traditional 
trust mechanism. In the paper we proposed a novel trust 
evaluation model for mobile P2P systems. The main 
factors that influence the trust in mobile P2P systems are 
identified. Our model does not employ cryptographic 
approaches or certification mechanisms, so it is light 
enough to fit well with mobile P2P systems without great 
overheads. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is 
one of the incipient researches on trust evaluation model 
for mobile P2P systems that can detect malicious and 
compromised mobile peers. In addition, the proposed 
model effectively solves the trust problem of peers 
without any interacting history. We expect that our trust 
evaluation model can help to make resilient mobile P2P 
systems. In the near future, we would like to test our trust 
into more real mobile p2p systems and analyze the 
system performances.  
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       Abstract—For the purpose of solving the problems of user 
repeated logon from various kinds of Application which based 
on hybrid architecture and in different domains, single sign-
on architecture is proposed. On the basis of analyzing the 
advantages and disadvantages of existing single sign-on 
models, combined with the key technology like Web Service, 
Applet and reverse proxy, two core problems such as single 
sign-on architecture mix B/S and C/S structure applications 
and cross-domain single sign-on are resolved. Meanwhile, the 
security and performance of this architecture are well 
protected since the reverse proxy and related encryption 
technology are adopted. The results show that this 
architecture is high performance and it is widely applicable, 
and it will be applied to practical application soon. 
Index Terms—single sign-on, web service, cross domain, 
reverse proxy, B/S, C/S 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the information society, people enjoy the progress 
in the huge interests, but at the same time also faced the test 
of information security. With all system users need to log in 
the system increased, users need to set a lot of user names 
and passwords, which are confused easily, so it will 
increase the possibility of error. But most users use the 
same user name and password, this makes the 
authentication information is illegally intercepted and 
destroyed the possibility of increased, and security will be 
reduced accordingly. For managers, the more systems need 
more corresponding user databases and database privileges, 
these will increase management complexity. Single sign-on 
system is proposed a solution to solve the problem. Using 
single sign-on, we can establish a unified identity 
authentication system and a unified rights management 
system. It not only improve system efficiency and safety, 
but also can use user-friendly and to reduce the burden on 
administrators. 
TABLE 1 The comparison of a variety of single sign-on to 
achieve models 
SSO Achieve-
Model 
 
Action ability Manageability 
Broker Model The large 
transformation of the 
old system 
Enable centralized 
management 
Agent Model Need to add a new 
agent for each of the 
old system, 
transplantation is 
relatively simple 
Management more 
difficult to control 
Agent and 
Broker Model 
Transplantation 
simple, 
transformation of the 
old system with 
limited capacity 
Enable centralized 
management 
Gateway Model Need to use a 
dedicated gateway to 
access various 
applications 
Easy to manage, but 
databases between the 
different gateways need 
to be synchronized 
Token Model Implementation of 
relatively simple 
Need to add new 
components and 
increase the 
management burden 
 
Single sign-on refers to when the user needs to access a 
distributed environment which has different applications to 
provide the service, only sign on once in the environment, 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1  Manuscript received December 29, 2010; revised October 26,          
2010; accepted October 18, 2010. 
2  corresponding author: Zhigang Liang, South China 
University of Technology; Yuhai Chen  HSBC Software Development 
3   
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 7, NO. 1, JANUARY 2012 165
© 2012 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
doi:10.4304/jnw.7.1.165-172
no need for the user to re-sign on the various application 
systems[1]. Now there are many products and solutions to 
implement SSO, such as Passport of Microsoft, IBM Web 
Sphere Portal Server although these SSO products could do 
well in the function of single sign-on, but most of them are 
complex and inflexible. Currently, the typical models to 
achieve SSO include broker model, agent model, agent and 
broker model, gateway model and token model [2]. In table 
1, it analyses these models can be implemented and 
manageability. Based on the above comparison, agent and 
broker model has the advantages both centralized 
management and revised less original application service 
procedure.  So I decide to adopt agent and broker model as 
the basis for this model. In order to integrate information 
and applications well and with the B/S mode in-depth 
application software, there has been the concept of 
enterprise portal, offer a best way to solve this problem. 
Enterprise portal provides business users access information 
and applications, and complete or assist in a variety of 
interactive behavior of a single integrated access point. The 
appropriate system software portal provides a development, 
deployment and management of portal applications services. 
Enterprise information portal concerns portal, content 
management, data integration, single sign-on, and much 
other content. 
 
II. SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION WHICH REGISTERS BASED 
ON THE WEB SERVICE MIX CONSTRUCTION SINGLE SIGN-ON 
The system consists of multiple trust domains. Each 
trust domain has much B/S architecture of the application 
servers; in addition to B/S architecture of the application 
servers also included C/S architecture application servers. 
All the applications are bound together through a unified 
portal to achieve functionality of single sign-on. You can 
see that this architecture is based on the agent and the 
broker model. A unified agent portal is playing a broker 
role, and various applications are playing an agent role. The 
B/S architecture applications are installed on the Client side 
of SSO Agent, and the unified portal is installed on the 
Server side of SSO Agent. Between them is through these 
two Agents to interact. In addition, in Fig 1, the external 
provision of authentication server is LDAP authentication 
interface. Token authentication Web Service server 
provides the interfaces of single sign-on token of the 
additions, deletions, editions and queries. But the 
permission Web Service server provides the appropriate 
authority information system, to achieve unified 
management authority for accessing unified portal 
application system. 
The system supports cross-domain access, that is, the 
domain D1 users can access the application domain D2, and 
the domain D2 users can access the application domain D1. 
At the same time, the system also supports the application 
of different structures between the single sign-on, that is, 
user after accessing the application A of the B/S structure 
access the application E of C/S structure without having to 
repeatedly enter user name and password, or user access the 
application A after the application E without re-enter login 
information. 
The whole structure of Single Sign-on is as Fig 1 shown. 
 Figure 1: The Structure of Single Sign-on 
A. The login process 
The whole single sign-on process is as Fig 2 shown: 
Below is the process specific steps description: 
1) User login in the client browser to access A 
application, SSO Client of A system intercept and redirect 
the URL to the landing page of Unified Portal System 
2) Enter the user name and password, Unified Portal 
System submits to the authentication server for 
authentication. If the information is correct, Unified Portal 
System automatically generates, saves notes and the role of 
the user ID to a local, and calls the increate-note interface 
of Web Service to insert the information. 
3) Unified Portal System returns a list of application 
resources pages to the user. The user clicks any one 
application system (e.g. A system). The SSO Client-side of 
A application system read the notes information and call 
the query-notes interface of Web Service. If it is consistent 
and within the time limit, it will get the role information of 
the user in A application system and log in A application 
system. At the same time, it will call the update-note 
interface of Note Certification Web Service to update the 
log-in time of this current note. Then call the interface of 
user rights Web Service to get this user’s permission 
information with corresponding application system. 
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4) If user end to access A application system, exit and 
click on the link of B application system, system 
implementations will be are as the same as steps (3). 
5) If user complete all the required access-applications 
and need to do the log-off operation, it will mainly call the 
deletion-note interface to destroy the corresponding note 
information. 
 
Figure 2: The whole process of Single Sign-on 
B. The solution of Cross-domain problems 
In the traditional implementation of single sign-on 
system will be generally used cookie as storage of client-
side notes, but because of restrictions on cookie itself 
properties make it only on the host under the same domain 
effective, and distributed application system always can not 
guarantee that all hosts under the same domain. The current 
system does not store the note information in the client-side 
but placed various application parameters of the link 
directly. The note-verification is through the application of 
the SSO Client-side call to the corresponding interface of 
Web Service to complete. 
Through the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) to 
provide software service in the Web, use WSDL file to 
illuminate and register by UDDI [3]. Shown in Fig 3, after 
the user through the application of UDDI to find a WSDL 
description of the document, he can call the application 
which through SOAP to provide by one or more operations 
of Web services. The biggest characteristic of Web Service 
is its cross-platform, whether it is the application of B/S 
structure or C/S structure, whether it is the application using 
J2EE or .NET to implement, it can access Web Service as 
long as to give Web Service server's I:P and interface name. 
The following is this system process of achieving cross-
domain access: 
1) User log in Unified Portal system successfully. 
2) User accesses A application system within the 
trusted domain D1, complete the access and then exit this 
application. 
3) User clicks the URL of B application system within 
trusted domain D2 of the resources list of Unified Portal. 
4) SSO Client of B application intercepts the request, 
gets the note behind URL, and calls the query-note 
interface of Web Service. 
5) Query interface of Web Service gets back the legal 
information of this note to the SSO Client. 
6) SSO Client redirect to B application system, the user 
access B application. 
                               Figure 3: Web Service Structure 
C. The Solution of Single Sign-on between B/S and C/S 
Structures 
As we know, the implementation principles of 
applications are quite different between B/S and C/S 
structures. In this system, the applications of B/S structure 
can be accessed through by clicking URL of the 
application-resources-list page of Unified Portal. Since the 
browser security restrictions, the page does not allow users 
to directly call the local exe files, so need to adopt an 
indirect way to call C / S architecture applications. This 
article uses the way of Applet to call local exe files, the 
implementations as below: 
For all C/S structures, create a common Agent. This 
Agent's role is an interceptor, which means it need browsers 
to access after the C/S structure joined up Unified Portal 
system. (Please note that: Since the original B/S 
architecture and C/S structure is not using the same 
authentication method. For the C/S application access to the 
unified portal framework to achieve single sign-on system, 
the need for a unified authentication management, and in 
order to change the amount of compression to a minimum. 
Implementation of this system is to create a needless user 
name and password authentication code for all applications 
which are accessed a unified portal, and land on the unified 
portal system certified landing page. When a user uses 
browser to log into the unified portal system successfully 
and then can access any application, including the B/S 
architecture and C/S structure of the application. To be 
ensure the security of C/S application framework, when the 
user clicks directly to the desktop shortcut to open 
applications still using the original authentication.) 
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Applications of C/S architecture are all using the same 
Applet of URL. The received parameters of this common 
Applet include bills, application name, unified login-name 
and password. When a user does not do the login operation 
before, the first visit a C/S application will be intercepted to 
the login-page of Unified Portal system for sign-on. If a 
user logged in before, when visiting a C/S application, this 
Agent will call the interface of Web Service note-validation 
to validate the note which was transferred. If the validation 
is successful, Applet object will be downloaded to the user's 
local to implement. In order to transform the original 
applications as little as possible, the method of this article is 
to open the login window of the corresponding application 
through by Applet. Below are the codes: 
public void OpenExe(String appName){ 
Runtime rn=Runtime.getRuntime(); 
  Process p=null; 
p=rn.exec(“c:\.” + appName + “.exe”); 
} 
 
After opening the log-in window of the application, the 
operation steps of this Applet as follows: 
1) Applet needs to call the bottom API of windows to 
get the user-name of login window, password-input box 
and the handle of login button through by JNI. 
2) Locate the user-name-input box to send unified 
login name. Locate password-input box to send the 
password. (Password information is arbitrary and in order 
to distinguish it from the user clicks on a shortcut directly 
landing system, also need to send a code that uses a unified 
portal access without a password authentication system.) 
Locate the login button to send the click event. 
3) At last, Applet will minimize the IE window, the 
related windows of applications will be placed to the 
forefront. 
These are the implementation process of C/S 
architecture application single sign-on. The application 
codes which have not been changed at all before will join 
up the Unified Portal system using a loosely coupled way. 
Need to explain that, due to the Applet JVM security 
restrictions, cause Applet can not directly call the user's 
System32 directory of local native windows dll. Now the 
method is first to start to use C or C + + to write the class 
which got the corresponding input box and button of the 
login window, and generate a JNIWindowUtil.dll file 
(JNIWindowUtil is a user-defined dll's name). And it is to 
place the dll in the same directory with the Applet. When 
the Applet is downloaded to the client side, dll is also 
downloaded to the user's System32 directory of local at the 
same time. Applet process also needs to execute statement: 
System.loadLibrary("JNIWindowUtil"). After completing 
these above steps, it can really use JNI in Applet internal to 
achieve the corresponding functions. 
D. Authentication server 
The old system user authentication information is 
usually stored in a database, but this architecture used 
LDAP to store user information. LDAP, short for 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, is the standard 
directory access protocol based on a simplified form. It also 
defines the way data organization; it is based on TCP/IP 
protocol of the de facto standard directory service, and has 
distributed information access and data manipulation 
functions. LDAP uses distributed directory information tree 
structure. It can organize and manage various users’ 
information effectively and provide safe and efficient 
directory access. Compared with the database, LDAP is the 
application for reading operation more than writing 
operation, and database is known to support a large number 
of writing operations. LDAP supports a relatively simple 
transaction, but the database is designed to handle a large 
number of various transactions. When the query in Cross-
domain data is mainly read data, modify the frequency is 
very low. When Cross-domain access to the transaction, it 
does not require a large load, so in comparison with the 
database, LDAP is the ideal choice. It is more effective and 
simple. This framework is applied to a large bank, the 
bank's systems can belong to different regions, and use of 
personnel may come from different geographies. In order to 
achieve distributed management, the use of three-level 
management, respectively named the Bank headquarter, 
Provincial and City branches of the three levels of branches, 
as shown in Fig 4:    
 Figure 4: LDAP Authentication Structure 
Directory replication and directory reference is the most 
important technology in LDAP protocol. It can be seen 
from the figure, Provincial and City branches of the LDAP 
server branch data are copied from the floor, but not a 
simple copy of all information, just copy the relevant data 
with their own information. Because for a particular 
application system, its users are mostly belong to the same 
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region, so that implementation can greatly simplify the 
management of directory services and to improve the 
efficiency of information retrieval. When a user outside the 
region to use this system, because of its user information in 
the region can not retrieve LDAP server, you need to other 
regions of the LDAP server to query, and therefore requires 
a way to use up the reference queries, first Provincial 
branches of the server search, without further reference to 
Bank headquarter of the server up until the search to the 
appropriate user information.  
The management of the regional City branch, using the  
LDAP directory replication model of Single Master/Multi 
Slave. When a directory user queries the directory 
information, Master LDAP Server and Slave LDAP Server 
(Slave server can have more than one) can provide services 
to the directory, depending on the directory user makes a 
request to which the directory server. When the user 
requests the directory update directory information, in order 
to ensure the Master LDAP Server and Slave LDAP Server 
in the same directory information content, the need for 
replication of directory information, this is achieved 
through the LDAP Replica server data synchronization. 
Using directory replication, when the directory number of 
users increases or the need to improve system performance, 
only simply add Slave LDAP server to the system and then 
can immediately effective in improving system 
performance, and the whole directory service system can 
have a good load balancing.        
E. Permissions Web Server 
Access Control technology began in the computer age 
of providing shared data. Previously, the way people use 
computers is mainly to submit the run-code written by user 
or run the user profile data. Users do not have much data 
sharing, and do not exist to control access to data. When 
computer comes into user's shared data, the subject of 
access control is nature to put on the desktop. Currently, the 
widely used access control models is using or reference to 
the early nineties of last century the rise of role-based 
access control model (Role-Based Access Control - RBAC). 
RBAC model's success is that it is inserted the "role" 
concept between the subject and object, decouples 
effectively between subject and the corresponding object 
(permission), and well adapts to the subject and object 
associated with the instability. RBAC model includes four 
basic elements, namely the user (User - U), roles (Roles - 
R), session (Session - S) and permission (Permission - P), 
also in the derived model also includes constraints 
(Constrains - C). The basic idea is to assign access rights to 
roles, and then the roles are assigned to users. In one 
session, users can gain the access rights through roles. The 
relationship between the elements: a user can have multiple 
roles, a role can be granted to multiple users; a role can 
have multiple permissions, a permission can be granted 
multiple roles; user can have multiple conversations, but a 
conversation is only to bind a user; a conversation can have 
multiple roles, a role can share to multiple conversations at 
the same time; Constraints are that act on specific 
constraints on these relationships. As shown in Fig 5:  
 
Figure 5: RBAC Basic Model 
This system is to use this very sophisticated permission 
access control model. 
Rights management, not only protects the safety of 
system, but also facilitates management. Currently most 
using the manner of code reuse and database structure reuse, 
rights management module is integrated into business 
systems. Such a framework has the following shortcomings.       
1) Once the permissions system has been modified, the 
maintenance costs will be very high. This is the general 
shortcoming of using code reuse and database structure 
reuse. Once revised, we will have to update the code in all 
business system and database structure, and also to ensure 
that existing data can smooth the transition. Some 
processes may require manual intervention, which is a 
"painful" thing for the developers and maintenance 
personnel.  
2) Did not facilitate management of Permission data. 
Need to enter permission management module of various 
business systems to manage the corresponding rights. It is  
complex operation, and not intuitive.  
3) For different architectures, different software 
operating environment, we must develop and maintain 
different permissions system. For example, B/S and C/S 
architecture system must each develop their own rights 
management system.  
This paper argues that most common function of the 
permission system can abstracted from business systems to 
form an independent system - "unified rights system". 
Business system only retains the rights inquiries, read 
common data system and the control rights function of this 
system specific fine degree (such as menus, buttons, links 
and so on). As shown Fig 1. How to achieve a unified rights 
management? This paper argues that there are two 
implementations, one way is to use Web services to provide 
rights data; the other is using Mobile Agent to provided 
permissions data. However, the second one run, 
maintenance costs are higher, and implement is more 
difficulty than Web services. So this architecture using Web 
services to provide authority data of the various systems in 
User 
Role 
Permission 
Constrains Session 
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a unified way. Business system using Web services client 
interface to query data and obtain system privileges to share 
data. The client is just a port, and specific implementation 
code is placed in "unified rights system". These client 
interfaces introduced to the business system by package. If 
we keep the client interfaces unchanged, modify and 
upgrade of the unified authority system will not affect the 
business system. Users and permissions through Web pages 
of "unified rights system" to unify management and to 
achieve the user's single sign-on. The biggest advantage of 
Web services is the integration of data between 
heterogeneous systems. This breaks the restrictions of B/S, 
C/S structure; there is no difference between Windows and 
Linux platform.   
III. SYSTEM SECURITY ANALYSIS 
1) The interception of user name and password. The 
system for authentication of the user login and send the 
user name and password to Applet objects are used SSL 
protocol. And make sure that information during 
transmission confidentiality and integrity. Meanwhile, due 
to the key which is hard to get and time limited, so it can 
effectively prevent that intermediary attack to the 
transmission of information. 
2) Replay attack. Many systems will use the ways of 
time stamp to avoid duplication attacks. However, this 
approach requires the computer clocks of communication 
parties to be synchronization. But it is difficult to achieve, 
while also appears the following situation: the two sides’ 
clocks which are connecting with each other, if they are out 
of synchronization occasionally, the correct information 
may be mistaken to discard for replay information, but the 
incorrect replay information may be as the latest one to 
receive. Base on the above, this system needs a simple 
method F of an appointment between query interfaces of 
Web Service provided and SSO Client of each application 
system or Agent. This system’s parameter value is a 
random string X. The whole process of bill validation as 
shown in Fig 6: 
 
Figure 6: The process of Based on Web Service bill validation 
a) When the user accesses to application system A, 
the SSO Client of system A intercept and call the query 
interface of Web Service provided, and the input 
parameters are a random string X and the corresponding 
note. 
b) Web Service server receives system A’s call, 
intercepts note to compare with the note’s information of 
Session queue. If the queue contains the note, it will return 
the value of F(X) for showing validation is successful. If 
not, it will return ‘failed’ for showing validation is failed. 
c) SSO Client of the application A receives the 
return information of Web Service server, and then 
compares the return value with F(X) of this system. If the 
two are the same, it will redirect to system A, otherwise it 
will not be allowed to visit. 
The random string is different, which each interact with 
Web Service server. So you can limit replay attacks very 
well. 
3) Use reverse proxy technology. Reverse proxy 
technology is a substitute, which is a reverse proxy server 
as to N identical application servers. When external access 
to this application, it just knows the reverse proxy server 
and can not see the back multiple application servers. This 
improves the security of this application system. 
Through the above analysis, this system can provide 
users with a good safety Web environment. 
IV. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ANALYZES 
First, this system in addition to use SSL encryption in 
the transmission of user name and password, the 
interactions of between other servers and between user and 
servers are based on HTTP protocol to transmit. SSL 
encryption and decryption process requires a lot of system 
cost, severely reduces the performance of the machine, so 
we should not be use this protocol to transmit data too much. 
Since the data which need to encrypt is small, only a user 
ID value (note), so the performance of using MD5 to 
encrypt is quite satisfactory. 
Second, when user accesses any application system of 
each domain, they will be redirected to Unified Portal 
system for identity authentication, or directed to Web 
Service server for note validation. User need to sign on the 
system only when he is certification first time. When the 
visitor volume is larger, the user switch to the new 
application system will easily handle an interruption, which 
is single sign-failure phenomenon [7]. This phenomenon 
has two reasons, one is the server load is too large, the other 
one is network bandwidth is not enough [8]. Among them, 
the method which is resolved the server load is too large is 
to use server cluster. Cluster is made up of multiple servers. 
As a unified resource, it provides a single system service to 
external. In this system, except for using reverse proxy 
technology to improve the security of accessing the 
applications, the more important is capability which can 
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help to implement cluster technology of load balancing. The 
whole structure of reverse proxy is shown in Fig 7: 
Figure 7: Reverse Proxy Structure 
Fig 7, reverse proxy server R provides the 
corresponding interface to implement the algorithm of load 
balancing except for providing cache for the behind A1, A2 
and A3 application. That is, it can consider the arrival 
request to distribute to the server which has the best 
performance through by scanning the conditions of CPU, 
memory and I/O of A1, A2, A3 server. By LoadRunner8.1, 
the use of reverse proxy system before and after was related 
to stress testing. The test results are shown in Fig 8:   
 
Figure 8: The system stress testing result 
It can be seen from Figure 8, at the beginning, when the 
number of concurrent users is not large, use the reverse 
proxy and out of use proxy is similar. But with the gradual 
increase of concurrent users, the performance difference 
between the two is more and more evident. To 100 
concurrent users to access, the system response time of 
using the reverse proxy is almost twice as fast as the one out 
of use proxy. 
System Web Service server needs to store the 
information of note, so using Web Service server cluster to 
pay attention to this problem: the different Servers of 
cluster use different JVM, so an object of JVM can not be 
accessed by other JVM directly. For this problem, there are 
two methods to resolve: 
1) Put the object in Session, and then configure cluster 
to the copy model of Session. 
2) Use Memcache, put the object in Memcache, and 
then all Server get this object from Memcache. To be 
equivalent to open a public memory area, which everyone 
can access. 
Any more, business system requires get rights 
information data through the Web services frequently. This 
performance of the system put forward higher requirements. 
The system has been taken two measures to improve 
performance: 
1) It receives a request by using time-sharing patterns 
of authority data server. After that, if always be calculated 
in real-time data, it will not certainly respond in time as the 
server limited resources. This will cause the system to slow 
down. A "time-sharing patterns of authority data" can solve 
this problem. When the system data changes (such as a 
new operation is authorized to the role, etc), the system 
automatically calculates the affected user, and then re-
calculate the relevant authority data, save to the specified 
field of database. When the business system requests data, 
only run "to read the database designated field 
corresponding to the specified data" such a simple action, 
you can greatly speed up the system response speed.    
2) Designed the cache structure to rely solely on time-
sharing model is not enough to improve response time. 
After all, access to the database is relatively resource 
intensive. This paper designes cache struture which is 
based on the memory to further improve the speed, to 
achieve the following functions: when the system starts, it 
will reside the public data which is often uesd to cache 
(such as organizational structure, role information, etc.), if 
the change in the operation of this part of the data, then 
also update the data in the cache. It is to adjust the priority 
of the data according to the frequency of access the cache 
object, and regularly to remove expired objects. It can 
improve the cache hit rate through the trade-off algorithm 
of cache object which is optimized.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This text develops a single sign-on. Compare with the 
traditional sign-on model, this text presents a new solution 
which is single sign-on of hybrid framework of being based 
on Web Service. This program can be applied to distributed 
environment of being based on multi-trust-domain, and also 
applied to the case which has both B/S structure and C/S 
structure applications. It optimizes the unified management 
of the administrator faces to user information, facilitate the 
user to access to each application resource, improve the 
efficiency of user use application resource, enhance the 
security of user access each site, and provide the basis for 
integrating more sub-application systems. 
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Abstract—Conventional access control models are suitable 
for centralized and static environment, but they seldom 
meet the requirements of open and dynamic environments. 
The design of effective access control models to meet the 
challenge is a current research focus. As an important 
factor in security, trust is increasingly applied to security 
management, especially in access control. In this paper, by 
considering multi-factors feature of trust, we proposed an 
access control model based on multi-factors trust. The 
model includes multi-factors trust computation, permission 
mapping and feedback module. Simulation results show 
that the model is suitable for access control in dynamic 
environments. 
Index Terms—trust; access control; permission 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Access control, which is used to restrict the use of 
resources, is an important safeguard in network security. 
Nowadays, most of access control models have been 
studied extensively in centralized and static environment, 
and they seldom meet the requirements of some open and 
dynamic environments, such as Grid and P2P. Traditional 
access control models do not work in these environments. 
The entities that a system well will interact with or the 
resources that will be accessed are not always known in 
advance. Thus, it is almost impossible to predefine 
permissions to an entity. Since almost all traditional 
access control models rely on successful authentication of 
predefined users, they become unsuitable for open and 
dynamic environments. Access control in these 
environments must dynamically adapt to dynamic 
addition and deletion of entities. 
Trust is a part of our daily life and thus can be used as a 
tool to reduce the complexity of making access decisions, 
which can be accomplished by using trust to provide 
security [1]. In recent years, many researchers have 
applied trust to the dynamic environments. In [2], trust 
models are proposed to control anonymity, 
unpredictability and uncertainty. However, there is 
several factors affect trust. For example, entities’ attribute, 
time, network condition and history behavior. 
In this paper, we propose an access control model 
based on multi-factors trust. We compute trust using 
several factors, and we present a trust based access 
control model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 
2, we review some related works. In Section 3, we 
compute trust using several factors. In Section 4, we 
describe an access control model based on multi-factors 
trust. In Section 5, we present and analyze some 
simulation results. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude this 
paper with a discussion on our future work. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
Access control is the mechanism that allows owners of 
resources to define manage and enforce access conditions 
applicable to each resource [3]. Most access control 
models were developed for special environment. There 
are mainly three kinds of access control methods: 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)[4], Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC)[1][5]and Role-based Access 
Control (RBAC)[6][7][8]. However, none of them is 
suitable for the dynamic and open environments due to 
the lack of flexibility and efficiency.  
Semantic access control (SAC) [9] is a new kind of 
access control model, which uses machine reasoning at a 
semantic level to determine whether let the requests pass 
according to the semantic descriptions of the policies, 
requests, resources and other entities. Compared with 
traditional access control, SAC is more scalable, more 
applicable to dynamic environments with heterogeneous 
and complex access criteria. But the foundation of SAC is 
the semantic web technologies. Thus it can not be applied 
in all access control fields. 
A management of access control for distributed 
environment which supports dynamic collaboration is 
discussed in [10]. With the development of ontology and 
semantic web, a new access control, context-based access 
control has been designed. Different from the traditional 
access control, context-based access control looks context 
as the key of access control [11]. It uses the context of 
requestor to decide whether to give the requestor the 
warranty or not.  
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With the research of trust, some researchers have 
thought about the application of trust. Researchers in [12] 
have proposed a way to incorporate the concept of trust to 
RBAC to address this particular problem. The concept of 
access control based on a trust level was discussed in 
[13], who described a role-based access control model 
that assigns roles to users based on their trust level. 
TCAC [14] proposed an extended RBAC model based on 
trust and context. In TCAC, only the user’s trust value is 
not less than the trust threshold in access control policy 
and the context information satisfy the limit, the user will 
be given some roles. Some researchers proposed 
trust-based access control [15][16]. Trust-based access 
control is to use trust to the requestor as the key of access 
control. The owner of resource gives the warranty to the 
requestors who he trusts. In these work proposed above, 
although trust was introduced into access control models, 
but they didn’t take into account factors which affect 
trust.  
III. MULTI-FACTORS TRUST COMPUTATION  
A Multi-factors of Trust 
Trust is very subjective that reflects one body’s 
subjective expectation on another body’s future actions 
based on their previous exchanges [17]. In general, trust 
changes dynamically along with the behavior of users. 
Every user has a particular trust value towards others at a 
certain point of time or during a certain period of time. 
The trust value changes as a result of interactions with 
others. 
When computing trust value of an entity, we will take 
into account its attribute, history behavior, time and 
network condition. 
IP attribute can affect trust value of an entity. We use 
1T  to denote the influence of IP attribute for trust 
computation. 
We can predict an entity’s future behavior based on its 
history behavior. We use 2T  to denote the influence of 
history behavior for trust computation. After an 
interaction between a subject and an object, there is 
feedback information from the owner of object. The 
information will be stored by the object, which can impact 
the subject’s trust computation next time.  
Time can affect trust value of an entity, for example, an 
entity’s trust value is different in the daytime or at night. 
We use 3T  to denote influence of time for trust 
computation. 
Network condition can also affect trust computation. 
We use 4T  to denote the influence of network condition 
to trust computation. 
B Multi-factors Trust Computation 
Given IP attribute affects trust computation, we 
suppose that IP attribute has four possible cases. Trust 
interval is then divided into four disjoint subintervals in 
which every case of the IP attribute corresponds to a 
subinterval. For example, an entity’s trust value which 
corresponding to IP is shown in Table I in which the trust 
interval is A= [0, 1]. 
According to interaction results between entities, the 
history behavior can be divided into four possible cases, 
such as trusted behavior, hostile behavior, attempted 
hostile behavior and hostile behavior. Every case 
corresponds to a subinterval. For example, an entity’s 
trust value corresponding to history behavior is shown in 
Table II in which the trust interval is A= [0, 1].  
There are different methods to evaluate history 
behavior factor according to different application. In this 
paper, we use the following method to evaluate history 
behavior factor in trust computation. Assume that a 
subject’s trust value last time is T. The subject accesses an 
object, and the object’s owner gives satisfaction degree on 
the subject. The satisfaction degree is denoted as S, and 
S∈ [0,1]. The actual trust value of the object on the 
subject is aT T S= × . According to Table II, we can 
see a iT K∈ , in which [ , ]iK a b=  is an interval in Table 
II. The trust value corresponding to history behavior 
factor 2T  is a random value between a and aT . 
Namely, 2 [ , ]aT a T∈ . If an entity’s history behavior is 
good and its actual trust value aT is high, then the trust 
value corresponding to history behavior factor is also 
high. 
The computation of trust value which corresponding to 
history behavior factor can be described as follows: 
Step1: We divide trust into i intervals, and every 
interval [ , ]i i iK a b= . 
Step2: If it is the first time a subject interacts with the 
object, then the trust value which corresponding to    
history behavior factor 2 0.5T = . Otherwise, we read the 
subject’s trust value T at last time from history 
information which stored by the object. 
TABLE I. 
TRUST INTERVAL CORRESPONDING TO IP ATTRIBUTE 
IP    
attribute 
Very safe Safe Moderate Dangerous
Trust 
interval 
[0.9,1] [0.6,0.9) [0.3,0.6) [0,0.3) 
TABLE II. 
TRUST INTERVAL CORRESPONDING TO HISTORY BEHAVIOR 
History  
behavior 
Trusted Moderate 
Attempted 
hostile 
Hostile 
Trust 
interval 
[0.8,1] [0.5,0.8) [0.2,0.5) [0,0.2) 
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Step3: According to feedback satisfaction degree S, we 
can compute the actual trust value aT T S= × . 
Step4: We select the trust interval [ , ]j j jK a b=  to 
make a jT K∈ . 
Step5: The trust value corresponding to history 
behavior factor 2T  is randomly generated, and 
2j aa T T≤ ≤ . 
Generally speaking, access behavior has time 
characteristics. According to history access behavior, we 
establish the relationship of time factor and trust. We 
divide access time into four periods: frequent period, 
moderate period, rare period and impossible period. Trust 
value which corresponding to access time is shown in 
Table III. 
We consider network condition as a factor which 
affects trust computation. Network condition mainly 
includes bandwidth and channel security. We divide 
network condition into four cases: very safe, safe, 
moderate and dangerous. For example, the network 
condition corresponding trust value is shown in Table IV. 
We calculate trust values which corresponding to IP 
attribute, history behavior, time and network condition, 
then use these values to compute a subject’s trust value. 
There are different methods to compute 1T , 3T , 4T . The 
method in this paper is determining trust intervals which 
these factors correspond to, and randomly selecting trust 
values in these trust intervals. Trust value corresponding 
to each factor has more accurate selection methods. 
Therefore, the multi-factors trust computation method has 
good scalability. In this paper, we mainly focus on 
feasibility of the multi-factors trust computation method. 
To reflect dynamicity of trust in an open environment, 
we compute trust with four factors introduced above as 
follows: 
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4T T T T Tα α α α= + + +                (1) 
in which 1 2 3 4 1α α α α+ + + =               (2) 
In formula (1), 1 2 3 4, , ,α α α α is the respectively weight 
of every factor, and 1 2 3 4, , , [0,1]α α α α ∈ . These weight 
values are selected according to specific case. 
C  Multi-factors weight distribution method 
Weight allocation of each factor is a multiple attribute 
decision problem. There are several weight allocation 
methods, for example, information entropy method, 
multi-objective optimization method and fuzzy 
aggregation method. 
In this paper, the weights of these four factors are 
initialized to 1/4. The information and subjects’ trust and 
access feedback results are considered as sample 
information and stored in files. When the sample reaches 
a certain number, then we use information entropy weight 
allocation method [18].  
Following is the procedure of information entropy 
method: 
Step1: Determine sample information which need to 
deal with, and extract every factor’s data. 
Step2: Establish fuzzy similarity relationship. 
Step3: Use fuzzy equivalence closure method to 
achieve fuzzy equivalence matrix, and then determine the 
classification number of factors. 
Step4: Determine the mutual information content of 
each factor at every confidence level. 
Step5: According to information content of factors, 
determine their weight value. 
Every entity built its history access record table which 
stores entity’s history behavior which provides decision 
support for future behavior trust computation. The history 
access record table includes subject, time, behavior and 
trust value. Every factor’s weight and the calculated trust 
value will be stored as files. 
The formula we have proposed describes factors that 
can affect trust computation including entities’ IP 
attribute, time, history behavior and network condition. It 
also depicts dynamicity and uncertainty of trust in open 
and dynamic systems. 
IV. ACCESS CONTROL MODEL BASED ON  
MULTI-FACTORS TRUST 
A  Mapping between Trust and Permission 
In this section, we describe how a trust value is mapped 
to access permissions for providing fine-grained access 
control over sensitive resources. Meanwhile, access 
permissions can be dynamically adjusted based on the 
change of the trust values. 
Assume that an object’s permission set is P. We divide 
the trust of object’s owner on a subject into k intervals, 
namely, T=(T1,T2,...,Tk). Then, access permission set AP 
can be represented as 
TABLE IV. 
TRUST INTERVAL CORRESPONDING TO NETWORK CONDITION 
Network  
condition 
Very safe Safe Moderate Dangerous
Trust 
interval 
[0.9,1] [0.6,0.9) [0.3,0.6) [0,0.3) 
 
TABLE III. 
TRUST INTERVAL CORRESPONDING TO TIME 
Access 
time 
Frequent Moderate Rare Impossible
Trust 
interval 
[0.8,1] [0.5,0.8) [0.2,0.5) [0,0.2) 
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{ },{ },{ , },...,{ , , , }AP read read write read write app exeφ= in which 
the number of elements of AP is k, which is equal to the 
number of trust intervals and each trust interval 
corresponds to an access permission set. For instance, if 
trust interval [0, 0.2] corresponds toφ , subjects whose 
trust quantification value belong to [0, 0.2] would have no 
access permission to the object. If trust interval [0.4, 0.6] 
corresponds to {read, write}, subjects whose trust 
quantification value belong to [0.4, 0.6] would have the 
read and write permissions to the object. 
In an open environment, a subject’s permission is 
dynamic with the change of its trust value. When there is 
deception, the owner of the resource can modify mapping 
relationship between the access permission set and the 
trust intervals. 
B  Multi-factors Trust based Access Control Model 
The mapping method mentioned above is used for 
access control and an access control model based on 
multi-factors trust is thus proposed. The model includes 
three layers: request management, access control 
management and access feedback management. The 
model also includes four modules: subject request, 
multi-factors trust computation, access permission 
mapping and access feedback. The model is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Multi-factors trust based access control model 
 
The request management layer is mainly responsible for 
access request scheduling. 
The main function of the trust computation module is 
to divide trust interval and compute trust value. Based on 
several related factors and access feedback information, 
it would compute the new trust value of a subject. 
The permission mapping module reads the mapping 
table between a subject’s trust value and access 
permissions and assigns corresponding permissions to 
the subject. 
In the access feedback module, the feedback 
information from access behavior is sent to the trust 
computation module, which can be referenced for the 
next access control. 
To provide global network environment information 
for every entity, we apply a network performance matrix 
M which is an N×N matrix. M [i, j] of the matrix 
indicates network performance between i and j which 
mainly includes network speed and channel security. 
When trust value is computed, entities get network 
performance information from the matrix which can be 
computed according to trust interval. 
V.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
To verify the validity of the multi-factors trust based 
access control model, a simulation is developed using Java 
program. Assume that there are 2 subjects and 8 objects. 
Every factor’s trust interval is shown in TABLE I, II, III, 
IV. Permission mapping relationship is shown in TABLE 
V.  
In the experiment, we assume that every honest 
subject’s trust value is randomly initialized to a value 
between 0.5 and 1, and hostile subject’s trust value is 
randomly initialized to a value between 0.9 and 1. After 
each access, the satisfaction degree of the object to the 
honest subject is S∈[0.9,1] and that of the object to the 
hostile subject is S’∈ [0,0.2]. Access feedback result 
denotes behavior evaluation of an object on a subject. 
History access record table is created for every object. 
Network matrix is created to denote network condition. 
Experiment 1: Subject A and subject B are both honest 
nodes. Subject A and objects are in very safe network 
segment. Subject B and objects are in safe network 
segment. Two honest subjects randomly access objects 10 
times respectively. The experiment executes 50 times and 
we randomly extract one of them. The permission change 
of subject A and subject B is shown in Figure 2. 
 
TABLE V. 
PERMISSION MAPPING 
Trust    
interval 
[0,0.2) [0.2,0.4) [0.4,0.6) [0.6,0.8) [0.8,1) 
Permission 
ID 
0 1 2 3 4 
Permission 
set 
∅  { read }  { read, 
write }  
{ read, 
write , 
app }  
{read, 
write, 
app, 
exe }  
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Figure 2. Subjects’ permissions corresponding to different IP 
 
We can see from Figure 2, since subject A and B are 
both honest nodes and they have good behavior, their 
permission levels are gradually increasing. Because the IP 
of subject A is in the network segment whose security is 
higher than the IP of subject B, subject B needs more visit 
times than A to achieve the same permission. 
Experiment 2: Subject A and subject B are both hostile 
nodes. Subject A and objects are in safe network, but 
subject B and objects are in dangerous network. Two 
honest subjects randomly access objects 10 times. The 
experiment executes 50 times and we randomly extract 
one of them. The permission change of subject A and 
subject B is shown in Figure 3. 
We can see from Figure 3, since subject A and B are 
both hostile nodes and they have bad behavior, their 
permission level drops fast. Because subject B is in 
dangerous network, permission of subject B drops faster 
than subject A. 
 
 
Figure 3. Subjects’ permissions corresponding to different network 
condition 
Experiment 3: Subject A and subject B are both 
hostile nodes. Access time of subject A is in the frequent 
or moderate time period, and subject B access time is in 
the rare or impossible time period. Two honest subjects 
randomly access objects 10 times. The experiment 
executes 50 times and we randomly extract one of them. 
The permission change of subject A and subject B is 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Subjects’ permissions corresponding to different time 
 
We can see from Figure 4, since subject A and B are 
both hostile nodes and they have bad behavior, their 
permission level drops fast. Because subject B access time 
is in rare or impossible time period, the permission of 
subject B drops faster than subject A. 
Experiment 4: Subject A is an honest node and subject 
B is a hostile node. Subject A and B randomly access 
objects 10 times respectively. From the fourth access, 
subject A becomes a hostile node and has bad access 
behavior. From the fourth access, subject B becomes an 
honest node and has good access behavior. The 
experiment executes 50 times and we randomly extract 
one of them. The permission change of subject A and 
subject B is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Subjects’ permissions corresponding to history behavior 
 
We can see from Figure 5, at beginning, trust value of 
subject A is randomly initialized to 0.58, and it has good 
behavior. The feedback satisfaction degree is high and the 
permission level is gradually increasing. From the fourth 
access, subject A has hostile behavior, and the permission 
level drops fast. The trust value of subject B is randomly 
initialized to 0.96, and it has hostile behavior. The 
feedback satisfaction degree is low and the permission 
level drops fast. From the fourth access, subject B has 
honest behavior, and the permission level is gradually 
increasing. 
We can conclude that the access control model based 
on multi-factors is feasible. It can reflect trust’s dynamic 
nature and manage access control permission. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In open and dynamic network applications, not every 
resource requestor can be known beforehand by the 
resource owners because of the open property. Trust can 
be used as a tool to reduce the complexity of making 
access decisions, which can be accomplished by using 
trust to provide security. By considering several factors 
which affect trust, we computed trust using several 
factors, and we proposed an access control model based 
on multi-factors trust. In the model, we described how 
trust values can be mapped to access permissions. In the 
future, we will design the mapping algorithm in the 
model to make it more suitable for fine-grained access 
control.    
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Abstract—Focusing on the characteristics of the new high 
secure architecture of network computer, an operating 
system with internal network structure is designed. The 
operating system contains two subkernels:  local kernel and 
network kernel, the two subkernels run individually in two 
subsystems. In order to communicate between two 
subsystems securely, an inter-subsystem private data 
transfer protocol is proposed and implemented in this 
paper. The private protocol is a connection-oriented 
protocol, it can provide reliable end-to-end connectivity 
Protocol format and protocol connection management based 
on signature verification are elaborated. Combining with 
shared transit cache which mounted on the shared bus, the 
private data transfer protocol can ensure data to be 
transferred safely and inerrably between subsystems. The 
effectiveness of the private data transfer protocol is verified 
by the results of final experiments. 
 
Index Terms—private protocol, data transfer, operating 
system, computer architecture, bus bridge, shared transit 
cache, protocol performance evaluation 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the development of computer network, the 
network security is becoming more and more important. 
A series of network security technologies have been used 
to protect the computer security, such as computer virus 
scan technology, intrusion detection technology [1,2], 
software or hardware encryption technology [3,4], secure 
computer architecture [5], etc. 
Based on the traditional architectures of computer such 
as Von Neumann [6], network and local storage are 
connected to the same bus, which causes potential  
security issue because data in local storage might be theft 
if network intruder has the control of the system bus. 
Aiming at this security problem, many methods have 
been proposed, such as TPM (Trusted Platform Module) 
[7,8], information exchange and encryption [9]. Although 
these methods enhanced the security of computer, they 
could not address the fundamental problem due to the 
vulnerability of Von Neumann architecture. 
A new high secure architecture of network computer is 
proposed by Fengjing Shao [10]. The new computer 
architecture has a single CPU and two physically isolated 
high-speed system buses (local bus and network bus), 
ensure only one bus can be connected to CPU at the same 
time, a Bus Bridge [11] is designed. 
In this new architecture, computer system is divided 
into tow subsystems. All the network devices and other 
devices mounted on the network bus form into a network 
subsystem which connects with the Internet. All the 
storage devices and other devices mounted on the local 
bus form into a local subsystem which is isolated from 
the Internet. So even if the network intruder suddenly 
gets the whole control of network bus in network 
subsystem, only the temporary information of the 
network subsystem is exposed, while the local subsystem 
is left intact. Thus, hardware-level isolation can 
effectively ensure the security of sensitive data in local 
subsystem. 
As the new secure computer architecture has one CPU 
and two subsystems, there should be a befitting operating 
system to support this architecture. In order to enhance 
the security of the computer architecture, an operating 
system with internal network structure is designed, the 
operating system contains two subkernels: the local 
kernel and the network kernel. The two subkernels run 
individually in two subsystems, and they are coordinating 
relationship rather than subordinate relationship. The 
relationship between the operating system and the new 
secure computer architecture is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1.  The operating system based on new high secure computer 
architecture 
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The new secure computer architecture combined with 
the operating system can effectively prevent network 
intrusions from invading local subsystem. But at the same 
time, it also prevents the data that user gets from Internet 
in the network subsystem from entering the local 
subsystem, and the data that user wants to send to Internet 
in local subsystem from entering the network subsystem. 
In order to implement communication between two 
subsystems, there should be a secure communication 
mechanism. Currently there are many secure 
communication technologies in bus systems [12], but 
none of them can be used in the new secure computer 
architecture. In order to communicate between two 
subsystems securely, an inter-subsystem private data 
transfer protocol is designed and implemented in this 
paper. With the private data transfer protocol, data can be 
transferred between the two subsystems and the network 
intrusion can still be isolated from the local subsystem. 
II.  BUS BRIDGE 
The function of the bus bridge is to connect the shared 
bus with one of the peripheral buses. The goal of the bus 
bridge is: 
• The bus bridge should make sure that the shared 
bus can connect one of the peripheral buses in 
anytime; 
• The bus bridge should make sure that only one of 
the peripheral buses is connected to the shared 
bus at the same time;  
• When CPU needs to connect the other peripheral 
bus, the bus bridge can cuts current connection 
and connects shared bus with the other peripheral 
bus. 
A.  Structure of Bus Bridge 
Based on the functionality, the bus bridge is designed 
as Fig. 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Structure of  bus bridge 
The bus bridge includes two slave ports (Control and 
S), two master ports (Ava0 and Ava1) and one state 
register.  
The function of the Control port is to receive the 
instructions for the bus bridge from CPU, or send the data 
of the state register to CPU. The function of the S port is 
to receive/forward all Avalon signals from/to the shared 
bus. All these signals of the S port are bridged with their 
corresponding signals of the Ava0 or Ava1 port, which 
connects the peripheral bus with all Avalon bus signals, 
depending on the instruction type. Therefore, a path 
between the shared bus and the peripheral buses is built. 
A state register with five bits exists in the bus bridge. The 
lower four bits of the register store work modes; the 
higher one bit, called flag bit, stores the flag that helps 
describe which peripheral bus is connected to the shared 
bus through the bus bridge currently. If the flag bit is set 
as 0, all the signals of the S port connect with their 
corresponding signals of the Ava0 port. Therefore the 
shared bus connects peripheral bus 0, and the system 
works in area 0; otherwise the flag bit is set as 1 and the 
system works in area 1.  
The data of state register shows as table 1. 
TABLE I.            DATA OF STATE REGISTER 
The lower 4 bit of state register 
value Work mode 
0000 Requirement for initialization 
0001 Finish of initialization 
0010 Maintain in current area 
0011 Maintain in area 0 
0100 Maintain in area 1 
1111 System reset 
others reserved 
The flag bit 
value Work area 
0 area 0 
1 area 1 
others area 0 
The data of state register is written by CPU, and read 
by CPU for detecting the state of the system. 
B.  Implement of Bus Bridge 
The implement of the bus bridge includes four 
modules: 
• Write transfer 
Avalon fundamental slave write transfer [13] describes 
how CPU writes state register through the Control port. 
Write transfer is completed in a single bus cycle. CPU 
writes the work mode and work area according to table 1. 
In the write transfer of the bus bridge, the CPU passes 
signals writedata, write_n and address to the bus bridge 
through the shared bus. The signal writedata carry 
command code from CPU; the signal write_n can enable 
the write operation; the shared bus set the signal 
chipselect, which selects the bus bridge, according to the 
signal address. Once the signals write_n and chipselect 
are both available, the bus bridge reads the lower five bits 
of the signal writedata, and writes in the state register. 
The pseudo codes of write transfer show as following:  
always @ (posedge clk)  
begin 
 if (!write_n && chipselect = = 1)  
     the state register <= writedata[4:0] ; 
end 
• Read transfer 
Avalon fundamental slave read transfer describes how 
CPU reads state register through the Control port, Read 
transfer is completed in a single bus cycle. CPU reads the 
work mode and work area according to table 1. 
In the read transfer of the bus bridge, the CPU passes 
signals read_n and address to the bus bridge through the 
shared bus. The signal read_n can enable the read 
the shared bus 
Control S
state register 
Ava0 Ava1
peripheral bus 0 peripheral bus 1 
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operation; the shared bus set the signal chipselect, which 
selects the bus bridge, according to the signal address. 
Once the signals write_n and chipselect are both available, 
the bus bridge sends data of the state register to the lower 
five bits of the signal readdata, which carry data to CPU. 
The pseudo codes of read transfer show as following:  
      always @ (posedge clk)  
begin 
if (!read_n && chipselect == 1)      
readdata[31:0] <= {27'b0,the state register} ;  
end 
• Connection between S port and master ports 
All the signals of the S port connect with their 
corresponding signals of the master ports; therefore the 
shared bus connects peripheral bus. For example, the S 
port gets a signal writedata, which has 32 bits, from the 
shared bus. Its corresponding signal in the Ava0 port is 
named ava0_writedata. The connection in verilog 
program is set as follow:  
ava0_writedata[31:0] <=  writedata[31:0] 
The flag bit hold the flag of the work area, if it’s 0, the 
system works in area 0; otherwise the system works in 
area 1. In the Verilog program of the bus bridge, the 
change of flag bit is one of the trigger condition of always 
block for connecting the S port signals and master port 
signals. When the state of flag bit changes, the bus bridge 
automatically reconnects the S port and the master port.  
• Reset 
When the system is reset,  the state register is set as 
01111, which means the system work in area 0, and the 
work mode is “system reset”; the bus bridge bridges the S 
port signals and the Ava0 port signals. 
III.  INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF OPERATING SYSTEM 
The operating system with internal network structure 
consists of two subkernels: the local kernel and the 
network kernel. The two subsystems of the new secure 
computer architecture are managed respectively by two 
kernels, that is, network kernel manages network 
subsystem and local kernel manages local subsystem. 
Inter-process communication of the operating system 
is similar to Inter-computer communication of network. 
A kernel is like a subnetwork, there is only a Router 
process, which acts the role of Router in network, in each 
kernel, and other processes except Router process are 
called as user process. Router process is the data transfer 
interfaces between the subkernels, a user process can only 
communicate with a user process of another kernel 
through Router process of the same kernel. Topological 
structure of the operating system is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Topological structure of the operating system 
The Router process communicates with user processes 
in the same subkernel via signal mechanism. The two 
Router process in different subkernels communicate with 
each other via message mechanism. Because only one 
subkernel can use the CPU at any time, i.e., only one 
kernel is active at the same time, the two Router process 
can’t directly communicate with each other via message. 
Therefore, they must use the shared transit cache 
mounted on the shared bus to transfer messages 
indirectly. The process of inter-subkernel data transfer is 
shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Figure 4.  The process of inter-subkernel data transfer 
IV.  SHARED TRANSIT CACHE 
The shared transit cache mounted on the shared bus is 
managed and operated by the two Router processes. And 
it plays a role of bridge in the communication between 
the Router processes which must transfer data indirectly 
through the shared transit cache. 
A.  Shared Transit Cache Structure 
The shared transit cache is divided into three parts: 
transit cache state block, transit head area and transit 
block area. In the process of shared transit cache 
initialization, transit heads are set from the end of transit 
cache state block which is in the low-end of cache area 
and their corresponding transit blocks are divided in the 
high-end of cache area at the same time. All the transit 
blocks form the transit block area, while all the transit 
heads form the transit block area. Every transit head links 
its corresponding transit block to form a transit unit. 
There are two kinds of transit units: network transit unit 
which is made up of a network transit head and a network 
transit block, and local transit unit which is made up of a 
local transit head and a local transit block. The transit 
cache structure is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Shared transit cache structure 
The transit head area is made up of network transit 
heads and local transit heads. The two kinds of heads 
have the same structure that is shown in the table 2. The 
transit head is used to descript attributes of the transit unit, 
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store the message head and link all the same type of 
transit units to be a doubly linked circular list. All the 
network transit units are linked to be a network doubly 
linked circular list and all the local transit heads are 
linked to be a local doubly linked circular list. 
TABLE II.  TRANSIT HEAD STRUCTURE 
field name field introduction 
trans_idle idle marker, it indicates if the transit unit is used. 
trans_num transit unit number, it is the transit unit ID. 
mes_head message head, it is used to store the message head. 
trans_prev transit head forward pointer, it points to the transit 
head before itself. 
trans_next transit head backward pointer, it points to the 
transit head after itself. 
trans_block transit block pointer, it points to the corresponding 
block pointer. 
The transit block area only contains two kinds of 
blocks: network transit block and local transit block. All 
the blocks are linked to corresponding transit heads. The 
function of transit block is to store the data of message. 
The transit cache state block contains a transit cache 
state structure which mainly has three fields: network 
linked list head pointer, local linked list head pointer and 
residual connection count. The network linked list head 
pointer points to the first idle transit unit of the network 
doubly linked circular list. It is used when Router process 
of network subkernel receives message or Router process 
of local subkernel sends message. The local linked list 
head pointer points to the first idle transit unit of the local 
doubly linked circular list. It is used when Router process 
of local subkernel receives message or Router process of 
network subkernel send message. The residual connection 
count indicates that how many data transfer connections 
the shared transit cache can still support to create. It is 
used for the Router process to create a data transfer 
connection. 
B.  The Operation and Management of Shared Transit 
Cache 
There are two kinds of transit units in a doubly linked 
circular list of transit units (both the network doubly 
linked circular list and the local doubly linked circular 
list): idle transit unit and non-idle transit unit. In the 
beginning, every transit unit in the list is the idle transit 
unit. When an idle transit unit is needed, it will be 
obtained from the head of the list, become a non-idle 
transit unit, and then be inserted into the tail of the list. 
Therefore, the idle transit units are in the front of the list 
while the non-idle transit units are in the end of the list. 
The linked list head pointer (both the network list head 
pointer and the local list head pointer) in the transit state 
structure points to the first idle transit head of the list. 
The doubly linked circular list of transit units is shown in 
the Fig. 6. 
 
Figure 6.  The doubly linked circular list of  transit units 
A data transfer connection has a pair of transit unites (a 
network transit unit and a local transit unit) which have 
the same ID to transfer message. The network transit unit 
is used by Router process of network subkernel to receive 
the message that Router process of local subkernel sends. 
Similarly, the local transit unit is used by Router process 
of local subkernel to receive the message that Router 
process of network subkernel sends. These two units are 
released after the connection is closed. Residual 
connection count in the transit state structure indicates 
how many pairs of idle units still can be used. 
Before creating a connection, Router process first 
check the residual connection count to find if there is a 
pair of idle units which can be used for the new data 
transfer connection. If there is, it will find an idle network 
transit unit by the network transit head list pointer, 
modify the idle marker of the unit to make it turn into a 
non-idle unit, and then insert it into the end of the list. 
After that the Router process traverses the local doubly 
linked circular list to find the idle local transit unit whose 
number is same to the network transit unit’s, and then 
modify the it’s idle marker and insert it into the end of the 
list. All the messages of the connection are transferred via 
these two transit units. 
If the Router process needs to send a message in a 
connection, it should traverse the doubly linked circular 
list of target subkernel from the end to find the transit unit 
that belongs to this connection, and then put the message 
into the unit. When the Router process wants to receive 
message in a connection, it will traverse the doubly 
linked circular list of itself subkernel from the end to find 
the transit unit which belongs to the connection, and then 
get the message from the unit. 
After Router process closes a connection, it restores 
the idle marker of the pairs of the transit units that belong 
to the connection, and inserts them into the head of their 
doubly linked circular list to release them. 
V.  PRIVATE DATA TRANSFER PROTOCOL FOR INTER-
SUBSYSTEM 
In order to prevent the network intrusions from 
entering local subsystem from network subsystem via 
shared transit cache, a private inter-subsystem data 
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transfer protocol is used to control the inter-subsystem 
data transfer. 
The private protocol is a connection-oriented protocol, 
it can provide reliable end-to-end connectivity and ensure 
data to be transferred safely and inerrably between 
subsystems. 
A.  Protocol Format 
In the process of transferring data, data is packeted as 
file which is written into or read from shared transit 
cache. The private protocol format is in manner of data 
stream.  
The protocol format is fairly straightforward, which is 
shown in Fig. 7, including File Structure Information 
(FSI), File Begin Token (FBT), File Size (FS), File Data 
(FD) and File End Token (FET).  
 
Figure 7.  Private Protocol Format 
The private protocol is a peer two-way transfer 
protocol. The Router process of one subkernel acts as 
sender, the Router process of another sunkernel acts as 
receiver at the same time. The sending and receiving 
algorithm is accordant. 
The sending algorithm as follows: 
send(dest) 
    if(dest is a file) 
         result:=sendFile(dest); 
         push(ET); 
    else  
        while(untransferred files exist) do 
           newFile:=get an untransferred file; 
           result:=sendFile(newFile); 
           if(newFile is the last file in dest) 
                  push(ET); 
          else 
                 push(FET); 
         end if; 
         if(result<0) 
              break; 
         end if; 
      end while; 
  end if; 
return result; 
sendFile(file) 
      acquire(FSI); push(FSI); 
      acquire(FBT);push(FBT); 
      acquire(FS);push(FS); 
      rusult:=push(FD); 
return result; 
The receiving algorithm as follows: 
receive() 
    buf:=new_buffer; 
    whiel(Shared Transit Cache is not empty) do 
        character:=read a byte from Shared Transit Cache; 
        if(character is FBT) 
              receiveFile(buf); 
        else if(character is ET) 
           break; 
        else if(character is FET) 
          receive(); 
          break; 
        end if; 
        append the character to the buf; 
     end while; 
return; 
receiveFile(buf) 
       Filename:=get the name from the buf; 
       FileSize:=read bytes from Shared Transit Cache; 
       read FileSize bytes from Shared Transit Cache and 
       create the file with name of filename 
return; 
Firstly, communication of both ends packet data as a 
file or a group of files, then, through shared transit cache, 
sender send data with the sending algorithm, accordingly, 
receiver receives data with receiving algorithm. If a file is 
the last file of file group, the transfer finish mark ET 
would be sent after transfer completion of the file, 
otherwise, sending file finish mark FET. 
B.  Protocol Connection Management Based on 
Signature Verification 
As a connection-oriented protocol, it must set up end- 
to-end connection before transferring data. Because of the 
demand of the new secure computer architecture, when 
using the private protocol for transferring data, both ends 
of connection should be identity authentication for 
validation of identity. A switch of transit cache can be 
used to control whether setting up connection of both 
ends, for the connection request which do not pass 
identity authentication, the switch would close transit 
cache and the connection request would be refused. It 
requires the establishment of a security authentication 
mechanism to meet the demand. In the private protocol, 
connection management based on signature verification is 
proposed and designed. 
Digital signature technology is proposed on the basis 
of public-key cryptosystem, It can ensure that only the 
sender can produce information which can not be faked 
by others, sender uses private-key to sign the message 
which would be sent, the information which had been 
signed is a proof of authenticity for a message which is 
sent by sender. Another important function of digital 
signature is to verify the integrity of data, because digital 
signatures can prevent third-party from forging or altering 
message which had been signed. The private protocol use 
digital signature technology based on public-key for 
adding authentication mechanism in the connection 
management process, therefore, security of  protocol is 
increased and high security requirements of data transfer 
is met. 
The private protocol adopts digital signature 
technology based on RAS algorithm. The first researchers 
to discover and publish the concepts of Public-Key 
Cryptography(PKC) were Whitfield Diffie and Martin 
Hellman [14], and The Diffie-Hellman key agreement 
protocol (also called exponential key agreement) was 
developed, The protocol allows two users to exchange a 
secret key over an insecure medium without any prior 
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secrets. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol 
provided an implementation for secure public key 
distribution, but didn't implement digital signatures. After 
reading the Diffie-Hellman paper [14], three researchers 
at MIT named Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard 
Adleman (RSA) began searching for a practical 
mathematical function to implement a complete PKC 
approach [15]. After working on more than 40 
candidates, they finally discovered an elegant algorithm 
based on the product of two prime numbers that exactly 
fit the requirement for a practical public key 
cryptography implementation. 
The basic protocol of digital signature based on RSA is 
very simple. Roughly speaking, the basic idea is as 
follows. The protocol has two system parameters p and g. 
They are both public and may be used by all the users in a 
system. Parameter p is a prime number and parameter g 
(usually called a generator) is an integer less than p, with 
the following property: for every number n between 1 and 
p-1 inclusive, there is a power k of g such that n = gk mod 
p. 
Prior to execution of the protocol, the two parties A 
and B each obtain a public/private key pair and a 
certificate for the public key. During the protocol, A 
computes a signature on certain messages, covering the 
public value ga mod p. B proceeds in a similar way. Even 
though the third-party is still able to intercept messages 
between A and B, the third-party cannot forge signatures 
without A's private key and B's private key. Hence, the 
enhanced protocol defeats the man-in-the-middle attack. 
The way of protocol connection management based on 
signature verification is adopted for ensure the connection 
of stability, reliability and security. The private protocol 
uses four-way handshake to establish connection. 
• Creating connection 
In a data transfer connection, the data transfer process 
whose responsibility is to send data is called sender 
Router process, and the one whose responsibility is to 
receive data is called receiver Router process. For 
creating a data transfer connection, the sender Router 
process obtains a private key, then generating connection 
request message with signature through the private key. 
After receiving connection request message, receiver 
Router process sends validation message with signature 
to sender Router process, sequence number of validation 
message is equal to the sequence number of request 
message plus 1. Sender Router process would validate 
signature of validation message, if signature is validation, 
the connection is semi-connected status. Then, receiver 
Router process sends its connection request message with 
signature to sender Router process, and randomly select a 
starting sequence number, sender Router process receives 
connection request message, it would also send validation 
message with signature to receiver Router process, 
sequence number of validation message is equal to the 
sequence number of request message which is sent by 
receiver Router process plus 1. If receiver Router process 
validates signature successfully, the connection between 
send Router process and receiver Router process would 
be completely established. The process of creating 
connection is shown in Fig. 8. 
 
Figure 8.  The process of creating connection 
• Closing connection 
The process of creating connection needs four-way 
handshake, and the process of closing connection also 
needs four-way handshake. For closing a data transfer 
connection, the sender Router process sends a connection 
close message, the sequence number is the next sequence 
number of message which would be sent. After receiving 
connection close message, receiver Router process sends 
validation message to sender Router process, sequence 
number of validation message is equal to the sequence 
number of close message plus 1. Then, receiver Router 
process sends its connection close message to sender 
Router process, the sequence number is also the next 
sequence number of message which would be sent. 
Sender Router process receives connection close 
message, it would also send validation message to 
receiver Router process, sequence number of validation 
message is equal to the sequence number of close 
message which is sent by receiver Router process  plus 1. 
After completion of the four interactive messages, the 
connection also closed. The process of closing connection 
is shown in Fig. 9. 
 
Figure 9.  The process of  closing connection 
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VI.  PROTOCOL  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION  
According to implementation process of the private 
protocol, transfer performance of the private protocol is 
analyzed as follows: 
Transfer efficiency of the private protocol V is defined 
as the ratio of the requested effective data quantity and 
the total transfer data quantity. 
A.  Transfer Efficiency 
Theorem 1. With increase or decrease of transfer data 
quantity, transfer efficiency V increases or decreases. 
Supposing transfer data includes n files, and every file 
size is FileSize bytes, thus, size of requested data Demand 
is defined as, 
                            Demand = n ×FileSize. (1) 
Size of connection request message is Request bytes, 
size of relevant validation message is Response bytes. 
Size of data quantity of creating connection Cmessage is 
defined as, 
                Cmessage = 2×(Request + Response) (2) 
Size of data stream prefix in protocol is Prefix, thus, 
size of actual transfer data quantity through protocol 
Pdata is defined as, 
                       Pdata = n×(Prefix + FileSize) (3) 
The total transfer data quantity Trandata is defined as, 
                       Trandata = Cmessage + Pdata               (4) 
According to (1) ~ (4), Transfer efficiency V is defined 
as, 
1
Pr 2 (Re Re )1
DemandV efix quest sponseTrandata
FileSize n FileSize
= = × ++ + ×
     (5) 
Because of size of connection request message and 
relevant validation message, and value of Prefix are 
constant, from (5), transfer efficiency V would change 
along with transfer data quantity (size of file FileSize or 
number of file n), and max is 1. 
Theorem 2. Transfer efficiency of the private protocol 
V is in direct ratio to rate of requested data Demand/t. 
In the private protocol, data transfer operation is serial, 
transfer time is in direct ratio to data traffic, the equation 
is defined as, 
                               t = const×Trandata                   (6) 
According to (5), (6), transfer efficiency V is in direct 
ratio to transfer rate, the equation is defined as, 
                          const
t
DemandV = ×                (7) 
B.  Rate of Throughput 
Rate of throughput is defined as the reciprocal of 
service time of unit data. 
Theorem 3. With increase of transfer data quantity, 
rate of throughput of the private protocol increases. 
Supposing creating connection time is Tc, closing 
connection time is Tr.  
Firstly, setting file size FileSize is fixedness, and 
number of files n is increasing, then, the relationship 
between service time of single file Tn and number of files 
is defined as, 
c r
n
T +T const (Request+Response)T const (Pr efix FileSize)
n n
×= × + + + .(8) 
Next, setting number of files is fixedness (n=6), and 
file size FileSize is increasing, the relationship between 
transfer time of unit data Tb and file size is defined as, 
c r
b
T +T const (Request+Response+6 Pr efix)T 6 const
FileSize FileSize
× ×= × + + .(9) 
From (8), (9), with increase of transfer data quantity 
(size of file FileSize or number of file n), service time of 
unit data decreases, and rate of throughput of the private 
protocol increases accordingly.  
VII.  SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENT 
Service capabilities of the private protocol can be 
further validated through simulation experiments. 
We use development board based on new high secure 
architecture of network computer for experimenting with 
the private protocol. The development board which we 
make is shown in Fig. 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Development board based on new high secure architecture of 
network computer 
When setting file size FileSize is fixedness, and 
number of files n is increasing, the relationship between 
service time of single file Tn and number of files is shown 
as Fig. 11. 
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Figure 11.  Relationship between service time of single file and number 
of file 
When setting number of files is fixedness(n=6), and 
file size FileSize is increasing, the relationship between 
transfer time of unit data Tb and file size is shown as Fig. 
12. 
 
Figure 12.  Relationship between service time of unit data and file size 
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Abstract—Wormhole attack is one of the most devastating 
threats for range-free localization in wireless sensor 
networks. To address this issue, we propose a robust 
localization scheme in wireless sensor networks against 
wormhole attack, called ConSetLoc, which neither 
complicated distance measuring devices nor extra complex 
encrypting algorithms is necessary. With the relationship 
between hop counts and geographic distance of sensor nodes 
in the deployment territory, we design a partition method of 
consistent anchors sets by the convex constraints in 
geometry which can reduce the effect of bad measurements 
on estimates,  and then present a filtering strategy for the 
candidate locations with these anchors sets. In addition, we 
conduct simulation experiments for performance evaluation 
and the results demonstrate the proposed ConSetLoc can 
estimate the locations for most of sensor nodes with good 
accuracy and stability when wormhole attack exists in the 
network.  
 
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks, Range-free 
Localization, Wormhole Attack, Hop-Distance Relationship, 
Convex Constraints, Consistent Set 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Localization technology in wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) is one of the most important supporting 
techniques [1]. Over the past few years, many 
localization algorithms have been proposed to provide 
sensors’ location. Out of these localization schemes, 
range-free localization methods have attracted much 
attention because no extra sophisticated devices for 
distance measurement for each sensor nodes are 
necessary. The hardware cost should be taken into 
consideration when WSNs have to scale to extremely 
large number of sensor nodes. Most of range-free 
localization algorithms assume that sensor nodes are 
deployed in a trusted region. However, many applications 
in hostile environments like military monitoring may 
have malicious attacks, in which an adversary may 
provide incorrect position information, or compromise a 
beacon node, or replay beacon information to mislead the 
node position estimation. Range-free localization 
algorithms are vulnerable in these attacks. The secure 
localization problem has been studied in these years, and 
the proposed approaches can be classified into two 
categories. By the authentication with a cryptographic 
key, the first ones can guarantee the security of location 
process away from some attacks, but the computation of 
cryptographic operation is intensive and it is tedious for 
key management. The other methods firstly employ 
detection mechanisms which can passively detect 
anomalies by observation and deployment knowledge and 
then localize sensor nodes. Most of these mechanisms 
need multimodal techniques, for example SeRLoc [2] 
works with directional antennas and ROCRSSI [3] is 
based on comparison of received signal strength indicator 
and secure enhancement method.  
Among malicious attacks, wormhole attack [4] is a 
devastating threat, and it does not require compromising 
any sensor nodes and knowing cryptographic keys. The 
attackers use direct low-latency links (called wormhole 
links) to connect two or more end-points. When a 
message is received by one end-point, it will be 
forwarded to other end-points by wormhole links, and 
then replayed into the network. Therefore, wormhole 
attack can change the network topology and deteriorate 
the positioning accuracy for range-free localization in two 
aspects. On the one hand, wormhole attack can enlarge 
the neighborhood for the range-free localization based on 
neighborhood measurement like APIT [5] and DRLS [6]. 
On the other hand, it can shorten the shortest routing path 
between two nodes for those based on hop count 
measurement like DV-Hop [7]. A few schemes have been 
proposed to detect the wormhole using graph theoretic [8] 
and metric threshold in neighborhood [9], but these 
mechanisms cannot always guarantee detection of 
wormholes. 
In this paper, aiming at the range-free localization 
problem under the wormhole attack, we propose a robust 
localization scheme, called ConSetLoc, instead of coming 
up with solutions to the attack detection.  To reduce the 
large errors in ranging measurements due to wormhole 
attack in our scheme, we firstly focus on the hop-distance 
relationship between sensor nodes. The hop-distance 
relationship can be evaluated by an approximate recursive 
expression when sensor nodes are randomly deployed in 
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a circular region. With the above hop-distance 
relationship, the ConSetLoc has the following two 
aspects: 
? We design a partition method of consistent 
anchors sets by the convex constraints in 
geometry. Each anchor can provide ranging 
measurement information which can be 
considered as a ring in geometry. A practical 
algorithm is developed to achieve the consistent 
anchors set which can obtain the convex region 
intersected by these rings. The candidate 
location of sensor nodes estimated by the convex 
region is consistent with ranging measurement 
information.  
? We present a filtering strategy for the candidate 
locations with these consistent anchors sets, and 
the final location of sensor nodes will be filtered 
out.  
Simulation experiments with wormhole attack have 
been conducted. The simulation results demonstrate that 
the proposed ConSetLoc can accurately estimate the 
locations for most of the nodes when wormhole attacks 
exist in the network, and ConSetLoc performs better than 
other methods in literature. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section , we present a recursive formula to evaluate the 
relationship between the hop counts and distance 
information. Section Ⅲ gives the consistent anchors set 
partitioned by the geometry constrains and a filtering 
strategy for the candidate location set in proposed range-
free localization algorithm ConSetLoc. In Section , we 
introduce simulation parameters and present performance 
evaluation with other methods. Finally, Section Ⅵ 
conclude the paper. 
II.  THE HOP-DISTANCE RELATIONSHIP 
The hop-distance relationship information can 
effectively improve the performance of the protocol for 
wireless sensor networks. Usually, the hop-distance 
relationship in wireless sensor networks closely related to 
the deployment method, node density and communication 
radius. Therefore, the deduction process is tedious and 
impossible to obtain a exact close form by using the 
geometric methods [10]. 
From the research during the last decades, the methods 
for hop statistics can be divided into two categories, 
statistical analysis and probability deduction. According 
to the results of Monte Carlo simulation and statistical 
analysis, Zhao et al [11] points out that the two-
dimensional multi hop-distance relationship approximates 
to the decaying Gaussian distribution. The formula and 
the least remaining distance (LRD) [12] have derived the 
single hop-distance equation based on the node 
distribution and routing strategies. Vural et al. [13] and 
Dulman et al. [10] propose the probability density 
function of the multi hop-distance distribution under the 
one-dimensional condition. In two-dimensional case, the 
multi hop-distance recursive formulas have been derived 
in [10, 14-15] with different assumptions. In this study, 
we focus on a new localization scheme against wormhole 
attack with the hop-distance relationship under the two 
dimensional condition.  
Without loss of generality, we assume  sensor nodes 
have been deployed randomly in circular region  by a 
homogeneous Poisson process. For what concerns 
connectivity, we use the Unit Disk Graph (UDG) model 
[16], i.e. each node is equipped with the omni-directional 
antenna and any two nodes can communicate if their 
distance is less than the radio range . Anchors, denoted 
by , which have a priori knowledge about their 
coordinates have the same radio range . We assume 
there are two end-points of wormhole of which attack 
range is the circular region with the radius , and the 
length of wormhole link is denoted by . As for the 
range-free localization, the delay of the wormhole link is 
omitted. When no wormhole attack exists, , 
defined as the probability of the hop count  of two 
separated nodes by the known distance  is obtained in 
the equations(1-2) from [15]. We set  is the node 
average density, and  denotes the scaling factor for 
each hop  for the multihop dependence elimination, and 
 can be calculated by equation (3). 
 
? When , 
    (1) 
? When  and , 
 
 (2) 
    (3) 
 will be estimated by MAD (mean absolute 
difference ) [15]. We set  and average neighbor 
nodes . The experimental data are 
collected from statistical results in 100 simulations, each 
of which all nodes are re-deployed randomly. Compared 
with experimental data, the analytical results are shown in 
Figure 1. 
Ⅲ. THE  LOCALIZATION SCHEME AGAINST WORMHOLE 
ATTACK 
A. Measurement information from anchors 
Since the hop counts among anchors are affected by 
the wormhole attack in networks, the error should be as 
small as possible when we determine the measurement 
information from candidate location. The distance value 
 can be calculated using the known anchor positions. By 
the Equation (1-2), the hop counts set 
 and the corresponding 
probability  can be 
obtained. In order to reduce the error of hop counts by 
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Figure 1.  Analytical results and experimental data of . 
(a)      (b)  
Figure 2.  The mean and the variance of  
wormhole attack, the estimated hop count  between any 
two anchors  and  is calculated by (4). 
   (4) 
Because the sum of the two largest probabilities in 
 with a known distance can be approximated to 1, 
we can simplify  by the equation (5). We set 
  and . 
  (5) 
We set the relative error of hop counts as , 
and the mean and the variance of  is calculated: 
   (6) 
 
   (7) 
 and  are depicted in Figure 2 with the 
.  is the method for   calculation with 
the largest probabilities , and  represents 
the equation (5).  is the method for   
calculation with three largest probabilities and  
represents the equation (4). From Figure 2(a), it is 
obvious that  by  and we set 
. 
Each anchor  can calculate the single hop distance to 
every anchor  with the distance information 
 and hop count , i.e. . We 
sort the  as . As is known, 
when the inequality  with positive numbers , 
,  and , the inequality  will hold. 
We set  
 (8) 
and therefore,  
   (9) 
According to the above conclusions, e.g.,  
and , the inequalities  and 
 are hold, therefore the range of the 
average hop count distance  satisfies the following: 
  (10) 
The individual node  receives the information  and 
, and calculates the upper limit  and 
the lower limit . 
With location reference  of anchor , the maximum 
distance  and the minimum distance , we 
know that the node  locates in the ring centered at  
with the inner radius  and the outer radius . 
The candidate position of node  will be located into the 
ring region , and the anchor information can be 
represented by  .  
Let  and 
 is hold with  in Figure 1, therefore we 
have . 
B. Partitioning anchors set by contradiction constrains 
Each node to be localized can collect ring information 
from many anchors and the overlay area of these rings 
can be seemed as the estimate location region of the node. 
However, the overlay area may be error or discontinuous 
because of the measurement error and the effect on hop 
count caused by wormhole attack, so that it is hard to 
correctly estimate the node location by all candidate 
rings. For this reason, we firstly present a partitioning 
method for several consistent anchor sets according to the 
contradiction constrains in geometry. Without the loss of 
generality, take the node  for an example, the anchors 
information set of node  can be denoted as 
. 
For any two anchors information , if one 
of the formula (11-13) is satisfied, two rings   and 
 will not overlap each other.  
   (11) 
  (12) 
   (13) 
We call the inequality (11-13) as contradiction 
constrains , and if ,  and  will 
have intersection region into which node   may be 
located. We partition the anchors set  to  with 
several subsets  by constraint  which  is: 
  
(14) 
The partition process is described in Algorithm 1. 
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Figure 3.  Three rings intersect with each other 
  
(a)                                   (b)   
 
(c)                                  (d)   and  
  
(e)    and                  (f)   
Figure 4. the geometric relationship between  and 
 
 
However subset  in  is not a consistent set. 
As shown in figure 3, any two of ,  and  do not 
satisfy contradiction constrains , but , 
 and   will not have the continuous 
region which means that no consistent location meets 
simultaneously three anchor conditions. Therefore, we 
need more constrains to partition anchor sets. 
C. Partitioning anchors set by convex constrains 
As the above analysis, we will mainly focus on the 
convex constrains of . Firstly, we would consider the 
geometric relationship between the candidate rings 
 and  determined by  and , and there 
are the following three cases: 
(1) The ring center distance  between 
 and  satisfies:  
           
 
(2)  satisfies  and the central angle  
corresponding to the bound of the overlay area 
 of  and  cannot be larger 
than the threshold  
 
(3)  satisfies  while  would be larger than the 
threshold  and  satisfies . 
 
 For case (1), when  satisfies ,  as shown in Figure 
4(a),  is a convex region, and when 
, the area and the 
bound length of the convex region are both maximal. 
Meanwhile, in order to avoid the convex region of 
 being too small,   is used and the upper bound 
of  is reduced to .  
When  satisfies ,  is a non-convex region 
as shown in Figure 4(b). The range of  is 
. If 
 , e.g. , the convex 
region by two circle with  and  will be 
large enough and  can be regarded as convex 
region. When   satisfies  shown in Figure 4(c),  
 is the concave region which will not be 
considered in this paper.  We classify  and  into  as 
shown in the formula (15-16), and  will be 
approximately regarded as the convex region. 
    (15) 
      (16) 
We set ,  and 
. The region boundary of  is two 
arcs which central angles denote  and  in the formula 
(17). 
Algorithm 1. Partition  method by contradiction 
constrains 
Require: Constrain , the anchors set  and 
size   
Ensure: Output  
1:  . 
2:  for all  to  do 
3:     for all  to  
4:       if  AND  with all 
  
5:          
6:       end if       
7:      end for 
8:  end for 
9: Remove the repeated sequence of  
to  
10:  with all  
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Figure 6. the curve of   and   with different  and  
 
Figure 5. the curve trend of  and  
   (17) 
When  and ,  
and  will reach the maxima, whereas  or  
and ,   and  can obtain 
the maximum values.  We depict the curve of  and  in 
Figure 5 with a fixed , and it is shown that neither  or 
 cannot exceed .  
 
For case (2), when  satisfies ,  the  region 
is  shown in Figure 4(d) and Figure 4(e). When central 
angle  is small enough,  and arc 
length  is close to chord length . We set  
for the threshold of central angle. If the central angle  
 and  in Figure 4(d), 
 will be deemed to the convex region. Similarly, 
if  or   is larger than  as shown in Figure 4(e), 
 is a concave region.  and   are calculated in 
the Equation (18-19). 
   (18) 
   (19) 
Due to high complicated computation of  and , the 
Equation (18-19) need to be simplified. We set  
, , and  and  are 
approximately proportional to  and . 
Therefore,  and . The 
expression of   and    become,  
(20) 
(21) 
Figure 6 shows the curve of  and   varied with  
and . We can conclude: (1) when ,  and the 
range of  for  is smaller than that for ; (2) when 
,  and the range of  for  is smaller than 
that for ; (3) if  is small or large enough, either  or 
 may not satisfy the threshold  . 
Therefore, we can determine the range of  by the 
equation (20) when . We set  
and , it can be found as 
 , i.e., . In 
the sense, we have that,  
  (22) 
Notice that  only when , 
that is to say, . We have,  
(23) 
Similarly, when , we have that, 
     (24) 
from which we obtain when , 
(25) 
We classify the equation (23) and (25) into the 
constrain , and it follows that, 
    (26) 
  (27) 
For case (3),  is the concave region which 
will not be considered in this paper. 
As stated previously, if  and  satisfy the constrain 
 in the equation (15-16),  formed by  and  
is the convex region and two central angles 
corresponding two boundary arcs are less than . If  
and  satisfy the constrain  in the equation (26-27), 
 will be two disconnected regions called 
 and .  and  are referred to as the 
convex constrains. 
Following that, the geometric relationship would be 
considered for three non-collinear candidate rings , 
 and  determined by  ,  and ,  any two 
of which satisfy the convex constrains. There are mainly 
two following case. 
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(1) If the ring center distance  between  and 
 satisfy the constrains  ,   will 
have two points of intersection  and . Let 
 and . If the 
equations (28-29) do not hold, the region 
 intersected by  and  
will be a convex region. 
   (28) 
     (29) 
(2) If the distance  between  and  
satisfy the constrains , two disconnected 
regions  and  are shown in 
Figure 4(d). To reduce the computational 
complexity,  and  are 
approximated by two circles whose radii are 
 and centers called  and , 
are intersection points by two circle with centers 
of ,  and radii of , 
 respectively. According to the 
conclusion in [17], if ,  and  lie on the 
same line and the difference  is much less than 
the inner radius of the ring, the intersection of 
,  and  only have one 
continuous region. Let and 
. If the equations (30-31) do not 
hold, the region  intersected by 
,  and  will be a convex 
region. 
   (30) 
  (31) 
We call the constrains above that let  be the 
convex region as . The corresponding anchor set 
will be   
, and the partition algorithm for  is 
shown in Algorithm 2. The subset  in  can be 
accepted as the consistent location references, i.e. the 
intersection of rings determined by  in  
will be a continuous region in geometry. 
D. A filtering strategy for anchor sets  
For each subset in , a candidate 
location  of the node  can be solved by the least 
square method. We propose a filtering strategy for these 
candidate locations to obtain the final estimated location. 
For each  and all anchors information set  , 
we have the distance set  in 
which . With  and hop counts to 
all anchors  in equation (5), the 
probability set  
is obtained by hop-distance relationship. We use two 
parameters  and  to estimate the final location 
of node ： 
 
 
(1)  is the mean of the probability : 
    (32) 
(2)  is the number of  smaller than the 
threshold  in : 
   (33) 
Due to the presence of wormhole attack, the hop 
counts set  may not be true. Therefore, we use two 
parameters to estimate the location of node  in the 
equation (34). A candidate location set with 
is filtered, and the final estimated location 
 is selected by the maximum of .  
  (34) 
IV. PERFORMACE EVALUATION 
The section presents several simulations for 
performance evaluation of the ConSetLoc under 
wormhole attack. In our simulation setting, sensor nodes  
  are deployed randomly in a circular region 
with the radius  by a planar Poisson process. 
We vary the anchor fraction , and the average local 
neighborhood  to performance comparisons with 
MMSE (Minimum Mean Square Estimate)[18], PDM 
(Proximity-Distance Map)[19] and LMS (Least Median 
of Squares)[20]. Each experiment has been carried out for 
50 trials with different random seeds. And the average 
localization error  is calculated. 
A. Comparisons of localization error distribution 
Let ConSetLoc(0) be the localization scheme with the 
anchor set  and ConSetLoc(1) be the scheme with the 
anchor set . In our experiment parameters, we set 
anchor fraction  , the radio range  and 
Algorithm 2. Partition method by convex constrains 
Require: Constrains 、  and , the anchors set   
Ensure:  Output  
1:  Obtain the set  of size  with anchors set  
and constrains 、  by Algorithm 1. 
2:    
3:  for all  to  do   
4:     repeat    
5:       Select any pair  and  from  in , and 
obtain  which , 
 
6:     Obtain the  with  and constrain  with 
 and  by Algorithm 1. 
7:         
8:         
9:       until complete  traversal 
10: end for 
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           (a) ConSetLoc(0)                  (b) ConSetLoc(0) with WA
  
(c) ConSetLoc(1)                  (d) ConSetLoc(1) with WA 
  
(e) ConSetLoc                  (f) ConSetLoc with WA 
Figure 7 the histograms of localization error  
without and with wormhole attack (WA) 
 
Figure 8. Effect of anchor fraction for localization error  
the length of wormhole link . The simulation 
results of the histogram for localization error 
 are shown in Figure 7 with and without 
wormhole attack. 
When no wormhole attack exists, the histograms for 
localization error  of ConSetLoc(0) and ConSetLoc(1) are 
comparable, and  are within  shown in Figure 
7(a) and 7(c). By contrast, all localization errors of 
ConSetLoc are less than  in Figure 7(e). This is because 
less contradiction constrains for  while the 
ConSetLoc algorithm can filter out all inconsistent 
location references of . 
When there is wormhole attack in the network, 
ConSetLoc(1)  in Figure 7(d) has higher proportion of 
sensor nodes with lower localization errors compared 
with histograms in Figure 7(b). However, ConSetLoc has 
the least impact on wormhole attack and the majority of 
sensor nodes’ estimated locations lie with  of the true 
locations. There are only  sensor nodes that have huge 
localization error, and the measured information indicates 
that these nodes locate nearby one wormhole and are 
estimated incorrectly to another wormhole because of 
majority of location references. 
B. Effect of the anchor fraction  
In this experiment, we investigate the effect of the 
anchor fraction on the performance of ConSetLoc 
compared with MMSE, LMS and PDM. 
We vary  from 2% to 10%. Figure 8 depicts the 
average localization error . From the figure, PDM 
performs a litter better than MMSE and LMS, while 
ConSetLoc has the smallest localization error. As the 
anchor fraction increases, the estimated geographic 
distances increase, but more false distances may be used 
to position estimation. When the anchor fraction 
increases over 4%, the performance of the four methods 
will nearly remain unchanged. ConSetLoc has better 
filtering ability with more consistent sets than those 
methods for wormhole attack-resistant.  
C. Effect of the average local neighborhood  
In this experiment, the average local neighborhood 
varies from 12.8 to 23.2 with the corresponding 
adjustment of radio range . The results of MMSE, PDM, 
LMS and ConSetLoc are shown in Figure 9. As the 
average local neighborhood increases, the network 
provides stronger connectivity and less impact on hop 
counts. We can see that the localization error of MMSE 
and LMS reduce obviously, whereas PDM and 
ConSetLoc remain almost unchanged. PDM is closely 
related to the network topology and more volatile than 
ConSetLoc for the average localization error. For the 
average localization error, ConSetLoc outperforms the 
other three localization methods. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Secure localization against wormhole attack for 
wireless sensor network is challenging not only because 
wormhole attack is immune to cryptographic techniques 
but special hardware devices to detection present 
additional overhead. In this paper, we present a robust 
range-free localization algorithm ConSetLoc without 
coming up with detection solution for wormhole attack. 
With the hop-distance relationship, we utilize convex 
constrains in geometry to partition consistent anchors set 
and propose a filtering strategy for sensors' candidate 
location in the ConSetLoc algorithm. Simulation results 
demonstrate that the ConSetLoc algorithm can provide 
good localization precision for majority of sensor nodes 
and performs better than other methods in literature. 
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Figure 9. Effect of average local neighborhood   
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Abstract—A novel water quality monitoring method named 
WQMMFCE is proposed based on fuzzy comprehensive 
evaluation model to solve the issue of high energy 
consumption caused by centralized approach under the 
background of water quality monitoring. The weights of all 
factors which are necessary for fuzzy comprehensive 
evaluation can be obtained firstly by using the binary expert 
evaluation. The information needs to transmit is decided 
according to water quality grade which is quantitatively 
analyzed directly by using fuzzy comprehensive evaluation 
rather than transmitting large amount of raw data to the 
monitoring center. Simulation result shows that the method 
has a great advantage over the centralized one on energy 
saving and can prolong the lifetime of the network. 
 
Index Terms—wireless sensor networks, fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation, water quality monitoring 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Poyang Lake is the largest freshwater lake in china, 
and it also is one of freshwater lakes whose water quality 
is best. The data from water environmental monitoring 
department shows that 97 percent water from the lake 
whose quality is better than grade III in 2002. While it 
dropped to 82.1% in 2006 and 44.4% in the first half year 
of 2009. The proportion decreased year by year [1]. 
Furthermore, in recent years, several cyanobacteria crisis 
are broken out in the third largest freshwater lake - Tai 
Lake. The seriously deteriorated water has threatened the 
safety of the drinking water. At present, the regular fixed-
point sampling measurement is used for monitoring water 
quality in most area of china, but it can’t 
comprehensively reflect water quality and other 
environmental factors in time. Especially it can’t track the 
sudden water pollution, air pollution and other serious 
incidents dynamically and timely. 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a wireless network 
system which is constituted by a large number of micro, 
cheap and low power sensors nodes deployed in the 
environment monitored area by means of wireless multi-
hop (Ad Hoc) [2]. The monitored information is sensed 
and processed by the node simply. Then the data is sent 
to the Sink node through multi-hop. The Sink node sends 
the data to the monitoring center through satellite 
channels, internet or mobile communication network, etc. 
Therefore, WSN can comprehensively monitor air, water, 
soil and even bird migration habits in lake area in time. 
Domestic and overseas research institutions have 
begun to research the application of wireless sensor 
networks in remote monitoring. Some well known 
applications are “GreenOrbs” [3], “FireBug system” [4], 
and “location and emergency linkage system for mines” 
etc. They are applied in forest ecological monitoring, 
forest fire fighting, and coal mine safety monitoring 
respectively. At present, the traditional centralized data 
processing method is used in most remote monitoring 
systems. However, the centralized method has the 
problem of large energy consumption. According to the 
characteristic of water monitoring, this paper proposes a 
water quality monitoring method based on fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation in wireless sensor networks 
(WQMMFCE) to alleviate the problem of large energy 
consumption cased by the centralized method. 
II.  SYSTEM MODE 
Under the background of water quality monitoring, a 
large number of nodes are deployed in multiple 
monitored areas. The nodes in each monitored area form 
a wireless network. Each network has one sink node, 
some high-power relay nodes, and some sensor nodes. 
Sink takes responsible for transmitting the collected data 
to the monitoring center. High-power relay nodes take 
responsible for forwarding the data from cluster heads to 
sink node. Sensor nodes collect data periodically. The 
monitoring Center is constituted by software and 
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hardware device. The architecture of the system is shown 
in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1.  The architecture of system. 
 The power supply module of sink is constituted 
by solar panel and rechargeable lithium battery. 
The node uses solar for power supply and 
charging the battery during day time. While at 
night, it uses rechargeable lithium battery for 
power supply. The computing ability of Sink 
node is stronger than other nodes, and it uses 
GSM module to transmit the collected data to the 
monitoring center. 
 The same as Sink node, the high-power relay 
node uses solar and rechargeable lithium battery 
for power supply. Compared with sensor node, 
the high-power relay node adds the power 
amplifier circuit which is opened only when the 
data is forwarding and closed immediately after 
transmission. Its transmission distance can be up 
to 1 ~ 2km. 
 Sensor node uses two 1.5V batteries for power 
supply. TIMSP430 chip is used as processor and 
Chipcom's CC2420 chip is used for wireless 
transceiver module. The sensor node is equipped 
with several sensors. TinyOS2.0 operating 
system is used. Its transmission distance can be 
up to 60~100m. During the network initialization, 
the network forms the cluster by using an 
improved clustering algorithm. During run time, 
the work mode that sleeping, collecting and 
processing sensory data periodically is adopted 
by the cluster member node. 
 Hardware devices in monitoring center include 
server, gateway node and client. Gateway node is 
equipped with GSM module whose responsibility 
is to collection data comes from Sink nodes 
deployed in each monitoring area, and transmit 
the data to the server through the serial port. The 
server processes and stores the received packet. 
The client accesses the data stored in the server 
through the Internet for further processing. 
 Software in the monitoring center includes server 
and client software. Server software is used for 
collecting and analyzing the data from each 
monitoring area. It also take responsible for 
forwarding the data to the client through the 
Internet by VPN tunnel once the client asked for 
the data. Client software is used for receiving 
data from the server and showing water quality 
distribution map of the entire monitoring area by 
combining the GIS information. 
WQMMFCE is designed based on the following 
assumptions: 
 All nodes are homogeneous and the energy is 
limited. The number and type of sensors in each 
node are the same. There are dissolved oxygen 
(DO), chemical oxygen demand (COD) and 
ammonia (NH3-N)
 [5]. 
 All the nodes are located and fixed, that is, the 
monitoring center has the location information of 
each node, such as longitude, latitude and altitude. 
 Cluster-based network topology is used. 
III.  FUZZY COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION 
Fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is an overall 
evaluation which is used for evaluating object or 
environment affected by variety of factors. Its most 
significant feature is that it can handle fussy factors well. 
Comprehensive evaluation can solve the problem that 
quantitative analysis is hard to be implemented by 
analytical method due to the effects of various complex 
and uncertain factors [6]. The concrete step of this method 
is described as follows: 
A.  Establishing factor set, weight set and judgment set 
 Factor set: U= {u1, u2 ,…, un} is a set of various 
properties which will affect final evaluation. In 
this paper, it is the set of the necessary sensor 
types carried by each node: U={dissolved 
oxygen(DO), chemical oxygen demand (COD), 
ammonia (NH3-N)}. 
 Weight set: W= {w1, w2,…, wi ,…, wn}. Where wi 
is the weight of factor i. 
 Judgment set: V= {v1, v2,…, vn} is a set of all 
possible evaluation results for the evaluation 
objects. The purpose of fuzzy comprehensive 
evaluation method is to select the best evaluation 
result from the judgment set based on considering 
all the factors. According to GB3838-2002[7], the 
water quality is divided into five levels: I, II, III, 
IV and V. the best level is Grade I. Therefore, in 
this paper, V= {I, II, III, IV, V}. 
B. Determining the weight of different factors 
The grade of water quality is evaluated by considering 
various factors which have different effects. So the 
weight of each factor should be considered. This paper 
will use expert evaluation and the binary comparison 
method to determine the weights. 
Expert evaluation [8] is a common used method to 
determine the weights of each factor. The method firstly 
distributes the factors to the experts in the form of table. 
Then, each expert scores the factor based on considering 
the importance of each factor according to the knowledge 
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and experience. Finally, the weight is decided by 
calculating average value. The method collects wisdom 
of all the experts, but it is difficult to compare all factors 
at the same time for any expert. 
Binary comparison method [9] is known as paired 
comparison or intercomparison. The method make paired 
comparison of all the factors. Then the relation among the 
factors is determined by superposition calculation. 
This paper combines the advantages of two methods 
and proposes a binary expert evaluation to solve the 
problem that it is hard to assign the weights for each 
factor. The steps of the method are described as follows: 
Step 1: Determining experts, and distributing the 
questionnaire of the comparison of main factors xi (i=1, 2, 
3,…, n) to all experts. Then the forms are taken back. The 
format of questionnaire is shown in Table I. 
TABLE I.   
THE FORMAT OF  QUESTIONNAIRE 
Factors 
Factors 
x1 x2 … xn 
x1 a11=1 a12 … a1n 
x2 a21 a22=1 … a2n 
… … … … … 
xn an1 an2 … ann=1 
 
Where aij is the comparison scale of factor i and factor 
j. The value of aij can be an integer ranged from 1 to 9.  
Factor i is the same important as factor j if aij equals 1. 
The larger the value of aij is, the more important is factor 
i compared with factor j. 
Step 2: The final scale matrix Anxn is obtained by 
averaging the scale from each expert, namely 



m
k
k
ijij a
m
a
1
1 (k=1, 2…m; k represents different experts). 
Anxn is shown in formula(1). 
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Step 3: The weight vector },...,,{ 21 nwwwW   is 
calculated by geometric averaging the row vector of scale 
matrix Anxn. The calculation formula is shown in formula 
(2): 
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C.  Establishing membership function and determining 
the membership matrix 
In water quality monitoring, membership is used for 
describing the fuzzy boundaries of the water quality 
grade. It can overcome the disadvantage of discontinuity 
of water quality grade so as to make the evaluation result 
more reasonable. Lower semi-trapezoidal function whose 
calculation is simple is adopted to describe the affiliation 
between each factor and each water quality grade due to 
the limited computing capability of the node. The 
functions are shown in formula (3), (4), and (5): 
 Membership function under grade I (j=1) is 
shown in formula (3): 
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 Membership function under grade II (j=2), III 
(j=3), and IV (j=4) is shown in formula (4): 
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 Membership function under grade V (j=5) is 
shown in formula (5): 
 
1,
1,
1,
1,
0
1

















jii
ijiji
jiji
jii
iji
ji
sc
scs
ss
sc
sc
u           (5) 
Where, uij is the membership value between factor i 
(i=1,2,3,…,n) and the water quality grade j (j=1,2,3,4,5). 
Ci is the current observed value of factor i. Sij represents 
the standard value of factor i when the water quality 
grade is j. The standard values can be found in GB3838-
2002. Thus, the membership matrix as shown in formula 
(6) can be obtained. 
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D.  Determination of  fuzzy synthesize judgement model 
The water quality is evaluated comprehensively 
through the main factor highlighted decision model 
),( M
 [6] after the membership matrix Rnx5 is obtained. 
The formula as shown in formula (7) can be obtained by 
the model. 
51
51~


 nn RWB                             (7) 
Where, )5,4,3,2,1(
1


juwb iji
n
i
j
is the element of 
comprehensive evaluation vector
51~ 
B , wi is the i-th 
element of weight vector W, while uij is the element of 
membership matrix Rnx5. 
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The water quality grade can be obtained according to 
the principle of maximum membership after 
comprehensive evaluation vector
51~ 
B  is obtained. For 
example, if bj = max (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5), then the water 
quality grade is determined to be j. When the evaluation 
vector obtained by calculation 
is },0.01,0 ,0.39000 85735143,0.14.0{
51~


B , then, 
b3 equals 0.39000 which is the biggest value in
51~ 
B , so 
the water grade of this region should be determined as III. 
IV.  A WATER QUALITY MONITORING METHOD BASED ON 
FUZZY COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION IN WIRELESS 
SENSOR NETWORKS 
In this paper, wireless sensor network will be used for 
water quality monitoring in lake. If the traditional 
centralized approach is used, the monitored data is sent to 
the monitoring center after simple processing. For 
practical applications, more factors need to be monitored, 
so, large amount of data is need to be transmitted, which 
will increase the possibility of collision, reduce quality of 
service, and shorten the lifetime of the entire network 
caused by high energy consumption. 
In this paper, fuzzy comprehensive evaluation is 
adopted to calculate the water quality. The sensor node 
can calculate the water quality using fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation after sensing and collecting the 
data. Whether the pollution information should be 
transmitted or not is determined by the grade of water 
quality. The processed data is transmitted to cluster head. 
Then the data is compressed and transmitted to the sink 
by the cluster head. Finally monitoring center obtains the 
data. 
A.  WQMMFCE processing 
The main steps of WQMMFCE are described as 
follows: 
Step 1: The network is initialized to clusters. In this 
paper, tri-color method which is mentioned in paper [10] 
is used for generating clustered network topology. It is 
one of TopDisc algorithms. There is only one hop from 
cluster member nodes to cluster head to avoid the 
existence of multi-hop in a single cluster. In the tri-color 
method, nodes have three states which are represented by 
white, black and gray. White represents undiscovered 
node, black represents cluster head node, and gray 
represent cluster member nodes. All nodes are marked as 
white before clustering. Then Sink node sends the 
network clustering message and marks itself black. White 
nodes change themselves into gray once they received the 
message from a black node and wait for a certain time 
period to send the network clustering message, the 
waiting time is inversely proportional to the distance 
from itself to the black node. When a white node receives 
the message from a gray node, it will wait for a period of 
time firstly, the length of waiting time is inversely 
proportional to the distance between itself and the gray 
node. As it’s very difficult to obtain the exact distance 
between the nodes in the wireless sensor network, 
clustering effect will be not satisfactory. So, RSS value is 
used to replace the actual distance which is mentioned in 
literature [11]. In the method, it is assumed that each 
node has a global ID. The waiting time is calculated by 
formula (8). 
)(log10 IDcLOSSaT
b
w        (8) 
Where wT is the waiting time, LOSS represents the 
received signal strength (RSS), a, b, and c are experience 
control parameters which can be determined by many 
experiments. 
Step 2: Cluster member nodes collect the data, such as 
dissolved oxygen (DO), chemical oxygen demand (COD) 
and ammonia (NH3-N), etc. Supposed that the data 
obtained from node 1 and node 2 in a period is shown in 
table II. 
TABLE II.   
THE FACTOR VALUES OF NODE 1 AND NODE 2 COLLECTED IN A 
PERIOD 
Factors 
Nodes 
DO COD NH3-N 
1 8.83 6.10 0.41 
2 7.15 10.50 1.52 
 
Step 3: Cluster member nodes calculate the 
membership value uij after the data is collected, then the 
membership matrix Rnx5 is gotten. 
The membership function for each factor can be 
obtained according to the standard value under different 
water quality grades in GB3838-2002. For example, the 
standard values of NH3-N under grade I to grade V are 
0.15, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 respectively.  
The membership functions for NH3-N are described as 
follows: 
 NH3-N’s membership function under grade I (j=1) 
is shown in formula (9): 
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 NH3-N’s membership functions under grade II 
(j=2), III (j=3), and IV (j=4) are shown in 
formula (10),(11) and (12) respectively: 
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 NH3-N’s membership function under grade V 
(j=5) is shown in formula (13): 
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Memberships of NH3-N for node 1 and node 2 under 
each water quality grade are calculated by formulas 
(9)~(13), and they are u3=(0.25714,0.74286,0,0,0) and 
u3’=(0,0,0,0.96,0.04). Similarly, memberships of DO for 
two nodes under each water quality grade are u1 = (1, 0, 0, 
0, 0) and u1'= (0.76667, 0.23333, 0, 0, 0). Memberships 
of COD under each water quality grade are u2 = (0, 0, 
0.975, 0.025, 0) and u2'= (0, 0, 0, 0, 1). Then the 
membership matrixes of the two nodes are obtained and 
shown in formula (14) and (15). 
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Step 4: Cluster member nodes calculate the 
comprehensive evaluation vector
51~ 
B . Then the water 
quality grade is obtained by the main factor highlighted 
decision model.  
It is assumed that the value of weight vector (WDO, 
WCOD, WNH3-N) is (0.3, 0.4, 0.3), which has been 
determined by experts binary estimation method. Formula 
(7) can be used to calculate the final evaluation vectors 
for the two nodes. There 
are },0.01,0 ,0.39000 85735143,0.14.0{
51~


B and 
}12,0.288,0.4 0,0.069999,230001.0{'
51~


B , According to 
the principle of maximum membership, the water quality 
grade of node 1 can be determined to be grade III as 
b3=0.39000 which is the maximum value. Similarly, 
water quality grade of node 2 is grade V. 
Step 5: Node ID and water quality grade are only to be 
transmitted to the cluster head if the water quality is equal 
or better than grade III. Otherwise it indicates that the 
pollution in this region is very serious, the pollution 
information such as type and value of pollutants obtained 
by SL395-2007 [12] should be transmitted to the cluster 
head together with the water quality grade and node ID. 
Data format is shown in Fig. 2. Where, a) 2 Bytes are 
used for storing the node ID. b) 3 bits are used for storing 
Water quality grades whose range is from 1 to 5, c) 2 bits 
can be used for storing the number of the types of 
pollutants which is determined mainly by the sensor types. 
d) The type ID and the value of pollutants can be stored 
by using 2 bits and 2 Bytes respectively. The information 
introduced in c) and d) only needs to be transmitted when 
there is a serious pollution. The advantage of the 
algorithm is that it can reduce data transmission and so 
reduce energy consumption. 
In the example, only the node number and the water 
quality grade need to be transmitted as the water quality 
grade of node 1 is grade III. Its data format is shown in 
Fig. 3(a). While for the node 2, it indicates that this area 
has serious pollution as the water quality grade is grade V. 
So the information of pollutants (COD and NH3-N) needs 
to be transmitted. Besides, the node number and the water 
quality grade also need to be transmitted. Its data format 
is shown in Fig. 3(b). 
Step 6: The cluster heads firstly compresses the data 
collected from their member nodes. Then the compressed 
data is sent to the sink. Data format is shown in Fig. 4.  
The length of data format is not fixed, because it is 
mainly related to the collected information of all the 
cluster member nodes. The total number of water quality 
grade is determined according to the grade information of 
each cluster member node and it can be stored by using 3 
bits as its maximum value is 5. The data of various water 
quality grades are followed by, and it includes specific 
information of all cluster member nodes under the water 
grade. The data is arranged as follows: water quality 
grade is stored first, and then, the number of nodes which 
under the grade is stored, finally, is the specific 
information of nodes. Its format is similar to Fig. 2. 
The compression is implemented by combining the 
nodes whose water quality grade are the same. Data 
compression can reduce network congestion. 
In the example, it is assumed that the cluster head of 
nodes 1 and 2 is node 3. According to the principles 
mentioned above, the data format of node 3 is shown in 
Fig. 5. 
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Figure 2.  Data format of cluster members. 
            
                    (a)                                                                                                                             (b) 
Figure 3.  Data format of node 1 and node 2.                              
 
Figure 4.  Data format of cluster heads. 
 
Figure 5.  Data format of node 3. 
Step 7: The monitoring center generates the water 
quality map according to the received data. Fig. 6 shows 
an example of water quality map. 
I
V
II
III
IV
 
Figure 6.  Water quality monitoring map in monitored area. 
B.  Analysis of energy consumption 
When the distance between two nodes is less than d0, 
free space model is adopted, otherwise, Multi-channel 
attenuation model is used [13, 14]. The energy consumption 
is shown in formula (16). Where elecE is energy 
consumed by transmission circuit for sending or 
receiving one bit data. fs  and amp represent the energy 
for amplifier in free space model and Multi-channel 
attenuation model respectively. The length of the data is 
k bit. 
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      (16) 
The energy consumption of receiving k bit data is 
shown in formula (17): 
 
elecRx EkkE *)(                            (17) 
The energy consumed by calculation is neglected, 
since the computation involved in WQMAFCE is simple 
and the energy consumption of calculation is much lower 
than that of communication. 
The energy consumption of the algorithm proposed in 
the paper is compared with the centralized algorithm 
according to the communication model under the 
circumstance that only one cluster exists. Provided that 
the number of the cluster member nodes is N, and 2 
Bytes is needed for storing the node ID. Each node 
equipped with M kinds of sensors, each sensor data 
needs 2 Bytes to store. The free space model is used for 
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member nodes transmitting data to the cluster head, and 
the average distance between them is d. The Multi-
channel attenuation model is used for cluster head 
transmitting data to the Sink, and the distance between 
them is d'. 
The energy consumption per round of the two 
algorithms is compared as follows: 
1) Centralized Algorithm 
a) The energy consumption of cluster members 
sending data to the cluster head is shown in formula (18): 
)*(*16*)1(* 2dEMNE ampelecTx             (18) 
b) The energy consumption of cluster head receives 
data from all the members is shown in formula (19): 
elecRx EMNE *16*)1(*                     (19) 
c) The energy consumption of the cluster head sends 
data to the Sink is shown in formula (20):  
)*(*16*)1(* 4dEMNE ampelecTx           (20) 
2)  WQMMFCE 
The data volume for transmission is determined by the 
current water quality: if the water quality is equal or 
better than grade III, only the grade information and 
node ID need to be transmitted. Otherwise, it needs to 
transmit the pollution information together with the 
grade information and node ID. The WQMMFCE 
performs best if the water quality is equal or better than 
grade III by taking data transmission as a metric. It is the 
worst case if the water is worse than grade III. The two 
cases are analyzed respectively as follows: 
a) The energy consumption of cluster members 
sending data to the cluster head is shown in formula (21) 
and (22): 
For the best case: 
)*(*19* 2dENE ampelecTx                (21) 
For the worst case: 
)*(*)2118*(* 2dEMNE ampelecTx       (22) 
b) The energy consumption of cluster head receiving 
data from all the members is shown in formula (23) and 
(24): 
For the best case: 
elecRx ENE *19*                     (23) 
For the worst case: 
elecRx EMNE *)2118*(*               (24) 
c) The energy consumption of the cluster head sends 
data to the Sink is shown in formula (25) and (26):  
For the best case: 
)*(*)16*22( 4dENE ampelecTx         (25) 
For the worst case: 
)*(*]18*)1(*98[ 4dEMNE ampelecTx       (26) 
VI. SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
In order to verify the validation of the method, 
OMNet++ is used for simulation. 200 nodes are 
deployed in an area of 1000x1000 uniformly. The 
coordinates of Sink is (500, 1000). Other parameters are 
set as follows: 
elecE is 50nJ/bit, amp is 10pJ/(bit*m^2), 
amp  is 0.0013pJ/(bit*m^4).The initial energy of each node 
is 2J and  the experiment runs 2000 rounds. 
Fig. 7 shows the comparisons of energy consumption 
between WQMMFCE and the centralized one. The 
energy consumption is increasing with the increment of 
running rounds for both methods. For the best case of 
WQMMFCE, its energy consumption is much lower than 
the centralized one. While for the worst case, its energy 
consumption is slightly higher than the centralized one. 
But in actual situation, the large-scale pollution can be 
occurred in short duration low-frequency. Therefore, 
WQMMFCE can achieve a very good energy saving 
effect due to node ID and water quality grade are only 
need to be transmitted most of the time. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Rounds
E
n
e
r
g
y
(
J
)
The centralized algorithm
The best case of WQMMFCE
The worst case of WQMMFCE
 
Figure 7.  Comparison of energy consumption. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A water quality monitoring method based on fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation is proposed under the 
background that the wireless sensor network is used for 
the application of water quality monitoring. The key 
point of the method is that the weight of factors should 
be calculated firstly by using binary expert evaluation in 
fuzzy comprehensive evaluation. Then each sensor node 
calculates the water quality by using fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation method. Whether the pollution 
information should be transmitted or not is determined 
by the grade of water quality. Simulation results show 
that it can reduce energy consumption and prolong the 
network life compared with the centralized method. 
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Abstract—This paper considers the channel capacity of 
60GHz wireless communications systems over Rayleigh 
fading channels and Ricean fading channels. The SNR and 
therefore capacity varies according to the communication 
distance. The capacity is presented for line-of-sight (LOS) 
and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) channels given based on a 
60GHz link budget model. Phase shift keying (PSK) 
modulation is considered under FCC power constraints for 
the unlicensed 59-64GHz radio spectrum. The channel 
capacity over Rayleigh fading channels is compared with the 
capacity in additive white Gaussian noise channels. The 
paper also investigates the channel capacity of 60GHz 
wireless communications systems over Ricean fading 
channels and gives the channel capacity compariasion with 
q-ary PSK modulation over Ricean fading channel, AWGN 
channel and Rayleigh channel when the SNR per symbol is 
given. The results show that a 60GHz wireless system is 
more suitable for short range communications less than 100 
meters rather than long distances.  
 
Index Terms—Channel capacity, AWGN, Rayleigh fading, 
Ricean fading, 60GHz 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The desire for unrestricted access to information and in 
particular multimedia spurs the growth of wireless 
communications. However, the lower frequency spectrum 
is almost completely occupied. Fortunately, an abundance 
of widely available spectrum around 60 gigahertz (GHz) 
is available to support high-rate, unlicensed wireless 
communications. The up to 7 GHz of bandwidth is very 
suitable for short-range wireless communication, and is 
an excellent prospect for future system development. 
The regulations and standards of each country are 
slightly different according to IEEE 802.15.3c 
[1][2][3][4][5]. In 2001, the United States Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) set aside 7 GHz of 
contiguous spectrum between 57 and 64 GHz for 
unlicensed use. In 2000, the Ministry of Public 
Management, Home Affairs, Posts, and 
Telecommunications (MPHPT) of Japan issued 60 GHz 
radio regulations for unlicensed utilization in the 59–66 
GHz band [2]. The 54.25–59 GHz band is, however, 
allocated for licensed use. The maximum transmit power 
in the unlicensed band is limited to 10 dBm with a 
maximum allowable antenna gain of 47 dBi. Unlike in 
North America, Japanese regulations specify that the 
maximum transmission bandwidth must not exceed 2.5 
GHz. There is no specification for RF radiation exposure 
and transmitter identification requirements. In Europe, 
point-to-point fixed services in the 64–66 GHz band is 
recommended. Figure 1 shows the international 
unlicensed spectrum around 60GHz [1][2].  
 
 
Figure 1.  International unlicensed spectrum around 60 GHz. 
With 7 GHz of bandwidth, 2-3Gbit/s high definition 
media interface (HDMI) or wireless gigabit Ethernet 
could be achieved even using simple modulation 
methods, for example, PAM, PSK and QAM. 
Furthermore, 60 GHz regulations allow for a much higher 
transmit power (10W) compared to existing wireless local 
area network (WLAN) and wireless personal area 
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network (WPAN) systems. The higher transmit power is 
necessary to overcome the higher path loss at 60 GHz. 
60 GHz wireless systems present several challenges 
that have made deployment difficult [2][3][4]. The 60 
GHz channel has 20 to 40 dB increased free space path 
loss compared to lower frequency bands, and suffers from 
15 to 30 dB/km of atmospheric absorption depending on 
the conditions. In addition, multipath effects are vastly 
reduced at 60 GHz making non-line-of-sight (NLOS) 
communications very difficult. Furthermore, increased 
phase noise, limited amplifier gain, and the need for 
transmission line modeling of circuit components due to 
the ultra high frequencies [2][3][4][5] are challenges for 
millimeter-wave transceivers. 
IBM engineers have reported the development of 60 
GHz front-end chip sets [2][5], and the first experimental 
60 GHz transmitter and receiver chips using a high-speed 
alloy of silicon and germanium (SiGe). Meanwhile, 
researchers from UCLA, UC Berkeley Wireless Research 
Center (BWRC), and other universities and institutes are 
using widely available and inexpensive complementary 
metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) technology to build 
60 GHz transceiver components. 
To date, there have been few results on the channel 
capacity of these systems. The capacity of a 60 GHz 
wireless communication system over an AWGN channel 
was presented in [6]. However,  Rayleigh fading channels 
and Ricean fading channels are more practical, especial in 
non-line-of-sight (NLOS) and part line-of-sight (LOS) 
environments. This paper investigates the capacity of 60 
GHz systems over Rayleigh fading channels and Ricean 
fading channels considering the FCC transmission rules. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 
II presents the 60GHz link budget model and Shannon 
capacity. The channel capacity over Rayleigh fading 
channels and Ricean fading channels is calculated in 
Section III, and results to illustrate the capacity are given 
in Section IV.  Finally, Section V concludes the paper.  
 
II.  60G LINK BUDGET MODEL AND SHANNON 
CAPACITY 
A. 60GHz Link Budget Models 
In 2001, the FCC set aside 7 GHz of spectrum between 
57 and 64 GHz for wireless communications. Their rules 
limit the equivalent isotropic radiated power in this band 
to a maximum power density of 9 µW/cm2 at 3 meters 
from the radiating source [7]. This means that 40 dBm 
transmit power is the legal power limit with an antenna 
having 0 dBi gain.  
The link budget model according to Friis free-space 
path loss formula is 
r t t r LP P G G P= + + −   (1) 
where Pt is the transmit power, Pr is the received power 
at distance d, Gt and Gr are antenna gain for the transmit 
and receive antennas respectively, both assumed to be 0 
dB for simplicity. All expressions are in decibels (dB). It 
is shown in [8] that the received signal strength is 
dominated by the distance from the transmitter and the 
receiver, taking into account the oxygen absorption. The 
general path loss model can be expressed as 
10
4( ) 10log
n
L
dP dB πλ
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                 (2) 
where λ is the wavelength corresponding to the center 
frequency fc, n is the path loss exponent which can be 
approximated as 1.55 for line-of-sight (LOS) channels 
and 2.44 for non-line-of-sight (NLOS) in an indoor home 
environment (5-15m) [10]. In conference room 
environments, n can be approximated as 1.77 in line-of-
sight (LOS) channels and 3.85 in non-line-of-sight 
(NLOS) environments [11]. Using the frequency range 
from 57 to 64 GHz, the constraint on the transmit power 
is 
dBm40Pt ≤                              (3) 
If thermal noise as the primary source of interference, the 
required sensitivity at the receiver can be calculated as  
SNRFNFSr ++=                      (4) 
where NF is the noise floor calculated by thermal noise  
kTWFN =                              (5) 
F is the noise figure (optimistically) assumed to be 0 dB, 
SNR is the signal to noise ratio at the receiver, k is 
Boltzmann’s constant, and T is the room temperature 
(typically 290K). For the 60 GHz system, the noise floor 
is calculated as -76 dBm. To ensure adequate 
performance at the receiver, the minimum received power 
should be greater than or equal to the required sensitivity. 
Thus the relationship between the system performance 
and maximum communication distance can be derived as 
 
Figure 2.   Received SNR versus communication distance for a 60GHz 
wireless system over LOS and NLOS channels and employing the FCC 
in band power density limit. 
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10
4116 10 log
ndSNR πλ
⎛ ⎞≤ − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠               (6) 
The relationship between SNR and distance is shown 
in Fig. 2. This shows that there is about 20dB in 
attenuation in LOS environments in both the home (5-
15m) and conference room (20m) environments. 
However, in NLOS channels, the SNR degradation as 
distance increases is very significant, especially in 
conference room environments.  
B.  Shannon Capacity 
Channel capacity can be calculated according to the 
Shannon capacity [12] which is given by 
log(1 )C W SNR= +                             (7) 
where W is the system bandwidth, SNR is the receive 
signal to noise ratio, defined as Eb/N0, where Eb is the 
energy per bit and N0 is the noise power spectral density. 
The relationship between the capacity and 
communication distance is then given by 
10
4(116 10log ( ) )/10
2log (1 10 )
nd
C W
π
λ−≤ +      (8) 
 
 
Figure 3.  The achievable Shannon capacity versus communication 
distance. 
Figure 3 shows the Shannon capacity limit for the LOS 
and NLOS cases. It can be observed that there is only a 
small capacity decrease for the LOS cases (n=1.55 and 
n=1.77), while the operating distance for the NLOS 
n=3.83 case is limited to several meters because the 
capacity decreases drastically as a function of distance. 
To improve the capacity, we can either increase the 
bandwidth or signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), or both. 
According to (1), improving the transmit antenna gain Gt 
and/or the receive antenna gain Gr can also improve the 
capacity. 
 
 Ⅲ.  60 GHZ CHANNEL CAPACITY OVER 
RAYLEIGH AND RICEAN FADING CHANNELS 
A.  Channel Capacity with PSK Modulation over 
AWGN Channels 
The Shannon capacity expression (7) corresponds to 
continuous-valued inputs and outputs. However, a 
channel employing multilevel/phase modulation, for 
example PAM, PSK or QAM modulation, has discrete-
valued inputs and continuous-valued outputs, which 
imposes an additional constraint on the capacity 
calculation. We consider modulation channels with 
discrete-inputs and continuous-outputs, which was 
capacity given in [12] as 
∑∫−
=
∞
∞−=
1q
0k
k
2kk)x(P
dy
)y(p
)x|y(plog)x(P)x|y(pmaxC
i
     (9) 
where 
( ) ( ) ( )1
0
q
i i
i
p y p y x P x
−
=
=∑                        (10) 
xk is the discrete-valued input, and y is the continuous-
valued output, modeled as  
( ) ( ) ( )y t x t w t= +                           (11) 
where w(t) is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) 
with variance N0/2 in each dimension.   
Assuming an equal a priori probability real or complex 
signal constellation, i.e. ( ) 1iP x q=  , the channel capacity of 
an AWGN channel with q-ary modulation is then [6][13]   
( ) ( )( )
( )
1
1
0
2 2
0
2 21 1
2 2 2
0 0
1log log
1log log exp
2
k
k
q
iq
i
y x
k k
q q
k i
y x
k i
p y x
C q
q p y x
x w x w
q
q σ
−
−
=
=
− −
= =
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= − ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤+ − −⎪ ⎪= − −⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
∑∑
∑ ∑
E
E
        (12) 
where E[.] denotes expectation, w is complex white 
Gaussian noise, modeled as a Gaussian distributed 
random variable with zero mean and variance 
2σ  in each 
real dimension. Equation (12) can be evaluated by Monte 
Carlo simulation. Note that (12) is a universal formula 
which applies to q-ary PAM/PSK/QAM, although PSK is 
commonly used in 60 GHz systems. With normalized 
signal energy, the relationship between channel capacity 
and SNR can be evaluated using (12), as well as the 
relationship between channel capacity and 
communication range. 
B.  Channel Capacity with PSK Modulation over 
Rayleigh and Ricean Fading Channels 
On wireless channels, channel capacity is typically 
degraded by fading phenomena which arise from 
multipath propagation. In NLOS cases, the channel can 
be modeled using a Rayleigh distribution. While in most 
cases, there are LOS paths and NLOS paths, so the 
channel can be modeled using a Ricean distribution. The 
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complex process received at the output of a noisy flat-
fading wireless channel is then 
)t(w)t(x)t(h)t(y +=                      (13) 
where h(t) is a generally time-correlated ergodic fading 
complex sequence independent of x(t) and w(t), and w(t) 
is complex zero mean AWGN with variance N0/2 in each 
dimension. Assuming coherent detection at the receiver, 
the effect of fading is reduced to multiplication of the 
transmitted symbol x(t) by the real nonnegative random 
variable h(t), which represents the envelope of the 
complex fading. Therefore, without loss of generality, we 
can rewrite (13) in an equivalent sampled form. 
)n(w)n(x)n(h)n(y +=              (14) 
With perfect channel state information available at the 
receiver, it is known that the capacity of the channel in 
(14) can be directly obtained by averaging the 
corresponding conditional capacity )h(C
~
 with respect to 
the probability density function (pdf) of the fading gain. 
This leads to the following expression for the channel 
capacity of fading channels for an equiprobable signal 
constellation 
∫∞= 0 dh)h(p)h(C~C                 (15) 
where 
∑ ∑−
=
−
= ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−−=
1q
0k
2
2
k
2
i
1q
0i
2x|y2 2
|hxy||hxy|explogE
q
1)q(log)h(C~
k σ
(16) 
With Rayleigh fading,  h can be modeled as a complex 
Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance 
2σ   in 
each dimension. Rayleigh fading model assumes that all 
paths are NLOS paths and there is no a dominant path.  
While for Ricean fading,  h can be modeled as a 
complex Gaussian variable with means m for the real and 
imaginary parts, and variance 
2σ  in each dimension. The 
Ricean parameter is defined as 
2
2
σβ
m=
 which means 
the ratio of the LOS paths power to the NLOS paths 
power. 
Ⅳ.  NUMERICAL RESULTS 
Monte Carlo simulation was used to evaluate the 
channel capacity of a 60 GHz communication system 
over Rayleigh fading channels under FCC restrictions. 
These results are compared with the AWGN channel 
capacity.  
To provide a basis for comparison, Fig. 4 gives the 
normalized channel capacity of q-ary PSK modulation 
over an AWGN channel [6]. This shows that the 
achievable data rate for BPSK is 3.75 Gbps with 5 GHz 
bandwidth and an SNR of 0 dB. 
The normalized channel capacity of q-ary PSK over 
Rayleigh fading channels is shown in Fig. 5.  This shows 
that the achievable data rate for BPSK is about 2.9 Gbps 
with 5GHz bandwidth at an SNR of 0 dB. Thus there is a 
significant capacity decease due to the fading. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Channel capacity with q-ary PSK modulation over an 
AWGN channel. 
 
Figure 5.  Channel capacity of q-ary PSK over Rayleigh fading 
channels. 
A comparison of q-ary PSK capacity over AWGN and 
Rayleigh fading channels is given in Fig. 6.  As expected, 
there is no significant difference in the capacities when 
the SNR is less than 5dB, since the noise dominates 
performance. However, for values of SNR from 5dB to 
20 dB, the capacity decease due to the fading is obvious. 
In addition, the capacity decease over Rayleigh fading 
channels is greater as q increases. 
The channel capacity of a 60 GHz communication 
system over Ricean fading channels under FCC 
restrictions is simulated below. These results are 
compared with the AWGN channel and the Rayleigh 
fading channel capacity.  
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Figure 6.  Comparison of q-ary PSK channel capacity over AWGN and 
Rayleigh fading channels. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Channel capacity compariasion  with q-ary PSK modulation 
over Ricean fading channel, AWGN channel and Rayleigh channel 
when the SNR per symbol is 5 dB. 
To provide a basis for comparison, Fig. 7 gives the 
normalized channel capacity of q-ary PSK modulation 
over Ricean fading channel, AWGN channel and 
Rayleigh channel when the SNR per symbol is 5 dB. This 
shows that the achievable data rate for BPSK and 4PSK 
is increasing with the Ricean parameter increasing. 
Fig. 8 gives the normalized channel capacity of q-ary 
PSK modulation over Ricean fading channel, AWGN 
channel and Rayleigh channel when the SNR per symbol 
is 10 dB. Fig. 2 shows that the achievable data rate for 
BPSK and 4PSK is increasing with the Ricean parameter 
too. But the increasing of channel capacity when the SNR 
per symbol is 5 dB is more clearly compared to the SNR 
per symbol with 10 dB.  
Fig.7 and Fig.8 show that when the Ricean parameter 
is small, for example, less than -5dB, the channel 
capacity over Ricean fading channel is near to the 
channel capacity over Rayleigh fading channel because 
there is much more NLOS paths than LOS paths when 
the Ricean parameter is small. On the contrary,  when the 
Ricean parameter is big, for example, bigger than 15dB, 
the channel capacity over Ricean fading channel is near 
to the channel capacity over AWGN channel because 
there is much more LOS paths than NLOS paths when 
the Ricean parameter is big. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Channel capacity compariasion  with q-ary PSK modulation 
over Ricean fading channel, AWGN channel and Rayleigh channel 
when the SNR per symbol is 10 dB. 
 
Ⅴ.  CONCLUSIONS 
The capacity of 60GHz wireless communications over 
Rayleigh fading channels and Ricean fading channels was 
investigated for PSK modulation employing FCC in band 
power density limits. In NLOS cases, the channel can be 
modeled using a Rayleigh distribution. While in most 
cases, there are LOS paths and NLOS paths, so the 
channel can be modeled using a Ricean distribution.  
The relationship between channel capacity and SNR or 
communication range was demonstrated over Rayleigh 
fading channels in different channel conditions. As 
expected, the lower the path loss exponent, the longer the 
communication range. It can be concluded that a 60GHz 
wireless system is more suitable for short range 
communications less than 1 km rather than long 
distances. The q-ary PSK channel capacity over Rayleigh 
fading channels was shown to be less than the capacity in 
AWGN channels, particularly in the 5-20 dB SNR range. 
The capacity decease over Rayleigh fading channels is 
more serious with increasing q. The relationship between 
channel capacity and Ricean parameter was demonstrated 
in different SNR conditions. As expected, the bigger the 
Ricean parameter, the greater the channel capacity.  
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Abstract—Currently more and more web applications and 
telecommunication applications are required to be 
separation with database layer. A general solution is to 
employ a middleware-based architecture, including an 
application client tier, a database front end (DB-FE) tier, 
also called middleware tier, and a database backend (DB-
BE) tier. This paper mainly focuses on the issues of data 
synchronization and resynchronization in the case of 
failures for the architecture. Firstly, a synchronous update 
everywhere replication model and a replication 2-phase 
commit protocol (R2PC) are discussed, which can increase 
update success ratio of replication transactions through 
relaxing the commit constraints, and enhance DB-BEs’ 
availability using transaction retry and discard mechanisms. 
Then, a novel method using request logs is suggested for 
data resynchronization. The method only records the 
missing transaction requests for the unavailable DB-BEs in 
the DB-FEs and links the logs belonging to a site together, to 
reduce the resynchronization time. Moreover, the method 
doesn’t interrupt the normal transaction processing in the 
DB-BEs, so system throughput using request logs is higher 
than using transaction logs. Experiences validate that the 
suggested methods have better performance. 
 
Index Terms—-synchronization replication, data 
resynchronization, heterogeneous databases, middleware-
based architecture 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the growing numbers of subscribers and the 
introduction of new additional services, a large of web 
applications and telecommunication applications such as 
home location register (HLR) and home subscriber 
service (HSS), are required to be separation with database 
layer and high availability. A general solution is to 
employ a middleware-based replication architecture 
shown as Figure 1[1~5].  
The architecture consists of three tiers: 
• The application client (AC) tier, which initiates 
requests from clients. An AC may connect to one 
or more DB-FEs for better performance, e.g. load 
balancing and connection redundancy. 
• The database front end (DB-FE) tier, also called 
middleware tier, which is responsible of 
receiving the requests from ACs, routing the 
requests to DB-BEs, and passing on the results, 
either a success or failure, back to the ACs. 
• The database backend (DB-BE) tier, which holds 
the actual user/subscriber data, executes the 
transaction requests from BE-FEs, and returns 
results/responses back to the DB-FEs. For 
guaranteeing high availability of databases, N 
(N≥3, Figure 1 shows a case of N=3) DB-BEs are 
organized into a cluster for data redundancy, 
which could be heterogeneous and co-located or 
spread out to a wider geographic region. 
 
Figure 1.  The middleware-based replication architecture for high 
availability database applications 
It is assumed that these elements, including the ACs, 
DB-FEs and DB-BEs, are all connected to form a 
network and they are supported by some network 
protocols, e.g. Ethernet, TCP/IP, ATM, or etc. Some 
characteristics of such a network are: 
• Redundant connection. There are redundant 
physical connections between ACs and DB-FEs, 
DB-FEs and DB-BEs. With redundant 
connections, any single point of failure will not 
have impact to the overall system service 
availability. 
• Replicated Data. All data objects in the databases 
are fully replicated in N DB-BEs among one 
cluster to make data continuously available to the 
DB-FEs in the event of a component failure, 
which could be due to a hardware node, software 
or a connection failure. Whenever an object in 
the database is to be updated, the update has to be 
DB-FE DB-FE DB-FE
AC
DB-BE Cluster DB-BE Cluster DB-BE Cluster
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replicated in all of the N instances to ensure a 
consistent database view, i.e., synchronous 
replication.  
The purpose of synchronous replication is to guarantee 
all replicas of every data object in a cluster always have 
the same image. But one problem of synchronous 
replication is it may lead to an increased response time 
due to waiting for the completion of all the replicas’ 
updates. Another problem is an update request has to be 
rejected if one replica can’t be updated successfully, to 
ensure data consistency across all replicas. The increased 
level of update failure will have negative impact to the 
high availability concept for such architecture. 
In the other hand, there will be instances of network or 
other failures that stop data from being replicated to all 
replicas. When this occurs, the replicas on the failed 
servers will become out of synchronization. Therefore, a 
resynchronization process must take place to ensure the 
failed servers can catch up of the missed updates. How to 
“catch up” the missed updates but without interrupting 
the services in the active servers is also a challenge for 
this architecture.  
This paper mainly focuses on data synchronous and 
data resynchronization in the case of failures in the 
middleware-based replication architecture. The remaining 
parts of the paper are organized as following. Section 2 is 
the introduction of related works. Section 3 gives a 
synchronous update everywhere replication model and a 
commit framework for the architecture. Section 4 gives 
some rules and mechanisms for replication transactions. 
Section 5 describes a replication 2-phase commit protocol, 
including commit state graphs and algorithms both for the 
coordinator and participants. Section 6 suggests a novel 
resynchronization method using request logs. Section 7 is 
performance testing and evaluation. Section 8 concludes 
the paper. 
I. RELATED WORKS 
In general, database replication protocols can be 
categorized into two classes by the time when update 
propagation to databases takes place, eager vs. lazy[6]. In 
eager replication schemes, i.e. synchronous replication, 
updates are propagated within the boundaries of a 
transaction. In this scheme, the user does not receive the 
commit notification until sufficient copies in the system 
have been updated. Lazy replication schemes, i.e. 
asynchronous replication, on the other hand, update a 
local copy, commit and only some time after the commit, 
the propagation of the changes takes place. The first 
approach provides consistency in a straightforward way 
but it is expensive in terms of message overhead and 
response time. Lazy replication allows a wide variety of 
optimizations, however, since copies are allowed to 
diverge, inconsistencies might occur.  
In the other hand, by the dimension of where the 
updates can take place, replication protocols can also be 
classified into primary copy (master) and update 
everywhere (group) approaches[7]. The primary copy 
approach requires all updates to be performed first at one 
copy (the primary or master copy) at a master server and 
then at the other copies (the secondary copies) at 
secondary servers. This simplifies replica control at the 
price of introducing a single point of failure and a 
potential bottleneck. The update everywhere approach 
allows any copy to be updated, thereby speeding up 
access but at the price of making coordination more 
complex. 
In most present industrial products, one standard 
solution for synchronous replication is the Two-Phase 
Commit (2PC) protocol such as XA model[8], which 
makes global decision by following rules:  
• all vote “YES” ⇒ global commit 
• one votes “NO” ⇒ global abort 
But for replication transactions, the rule of making 
global commit is too strict since it requires all replicas 
can be updated successfully, and the rule of making 
global abort is too relaxed since it will lead to aborting a 
lot of transactions due to a single site’s failure. Moreover, 
an update transaction can’t be committed if one replica 
always say “NO”. Therefore, the rules are inconsistent 
with the requirement of high availability.  
In addition, as long as one site votes “NO”, the 
transaction will be aborted regardless of the reason of 
voting “NO”. In general, if a replication transaction can 
commit in one site, it should also execute successfully in 
all other available sites if there is no site failures and link 
failures. However, it is possible for a replication 
transaction that one site votes “YES” while another site 
votes “NO” due to some temporal software or hardware 
failures, like temporary memory shortage, deadlock, or 
software bug, etc. In this case, the whole transaction will 
also be aborted, which will lead to wasting a lot of system 
resources.  
There are many 2PC-related protocols, like presumed 
commit (PC), presumed abort (PA, three-phase commit 
(3PC)[9], and etc, which are designed to enhance the 
performance of 2PC. Although 3PC eliminate the 
blocking in 2PC, all of them don’t give any special 
treatment for replication transactions. 
Now almost all databases replication products, 
including disk-resident databases (such as Oracle, DB2, 
Sybase, etc.) and In-Memory Database (IMDB) (such as 
Timesten), use transaction logs to handle 
resynchronization. That is, when receiving a 
resynchronization request from a failed server, the active 
DB-BE will send the logs of the missed committed 
transactions (called resynchronization logs) to it. Then 
the failed server can replay the missed updates by the 
logs.  
Since it is necessary for each transaction to write its 
logs to a stable log file before it commits, no additional 
log overhead needs for resynchronization in the method 
based on transaction logs. But the method has some 
disadvantages for resynchronization [10-12]: 
• As one replication server has lost communication 
for a long time, a great amount of logs need be 
stored in the active DB-BEs, even if many 
checkpoint and backup operations have been 
completed.  
• The transaction logs are essentially designed for 
recovery processing, to undo the uncommitted 
transactions and redo the committed transactions. 
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Since all transactions are recorded into the logs 
by appending data at the end of the log, the 
fetcher of the resynchronization logs in the active 
server will take time to distinguish which logs are 
required for resynchronization. Also the update 
process in the failed servers will spend time to 
analyze which part in a log is the after image of 
the missed data. 
• The procedure of resynchronization may interrupt 
the normal transaction processing in the active 
server, since the transaction logs must be 
accessed exclusively by both the transaction 
manager (log write) and the fetcher of the 
resynchronization logs (log read) in the active 
server. 
• The methods can’t be extended to the replication 
environment with heterogeneous databases, since 
heterogeneous databases have different log 
formats.  
So far as we know, no any special resynchronization 
solution has been suggested for the three-tier architecture.  
II. REPLICATION MODEL IN THE MIDDLEWARE-
BASED ARCHITECTURE 
A. Synchronous update everywhere replication model 
In the middleware-based architecture, the middleware 
(DB-FE) tier acts as an important role for all replication 
transactions. When a DB-FE receives a request from an 
AC, it will determine which cluster the request should be 
forwarded according to data distributed information, and 
then select one or more DB-BEs in the cluster to process 
the request.  
We use synchronous update everywhere replication 
model for the architecture since it needs less response 
time than the primary copy model (Figure 2). In the 
model, a replication procedure can be divided into five 
phases: 
 
Figure 2.  Synchronous update everywhere replication model 
Phase 1 (Request forwarding): After receiving an 
update request from a Client, the DB-FE will forward the 
request to all available DB-BEs in the specified cluster.  
Phase 2 (Lock Coordination): One of the database 
servers sends a lock request to all other servers for asking 
whether to grant the lock or not. If the lock can be 
granted by all sites, the transaction can proceed. If not, 
the transaction will be delayed till all sites agree to grant 
the lock. 
Phase 3 (Execution): When all the locks are granted, 
the operation will be executed at all sites.  
Phase 4 (Commit Coordination): During the commit 
coordination phase, a commit protocol is used to make 
sure that all sites can commit the transaction. The commit 
coordinator is acted by DB-FE.   
Phase 5 (Client Response): When the transaction is 
completed, the DB-FE returns a response, either success 
or failure to the Client. 
In this model, a DB-FE can forward transaction 
requests by their type: 
• If the request is a read request, the DB-FE will 
forward it to one of the available DB-BEs in the 
cluster by the load balance strategy used.  
• If the request is an update request, the DB-FE 
will forward it to all available DB-BEs in the 
cluster, instead of a master server.  
Therefore, updates on all replicas of a data object in 
the model are done almost simultaneously, so it can 
reduce the response time largely. However, in order to 
ensure the consistency of all copies, distributed locking 
approaches should be used to resolve data access 
conflicts, i.e., an object can only be accessed after all of 
its replicas have been locked. Therefore, for each update 
transaction, a lock coordinator phase should be added, 
which will increase transaction overhead.  
B. Middleware-based Commit Framework 
In the model mentioned above, a new kind of commit 
protocol should be designed to synchronize all N replicas 
in a cluster. The DB-FE in the middleware tier will act as 
a coordinator, and all DB-BEs in the cluster are the 
participants of the replication transactions. The commit 
framework for the middleware-based replication is shown 
as Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  The commit framework for the middleware-based replication 
In this framework, before a DB-FE forwards a request, 
it should know the up-to-date state of all DB-BEs. 
Therefore each DB-FE should keep heartbeats with all 
DB-BEs. In the view of DB-FEs, a DB-BE should be in 
one of the following states at any time (Figure 4):  
• DOWN state indicates the connection between the 
DB-FE and the DB-BE is broken, i.e., without 
any heartbeat message. 
DB-FE 
 (Coordinator) 
DB-BE1 
(Participant)
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• OUT-OF-SYNC state indicates the connection 
between the DB-FE and the DB-BE is linked but 
the data in the DB-BE is out of synchronization. 
When a DB-BE is in “OUT-OF-SYNC” state, it 
can’t become “SYNC” till catching up with all 
the missed updates through a resynchronization 
process. 
• SYNC state indicates the data in the DB-BE is 
consistent with other DB-BEs in the same cluster.  
       
Figure 4.  State graph of DB-BEs 
III. RULES AND MECHANISM FOR REPLICATION 
TRANSACTIONS 
In order to ensure high availability of the replication 
databases, we should design a new replication commit 
protocol for the middleware-based replication 
transactions with synchronous requirements.  
A. Base commit rules for replication transactions 
It has been discussed in Part I that the commit rules of 
2PC are not suitable for the synchronous replication 
transactions. First, two base commit rules for replication 
transactions are suggested as following: 
RR1. If one participant votes “YES”, the coordinator 
can make a global commit decision. 
RR2. Only if all participants vote “NO”, the 
coordinator can make a global abort decision. 
According to the new rules, a replication transaction 
may commit as long as one site votes “YES”, and 
whether it can abort must wait for a global abort decision. 
This is just opposite to the standard 2PC, which allows a 
site to abort unilaterally, and it must wait for a global 
commit decision after voting “YES”.  
However, although the participants are allowed to 
commit unilaterally in the end, it can’t commit till 
receiving a global commit decision, to ensure all replicas 
can be updated synchronously.  
RR3. The participant who votes “YES” can commit 
only receiving a global commit decision from the 
coordinator. 
B. Transaction retry mechanism 
In order to reduce the probability of transaction abort 
due to temporary failures, if at least one participant has 
voted “YES”, the participant who has voted “NO” 
should retry.  
Figure 5 is an example of retry mechanism. Both DB-
BE1 and DB-BE2 voted “YES”, and DB-BE3 voted 
“NO”. The coordinator should send a retry message to 
DB-BE3. When C receives a retry message, it will retry 
the transaction till timeout or success to revote “YES”. 
No matter what DB-BE3 votes, the coordinator can make 
a global commit decision and send the decision to both 
DB-BE1 and DB-BE2. The additional work is, if DB-
BE3 cannot success till timeout, the coordinator will 
indicate its state as “OUT-OF-SYNC”, and does not 
forward any new request to it until it has gotten the 
missed updates. Therefore, DB-BE1 and DB-BE2 can 
keep database services unceasingly, and the inconsistent 
replica in DB-BE3 will not be seen by applications. 
Therefore, we have following rule: 
RR4. If there is any participant voting “YES”, the 
participants voting “NO” should retry till timeout or 
success to revote “YES”. 
 
Figure 5.  Transaction retry mechanism 
C. Transaction discarding mechanism 
In replication environment, two kinds of DB-BEs 
should become unavailable, i.e., the sites in “DOWN” 
state or in “OUT-OF-SYN” state. For ensuring the 
applications can always see the consistent replicas of all 
data objects, the DB-FEs never forward requests to the 
unavailable DB-BEs. Therefore, in order to improve the 
availability, the DB-FEs can discard following 
participants in the decision phase: 
• The DB-BEs become “DOWN” because of broken 
link. 
• The DB-BEs vote “NO” or timeout after retrying. 
As to the first kind of transactions, since their sites 
can’t communicate with DB-FEs, the data objects in the 
sites cannot be accessed by DB-FEs. When the sites 
resume connection to DB-FEs, they will enter “OUT-OF-
SYNC” state first, and then do resynchronization to get 
the missed updates, which will be discussed in Part V. 
As to the second kind of transactions, when they are 
discarded, the states of their sites will be marked as 
“OUT-OF-SYNC” at once, and the DB-FE doesn’t 
forward any new request to it until it becomes “SYNC”.  
In Figure 6, DB-BE3 is in “DOWN” state. Since the 
coordinator cannot receive any vote from DB-BE3 as 
timeout, it can decide to commit the transactions on DB-
BE1 and DB-BE2, and discard the replication transaction 
in DB-BE3. But it should identify the state of DB-BE3 as 
“DOWN”, and does not forward any read or write 
requests to it.  
OUT-OF-SYNC 
DOWN 
SYNC 
Keep heartbeat 
Resynchronization 
Retry fail 
Lost heartbeat 
Lost heartbeat
DB-FE 
DB-BE1 DB-BE2 DB-BE3
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Figure 6.  Transaction discard mechanism 
RR5. If the coordinator finds a participant in 
“DOWN” state during commit processing, the 
participant will be discarded. 
RR6. If there is at lease a participant who votes “YES” 
and a participant who votes “NO”, the coordinator will 
discard the participants voting “NO”, and denote their 
states as “OUT-OF-SYNC”. 
 
IV. REPLICATIOIN TWO-PHASE COMMIT PROTOCOL 
(R2PC) 
A two-phase commit protocol integrating the features 
discussed in Part VI is called a replication two-phase 
commit protocol (R2PC), which can also be divided into 
two phases: 
• Vote phase: the participants vote their execution 
results “YES” or “No” to the coordinator. 
• Decision phase: the coordinator make a global 
commit or abort decision and forward it to the 
participants 
A. Coordinator’s  state transition diagram and commit 
algorithm  
Figure 7 is the state transition diagram for the 
coordinator, including INITIAL, WAIT, COMMIT, and 
ABORT states. After a coordinator send “prepare” 
message, it enters a WAIT state. Whether it enters 
COMMIT or ABORT state is determined by the votes it 
has received. 
 
Figure 7.  Coordinator ‘s state transition diagram 
The commit algorithm of the coordinator can be 
described as follows. 
BEGIN 
Pa:={all available sites}; 
if Pa≠Null {( 
  initiates a global transaction; 
    writes START to global log and flush; 
sends transaction request to the sites in Pa; 
wait until receives commit request from AC; 
sends “PREPARE” request to DB-BEs; 
while NOT receive all “YES” votes OR not timeout { 
      if has received a “YES” vote then 
        if receives a “NO” vote then 
                   send RETRY message to it 
    } 
Py:={participants voting “YES”}; 
Pn:={participants voting “NO”}; 
        if Py=Pa { // all sites vote “YES” 
     write COMMIT to global log and flush; 
           send global commit to the participants in Py; 
} 
else { 
if Pn = Pa { // all sites vote “NO”  
           write ABORT to global log and flush;  
                   send global abort to the participants in Pn;  
            } 
else { 
                send global commit to the participants in Py; 
                  identify the states of the sites in Pn as“OUT-
OF-SYNC”; 
          identify the states of the sites not in Pn and Pa 
as “DOWN” 
          } 
 write DONE to global log and flush; 
} 
END 
B. Participant’s state transition diagram and commit 
algorithm  
Figure 8 is the state transition diagram for the 
participants, which includes INITIAL, WAIT, READY, 
and ABORT states. After a participant votes commit, it 
enters READY state, and if it votes “NO” or timeout, it 
enters WAIT state. The WAIT state can be changed to 
READY state if the participant retry successfully. 
Participants will take different actions as timeout in 
different states. 
 
Figure 8.  Participant’s  state transition diagram 
The commit algorithm of the participants can be 
described as follows. 
BEGIN 
INITIAL 
READY
COMMIT ABORT 
- 
YES - 
NO 
global commit 
- 
 
timeout  
  NO 
WAIT 
global abort  
- 
retry 
NO 
retry 
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_timeout_   
state query 
timeout 
- Notes: 
_NO (at least one YES)_ 
retry 
_timeout (one YES)_ 
commit 
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commit 
 Incoming message 
 Outgoing message 
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ABORT 
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abort 
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RETRY_FLAG=0; 
start transaction; 
if receives PREPARE request { 
RP: if executes successfully { 
               writes PREPARE COMMIT log and flush; 
votes “YES” to coordinator; 
waits till receive the global decision or timeout; 
writes COMMIT to local log and flush; 
    commits transaction; 
return 
} 
      else { 
              if RETRY_FLAG=0 { 
writes PREPARE ABORT  log and flush; 
votes “NO” to coordinator; 
wait till receive the global decision or timeout; 
if receive RETRY command { 
RETRY_FLAG=1; 
re-execute the transaction; 
goto RP; 
                 } 
         if receive global abort decision { 
                    write ABORT to local log and flush; 
            abort transaction 
                } 
           } 
     } 
END 
 
V. RESYNCHRONIZATION METHOD BASED ON 
REQUEST LOGS 
The purpose of resynchronization procedure is to get 
the missed updates before the failed system resumes 
services. If a replication transaction can execute 
successfully on the replicas over all sites, the update 
information of the transaction needn’t be 
resynchronization since nobody missed it. Therefore, 
only the information of committed write transactions 
which are missed by some sites need be kept. 
Instead of the transaction logs, request logs are 
suggested for the middle-based replication architecture to 
handle resynchronization, i.e., only the requests of the 
write replication transactions missed by failed sites 
should be recorded, such that resynchronization can be 
accomplished by re-executing the missed requests in the 
resynchronization sites. 
A. Resynchronization procedure based on request logs 
The DB-FE is both a request forwarder and a 
transactions coordinator, so it knows about which 
requests have been forwarded, whether and when the 
requests have committed or aborted, and which requests 
are missed by the DB-BEs. Thus, whenever a DB-FE 
makes a global commit decision in the decision phase of 
R2PC, it will check whether the transaction is missed by 
any DB-BEs. If it is, the DB-FE will record the 
transaction request both into its memory and a stable 
storage. 
The format of request logs should be as <USN, TR, 
SBE>. Of which, USN is the update sequence number, TR 
is the transaction request, SBE is the set of DB-BE 
missing the update. The requests belonging to a DB-BE 
can be linked together. 
The resynchronization procedure based on request 
logs is shown as Figure 9: 
(1) After the DB-FE receives a heartbeat message 
from an “OUT-OF-SYNC” DB-BE, it sends a 
resynchronization command to the DB-BE; 
(2) The DB-BE starts a resynchronization procedure 
and send a ready message to the DB-FE; 
(3) The DB-FE fetches all missing request logs of the 
DB-BE, and sends them to it; 
(4) The DB-BE executes the missing request by the 
order recorded in the log; 
(5) After the DB-BE finishes resynchronization, it 
sends an end resynchronization message to the DB-FE; 
(6) The DB-FE identifies the state of the DB-BE as 
“SYNC”. 
(7) The DB-BE can resume normal service.  
B. Resynchronization order of requests 
The replay order of the missed requests is very 
important for guaranteeing the correctness of 
resynchronization in the failed sites. It is not necessary 
for the failed DB-BEs to replay the missed requests 
strictly by the same order as they have committed at the 
active servers, but it must ensure all conflicted requests 
can be replayed with the same order as they have 
committed.   
For example, say 3 missed transactions Ta, Tb and Tc, 
and Ta is conflicted with Tc. Their commit order in an 
active DB-BE is <Ta, Tb, Tc>. The replay orders both of 
<Ta, Tb, Tc> and <Tb, Ta, Tc> are said to be right for the 
failed DB-BE, since all of them can ensure Ta is replayed 
before Tc. 
In fact, a DB-FE doesn’t know the actual commit order 
of the transactions in the DB-BEs. But it knows the order 
of the global commits of all requests for it is the 
coordinator. If the replication two-phase locking (R2PC) 
is used to ensure the consistency of databases, the order 
of making global commit can be used as the replay order 
in the failed servers, since the conflicted transactions 
can’t vote YES at the same time.  
C. An example 
Figure 9 is an example of request logs, which keep the 
missed update records for both DB-BE2 (i.e., 
U001~U004) and DB-BE3 (i.e., U003 and U004). An 
update sequence number (USN) is the global commit 
sequence of a transaction request, which determines the 
replay order in the failed DB-BEs. Figure 10 shows the 
resynchronization orders of the missed requests for both 
DB-BE2 and DB-BE3.   
              
 
 
Figure 9.  An example of request logs 
<U001, R1, DB-BE2> 
<U002, R3, DB-BE2> 
<U003, R4, DB-BE2, DB-BE3> 
<U004, R2, DB-BE2, DB-BE3> 
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Figure 10.  Resynchronization order of the missed requests 
VI. PERFORMANCE TESTING 
In this section, the performances both of R2PC and the 
resynchronization method using request logs are tested. 
For R2PC, we first compare it with the standard 2PC 
protocol on update success ratio. Then, we will test the 
impact of transaction retry mechanism in R2PC. 
For the resynchronization method, we first compare it 
with the method using transaction logs on 
resynchronization time and transaction throughput of the 
system.  
The performance evaluation is performed on a 
simulation replication environment, including 3 ACs, 2 
DB-FEs, 2 DB-BE Clusters, which form a local network.  
A. Experimental results 
Figure 11 shows the comparison results of update 
success ratio under various transaction generating ratio. 
For the commit condition is relaxed in R2PC, i.e., as long 
as one DB-BE votes “YES”, then the replication 
transaction can commit. But in 2PC, only all DB-BEs in a 
cluster vote “YES”, the replication transaction can 
commit. Therefore, the update success ratio of R2PC is 
higher than that of 2PC. 
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Figure 11.  Comparison of update success ratio 
Figure 12 shows the impact of retry mechanism on the 
availability ratio of DB-BEs. In R2PC, if there is a DB-
BE votes “YES”, the replication transaction can commit. 
But the sites voting “NO” or without voting are denoted 
as an unavailability state: “OUT-OF-SYNC” or 
“DOWN”, which will reduce the availability of DB-BEs. 
In order to reduce the probability of unavailability due to 
temporal failures, R2PC allows the site voting “NO” re-
executes the transaction if some one else has votes “YES”. 
Therefore, the retry mechanism can increase the 
availability of DB-BEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Comparison of DB-BEs’ availability 
Figure 13 shows the comparison of resynchronization 
time using different methods. For each replication 
transaction in the experience only updates one or 2 data 
objects, so they are generally short transactions. That is, 
the times of resynchronization operations using both the 
transaction logs and the request logs are almost the same. 
But since all transactions logs are append-only logs, the 
fetcher of in the active server will take time to distinguish 
which logs are required for resynchronization, and the 
update process in the failed servers have to spend time to 
analyze which part in a log is the after image of the 
missing data. In the method using request logs, all logs 
belonging to one site are linked together, so it is easy for 
the DB-FEs to fetch the desired logs, and the format of 
the request logs is uniform. Therefore, it can save the 
resynchronization time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Comparison of resynchronization time 
Figure 14 shows the impact on system throughput 
using different logs. The resynchronization procedure 
using transaction logs may interrupt the normal 
transaction processing in the active server, since the 
transaction logs must be accessed exclusively by both the 
DB-FE 
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transaction manager (log write) and the fetcher of the 
resynchronization logs (log read) in the active server. But 
the resynchronization method using request logs doesn’t 
interrupt normal transaction processing in the “SYNC” 
DB-BEs, so no any overhead needs be added for 
resynchronization processing in the “SYNC” DB-BEs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Comparison of  transaction throughout 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper focuses on the synchronous and 
resynchronization mechanism for the heterogeneous 
databases replication under a middleware-based 
architecture. The main advantages can be gained from 
the suggested methods as following: 
• Because a replication transaction will be aborted 
only if all “SYNC” sites have voted “NO”, the 
availability of systems is greatly enhanced. 
• It always provides a consistent view to clients, 
since only the replicas in the “SYNC” sites can 
be accessed by clients.   
• The number of transactions who are aborted due 
to the temporal failures can be reduced largely 
through the transaction retry mechanism.  
• The suggested resynchronization method doesn’t 
interrupt normal transaction processing in the 
“SYNC” DB-BEs.  
• No any overhead is added for the “SYNC” DB-
BEs during resynchronization procedure. In other 
words, the DB-BEs care nothing about 
resynchronization . 
• The resynchronization procedure is independent 
of DB-BEs’ failures. That is, even if all other 
DB-BEs in the cluster have failed, the “OUT-OF-
SYNC” DB-BEs can still become “SYNC” after 
finishing the resynchronization with a DB-FE. 
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